Input–output interactions and optimal monetary policy

This paper deals with the implications of factor demand linkages for monetary policy design in a two-sector dynamic general equilibrium model. Part of the output of each sector serves as a production input in both sectors, in accordance with a realistic input–output structure. Strategic complementarities induced by factor demand linkages significantly alter the transmission of shocks and amplify the loss of social welfare under optimal monetary policy, compared to what is observed in standard two-sector models. The distinction between value added and gross output that naturally arises in this context is of key importance to explore the welfare properties of the model economy. A flexible inflation targeting regime is close to optimal only if the central bank balances inflation and value added variability. Otherwise, targeting gross output variability entails a substantial increase in the loss of welfare.     

Indexed versus nominal government debt under inflation and price-level targeting

This paper presents a DSGE model in which long run inflation risk matters for social welfare. Optimal indexation of long-term government debt is studied under two monetary policy regimes: inflation targeting (IT) and price-level targeting (PT). Under IT, full indexation is optimal because long run inflation risk is substantial due to base-level drift, making indexed bonds a better store of value than nominal bonds. Under PT, where long run inflation risk is largely eliminated, optimal indexation is substantially lower because nominal bonds become a relatively better store of value. These results are robust to the PT target horizon, imperfect credibility of PT and model calibration, but the assumption that indexation is lagged is crucial. A key finding from a policy perspective is that indexation has implications for welfare comparisons of IT and PT.     

TOWARDS SOUND MONETARY INSTITUTIONS

Most people see money and central banking as shrouded by an impenetrable veil of mystery, as matters that ought to be delegated to expert economists in central banks. Yet the actual performance of central banks has been less than stellar. And there are good reasons to expect unchecked, discretionary monetary policy by central bankers to produce less‐than‐perfect results. Not only do central bankers not have the right incentives and knowledge to make beneficial discretionary decisions, but the economy does not always behave in a predictable fashion, reacting as an automaton to discretionary policy shifts. A market‐based monetary arrangement – such as Friedrich von Hayek's free banking proposal – would be preferable to a national or supranational monopoly on the issue of money. If such an arrangement is not attainable, then it is desirable, at the very least, that the behaviour of central bankers is constrained by rules, such as nominal income growth targets.     

Monetary policy,financial uncertainty,and secular stagnation

A monetary policy framework describing how to cope with a financial crisis might alleviate a recession; however, it might also result in subsequent secular stagnation. Based on an empirical New Keynesian model with financial uncertainty, this study investigates how monetary policy can avoid sluggish economic recovery in response to financial shocks. The results show that a protracted sluggish response of an output gap to a financial shock is triggered by inflation targeting, without considering interest rate variations. In such a policy, the uncertainty causes additional sluggish behavior after a sharp reduction in the output gap. In contrast, in a speed limit policy, the output gap recovers rapidly, regardless of the central bank’s approach to interest rate variations, and the uncertainty mitigates reductions in the output gap. Finally, the results are robust under several alternative settings.     

Optimal monetary policy under incomplete markets and aggregate uncertainty: A long-run perspective

This paper examines the role of monetary policy in an environment with aggregate risk and incomplete markets. In a two-period overlapping-generations model with aggregate uncertainty, optimal monetary policy attains the ex-ante Pareto optimal allocation. This policy aims to stabilize the savings rate in the economy by changing real returns of nominal bonds via variation in expected inflation. Optimal expected inflation is procylical and on average higher than without uncertainty. Simple inflation targeting rules closely approximate the optimal monetary policy.     

On the desirability of nominal GDP targeting

This paper evaluates the welfare properties of nominal GDP targeting in the context of a New Keynesian model with both price and wage rigidity. In particular, we compare nominal GDP targeting to inflation and output gap targeting as well as to a conventional Taylor rule. These comparisons are made on the basis of welfare losses relative to a hypothetical equilibrium with flexible prices and wages. Output gap targeting is the most desirable of the rules under consideration, but nominal GDP targeting performs almost as well. Nominal GDP targeting is associated with smaller welfare losses than a Taylor rule and significantly outperforms inflation targeting. Relative to inflation targeting and a Taylor rule, nominal GDP targeting performs best conditional on supply shocks and when wages are sticky relative to prices. Nominal GDP targeting may outperform output gap targeting if the gap is observed with noise, and has more desirable properties related to equilibrium determinacy than does gap targeting.     

