最低工资对正规部门、非正规部门工资和就业的影响

本文根据是否遵守最低工资标准,将劳动部门分为正规部门和非正规部门。利用中国健康与营养调查（CHNS）微观数据,运用固定效应模型和Multinomial Logit模型,本文实证研究了2004年以来,最低工资对正规部门和非正规部门工资和就业的影响。研究发现：最低工资每提高1%,正规部门工资会增加0.5%,非正规部门平均工资下降统计不显著,而处于最低工资线附近的非正规部门劳动者工资下降0.77%;最低工资提高使得失业者向非正规部门流动,而非正规部门劳动者向正规部门流动,最终将有利于劳动者在正规部门就业。因此,政府在制定最低工资制度时应全面考虑最低工资标准作用效果的部门差异。     

The impact of minimum wages on wages,work and poverty in Nicaragua

In this paper we use an individual- and household-level panel data set to study the impact of changes in legal minimum wages on a host of labor market outcomes including: a) wages and employment, b) transitions of workers across jobs (in the covered and uncovered sectors) and employment status (unemployment and out of the labor force), and c) transitions into and out of poverty. We find that changes in the legal minimum wage affect only those workers whose initial wage (before the change in minimum wages) is close to the minimum. For example, increases in the legal minimum wage lead to significant increases in the wages and decreases in employment of private covered sector workers who have wages within 20% of the minimum wage before the change, but have no significant impact on wages in other parts of the distribution. The estimates from the employment transition equations suggest that the decrease in covered private sector employment is due to a combination of layoffs and reductions in hiring. Most workers who lose their jobs in the covered private sector as a result of higher legal minimum wages leave the labor force or go into unpaid family work; a smaller proportion find work in the public sector. We find no evidence that these workers become unemployed.Our analysis of the relationship between the minimum wage and household income finds: a) increases in legal minimum wages increase the probability that a poor worker's family will move out of poverty, and b) increases in legal minimum wages are more likely to reduce the incidence of poverty and improve the transition from poor to non-poor if they impact the head of the household rather than the non-head; this is because the head of the household is less likely than a non-head to lose his/her covered sector employment due to a minimum wage increase and because those heads that do lose covered sector employment are more likely to go to another paying job than are non-heads (who are more likely to go into unpaid family work or leave the labor force).     

Minimum wages,wages and employment in various sectors in Honduras

This paper contributes to our understanding of the impact of minimum wages on labor markets of developing countries, where there are often multiple minimum wages and compliance is weak. We examine how changes in more than 22 minimum wages over 1990–2004 affect employment, unemployment and average wages of workers in different sectors, defined by coverage under the legislation. The evidence suggests that minimum wages are effectively enforced only in medium and large-scale firms, where a 1% increase in the minimum wage leads to an increase of 0.29% in the average wage and a relatively large reduction in employment of ? 0.46%. We find that public sector wages emulate minimum wage trends but the higher cost of labor does not reduce employment there. There are no discernable effects of minimum wages on the wages of workers in small-firms or the self-employed; yet, higher minimum wages may create more unemployment. We conclude that (even under our upper bound estimate of the effect on the wages of workers) the total earnings of workers in the large-firm covered sector fall with higher minimum wages in Honduras, which warrants a policy dialogue on the structure and level of minimum wages.     

THE IMPACT OF LABOR MARKET REGULATION ON EMPLOYMENT IN LOW‐INCOME COUNTRIES: A META‐ANALYSIS

Controversy over labor market policy often centers on achieving a balance between preventing worker exploitation, and avoiding loss of productivity or employment through excessive regulation. Although the literature documenting the impact of labor market regulation on employment is extensive, there is a dearth of evidence on the impact of such policies in low‐income countries (LICs). Since it is easier for workers, especially women, to slip into the informal sector in LICs, regulations are likely to have stronger impacts on formal employment in these countries (but lower impacts on unemployment). We systematically reviewed available research from countries that are, or were until recently, LICs. Most studies document that more stringent labor regulations are associated with lower formal sector employment and higher informal sector employment. We also conducted a metaregression analysis of the impact of minimum wages on formal and informal employment. After controlling for publication bias, higher minimum wages are associated with lower formal employment and a higher share of informal workers.     

