Optimal Monetary Policy with Labor Market Frictions: The Role of the Wage Channel

This paper introduces right‐to‐manage bargaining into a labor search model with sticky prices instead of standard efficient bargaining and examines the Ramsey‐optimal monetary policy. Without real wage rigidity, even when the steady state is inefficient, price stability is nearly optimal in response to technology or government shocks. Right‐to‐manage bargaining creates the wage channel to inflation, because there is a direct relationship between real wages and real marginal cost. In the presence of the wage channel, price markups consist of only real marginal cost, and real wages and hours per worker are determined such as in the Walrasian labor market.     

Labor Selection,Turnover Costs,and Optimal Monetary Policy

We study optimal monetary policy and welfare properties of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with a labor selection process, labor turnover costs, and Nash bargained wages. We show that our model implies inefficiencies that cannot be offset in a standard wage bargaining regime. We also show that the inefficiencies rise with the magnitude of firing costs. As a result, in the optimal Ramsey plan, the optimal inflation volatility deviates from zero and is an increasing function of firing costs.     

Ramsey monetary policy with labor market frictions

Traditional New Keynesian models prescribe that optimal monetary policy should aim at price stability. In the absence of a labor market frictions, the monetary authority faces no unemployment/inflation trade-off. The design of optimal monetary policy is analyzed here for a framework with sticky prices and matching frictions in the labor market. Optimal policy features deviations from price stability in response to both productivity and government expenditure shocks. When the Hosios [1990. On the efficiency of matching and related models of search and unemployment. Review of Economic Studies 57 (2), 279-298] condition is not met, search externalities make the flexible price allocation unfeasible. Optimal deviations from price stability increase with workers’ bargaining power, as firms incentives to post vacancies fall and unemployment fluctuates above the Pareto efficient one.     

Non-Atomistic Wage Setters and Monetary Policy in a New Keynesian Framework

This paper extends an otherwise standard New Keynesian (NK) model to allow for the presence of large wage setters. Building on monetary models from an earlier generation, I contribute to the NK literature by adding some new insight. It is shown that once the presence of large wage setters is taken into account, the degree of wage setting centralization and the aggressiveness of the central bank in stabilizing inflation jointly affect steady state employment. Because of this interaction, the benefits associated with inflation stabilization increase in the centralization of the wage bargaining process.     

Monetary Policy,Asset Prices,and Liquidity in Over‐the‐Counter Markets

We develop a model where agents can allocate their wealth between a liquid asset, which can be used to purchase consumption goods, and an illiquid asset, which represents a better store of value. Should a consumption opportunity arise, agents may visit a frictional “over‐the‐counter” secondary asset market where they can exchange illiquid for liquid assets. We characterize how monetary policy affects both the issue price and the secondary market price of the asset. We also show that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, search and bargaining frictions in the secondary asset market can improve welfare if inflation is low.     

Agenda for a new monetary reform

The thrust of this article is that once more the time has come for a broad debate on domestic and international monetary order and on the role and the rules governing the functioning of financial markets in the modern market economy. We have to define an agenda and seek a consensus for a new monetary reform that will take into account both the positive and negative lessons learned from more than twenty years of experience with liberalization, deregulation and privatization in the financial sector, with flexible exchange rates and international monetary instability. In today's world economy there is an especially dangerous contrast between, on the one hand virtually total globalization of financial markets, and the fixation of monetary policy on narrow national objectives on the other hand. The article lists eight major items that ought to be considered in this debate: (1) the adoption of common rules necessary in a global market economy, (2) the need to return to a true international monetary order, (3) redefining and strengthening the role of central banks, (4) examining the dangers of a primarily short-term finance driven globalization, (5) extending the scope of the concept of price instability beyond the domestic price index, (6) dealing with the problem of artificial risk creation in financial markets and establish a more equitable distribution of the costs of risks, (7) reconsider the current distribution between earning on financial assets and other income and counteract the deflationary bias in the current system, (8) redefine monetary and financial order that is compatible with modern information technologies, rather than lagging behind the information revolution. The article does not offer set solutions for all these issues. Its conclusion is, however, that without such a debate and a consensus on a balanced new approach, there is a real threat of a backlash, the threat of losing the advantages of liberalization and globalization and of a return to increased monetary and economic nationalism and to excessive government intervention and control.     

