The Rules of the Game: Union Solicitation in the Twenty-First Century Workplace

Even though union membership has declined steadily over the last 20 years, unions are dramatically increasing their efforts to organize the workplace. As a consequence, union solicitation drives are on the rise. While the case law in this area is relatively settled, many managers in nonunion environments are generally unfamiliar with the federal case governing union solicitations. This article examines the federal case law surrounding union solicitation and provides some practical guidelines for managerial conduct for dealing with union solicitation drives. It also discusses future directions in an interconnect world.     

Vintage human capital and learning curves

I study a vintage-human-capital model in which long-lived workers accumulate human capital following an exogenous learning curve. Different skill levels inside a vintage are complementary in production; this makes the ex ante homogeneous workers enter different vintages. The continuous-time framework allows me to study the timing decision for the technology phase-out differentially and to derive sharp characterization for wages and the distribution of workers in the dying technology. I show how to posit and solve a planner's problem and construct equilibrium in this way. Consistent with empirical evidence, I show that the experience premium is always positive but diminishes as a technology ages. The connection between workers' learning curves and the technology's progress curve is characterized.     

Characterization of bidding behavior in multi-unit auctions

This paper considers a very general class of single or multi-unit auctions of indivisible objects. The model allows for interdependent values, multidiminensional types and any attitude towards risk. Assuming only optimal behavior, we prove that each bid is chosen in order to equalize the marginal benefit to the marginal cost of bidding. This generalizes many existing results in the literature. We use this characterization to obtain sufficient conditions for truthful bidding, monotonic best reply strategies and identification results for multi-unit auctions.     

An Econometric Analysis of Polish Inflation Dynamics with Learning about Rational Expectations

Rational expectations modelling has been criticized for assuming that economic agents can learn quickly about and compute rational price expectations. In response, various authors have studied theoretical models in which economic agents use adaptive statistical rules to develop price expectations. A goal of this literature has been to compare resulting learning equilibria with rational expectations equilibria. The lack of empirical analysis in this literature suggests that adaptive learning makes otherwise linear dynamic models nonlinearly intractable for current econometric technology. In response to the lack of empirical work in this literature, this paper applies to post-1989 monthly data for Poland a new method for modelling learning about price expectations. The key idea of the method is to modify Cagan’s backward-looking adaptive-expectations hypothesis about the way expectations are actually updated to a forward-looking characterization which instead specifies the result of learning. It says that, whatever the details of how learning actually takes places, price expectations are expected to converge geometrically to rationality. The method is tractable because it involves linear dynamics. The paper contributes substantively by analyzing the recent Polish inflation, theoretically by characterizing learning, and econometrically by using learning as a restriction for identifying (i.e., estimating wth finite variance) unobserved price expectations with the Kalman filter. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The Optimal Size of a Religious Congregation: An Economic Theory of Clubs Analysis

The economic theory of clubs model is applied to determine the optimal size of a religious congregation. The optimal size is specified to be where total contributions are maximized. This occurs where the marginal benefits of adding a new member (in terms of contributions gained from that new member) equal the marginal costs of that new member (in terms of contributions lost from existing members). Benefits from adding members include enhanced fellowship opportunities and the spreading of fixed costs across a broader base. Costs include the congestion of facilities and a greater tendency to free ride. The model is empirically tested for four denominations. The average Catholic parish is found to be much larger than its optimal size, while the average Episcopalian, Lutheran, and Methodist congregations are all found to be smaller than their optimal size.     

On the interpretation of cointegration in the linear–quadratic inventory model

The traditional formulation of the linear–quadratic inventory model with unit roots predicts cointegration between inventories and sales. That formulation implies that marginal production costs and the marginal benefits of inventories are both tending to ∞, and the cointegrating coefficient reflects the optimal trade-off between these competing factors. This paper suggests a reformulation of the problem in which marginal production costs and marginal inventory benefits are both stationary and in which the cointegrating coefficient is the same as the value that characterizes the target inventory level in the cost function.     

Learning by doing,endogenous discounting and economic development

In this paper, we focus on a growth model where the discount rate is decreasing in capital accumulation and endogenous growth is made possible through learning by doing, knowledge accumulation being a by-product of gross investment. In such a model, the utility function has to be restricted to take positive values implying that the elasticity of marginal utility is lower than one. The presence of endogenous discounting generates a steady-state of stagnation which can be saddle-path stable or unstable depending on the marginal productivity of knowledge. In the case of long run growth, the fact that the elasticity of marginal utility is lower than one implies the existence of two asymptotic balanced growth paths: the one with the higher growth rate being a saddle point while the one with the lower growth rate not being a saddle point. We also study the optimal solution which is characterized by a unique balanced growth path. The policy consists as usual in subsidizing investment in order to internalize the externality.     