Trade Boards and minimum wages, 1909-39

Trade Boards were first established in 1909 principally to protect workers in the sweated trades'but were vastly extended under new criteria in 1918. Although the interwar Trade Boards set wage minima which were'tough'by modern standards there has been little analysis of their effects on employment. But in one sector, agriculture, there is clear evidence that minimum wage setting cost jobs. If similar effects occurred in other sectors covered by minimum wages then this could have added significantly to the burden of unemployment during the interwar years.     

Estimating the effects of the minimum wage in a developing country: A density discontinuity design approach

This paper proposes a framework to identify the effects of the minimum wage on the joint distribution of sector and wage in a developing country. I show how the discontinuity of the wage distribution around the minimum wage identifies the extent of noncompliance with the minimum wage policy, and how the conditional probability of sector given wage recovers the relationship between latent sector and wages. I apply the method in the “PNAD,” a nationwide representative Brazilian cross‐sectional dataset for the years 2001–2009. The results indicate that the size of the informal sector is increased by around 39% compared to what would prevail in the absence of the minimum wage, an effect attributable to (i) unemployment effects of the minimum wage on the formal sector and (ii) movements of workers from the formal to the informal sector as a response to the policy.     

Examining policy configurations as conditions for long-term unemployment and non-standard employment in OECD countries using fuzzy-set analysis

This paper investigates how particular configurations of institutional conditions cause high rate of long-term unemployment and non-standard employment rate for 18 OECD countries during the period of 2001–2008. The paper aims to investigate how employment protection legislation (EPL), unemployment benefit and statutory minimum wages are associated with long-term unemployment and non-standard employment. Using the fuzzy-set analysis, the paper examines how the combination of policies matters in causing long-term unemployment and/or non-standard employment. The result suggests that a low level of statutory minimum wage can lead to high levels of non-standard employment in combination with either strict EPL for permanent workers or weak EPLs for temporary workers. The long-term unemployment rate is suggested to be high when there is strict EPL for temporary workers in combination with high levels of statutory minimum wage. This paper highlights the importance of examining multiple policies as configuration.     

The effects of multiple minimum wages throughout the labor market: The case of Costa Rica

This paper investigates the effects of legal minimum wages on employment and hours worked among workers covered by minimum wage legislation as well as those for whom it does not apply (the uncovered sector) in Costa Rica. This country's large uncovered sector and complex minimum wage policy, which has for decades set numerous wages throughout the wage distribution, provide a stimulating counterpoint to the U.S. framework for the analysis of the impact of minimum wages. Using 1988–2000 micro data, we find that a 10% increase in minimum wages lowers employment in the covered sector by 1.09% and decreases the average number of hours worked of those who remain in the covered sector by about 0.6%. We do not find a significant impact on hours worked in the uncovered sector. Finally, we show that despite the wide range of minimum wages, the largest impact on the employment of covered sector workers is in the lower half of the skill distribution.     

The interrelated dynamics of unemployment and low‐wage employment

This paper examines the extent of state dependence in unemployment and the role played in this by intervening low‐wage employment. A range of dynamic random and fixed‐effects estimators are compared. Low‐wage employment is found to have almost as large an adverse effect as unemployment on future prospects and the difference in their effects is found to be insignificant. Evidence is presented that low‐wage jobs act as the main conduit for repeat unemployment and considerably increases its probability. Obtaining a higher‐wage job reduces the increased risk of repeat unemployment to insignificance. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effect of minimum wage hikes on employment: Evidence from regional panel data from Romania

Minimum wage hikes aim to increase the income of low-wage workers and improve their labour market participation. However, there are concerns that large increases may reduce employment, especially in countries where minimum wages increased quickly and whose competitiveness depends, at least partly, on low production costs. This study examines the employment effect of large increases in the minimum wage in Romania between 2008 and 2016. It uses regional (NUTS III) data and dynamic panel methods. The results do not support the hypothesis that minimum wage hikes reduce employment. They are robust to the use of different econometric methods, plausible variations of the specification and definitions of the key variables. Moreover, the results suggest insignificant effects even for low wage, less developed or high unemployment regions.     

