Brexit – Customs borders will impose costs and delays

• ? The UK's decision to leave the EU customs union is likely to see physical customs borders being introduced, including in Ireland. This will impose administrative costs and delays, with our modelling suggesting that introducing customs checks would reduce the level of UK GDP in 2030 by between 0.7–1.3%. But there are opportunities for the two sides to limit the damage through cooperation and the UK could also mitigate the costs by agreeing free‐trade agreements (FTA) with third countries.
• ? The UK can take as ‘light‐touch’ an approach to customs checks on imports from the EU as it desires. But it is likely that the EU will introduce customs checks on goods imported from the UK, even if the two sides agree an FTA, to ensure regulatory compliance and that ‘rules of origin’ have been satisfied – this will be particularly important if the UK agrees FTA with countries the EU does not have deals with.
• ? Introducing customs borders would pose some logistical problems, particularly in the Dover Strait where existing infrastructure is limited and there are space constraints. A potential fivefold increase in customs declarations will also pose challenges on the IT front. If the UK and EU are unable to agree transitional arrangements, then the additional infrastructure would need to be up and running in a very short period of time. This risks a period of substantial disruption.
• ? Traders will have to complete additional paperwork – such as export licences and import declarations – but much of this can be dealt with electronically, which should help to limit costs and delays. In addition, if the two sides were to share information then this could help to limit the extent to which risk‐based inspections caused delays.
• ? The Government is effectively calculating that the benefits from agreeing FTA with other countries will outweigh the costs of customs controls on the UK‐EU border. This judgement looks doubtful and, at best, would take many years to bear fruit.

     

Over the cliff edge and on to the rocks below

• ? If Brexit negotiations were to break down, the UK would face a significant increase in trade disruption from March 2019, even if it were able to put some basic trading arrangements in place. In a scenario where key sectors face extra friction, we find that the level of UK GDP would be 2.0% – or £16bn in cash terms – lower at the end of 2020 compared with our baseline. The impact on the remaining EU countries, including Ireland, would be much smaller .
• ? This article focuses on what a cliff‐edge Brexit means for trade costs and prices. This is only part of the equation – such a scenario would also influence supply chains and migration, while there is also potential for policymakers to mitigate some of the negative effects via looser policy.
• ? The notion that the UK could simply walk away from Brexit negotiations and rely on WTO rules to trade with the world is deeply flawed. The UK would need to re‐establish more than 750 very complex international arrangements just to maintain the status quo. We expect only the most critical issues – such as air travel – to be resolved by March 2019. Exporters also face a substantial increase in non‐tariff barriers.
• ? A breakdown in talks would also see both sides levying tariffs on imports from each other from March 2019, raising the cost of importing UK goods into the EU by 3.5% and by 3.1% for goods imported into the UK from the EU. For the UK, this will apply to roughly 60% of its goods exports and imports, but for all EU countries except Ireland the share would be less than 10%.
• ? The additional trade frictions would knock around 1pp a year off UK GDP growth in 2019 and 2020, resulting in a period of very weak growth. And the risks to this scenario are skewed to the downside – a slump in confidence or failure to establish the necessary customs infrastructure in time could easily generate a worse outcome

     

Will Brexit speed a seismic shift in UK trade patterns?

• The UK's trade pattern has shifted significantly away from the EU since the 1990s. Our analysis suggests that this shift will continue in the decades to come, with the EU share in UK goods exports potentially slipping to around 35% by 2035. Shifts in relative prices from moves in tariff and especially non‐tariff barriers could lower the share further.
• Over 60% of UK goods exports went to the EU in the late 1990s but this has fallen to around 45%. Slow EU growth is partly to blame, with UK exports to the EU barely expanding since 2007. But our analysis also shows that a 1% rise in EU GDP leads to only around half the rise in UK exports to the EU that a 1% rise in GDP in the rest of the world induces in UK exports to non‐EU countries.
• Based on our findings and OE forecasts of long‐term growth in the EU and the world, the EU share of UK goods exports could fall to 37% by 2035 and around 30% by 2050 – back to its 1960 level. The share of services exports to the EU has held up better but is lower than for goods, at around 40%.
• Weakening growth of UK exports to the EU has taken place despite the development of the EU single market since the early 1990s. Indeed, based on our projections UK goods exports to the single market could drop below 5% of UK GDP by 2050. These projections make no allowance for Brexit effects, but the declining importance of exports to the EU single market could colour prospective Brexit negotiations.
• Simple income‐based projections of potential country shares in future UK exports suggest a further swing towards emerging countries (EM) in the decades ahead, especially China and India. Exports to EM could approach 40% of the total by 2035. A shift in the pattern of trade preferences and restrictions faced by the UK post‐Brexit could spark even larger shifts in the structure of UK exports.