Deviations from rules-based policy and their effects

Rules-based monetary policy evaluation has long been central to macroeconomics. Using the original Taylor rule, a modified Taylor rule with a higher output gap coefficient, and an estimated Taylor rule, we define rules-based and discretionary eras by smaller and larger policy rule deviations, the absolute value of the difference between the actual federal funds rate and the federal funds rate prescribed by the three rules. We use tests for multiple structural changes to identify the eras so that knowledge of subsequent economic outcomes cannot influence the choice of the dates. With the original Taylor rule, monetary policy in the U.S. is characterized by a rules-based era until 1974, a discretionary era from 1974 to 1985, a rules-based era from 1985 to 2000, and a discretionary era from 2001 to 2013. With the modified Taylor rule, the rules-based era extends further into the 1970s and there is an additional rules-based period starting in 2006. We calculate various loss functions and find that economic performance is uniformly better during rules-based eras than during discretionary eras, and that the original Taylor rule provides the largest loss during discretionary periods relative to loss during rules-based periods.     

Asset price targeting in an open economy with cognitive limitations: The best for macroeconomic and financial stability?

The choices of policy targets and the formation of agent expectations have been critical issues addressed by monetary policy management since the financial crisis of 2008. This paper evaluates macroeconomic stability in a new Keynesian open economy in which agents experience both cognitive limitations and asset market volatility. The (im)perfect credibility of various monetary policies (e.g., a Taylor-type rule with- or without asset price targeting, strict domestic inflation targeting, strict CPI inflation targeting, and exchange rate peg) may lead agents to react according to their expectation rules, and thus create various degrees of booms and busts in output and inflation. Simulations confirm that a Taylor-type CPI inflation targeting including an asset price target is the best choice. In contrast, the business cycles induced by Keynesian “animal spirits” are enhanced by strict inflation targeting. Furthermore, a credible exchange rate pegging system with an international reserve pooling arrangement can improve social welfare and stability in an open economy, even though its absolute value of the loss function is slightly lower than a Taylor-type CPI inflation targeting including an asset price target.     

STABILISATION POLICY,RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS AND PRICE‐LEVEL VERSUS INFLATION TARGETING: A SURVEY

We survey literature comparing inflation targeting (IT) and price‐level targeting (PT) as macroeconomic stabilisation policies. Our focus is on New Keynesian models and areas that have seen significant developments since Ambler's (2009, Price‐level targeting and stabilisation policy: a survey. Journal of Economic Surveys 23(5): 974–997) survey: optimal monetary policy; the zero lower bound; financial frictions and transition costs of adopting a PT regime. Ambler's conclusion that PT improves social welfare in New Keynesian models is fairly robust, but we note an interesting split in the literature: PT consistently outperforms IT in models where policymakers commit to simple Taylor‐type rules, but results in favour of PT when policymakers minimise loss functions are overturned with small deviations from the baseline model. Since the beneficial effects of PT appear to hang on the joint assumption that agents are rational and the economy New Keynesian, we discuss survey and experimental evidence on rational expectations and the applied macro literature on the empirical performance of New Keynesian models. Overall, the evidence is not clear‐cut, but we note that New Keynesian models can pass formal statistical tests against macro data and that models with rational expectations outperform those with behavioural expectations (i.e. heuristics) in direct statistical tests. We therefore argue that policymakers should continue to pay attention to PT.     

通货膨胀目标制:加拿大银行的政策实践与启示

在加拿大的通货膨胀目标制政策框架下,中央银行定期向公众宣布政策通货膨胀目标,然后根据通货膨胀预测值与政策目标之间的差距来确定调控方向;在实践中,加拿大银行通过使用利率操作区间和公告操作,从而很好地实现了对市场流动性及短期利率目标的调控,进而影响到市场主体的经济决策,并最终成功实现了实际通货膨胀率稳定地波动在中央银行的目标范围内。基于此,我国有必要借鉴加拿大银行的做法,建立一个更为简单透明的政策操作框架,以保证货币政策操作的效果。     

New monetarism with endogenous product variety and monopolistic competition

I examine the role played by endogenous variety and monopolistic competition in the long-run transmission of monetary policy. I integrate free entry, product variety and monopolistic competition into a New Monetarist framework, considering preferences that give rise to either constant or variable markups. I find that inflation generally reduces variety. Under CES preferences, firms are inefficiently small, with the inefficiency increasing with product differentiation and the extent of search frictions. The Friedman rule is the best policy under CES preferences. In contrast, with variable elasticity of demand, inflation can increase firm size, reduce markups, and raise welfare, even though output is lower. Under CES preferences, the welfare cost of inflation is high; moreover, this cost increases monotonically with the markup and is higher with endogenous variety than with a fixed product space.     

Should the monetary policy rule be different in a financial crisis?

This article reviews the finding that standard loss functions in output and inflation are higher during discretionary periods than in periods during which monetary policy is described by a rule, such as the Taylor rule. It shows that the finding is consistent with earlier research, but argues that we really do not know if the Taylor rule would have improved performance during the recent financial crisis. The article then considers modifications of policy rules to deal with changes in interest rate spreads, credit aggregates and banks׳ balance sheets.     

