The Stability and Growth Pact: A Delicate Balance or an Albatross?

The EU's Stability and Growth Pact tries to strike a delicate balance: it imposes the constraints on national fiscal policy that were deemed necessary to protect the new European Central Bank from outside pressures; at the same time, it allows flexibility for a counter-cyclical policy. First, we review official institutions' studies of the flexibility embedded in the Pact and find a rather strong consensus: the Pact seems likely to constrain counter-cyclical fiscal efforts in the years ahead, or at least until EU governments bring their structural deficits into balance. Then, we review conventional academic arguments that suggest a new central bank might need to be protected from external pressures, and we ask if the constraints that were actually written into the Pact are likely to be helpful in this regard. We conclude that the Pact is closer to an albatross than a delicately balanced package of necessary fiscal constraints.     

The macroeconomics of social pacts

In this paper we analyze macroeconomic interactions between trade unions, the central bank and the fiscal policymaker. We explicitly model unions’ concern for public expenditure, paving the way for an analysis of the potential gains from cooperation between the fiscal policymaker and the unions, i.e. the so-called corporatist or social pacts that have characterized economic policies in a number of European countries in the last few decades. We also highlight the profoundly different incentives generated by institutional arrangements such as the Maastricht criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact. The former has unambiguously induced more efficient outcomes; the latter is likely to backfire!     

Games of monetary and fiscal interactions in the EMU

This paper constructs various models of the EMU and ECB when member countries have different objectives. Voting in pursuit of national interest can yield moderate and stable inflation. The metaphor of Walsh-type contracts implements a monetary policy rule that averages the member countries’ most preferred rules. In a repeated relationship where a country suffering a large adverse shock can use political bargaining to subvert the ECB's commitment, the optimal rule should incorporate some flexibility to forestall that. Finally, freedom of national fiscal policies undermines the ECB's monetary commitment; this may justify fiscal constraints like the Stability and Growth Pact.     

Interactions between Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules

The Fiscal Stability Pact for EMU implies that constraints on fiscal policy facilitate inflation control. In this paper we identify two stable policy regimes. When monetary policy seeks to raise real interest rates in response to excess inflation, a self-stabilising fiscal policy is required to ensure model stability. A fiscal policy which does not, by itself, ensure fiscal solvency constrains monetary policy to be relatively 'passive'. However, in simulations we conclude that the central bank does not need to seek, on this account, the degree of debt stabilisation that appears to be implied by the fiscal stability pact.     

New constitutional “debt brakes” for Euroland? A question of institutional complementarity

Despite the EU Stability & Growth Pact and existing constitutional limits on public deficit/debt at the (sub)national level in many EU member countries, in the wake of the 2010 Greek bailout, many politicians and policy advisors have proposed new constitutional “debt brakes” to prevent future fiscal crises and bailouts. This paper puts a question mark behind this popular policy recommendation. Public choice scholars and other critical observers have repeatedly emphasised that constitutional deficit/debt limits are not per se credible commitments to run a sound fiscal policy in the future. To demonstrate this, design defects of such fiscal constraints are usually pointed out (no politically independent control, no sanctions, etc.). Going beyond this standard approach of credibility assessment, this paper argues for taking the issue of institutional complementarity seriously. To assess its credibility, one has to not only examine the design of a deficit/debt limit but also the institutional environment (tax/expenditure policy, capital market, etc.) in which such a constitutional commitment is embedded.     

OPTIMAL CONTRACTS FOR CENTRAL BANKERS AND PUBLIC DEBT POLICY*

We consider how the second‐best allocation corresponding to an optimal rule under the policy commitment of a central bank and a fiscal authority with a consolidated government budget constraint can be achieved, even though these authorities are unable to commit themselves to their optimal policies and ignore the strategic interaction between their policies. Our results show that the best practical institutional arrangement is to have an instrument‐independent central bank that controls the money supply to determine the rate of inflation and commits itself to an inflation target that depends on fiscal variables.     

The impact of the European Union fiscal rules on economic growth

This paper analyses whether Maastricht and Stability and Growth Pact fiscal rules have affected growth in the European Union negatively. A growth equation is specified for a group of 15 European Union countries (and 8 OECD countries) over the period 1970-2005 to analyse this issue. Panel estimations using fixed-effects, pooled mean group and system-GMM estimators show that the institutional changes that occurred in the European Union after 1992 were not harmful to growth. Moreover, results show that growth is slightly higher in the period in which the fulfilment of the 3% criteria for the deficit started to be officially assessed, i.e. after 1997.     