Incidence and duration of unemployment spells: Implications for the male–female wage differentials

We demonstrate in this paper that the incidence of unemployment and duration of unemployment spells affect the male–female gender wage differential. The results indicate that after controlling for sample selectivity bias in the wage equation, the incidence of unemployment and duration of unemployment spells account for about 14.2% and 39.6%, respectively, of the wage differential that exists between males and females. We observed that while the duration of unemployment accounts for a substantial portion of the wage differential in both the service (48.8%) and the manufacturing (17.0%) sectors, the impacts of the incidence of unemployment and duration of unemployment spells variables on the wage differential are rather small in the service (0.07%) and the manufacturing (1.6%) sectors. Also, high incidence of unemployments is associated with low wages for males and females in all samples. In contrast, longer durations of unemployment spells tend to increase males’ wages and decrease females’ wages in the full and service sector samples. At the macro level, the results seem to suggest that promotion of gender wage equality should be associated with policies that will minimize the female's incidence of unemployment and duration of unemployment spells.     

Government Employment and Wages and Labour Market Performance

Government wage, benefit, and employment decisions are not taken on a profit-maximizing basis, and have a substantial impact on aggregate labour market performance and unemployment. In a two-sector labour market model with free mobility of labour, an increase in government wages or benefits reduces private sector employment, and government employment is not an effective counter-cyclical instrument. Empirical tests for Greece confirm that the expansion of the public sector in the 1980s contributed to the deterioration of labour market performance.     

Can a minimum wage increase employment and reduce prices in a neoclassical perfect information economy?

This paper investigates the possibility that the imposition of a minimum wage increases employment in the affected sector, measured in terms of hours of work, and lowers product prices. Unlike related prior theoretical research, I consider a neoclassical perfect information economy. Both labor and product markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive. Workers choose the number of hours of work and their effort level. Workers can potentially, but not necessarily, differ in their preferences over income, leisure, and effort. Effort is perfectly observable by the employers. The general framework that highlights the channels through which a minimum wage can increase employment and reduce prices is introduced and necessary and sufficient conditions derived. The paper also develops a number of comparative statics and some illustrative examples. The results provide a simple theoretical foundation that explains some recent findings of the empirical literature on minimum wages. Auxiliary results help explain the effects of minimum wage on the entire wage distribution in a way that is consistent with empirical findings. Finally, welfare analysis shows that worker welfare and employment tend to go in opposite directions; in particular, if employment increases after the imposition of the minimum wage, worker welfare will be reduced, though not necessarily vice versa (the opposite is true for consumer welfare). Strikingly, if a minimum wage increases worker welfare, the chief beneficiaries are not the affected workers but those with incomes that exceed the minimum wage.     

Semi-Nonparametric Estimation of an Equilibrium Search Model

We specify and estimate an equilibrium job search model with productivity differences across labour market segments. The model allows for two types of unemployment: frictional unemployment due to search frictions and structural unemployment due to wage floors. Wage floors exist because of high unemployment benefits or binding minimum wages. The productivity distribution is estimated semi-nonparametrically along the lines of Gallant-Nychka, using Hermite series approximation. We decompose the total unemployment rate and we examine the effects of changes in the minimum wage.     