     

Brexit and immigration

• Net inward migration from the EU has been running at record levels in recent years, although the steep increase in new National Insurance numbers issued suggests that the official data may be understating the level of immigration. There was a clear step up in inflows after both expansions of the EU into central and eastern Europe, while the relative strength of the UK labour market has been an important driver of the more recent rise in inflows.
• High levels of immigration have helped to offset the impact of an ageing population and ensured that the UK has enjoyed stronger labour supply growth than many of its peers. With migrants typically being better educated than their UK‐born counterparts, the quality of the stock of labour has also improved, and migrants have been found to have a net positive fiscal impact.
• But there have been some downsides, with evidence that high immigration has had a small dampening impact on wages. That migrants tend to head to London and the other southern regions over other destinations has exacerbated the imbalances in regional housing markets.
• Given that a desire to have greater control over immigration is usually one of the key motivations for those favouring Brexit, a vote in favour of leaving the EU is likely to see the UK abandon the policy of free movement of labour. This would probably see the UK extend the points‐based system that it currently uses for non‐EU countries to include EU migrants.
• Our modelling suggests that the adoption of a ‘populist’ immigration policy which lowers net inward migration by 60,000 a year could reduce the level of GDP by 1.1% in 2030 compared with our baseline forecast.

     

Brexit and FDI

• The potential for a departure from the EU to undermine the UK's attractiveness as a location for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is often cited as one of the key risks were the UK to leave the EU. In weighing up the threat to FDI posed by ‘Brexit’ we assess the net gain from inward investment and the role played by EU membership in attracting FDI.
• In theory, FDI benefits the economy via lower interest rates, higher wages for workers and ‘spillover’ benefits boosting economy‐wide productivity. But the evidence for these benefits is ambiguous. And FDI has potential drawbacks. These include an adverse effect on the tradeable sector, reflected in a wider current account deficit, the potential to ‘crowd out’ investment by domestic firms and the fiscal cost of subsidies paid to inward investors.
• That almost half of FDI in the UK comes from other EU countries suggests that EU membership is not the only driver of foreign investment in the UK. Other factors include the UK's business friendly environment, as reflected in global competitiveness surveys, and a relatively deregulated labour market. Of perhaps most importance is the lure provided by the UK's large domestic economy. 80% of FDI in the UK is in sectors where sales to the EU account for less than 10% of total demand.
• However, FDI in manufacturing does look vulnerable to Brexit, given the importance of the EU market. Granted, manufacturing accounts for a modest share of UK FDI. But to the extent that FDI boosts productivity, a loss of inward investment in this sector is likely to come at a disproportionate cost.
• Our modelling suggests that in a worst case Brexit scenario, the stock of FDI could ultimately be 7% lower relative to the UK remaining in the EU, potentially knocking around ½% off the level of GDP.

     

Deciphering the UK's business investment performance

• ? Absent June 2016's Brexit vote, growth in business investment would have been much faster and the UK would be sharing in a global “investment boom”. Or so the Bank of England claims. But the reality is more complicated. What is striking is just how subdued investment growth has been across countries.
• ? Survey evidence presented by the Bank suggests that recent business investment growth has been less than a third of what might have been achieved absent Brexit. The UK has also been highlighted as an investment laggard among major economies.
• ? Headline investment growth has certainly been relatively weak since 2016. Uncertainty around future UK‐EU trading arrangements may have resulted in some investment being deferred or cancelled. And the Brexit‐related fall in sterling will have pushed up the cost of imported capital equipment, cutting demand.
• ? But a collapse in investment in the North Sea sector has had a significant effect on headline investment growth. On an excluding‐extraction basis, UK business investment rose at the same pace as the US (ex‐extraction) and faster than Japan in 2016 and 2017, while average annual growth rises from 1.0% to 2.4%.
• ? What is striking about the recent performance of business investment in the UK and other G7 members is how subdued growth has been across economies. Despite a favourable environment, no major advanced economy has seen investment rise at the type of rates that the Bank predicts the UK, but for Brexit, should be now enjoying.
• ? Sectoral shifts, the rise of intangible investment and the consequences of technooptimism offer some reasons as to why measured investment may have become less sensitive to economic upswings. These same factors suggest that 1990s‐style growth in private investment is unlikely in the UK (or elsewhere) even once Brexit uncertainty has cleared. Indeed, our own medium‐term forecasts see business investment growth across major economies continuing to run at a relatively subdued pace.