Simulation Analysis of Public Debt and Fiscal Deficit in Austria – Optimal Economic Policies for the Past and the Future

The macroeconometric simulation model AMOD1 and the optimization algorithm OPTCON are used to evaluate fiscal policies for Austria since the late seventies. In particular, the question of optimal (debt stabilizing) fiscal policies for the past and for the future is analyzed within the framework of a medium-scaled simulation model. The first set of optimization experiments aims to assess optimal fiscal policies for debt stabilization for the historical period 1978–2000 while trying to maintain reasonable growth rates of approximately 2 percent of real GDP. Optimal values of the instruments and the targets are compared to empirical data for Austria. A second set of simulations calculates optimal paths for the fiscal instruments for the period 2001-2010, particularly with respect to the criteria of the Stability and Growth Pact, which is mandatory for member states of the Euro zone.     

Have the euro area and EU governance worked? Just the facts

We test whether the two key EU and euro area economic governance pillars, the Stability and Growth Pact and the Lisbon Strategy, have had any impact on macroeconomic outcomes. We test this proposition on a panel of 27, some of which are non-EU (control group) using a programme evaluation approach. The impact of the EU economic governance pillars is evaluated based on both the performance before and after their application as well as against the control group. We find strong and robust evidence that neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the Lisbon Strategy have had a significant beneficial impact on fiscal and economic performance outcomes. We conclude that a profound reform of these pillars is needed to make them work in the next decade.     

Strategies for Fiscal Reform in the Context of the EMU: the Case of Portugal

The authors use an endogenous growth dynamic general‐equilibrium model, which accommodates the institutional constraints of the Stability and Growth Pact, to study tax reform in Portugal. Simulation results suggest that tax cuts financed in a nondistortionary way increase long‐term GDP; i.e., they are efficiency improving, but do not always increase welfare. The tradeoff between efficiency and welfare is alleviated when reductions in public spending or increased public indebtedness finance the tax cuts. Since these mechanisms are not realistic under the institutional setting of the Stability and Growth Pact, tax reform in Portugal must involve trading off distortionary tax margins. In this case, the best strategy to increase both efficiency and welfare is to increase investment tax credits and finance them either through personal income taxes or through employers’ social security contributions.     

No Credit for Transition: European Institutions and German Unemployment

The Stability and Growth Pact, adopted by members of the European Union,imposes tight limits on government deficits. But since the collapse of Communism,Europe has been faced with the problems of economies in transition: and reunifiedGermany—the leading economy of the EU—combines a prosperous western stateand an eastern economy in the process of transition. In a model where unions play akey role in wage bargaining and transition imposes a substantial burden on thenational budget, we analyze the implications of balancing the budget for the path ofunemployment. Where high but temporary costs are financed by raising taxes onemployment to satisfy the Stability and Growth Pact, then the title is a misnomer:relative to a policy of `tax smoothing', the pact increases unemployment and slowsgrowth. In designing fiscal rules for Europe, the benefits of tax smoothing must beweighed in the balance along with the virtues of fiscal discipline.     

The Economic Agenda: a View from the US

The paper surveys the agenda needed to restore noninflationary growth in industrial countries. The role of fiscal policy as short‐run stimulus both on the spending side and on the tax side is discussed. The author comments on trade, specifically the new trade round, and international finance. Long‐run fiscal imbalances due to aging are analyzed. The role of fiscal institutions such as the European Growth and Stability Pact, the Japanese bad‐loan problem, and structural problems are put into the perspective that advanced economies should nurture their reforms globally so as to provide successful examples of reforms and prove helpful trading partners.     

Policy-making in EMU: strategies, rules and discretion

Six years into the successful operation of European economic and monetary union (EMU), the conduct of the single monetary policy and of national economic policies and the interaction between them continue to be debated by both academics and policy-makers. This paper approaches the debate by assessing the role that strategies, rules and discretion play in the conduct of economic policies in the euro area. From this perspective, it discusses in particular the monetary policy strategy of the European Central Bank (ECB), the rules-based framework for national fiscal policies as laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact and the structural reform efforts under the umbrella of the Lisbon Strategy. It concludes that the current policy framework - with its combination of strategies, rules and constrained discretion - is well suited to deliver stability and growth in Europe, provided it is implemented effectively.     

Can the ECB be Truly Independent? Should It Be?

Most of the literature on the independence of the Central Bank assumes only one policy instrument is available: monetary policy. If we introduce fiscal policy as well, when preferences may differ among policy-makers, the situation is radically different. In this case fiscal policy will substantially weaken the impact of the Central Bank's actions, and may annihilate them altogether. The Stability Pact may then be a liability, instead of an asset, because it renders both policies impotent (even if credible). We examine whether there is any incentive to retain monetary policy independence; and whether accountability can and should be used to ensure fiscal and monetary policies support each other, rather than undermine each other.     