Monopoly pricing with dual-capacity constraints

This paper studies the price-setting behavior of a monopoly facing two capacity constraints: one on the number of its consumers, and the other on the amount of products it can sell. The characterization of the firm's optimal pricing and optimal customer mix as a function of its two capacities reveals a rich structure. In contrast to the results under one-dimensional capacity constraints with constant marginal cost of production, a firm may optimally respond to an exogenous reduction in one of its capacities by decreasing one of its prices. Moreover, neglecting the existence of the second capacity constraint can reverse some policy interventions' effects on consumer welfare. In particular, easing a regulatory restriction on one of the constraints may harm the average consumer.     

An empirical investigation of the roles of prior knowledge and learning activities in technology transfer

This study analyzes 120 university–industry technology transfer projects. A significant positive relationship was found between the learning activities performed by the firm during the development and implementation stages of the technology transfer project and the benefits to that firm from the project. In contrast, prior knowledge of the firm about the existing technology was found to have only a marginal contribution to the project benefits. However, further exploratory analysis based on high and low levels of technical and organizational uncertainty revealed more provocative relationships.     

模糊神经网络技术及防砂方法优选系统软件

神经网络技术是基于神经科学研究的最新成果而发展起来的边缘学科,人工神经网络的应用研究已渗透到许多领域,在石油工业中也经常见到有关的研究报道。文章介绍了神经网络知识获取、训练学习、优选过程、模糊神经网络防砂方法优选诊断系统软件及其在防砂方法优选中的应用,探讨了神经网络技术在油井出砂预测、防砂施工参数优选等方面的应用,模糊神经网络诊断系统的应用为防砂工艺的选择提供了决策依据。     

Bribery and inspection technology

The e-government movement advocates increased use of technology to improve government efficiency and reduce corruption by reducing the discretionary power of government officials. This paper studies the relationship between improvements in inspection technology within a Principal-Supervisor-Agent model, where the supervisor is an inspector who is hired by the principal to investigate the agent’s potentially illegal actions. We show that when technology increases the marginal or total productivity of the supervisor’s effort, improvements in inspection technology encourage some types of bribery. Although such technological improvements induce an equilibrium with bribery, compliance and social welfare can still rise. However, when technology and supervisory effort are sufficiently substitutable, improvements in technology may reduce compliance when bribery occurs in equilibrium even when those same technological improvements would have raised compliance in the absence of bribery. We also characterize the relationship between the principal’s socially optimal technology and the anti-corruption policy available to the principal and find that the socially optimal inspection technology may be a substitute for or a complement to the anti-corruption policy. Finally, we show that for any set of policies that optimally induces a no-bribe equilibrium, there exists another set of policies that induces an equilibrium with bribery that is pareto superior to it.     

Optimal Two‐part Pricing under Cost Uncertainty

This paper examines the optimal two‐part pricing under cost uncertainty. We consider a risk‐averse monopolistic firm that is subject to a cost shock to its constant marginal cost of production. The firm uses two‐part pricing to sell its output to a continuum of heterogeneous consumers. We show that the global and marginal effects of risk aversion on the firm's optimal two‐part pricing are to raise the unit price and lower the fixed payment. We further show that an increase in the fixed cost of production induces the firm to raise (lower) the unit price and lower (raise) the fixed payment under decreasing (increasing) absolute risk aversion. The firm's optimal two‐part pricing is unaffected by changes in the fixed cost under constant absolute risk aversion. Finally, we show that a mean‐preserving spread increase in cost uncertainty induces the firm to raise the unit price and lower the fixed payment under either decreasing or constant absolute risk aversion. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

International tenders and futures hedging

This paper examines the optimal bidding and hedging decisions of a risk‐averse firm that takes part in an international tender. The firm faces multiple sources of uncertainty: exchange rate risk, risk of an unsuccessful tender, and business risk. The firm is allowed to trade unbiased currency futures contracts to imperfectly hedge its contingent foreign exchange risk exposure. We show that the firm shorts less (more) of the unbiased futures contracts when its marginal utility function is convex (concave) as compared with the case that the marginal utility function is linear. We further show that the curvature of the marginal utility function plays a decisive role in determining the impact of currency futures hedging on the firm's bidding behavior. Sufficient conditions that ensure the firm bids more or less aggressively than in the case without hedging opportunities are derived. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On revenue recycling and the welfare effects of second-best congestion pricing in a monocentric city

This paper examines congestion taxes in a monocentric city with pre-existing labor taxation. When road toll revenue is used to finance labor tax cuts, 35% of the optimal road tax in our numerical model does not reflect marginal external congestion costs, but rather functions as a Ramsey–Mirrlees tax, i.e. an efficiency enhancing mechanism allowing for an indirect spatial differentiation of the labor tax. This adds a quite different motivation to road pricing, since welfare gains can be produced even in absence of congestion. We find that the optimal road tax is non-monotonic across space, reflecting the different impacts of labor supply elasticity and marginal utility of income, which both vary over space. The relative efficiencies of some archetype second-best pricing schemes (cordon toll, flat kilometer tax) are high (84% and 70% respectively). When road toll revenue is recycled lump-sum, the optimal toll lies below its Pigouvian level. Extensions in a bimodal framework show that the optimality of using road toll revenue to subsidize public transport depends on the initial inefficiency in public transport pricing.     