     

How likely is a UK recession after Brexit?

• In the wake of the UK Brexit vote, forecasters have rushed to downgrade their growth forecasts for the UK, with some now expecting a recession. Using the Oxford Economics' Global Economic Model, we examine how likely a recession is by looking at the shocks the UK economy faces and the policy responses. We conclude that while a sharp slowdown is likely – in line with our own new forecasts – a recession is unlikely.
• Many UK forecasters are now predicting a recession in 2017, even though ‘stand‐alone’ recessions in industrial countries are rare. Our forecast is less downbeat. The UK faces a series of negative shocks including to consumers and business confidence, but growth will be supported by the weaker sterling and likely policy responses.
• Using the Oxford Economics' Global Economic Model, we show that to shift our baseline forecast of growth of 1.1% next year to zero would require a very severe negative confidence shock. Our new baseline already assumes a shock equivalent to one‐third of that seen in the global financial crisis (GFC). All else being equal, the shock would have to be around two‐thirds of that in the GFC to cut GDP growth to zero in 2017.
• Our new baseline also does not incorporate all the possible policy levers the UK can employ. We currently assume the Bank Rate drops to zero, but if a ‘rescue package’ of £75 billion of QE and a fiscal stimulus equal to 1% of GDP was also added, then the shock to confidence needed to get zero GDP growth would have to be similar to that seen in the GFC. We do not consider this likely given the scale of financial stress and credit restriction that occurred globally at the time of the GFC.

     

Dead cert or long shot: the utility of social marketing in tackling problem gambling in the UK?

• Social marketing has grown from a fledgling discipline to one recognised as an established means of eliciting behaviour change. Concomitant with the maturation of social marketing has been an increasing focus on expansion into new and untapped areas for behaviour change. This paper examines the utility of applying social marketing to problem gambling in the UK by briefly detailing the development of social marketing and evidence of its effectiveness with traditional public health issues, and its applicability with emerging areas; outlining the situation in the UK regards problem gambling, and why this represents such a fertile testing ground for social marketers and proposing a broad agenda highlighting the potential applications of social marketing in relation to problem gambling, whilst considering the challenges that could encumber the effectiveness of such interventions.

Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Secular stagnation ‐ are we stuck in Summers' long winter?

• Stunningly low global long‐term bond yields provide some credence to a secular stagnation view of the world. We present an analytical framework – culminating in a simple scorecard – for assessing the extent to which purported drivers and manifestations of secular stagnation match global economic and financial developments and we compare with a complementary narrative focusing on balance sheet boom and bust. We find some support for each, but think global rates will not stay as low for as long as markets price in.
• Larry Summers has used the term to refer to a situation where demand and supply for savings deliver very low equilibrium real interest rates. The bulge in middle‐aged savers, falling prices of investment goods, and flows of savings ‘uphill’ from emerging markets may have all led to real rates trending much lower in recent decades.
• Another version of the story is that slow technical progress depresses demand for borrowing, and pushes down on real rates. This is less compelling, and based more on anecdote than anything else. There are as many reasons to be optimistic, as pessimistic, about the supply side.
• There are holes in the secular stagnation narrative. Until very recently, G7 savings rates have trended down rather than up, partly because of another decades‐long trend of financial innovation. Furthermore, few economists, nor the Fed or the BoE, expect policy rates in the US or UK to stay low for as long as is priced in to markets.
• A complementary narrative would stress the role of the credit‐fuelled mega‐boom and subsequent balance sheet blow out and Great Recession, and then the long road to financial repair. This is more consistent with the path of savings rates over recent decades, and the policy response – including QE – can explain much of the rest.
• We see the two explanations as complementary and reinforcing. In global terms, they appear no better or worse than each other. Comparing across countries, Japan comes closest to resembling secular stagnation, followed by EZ, US and UK, according to our scorecard.
• We think ultra‐low long rates will not be borne out by the future path of short rates, but acknowledge a significant risk they might, for example, if monetary policy remains too tight on average because of zero bound effects on interest rates and limited scope for fiscal accommodation.