Co-ordinating Stability: Some Remarks on the Roles of Monetary and Fiscal Policy under EMU

The launch of Monetary Union in Europe has prompted calls for enhanced policy co-ordination among economic policy-makers. This paper sounds a note of caution and argues that the problem of policy co-ordination needs to be placed in the broader context of the efficient assignment of tasks and responsibilities among separate actors. In the presence of incentive and information problems, overly ambitious attempts at EXPLICIT forms of policy co-ordination may actually turn out to undermine the IMPLICIT co-ordination properties of the clear division of responsibilities enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty. A single monetary policy that is credibly geared to the maintenance of price stability and national fiscal policies that genuinely accept the constraints of the Stability and Growth Pact already go a long way in securing macroeconomic stability. Additional channels for dialogue among policymakers should be helpful to the extent that they enhance the understanding of individual responsibilities and do not dilute accountability.     

The dynamic effects of monetary policy and government spending shocks on unemployment in the peripheral Euro area countries

In this paper we study the response of unemployment to monetary policy and government spending shocks in the peripheral Euro-area countries. By applying the structural near-VAR methodology, we jointly model area-wide and national variables. Our main finding is that fiscal multipliers vary across countries and the results are consistent with the prediction of the standard New Keynesian model only in Italy and Greece. Instead, in Ireland, Portugal and Spain increases in government spending are recessionary. Thus we find that Keynesian results of fiscal policy seem to prevail in high public-debt countries, whereas non-Keynesian outcomes seem to characterize high private-debt countries. As for the monetary policy shock, we find that it plays an important role, jointly with the other area-wide shocks, as a long-term driver of national unemployment.     

Independence Before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design

Abstract. The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two‐stage game between the government and the central bank. In the first stage the government chooses the institutional design of the central bank. Monetary and fiscal policy are implemented in the second stage. When fiscal policy is taken into account, there is a continuum of combinations of central bank independence and conservatism that produce optimal outcomes. This indeterminacy is resolved by appealing to practical considerations. In particular, it is argued that full central bank independence facilitates the greatest degree of policy transparency and political coherence.     

ACCRUAL BUDGETING AND FISCAL CONSOLIDATION IN THE EMU

Drawing on modern macroeconomic literature focusing on the study of politico-institutional determinants of public policies, this article analyzes the institutional design of the European fiscal policy laid down by the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Stability and Growth Pact. Both documents provide countries in the EU, and in particular those that have adopted the euro, with a common code of fiscal conduct that is expected to uphold discipline in the management of government finances. Nevertheless, a simple review of this code of conduct shows the existence of serious drawbacks mainly derived from the asymmetry between the treatment given to outcomes of fiscal policy in comparison with that given to the procedures followed in generating them. It seems that the current design of the European fiscal coordination system does not really take into account the findings of modern macroeconomics and does not pay due attention to the relation between budgetary processes/institutions and outcomes in fiscal policy. Moreover, this article argues that in the implementation of the broad reforms needed to achieve a sustainable fiscal consolidation, there are political complementarities (in the sense that the ability to gain political consent for one reform depends on the acceptance of other reforms) between the setting up of new fiscal policies of expenditure containment and new fiscal procedures.
All in all, this analysis points to a sorely needed procedural reform in public sector budgeting as the best contribution to pursuing the stabilization of European public finances: the fuller use of accrual concepts in budget reporting. Much more than an isolated technical exercise, the shift to accrual budgeting could be quite a useful tool to facilitate wider reforms aimed at improving public sector financial management and performance while enhancing transparency and accountability.     

Patching up the Pact

The paper considers the implications for the EU accession candidates of Central and Eastern Europe of the fiscal‐financial constraints imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact and the Maastricht Treaty. Our findings apply also to those current EU members whose initial conditions (e.g., infrastructure and progress in state pension reform) or other structural characteristics (e.g., demographic structure, growth potential, Balassa‐Samuelson equilibrium real exchange rate appreciation) differ significantly from the EU average. We find the existing criteria to be seriously flawed and propose an alternative rule, the Permanent Balance Rule, based on a strong form of tax smoothing.     

Estimating the effects of coordinated fiscal actions in the euro area

We estimate spillover effects of a fiscal shock in one member country in the euro area on outputs of the rest of the members, using a global vector autoregression (GVAR) model. We compare the effects of a domestic fiscal shock with those of a similar size area-wide shock expressed as a weighted average of the fiscal shocks across all member countries. According to our estimates, the impact of an area-wide fiscal shock on output of a member country tends to be positive and larger than that of a domestic shock. Since the cost of participating in the area-wide shock is lower than the cost of a similar size domestic shock, our finding indicates the importance of coordinated fiscal actions in the euro area.