合谋激励与国有商业银行改革

作为一个典型的企业组织,商业银行面临一个多重代理问题,代理人合谋是团队道德风险的主要形式。本文利用多重代理的理论分析框架和大量事实证明,国有商业银行合谋问题非常严重。文章最后从反合谋角度提出国有商业银行改革的若干建议,包括建立合格股东和董事会把公司的经营管理权交给出资人和出资人的代表、实行组织机构精简与分拆上市(而非总体上市)、强化规则和股东权力并弱化总行和分行自由处置权、引入期权激励大幅提高银行管理层收入、银行内部组织结构更扁平化并适当授权给分行、建立提高员工参与程度的机制等。     

Can Employee Stock Options Contribute to Less Risk-Taking?

The executive compensation literature presumes that shareholders offer risk-averse managers stock options to entice them to take on more risk, resulting in riskier investment decisions and thus a greater return on investment. However, recent empirical work challenges this assumption, and theoretical research even argues that high levels of option-based compensation for generally under-diversified managers may actually lead to greater risk aversion. We evaluate the incentive structure of employee stock options by examining the level of R&D investment and the return on that investment conditional on the portfolio “vega,” which captures the sensitivity of option value to stock price volatility. Our results suggest that both investment in R&D and the return on R&D, as measured by future earnings and patent awards, varies concavely with vega. That is, low to moderate levels of vega correspond to increasing investment in and returns on R&D, consistent with vega inducing more profitable investments, but marginal returns decline as vega increases. Collectively, these results, bolstered by several supplemental analyses, suggest that this surprising relation between vega and risky investment is driven by greater risk aversion at higher levels of vega. Overall, our results imply that employee stock options may not always align the incentives of managers and shareholders.     

Decomposition of Fraud‐Risk Assessments and Auditors' Sensitivity to Fraud Cues*

Practitioners and regulators are concerned that when auditors perceive management's attitude or character as indicative of low fraud risk, they are not sufficiently sensitive to high levels of incentive or opportunity risks in their overall fraud‐risk assessments. In this study, we examine whether a fraud‐triangle decomposition of fraud‐risk assessments (that is, separately assessing attitude, opportunity, and incentive risks prior to assessing overall fraud risk) increases auditors' sensitivity to opportunity and incentive cues when perceptions of management's attitude suggest low fraud risk. In an experiment with 52 practicing audit managers, we find that auditors who decompose fraud‐risk assessments are more sensitive to opportunity and incentive cues when making their overall assessments than auditors who simply make an overall fraud‐risk assessment. However, this increased sensitivity to opportunity and incentive cues appears to happen only when those cues suggest low fraud risk. When opportunity and incentive cues suggest high fraud risk, auditors are equally sensitive to those cues whether they use a decomposition or a holistic approach. We discuss and examine potential explanations for this finding.     

对农村信用社高管人员激励与监管的博弈分析

农村信用社资产所有者与其高级管理人员之间关于规避道德风险（隐藏行动）的博弈，实质是高级管理人员激励机制的设计。激励机制要求农村信用社向高级管理人员让渡一部分利润。金融监管机构与农村信用社高级管理人员之间在监管行为上存在静态的非重复博弈，最优的监管概率和违规概率是一种混合策略纳什均衡。只有同时通过激励机制和监管机制，才能有效规避农村信用社高级管理人员的道德风险和违规行为。     

推进农业银行农户小额信贷发展的策略研究

农业银行发展农户小额信贷,是发展现代农业,建设社会主义新农村,完成小康社会建设中必须解决的重大课题。推进农业银行农户小额信贷发展,需要准确定位小额信贷业务、完善小额信贷制度;建立良好的信用环境,增强农户合作意识;组建信贷员队伍、完善激励机制;放开利率管制,发挥市场作用;完善风险评估体系,构建风险管理体系等策略。     

中国农业发展银行对农村金融市场的供给

中国农业发展银行的业务范围和规模已经有了较大的增长,但还存在着管理理念滞后、激励约束机制不够完善等制约其发展的因素。未来发展中,农发行应当坚持其以政策性业务为主的战略定位,进一步缩短管理链条、调整贷款结构、更新思想观念,并强化人力资源建设或硬件设施建设。     

股权激励,到底是谁的“盛宴”?——对上市公司高管辞职套现行为的反思

最近一年多来,上市公司高管辞职套现的事件不断出现。这类现象的发生,一方面在于股票市场的低效和相关政策法规存在漏洞,更根本的是在于公司股权激励机制的不完善。要防范此类行为,首先必须要完善股权激励机制,强化激励机制的约束性,此外还需健全法制法规和培养成熟的股票市场。     