     

Compliance with Producer Responsibility Legislation: Experiences from UK Small and Medium‐sized Enterprises

This study investigated the legal performance of UK small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) with producer responsibility legislation. The research incorporated legislation controlling packaging and packaging waste, waste electrical and electronic equipment and the restriction of the use of certain hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment. Compliance audits and interviews were conducted with SMEs, regulators, government officials and SME support organisations. A total of 44 SMEs from the north‐west of England were audited between April and September 2008. The study's findings suggest:

• low levels of ‘letter of the law’ and ‘spirit of the law’ compliance;
• enforcement activity and surveillance of SME compliance was generally low; there has not been any formal enforcement action taken under the WEEE Regulations or the RoHS Regulations and enforcement under the PER Regulations is extremely low.

Recommendations on how to improve SME compliance control systems are provided. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

Corporate giving in the Netherlands 1995-2003: exploring the amounts involved and the motivations for donating

• Corporate giving as an expression of corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been researched less than the more general theme of CSR. In addition, much of the research in this area focuses on countries with an Anglo cultural tradition.
• The study outlined in this paper offers a comprehensive longitudinal study of corporate giving in the Netherlands. An overview is provided of corporate giving in the Netherlands in the period from 1995 till 2003.
• The data are gathered by means of a biennial survey of Dutch companies as part of the ‘Giving in the Netherlands’ project. Based on these findings, recent developments in corporate giving can be sketched out.
• Moreover, literature on motives for corporate giving behavior is focused upon and applied in exploring Dutch managers' motivations for offering donations. Nonprofit organizations could use this knowledge to increase the efficiency of their fund raising.

Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A ‘lost decade’ for pay may be a taste of things to come

• ? The failure of pay growth to respond to falling unemployment is less of a puzzle when allowance is made for structural changes in the jobs market. But the same developments make it hard to see where a pay revival will come from.
• ? In real terms, the average weekly wage in the UK is below the level of 10 years ago, an unprecedentedly poor performance. This is despite joblessness dropping to a 42‐year low and employment at a record high.
• ? The responsiveness of pay to falling unemployment has dwindled. A shift towards less secure forms of employment, the tightening up of eligibility for benefits and the consequences of globalisation have all made workers more compliant and less willing and able to push for higher wages.
• ? The result has been a decline in the ‘equilibrium’ rate of unemployment. The Bank of England currently judges this rate to be around 4.5%. But that earnings growth is so subdued despite unemployment being in line the Bank's estimate suggests that the sustainable rate of joblessness may well be much lower.
• ? With unemployment forecast to plateau at current levels, the odds of a revival in pay growth look slim, despite possible upsides from strong corporate profitability and rises in the National Living Wage. This would not be a new development – a secular decline in earnings growth has been apparent over the last 30 years in both nominal and real terms, with pay growth in successive periods of economic expansion failing to return to pre‐recession norms.
• ? This suggests that a serious revival in pay growth is unlikely to happen without the economy operating at significantly higher pressure and with a substantially lower unemployment rate. But this would require a recognition of, and a more accommodative policy response to, the historically weak economic expansion since the financial crisis. Neither seems likely.

     

Brexit adds to gloom over long‐term growth prospects

• The prospect of continued weak productivity growth and less support from rising labour supply means we are relatively gloomy about medium‐term growth prospects. Our forecasts show potential output growth of just 1.6% a year from 2017–2030. This would be well below the average of the decade prior to the financial crisis (2.7%) and in line with our estimate for the 2007 and 2016 period which included the global financial crisis.
• We have become more pessimistic about the extent to which growth in total factor productivity is likely to accelerate. This is partly due to a judgement call that more of the weakness since the financial crisis reflects structural factors. Brexit is also likely to weigh on long‐term prospects, resulting in a degree of trade destruction and lower FDI inflows than would be the case were the UK to remain in the EU. Brexit is also likely to result in less capital deepening.
• Demographic factors also point to weak potential output growth moving forwards. High levels of inward migration have mitigated the impact of an ageing population recently. However, immigration is likely to fall sharply over the next decade, as first an improving European labour market reduces incentives to migrate and then the UK Government adopts more restrictive immigration policy. We are also coming into a period where there will be fewer increases in state pension age than of late.
• Since the mid‐1990s there has been a surge in the number of people going to university, resulting in strong contributions from human capital. But this will be less important moving forwards as university admissions reach a ceiling.
• Stronger growth in potential output would be possible if Brexit results in trading arrangements which are closer to the status quo, or if policy is more ‘liberal’, than our baseline assumptions.