Optimal Two‐Part Pricing under Demand Uncertainty

This paper examines the pricing behavior of a risk‐averse monopolistic firm under demand uncertainty. The firm produces a single good at a constant marginal cost. To facilitate sales, the firm uses a two‐part pricing contract that includes a membership fee and a selling price per unit. The good is sold to a continuum of heterogeneous consumers who are subject to a common demand shock. We show that the global and marginal effects of risk aversion are to push the unit price closer to the constant marginal cost and to shrink the market coverage so as to limit the firm’s risk exposure to the demand uncertainty. The more risk‐averse firm as such charges a higher membership fee to consumers. We further show that an increase in the fixed cost of production induces the firm to lower (raise) the unit price, to raise (lower) the membership fee, and to shrink (enlarge) the market coverage under decreasing (increasing) absolute risk aversion. The firm’s optimal two‐part pricing contract, however, is unaffected by changes in the fixed cost under constant absolute risk aversion. Finally, we show that a mean‐preserving‐spread increase in the demand uncertainty induces the firm to lower the unit price, to raise the membership fee, and to shrink the market coverage under either decreasing or constant absolute risk aversion. The firm’s risk preferences as such play a pivotal role in determining the optimal two‐part pricing under demand uncertainty. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Technical Efficiency in a Semi-Formal Financial Sector: The Case of Mexico*

The semi-formal financial sector in Mexico is playing an increasingly important role in serving a largely poor, rural clientele. A stochastic frontier with non-monotonic marginal effects [ Wang, Journal of Productivity Analysis (2002 ), Vol. 18, pp. 241–253] reveals a wide disparity in technical efficiency levels among 190 Mexican semi-formal financial intermediaries. The results show that technology, average loan size, rural outreach and institutional age are all positively associated with technical efficiency. The marginal effects vary widely and, in some cases, the effects are non-monotonic over percentile groups. The results indicate that strengthening younger, technologically undeveloped financial institutions will have the strongest marginal benefit in revitalizing the rural financial sector.     

From mind to market: A global,dynamic analysis of R&D

Existing models of R&D are not easily reconciled with four observable aspects of R&D: initial technologies (ideas) need to be developed further, only a minority of initial ideas are successfully brought to the market, production and process innovations take place simultaneously (whereby, initially, there is no production at all), and process innovations are implemented for technologies that are destined to leave the market. We present a detailed bifurcation analysis for a dynamic model of R&D that captures these observations in one, unifying framework. As we provide a global analysis, we do not limit initial technologies to carry marginal costs that are below the choke price. We show that there always exists a critical value of initial marginal cost above which the firm does not initiate any (R&D) activity; the path to the saddle-point steady state is never globally optimal. We also sketch some tentative policy implications of our analysis.     

Converting volunteers to donors: Fundraising strategies for professional associations

The use of fundraising strategies in professional associations is on the rise as member donations have become an increasingly important revenue stream for the associations. This study aims to understand why member volunteers are potential donors to professional associations and to examine whether association solicitation is effective in increasing member volunteer donations. A moderated mediation model was tested with data that consisted of 3,224 professional association members. The results suggest that member satisfaction significantly mediates the relationship between member volunteering and financial giving, and solicitation only makes a difference to member volunteers who are satisfied with their membership. This study concludes that targeting satisfied member volunteers for donations could yield financial benefits to professional associations.     

Valuation and martingale properties of shadow prices: An exposition

Concepts of asset valuation based on the martingale properties of shadow (or marginal utility) prices in continuous-time, infinite-horizon stochastic models of optimal saving and portfolio choice are reviewed and compared with their antecedents in static or deterministic economic theory. Applications of shadow pricing to valuation are described, including a new derivation of the Black–Scholes formula and a generalised net present value formula for valuing an indivisible project yielding a random income. Some new results are presented concerning (i) the characterisation of an optimum in a model of saving with an exogenous random income and (ii) the use of random time transforms to replace local by true martingales in the martingale and transversality conditions for optimal saving and portfolio choice.     

Seniority bias in a tournament

The paper presents a model where the probability of promotion tends to increase with seniority (overall labor market experience) without relying on the accumulation of general human capital. To this end, we consider the optimal design of a tournament (a relative compensation scheme) between two agents with different time horizon, the young and the old, in an overlapping generations framework. When the principal can only imperfectly monitor each agent’s effort level, the difference in time horizon leads to the ex post difference in the marginal value of effort between the two agents. In this case, the optimal tournament necessarily involves a bias towards the old agent. Within this framework, we also examine the relationship between: (1) the monitoring accuracy and the optimal bias; and (2) the value of outside options and the optimal bias.