上市银行公司治理结构对高管薪酬影响研究

合理的薪酬方案能实现有效地激励上市银行高管,其薪酬方案由银行董事会制定,与上市银行治理结构息息相关。上市银行高管薪酬与国家股的比例、股权集中度、独立董事人数以及董事会、监事会会议成正比;而与法人股的比重成反比;至于监管代理机构的规模则基本没影响。上市银行公司治理结构中的一些约束与控制性因素需要进一步完善,从而促进银行业的健康发展。     

多元化、管理层激励与企业绩效──基于中国上市公司面板数据的实证检验

文章在参考企业多元化的代理理论文献研究基础上,首先在分析计量模型中控制了管理层激励对公司多元化战略的影响,避免了遗漏变量对估计的影响,其次,采用了面板数据的固定效应模型来估计多元化折价效应,进一步控制企业异质性的影响。计量模型结果显示企业绩效与多元化负相关,与管理层激励正相关。     

Credit Ratings and CEO Risk‐Taking Incentives

This study examines the sophistication of rating agencies in incorporating managerial risk‐taking incentives into their credit risk evaluation. We measure risk‐taking incentives using two proxies: the sensitivity of managerial wealth to stock return volatility (vega) and the sensitivity of managerial wealth to stock price (delta). We find that rating agencies impound managerial risk‐taking incentives in their credit risk assessments. Assuming other things equal, a one standard deviation increase in vega (delta) will lead to an approximately one‐notch (two‐notch) rating downgrade. In addition, we evaluate the significance of credit ratings in the design of CEO compensation. Our findings suggest that rating‐troubled firms will gear down managerial incentives of risk seeking. In particular, other things equal, a rating downgrade to the lower edge of the investment category (i.e., BBB?) in the immediate prior year will bring about an approximately 51 percent reduction of vega incentive from options newly granted to the CEO in the current year. However, we find no evidence that firms' rating concerns significantly affect delta. Given the significance of credit ratings in the marketplace and their close connection to accounting, the findings of the current study advance our understanding, not only of how sophisticated rating agencies are in incorporating forward‐looking information (i.e., vega and delta) into risk assessments, but of how influential the raters are in changing firms' compensation policies. The findings also have implications on the role of accounting in constraining excessive managerial risk taking with improved disclosures on managerial compensation.     

从招商银行收购永隆银行看中国银行业的“走出去”

文章从招商银行收购永隆银行事件切入,分析我国主要商业银行进行境外扩张途径,指出目前我国商业银行海外发展两大主要方式,即海外自设分支机构、经营网络和通过并购快速取得海外金融机构资源。最后指出海外并购是我国商业银行实现国际化经营的主要方式,但要根据当地实际监管政策,适当采取自设分支机构方式。     

股权激励与民营教育机构薪酬制度创新

民营教育机构普遍存在员工流失率高的难题。在奖金补贴等常规激励措施效果日见衰减的态势下,借鉴当前民营企业激励机制建设与改革的一些成功经验,发挥自身体制优势,尝试股权激励的薪酬制度创新,不失为民营教育机构稳定和提升师资队伍质量、破解人力资源建设难题的有效路径。     

浙江省民营企业激励机制研究

随着中国加入世界贸易组织和跨国公司进入中国市场的步伐加快,浙江省民营企业将面临巨大的挑战。而浙江省民营企业如何建立完善的企业激励机制,避免企业人力资源的流失也就被提到了记事日程。文章首先阐述了浙江民营企业激励机制的现状,指出浙江民营企业激励机制改革的必要性     

Redefining and Containing Systemic Risk

Official definitions of systemic risk leave out the role of government officials in generating it. Policymakers’ support of creative forms of risk-taking and their proclivity for absorbing losses in crisis situations encourage opportunistic firms to foster and exploit incentive conflicts within the supervisory sector. To restore faith in the diligence, competence, and integrity of officials responsible for managing the financial safety net, reforms need to rework incentives in the government and financial sectors. The goal should be to align the incentives of private risk managers, accountants, credit-rating firms, and government supervisors with those of ordinary taxpayers. This article describes a series of complementary ways of advancing toward this goal. The most important steps would be to measure regulatory performance in terms of its effect on the loss exposures that the safety net passes through to taxpayers and to require institutions that benefit from the net to produce information that would support this effort. This entails estimating the explicit and implicit safety-net benefits individual institutions receive and issuing extended-liability securities whose prices would improve the accuracy of these estimates.     