     

World Economic Prospects

Overview: Oil price slump boosts growth forecasts

• Oil prices have fallen further over the past month, with Brent dropping below US$50 per barrel. Prices are now down over 50% from their June 2014 peak levels. We do not expect any significant supply response (either from Saudi Arabia or US shale producers) to come through until late this year so low prices will persist for some time.
• This is a positive development for world growth, though the impact will be uneven across countries. Based on our new oil price forecast of US$55/barrel for 2015, we estimate that the oil bill for ten leading industrial economies, (accounting for over 60% of world GDP) will be US$440 billion lower than it would have been based on our June 2014 oil forecasts.
• This is around 1% of their combined GDP, money potentially free to be spent on other goods and services, including those of their main trading partners.
• US consumer sentiment already shows signs of reacting positively and with other US consumer fundamentals also improving we have upgraded our 2015 GDP growth forecast to 3.3% from 3% last month.
• We have also upgraded our forecasts for other advanced economies such as the Eurozone and Japan, where lower prices should be a flip to hardpressed consumers in particular.
• For the emerging markets, the slide in oil has starkly different consequences for different countries. Oil producers will be losers, most strikingly Russia where we now see GDP down over 6% this year – with financial instability exacerbating the oil effect. But China and India should both gain.
• Lower oil prices will also ease the external pressures some emergers have felt in recent months – reducing the risk of further hikes in domestic interest rates resulting from inflation and currency pressures.
• We now see world growth at 2.9% in 2015, up a tenth from last month and an increase from 2.6% growth last year. This is our first upgrade to the global growth forecast since August 2014.

     

The influence of branding on adolescent smoking behaviour: exploring the mediating role of image and attitudes

• This study investigates the continuing effects of tobacco marketing communications in a post advertising era, focusing on the constructs of brand awareness, brand image, attitude formation and intention to smoke by adolescents.
• A conceptual model is presented, based on 926 respondents from a UK wide study, to assess brand‐related interrelationships and influences of peers on adolescents' attitudes toward smoking and intention to smoke.
• Results show the strong influence of branding on both attitude and intention, and have implications for government anti‐smoking policies specifically in regard to generic packaging and point of sale displays.

Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How robots change the world

• ? The global robotics revolution is rapidly accelerating, as fast‐paced technological advances converge. This will transform robots’ capabilities and their ability to replace human workers, including in services where robot use is also set to rise steeply.
• ? The global stock of industrial robots multiplied three‐fold over the past two decades, to 2.25 million. Trends suggest it will multiply even faster in the next 20 years, reaching as many as 20 million by 2030, with 14 million in China alone.
• ? The rise of the robots will boost productivity and growth, and create new jobs, some in yet‐to‐exist industries. We estimate a 30% rise in robot installations by 2030 would create around $5 trillion in additional global GDP in today's prices.
• ? But existing business models will be disrupted and jobs lost – we estimate up to 20 million manufacturing jobs by 2030. Each new industrial robot eliminates 1.6 manufacturing jobs on average and almost twice that in low‐skilled regions.
• ? Job losses will vary greatly across countries and regions, with the toll falling disproportionately on lower‐skilled workers and on poorer local economies, aggravating social and economic stresses. The challenges for governments and policy‐makers are daunting at a time of already growing political polarisation

     

The effects of re‐branding large UK charities on staff knowledge,attitudes and behaviour

• Despite the costs of charity re‐branding, there is little research in the public domain of its effect on staff. This study addresses that gap in knowledge by evaluating the effects of re‐branding large UK charities on staff knowledge, attitudes and behaviour.
• A quantitative survey of 465 charity staff was carried out in 10 large UK charities. The study shows that knowledge has benefited most from re‐branding although unevenly across different levels of seniority. Length of service has no effect on levels of knowledge but level of support was positively correlated.
• The impact of re‐branding on attitudes proved positive with staff at all levels feeling more motivated, involved and valued as a consequence. However, the study also demonstrates that not all staff feel engaged with the re‐branding process for the organisation to capitalise fully on enhanced staff performance.
• Behaviour was less affected by re‐branding with the exception of a very positive impact on staff retention. The report discusses the practical implications for charity managers.

Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Brexit and world growth – what are the risks?