Political Macroeconomics: A Survey of Recent Developments

The paper surveys political macroeconomics, covering its development from Rogoff's conservative central banker to the most recent discussions of monetary policy and institutional design. Topics include the inflation-stabilization trade-off, central bank independence with escape clauses and overruling with costs, inflation targets, performance contracts for monetary authorities, and the consequences of output persistence for these issues. Further topics are the political business cycle when output is persistent, the political macroeconomics of fiscal policy, the government spending bias, and the game-theoretic interaction between fiscal and monetary policy. All work is discussed within a coherent analytical framework.     

Targeting and political support for welfare spending

This paper investigates the political support for social assistance policies in a model in which incomes are stochastic (so that welfare policies have an insurance benefit) and unequal ex ante (so that welfare policies have a redistributive effect). With self-interested voting, narrow targeting may so reduce the probability of receiving benefits for the majority that the majority prefers to eliminate benefits altogether, even though the cost of narrowly targeted benefits is close to zero. In contrast, a majority of self-interested voters always supports positive welfare benefits when the policy is targeted sufficiently broadly. If voters are somewhat altruistic, the impact of targeting on political support for welfare spending diminishes but does not disappear. Received: July 1999 / Accepted: May 30, 2000     

Tests of the money-output relation using disaggregated data

Either anticipated or unanticipated money affects output in fourteen of twenty U.S. manufacturing industries. In most of these instances, however, Akaike's final prediction error criterion indicates that money enters an industry's output equation with lags of three months or less. For just two industries, tobacco manufacturing and textile mill products, are there clear indications that money is not neutral at extended lags. Each of these industries is concentrated in one or two states suggesting that monetary policy may affect output through a regional credit channel.     

Inferring monetary policy objectives with a partially observed state

Accounting for the uncertainty in real-time perceptions of the state of the economy is believed to be critical for monetary policy analysis. We investigate this claim through the lens of a New Keynesian model with optimal discretionary policy and partial information. Structural parameters are estimated using a data set that includes real-time and ex post revised observations spanning 1965–2010. In comparison to a standard complete information model, our estimates reveal that under partial information: (i) the Federal Reserve demonstrates a significant concern for stabilizing the output gap after 1979, (ii) the model׳s fit with revised data improves, and (iii) the tension between optimal and observed policy is smaller.     

Monetary Policy Rules, Policy Preferences, and Uncertainty: Recent Empirical Evidence

We survey recent empirical evidence on monetary policy rules, and find that the emphasis in the political economy literature on institutional design (e.g. central bank independence and inflation targeting) is exaggerated. Formal institutional reform seems neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the observation of shifts in monetary policy rules. However, there is no doubt that in some cases (e.g. the UK following the start of inflation targeting in 1992, and Bank of England Independence in 1997), a major shift in monetary policy conduct is detectable. We also highlight the problems in explicitly testing the predictions of the political economy literature. Semi-structural modelling approaches, such as time-varying VAR models may be more useful in understanding policy rules, and the interaction between policy shifts and changes in the transmission mechanism.     

Does trade integration alter monetary policy transmission?

This paper explores the role of trade integration—or openness—for monetary policy transmission in a medium-scale new Keynesian model. Allowing for strategic complementarities in price setting, we highlight a new dimension of the exchange rate channel by which monetary policy directly impacts domestic inflation: a monetary contraction which appreciates the exchange rate lowers the local currency price of imported goods; this, in turn, induces domestic producers to lower their prices too. We pin down key parameters of the model by matching impulse responses obtained from a vector autoregression on time series for the US relative to the euro area. Our estimation procedure yields plausible parameter values and suggests a strong role for strategic complementarities. Counterfactual simulations show that openness alters monetary transmission significantly. While the contractionary effect of a monetary policy shock on inflation and output tends to increase in openness, we find that monetary policy's control over inflation increases, as the output decline which is necessary to bring about a given reduction of inflation is smaller in more open economies.     

Monetary convergence to the Euro

This special issue of Economic Systems includes seven papers about various aspects of monetary convergence to the Euro. It includes both policy discussion papers examining a wide range of issues and empirical studies evaluating specific areas of monetary convergence. From a policy strategy view, the selected papers examine the ways of combining the two key objectives of monetary convergence, i.e., price stability and exchange rate stability. In addition, the papers analyze the interplay between monetary policies and financial market stability. The findings provide new insights on monetary policy transmission channels, market equilibrium exchange rates, interest rates pass through effects, the importance of real relative to nominal convergence, and other intricacies encountered on the passage toward the Euro.     

Note on ‘Loss of monetary discretion in a simple dynamic policy game’

Jensen (1994a) finds that loss of monetary discretion leads to lower welfare. However, by extending his model we show that if real base money holdings are relatively low, as is likely to be the case for modern economics, a zero-inflation rule may well be preferable to monetary discretion. If the emphasis on achieving the output and public spending targets falls, a zero-inflation rule is more likely to be preferred. The increased support for binding policy rules thus conforms with a less tolerant attitude towards inflation.