基于违约成本的银行信贷风险管理

银行贷款的风险管理是关系到整个金融系统稳定的重大问题。本文利用logit方法以及人民银行提供的信贷数据库,根据相关的变量建立模型,并分析了该模型对贷款违约的预测能力。与以前的研究不同,我们的研究着重考虑了违约成本在贷款决策中影响,给予一类、二类错误不同的权重,这样的预测模型能更好地符合银行实际操作的需求。本文的研究也可以作为银行内部风险管理的参考。     

Accounting Conservatism and Stock Price Crash Risk: Firm‐level Evidence

Using a large sample of U.S. firms during 1964–2007, we find that conditional conservatism is associated with a lower likelihood of a firm's future stock price crashes. This finding holds for multiple measures of conditional conservatism and crash risk and is robust to controlling for other known determinants of crash risk and firm‐fixed effects. Moreover, we find that the relation between conservatism and crash risk is more pronounced for firms with higher information asymmetry. Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that conditional conservatism limits managers’ incentive and ability to overstate performance and hide bad news from investors, which, in turn, reduces stock price crash risk.     

Rules versus discretion in Central Bank communication

We propose a theoretical framework to study Central Bank communication and to assess the benefits of commitment to a disclosure rule. Our model features a coordination environment, where agents have dispersed private information and their interests are not aligned with those of the Central Bank. Public information can lead to undesirable coordination among agents. We show that anything goes when the Central Bank cannot commit; both its most and least preferred outcomes can be supported in equilibrium, and so can anything in between. We find that commitment does not necessarily implement the Central Bank's most preferred outcome. However, the Central Bank can avoid the least desirable outcomes by choosing an information structure with only two messages that act as action recommendations for agents. Furthermore, our results suggest a higher correlation between fundamentals and outcomes under commitment.     

考虑讨价还价和经理能力的有效激励研究

在委托代理理论中,由于委托人与代理人各自追求自身利益的最大化,且他们之间存在着信息不对称、契约不完备等不确定性因素,委托人应对代理人进行有效的激励和引导,使其充分发挥自身的能力,达到企业业绩最优。本文建立了一个动态的经理激励合同设计模型,假设经理在完成第一期任务后,可以与委托人重新谈判,进而对经理的有效激励问题进行了研究。根据计算和分析得出,经理能否得到满意的固定薪酬对经理人的行为选择和企业的长期业绩有重要的影响。     

Robustness of Forecasting Financial Crises in Emerging Market Economies with Data Revisions—A Note

Data revisions routinely introduced by the World Bank can lead to significant revisions in empirical results. We show this by re-estimating our aggregate indicator for predicting the 1997 Asian crisis utilizing the 1999 and 2004 updates of the 1996 World Bank data and comparing these results to those we obtained (this Journal, 2000) for predicting the same event using the original, unrevised, 1996 World Bank data. Since most data-gathering organizations routinely revise their data, this may represent a much greater problem for policy makers than might be recognized.     

Incentive Contract Design and Employee-Initiated Innovation: Evidence from the Field*

This study examines how the design of incentive contracts for tasks defined as workers' official responsibilities (i.e., standard tasks) influences workers' propensity to engage in employee-initiated innovation (EII). EII corresponds to innovation activities that are not formally assigned to workers but are nonetheless encouraged and considered to be important for the company's success. Like other extra-role behaviors, EII is difficult to incentivize directly. Therefore, it is important to understand whether and how explicit incentive contracts designed for the workers' standard tasks may indirectly influence their EII activity. We use field data from a manufacturing company that uses a dedicated information system to track workers' EII idea submissions. We find theory-consistent evidence that, compared to workers receiving fixed pay, employees rewarded for their standard tasks with variable compensation contracts exhibit a lower propensity to engage in EII. This result is concentrated among ideas benefiting other constituents and activities beyond the proponents' standard task (i.e., broad-scope ideas). In contrast, we find no difference attributable to standard task incentive design in the proposal of innovation ideas narrowly focused on the proponent's standard task (i.e., narrow-scope ideas). Our findings suggest that variable pay narrows employees' conceptual focus around the standard task and hinders employee engagement in broad-scope innovation activities compared to fixed compensation contracts. We contribute to the literature on incentives for innovation by showing that standard task compensation contracts have spillover effects on EII behavior. We also contribute to the nascent literature on EII by showing that innovation types, defined based on their relation with the proponent's standard task, matter. Our results are relevant for practitioners in that managers relying on variable pay contracts to incentivize standard task performance should expect lower employee engagement in broad-scope EII.