• The initial global market reaction to the UK Brexit vote was very negative and in our view overdone. Nevertheless, we expect the uncertainty to linger for a while, with the vote having refocused investors on existing vulnerabilities in the world economy. Our new forecasts see the main negative impacts on growth being in the UK, the Eurozone and Japan. Risks to our new forecasts remain skewed to the downside, with a significant danger of world growth dropping below 2% this year.
• Our new forecasts see UK growth dropping to 1.4% a year in 2017–18, down from 2.2–2.3% a year before. In the Eurozone, growth will be around 0.2% a year weaker in 2017–18 and Japan is also a loser as a result of the risk aversion‐driven stronger yen, with growth at just 0.3% in 2017 from 0.5%.
• The size of the initial global market sell‐off makes no sense in the context of the likely impact from a weaker UK. In part, it seems to have reflected the pricing in of very negative scenarios in the Eurozone. But investors may also be worrying about other global problems glossed over in recent months.
• One risk to our forecast is that confidence effects on businesses and consumers are larger than we expect – but such effects are often overstated. Another danger is that more of the recent financial market weakness will ‘stick’ than our new baseline forecasts assume.
• Our world recession indicator is already at elevated levels and suggests a significant danger of world growth slipping below 2% this year; not a recession, but it might feel like one. Global policymakers need to act quickly to head off the risks.

     

Brexit — velvet divorce or messy breakup?

• We use a ‘scenario tree’ approach to look at the possible outcomes of the negotiations around the UK's exit from the EU. Given how little common ground there is between the two sides, we find that a relatively loose relationship is the most likely outcome, with the UK set to leave the EU in early‐ 2019.
• The negotiating positions of the UK and EU are diametrically opposed. The UK wants to end the free movement of labour, cease making contributions to the EU budget and regain ‘sovereignty’ from Brussels, while retaining as much access to the single market as possible. But the EU's starting position is that single market access is dependent upon agreeing to the four freedoms and that this is non‐negotiable.
• So far all signs are that the UK will prioritise the ability to control immigration over single market access. Thus remaining a member of the EEA is very unlikely to be viable over the longer‐term – our scenario tree analysis gives it a probability of just 6% – although it may be adopted as an interim step. Remaining part of the customs union is also unlikely (18%) as it will preclude the UK from making FTA with third countries.
• If the EU takes a mercantilist approach, it will have little incentive to come to an agreement with the UK over single market access for services, given the UK's large trade surplus with the EU for these activities, implying that UK firms may face growing non‐tariff barriers after the UK has left the EU. The UK's large deficit on goods trade with the EU gives a better chance of agreeing a FTA for goods, though with any FTA requiring agreement from all 27 EU members, the UK would have to be prepared for lengthy negotiations and make extensive concessions. Therefore, we think that a reversion to WTO rules (37%) is slightly more likely than agreeing a FTA (36%).

     

Tighter labour markets to finally lift global wages

• Wage growth has been relatively slow since 2007 in advanced economies, but an upturn may be in sight. Slow productivity growth remains an issue but tighter labour markets make a positive response by wages to rising inflation more likely and there are signs that compositional and crisis‐related effects that dragged wage growth down are fading – though Japan may be an exception.
• Overall, our forecasts are for a moderate improvement in wage growth in the major economies in 2017–18, with the pace of growth rising by 0.5–1% per year relative to its 2016 level by 2018 – enough to keep consumer spending reasonably solid.
• Few countries have maintained their pre‐crisis pace of wage growth since 2007. In part this reflects a mixture of low inflation and weak productivity growth, but other factors have also been in play: in the US and Japan wage growth has run as much as 0.5–1% per year lower than conventional models would suggest.
• The link with productivity seems to have weakened since 2007 and Phillips curves – which relate wages to unemployment – have become flatter. A notable exception is Germany, where the labour market has behaved in a much more ‘normal’ fashion over recent years with wage growth responding to diminishing slack.
• ‘Compositional’ factors related to shifts in the structure of the workforce may have had an important influence in holding down wage growth, cutting it by as much as 2% per year in the US and 1% per year in the UK. There are some signs that the impact of these effects in the UK and US are fading, but not in Japan.
• The forecast rise in inflation over the next year as energy price base effects turn positive is a potential risk to real wages. But the decline in measures of labour market slack in the US, UK and Germany suggests wages are more likely to move up with inflation than was the case in 2010–11 when oil prices spiked and real wages fell.