Youth minimum wage reform and the labour market in New Zealand

This paper analyses the effects of a large reform in the minimum wages affecting youth workers in New Zealand since 2001. Prior to this reform, a youth minimum wage, applying to 16–19 year-olds, was set at 60% of the adult minimum. The reform had two components. First, it lowered the eligible age for the adult minimum wage from 20 to 18 years, and resulted in a 69% increase in the minimum wage for 18 and 19 year-olds. Second, the reform raised the youth minimum wage in two annual steps from 60% to 80% of the adult minimum, and resulted in a 41% increase in the minimum wage for 16 and 17 year-olds over a two-year period. We estimate the impact of this reform by comparing average outcomes for these two groups of teenagers, before and after the change, to those for 20–25 year-olds, who were unaffected by the reform. We find no evidence of adverse effects on youth employment immediately following the reform, but some weak evidence of employment loss by 2003. We also find evidence of a 10–20% increase in hours worked following the reform for employed 16–17 year-olds, and up to a 10% increase for employed 18–19 year-olds, depending on the specification adopted. Combined, wage, hours, and employment changes lead to significant increases in labour earnings and total income of teenagers relative to young adults. However, we also find evidence of a decline in educational enrolment, and an increase in unemployment, inactivity, and benefit receipt rates, suggesting that while the minimum wage reform increased the labour supply of teenagers, this increase was not matched by as large an increase in employment.     

The labor market consequences of experience in self-employment

Many public policies are designed to encourage self-employment. However, because self-employment experiences are typically brief, it becomes important to understand the long-term consequences of entering and then leaving self-employment. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), we examine the effects of brief self-employment experience on subsequent labor market outcomes. We find that, relative to continued wage employment, brief spells in self-employment do not increase—and probably actually reduce—average hourly earnings upon return to wage employment. We also find that those who experience self-employment have difficulty returning to the wage sector. However, these consequences are small compared to similar experiences in unemployment.     

社会地位对宏观经济变量的动态影响——基于两部门搜索均衡模型的研究

本文将失业理论的搜索模型与社会地位结合起来考察社会地位的动态影响。研究发现社会地位引入效用函数等价于代表性家庭时间偏好率的降低,利用对数效用函数,得到经济系统均衡状态存在的唯一性。在均衡状态下,更强的社会地位意识意味着更高的储蓄率和资本积累,以及提供更多的社会空闲职位、更高的工资、更高的就业率、更为宽松的劳动力市场和更低的利率。     

Teacher shortages and the business cycle

The ability of the public sector to recruit skilled workers is important for the quality of public sector services. Centralized and rigid pay systems in the public sector might reduce labour supply and lead to shortages of qualified personnel in areas and periods with strong outside labour markets. This paper shows that teacher shortages measured by the share of teachers without approved education are strongly procyclical in Norway. Using a large panel of Norwegian local governments for 1981–2002 and exploiting the rigid wage system, we find a sizeable negative relationship between teacher shortages and the regional unemployment rate.     

Minimum wage effects in a developing country

The available empirical minimum wage literature, which is mostly based on US evidence, is not very useful for analyzing developing countries, where the minimum wage affects many more workers and labour institutions and law enforcement differ in important ways. The main contribution of this paper is to present new empirical evidence on minimum wage effects for a large developing country, Brazil. Using a monthly household survey panel from 1982 to 2004 I find evidence of a wage compression effect for both the formal and informal sectors. Furthermore, I find no evidence of employment effects in either sector.     

The Effects of UI Benefits on Unemployment and Subsequent Outcomes: Evidence from a Kinked Benefit Rule

This paper analyses the effects of unemployment insurance benefits on unemployment exits and subsequent labour market outcomes. We exploit a piecewise linear relationship between the previous wage and benefits in Finland to identify the causal effects of the benefit level by using a regression kink design. Although we only find weak evidence of an effect on the time to the next job, higher benefits decrease the time spent in part-time unemployment and thus result in more full-time unemployment. The re-employment probability and post-unemployment wage are also negatively affected. The results for the duration of the first post-unemployment job are not conclusive, but in total both employment and earnings in the two years following the beginning of the unemployment spell decrease with higher benefits.