Information and Liquidity

We study how recognizability affects assets’ acceptability, or liquidity. Some assets, like U.S. currency, are readily accepted because sellers can easily recognize their value, unlike stock certificates, bonds or foreign currency, say. This idea is common in monetary economics, but previous models deliver equilibria where less recognizable assets are always accepted with positive probability, never probability 0. This is inconvenient when prices are determined through bargaining, which is difficult with private information. We construct models where agents reject outright assets that they cannot recognize, at least for some parameters. Thus, information frictions generate liquidity differences without overly complicating the analysis.     

Fiscal-monetary policy interactions in the presence of unionized labor markets

This paper develops a framework for studying the interactions between labor unions, fiscal policy, monetary policy and monopolistically competitive firms. The framework is used to investigate the effects of labor taxes, the replacement ratio, labor market institutions and monetary policymaking institutions on economic peformance in the presence of strategic interactions between labor unions and the central bank. Given fiscal variables, higher levels of either centralization of wage bargaining, or of central bank conservativeness are associated with lower unemployment and inflation. However the forward shifting of changes in either labor taxes or in unemployment benefits to labors costs is larger the higher are those institutional variables. The paper also considers the effects of those institutions on the choice of labor taxes and of unemployment benefits by governments concerned with the costs of inflation and unemployment, as well as with redistribution to particular constituencies. A main result is that, normally, higher levels of centralization and conservativeness induce government to set higher labor taxes. JEL Classification: E5 · E6 · H2 · J3 · J5 · L1     

美国财政和货币政策的困境与出路

本文分析了美国财政和货币政策的局限和困境,并探讨了其政策出路。本文突破了财政政策对私有部门挤出效应的传统分析方法,采用宽松货币和财政政策的交互作用,从更广泛视角分析政府政策的挤出效应;以个人和企业资产负债表在不同时期的状态及调整为框架,并突破货币政策分析将利息作为负债成本的传统方法,将利息也作为资产收益评估政策效果;运用这一框架,并采用"核心GDP"作为经济增长质量和可持续性的指标,分析美国最近财政和货币政策的局限和出路。     

Search and matching frictions and optimal monetary policy

A recent literature has merged the New Keynesian and the search and matching frameworks, which has allowed the former to analyze the joint dynamics of unemployment and inflation. This paper analyzes optimal monetary policy in this kind of hybrid framework. I show that zero inflation is optimal when all wages are Nash bargained in every period and the economy's steady state is efficient. In the more realistic case in which nominal wage bargaining is staggered, a case against price stability arises: in response to real shocks, the central bank should use price inflation so as to avoid excessive unemployment volatility and excessive dispersion in hiring rates. For a plausible calibration, the welfare loss under the zero inflation policy is about three times as large as under the optimal policy.     

A Group Utility Maximizer Mechanism for Land Assembly

Buyers requiring large parcels of land for development purposes engage several owners in a bilateral trade seeking monetary payment in exchange for land – a business transaction most often referred to in the literature as the problem of land assembly. To avoid the holdout problem which is a typical consequence of such negotiations necessitates a good pricing strategy that meets the subjective valuation considerations of the owners and protecting property rights to warrant a fair and efficient outcome. Several approaches have been proposed in the literature that includes contributions from game theory in the form of Nash bargaining, Bayesian theory for incomplete information, auction theory and Mechanism Design which have individually enriched this field and proposed credible solutions. In this paper, we consider a setting that has a single buyer and N sellers. We take a Mechanism Design approach to study the assembly problem in a utilitarian framework, where we associate risk-averse utility functions with the sellers. Given a set of reserve prices reported by sellers, and their risk-aversion behaviour, we seek an incentive-compatible mechanism that simultaneously maximizes the sum of individual expected utilities while delivering a Pareto optimal per-seller penalty-reward structure. We show how this mechanism, inspired and adapted from the actuarial Risk Exchange concept in the Insurance industry, can be fruitfully applied to the land assembly problem, yielding an efficient and optimal solution to the holdout problem, while making very minimal demands on knowledge of sellers valuations. The working of the mechanism is illustrated with a simple example.     

Multiple-solution indeterminacies in monetary policy analysis

A sizeable fraction of recent research on monetary policy has been concerned with issues relating to analytical “indeterminacies”—i.e. multiple solutions in rational expectations (RE) models. Most of the literature features sophisticated RE analysis conducted within dynamic models that reflect optimizing behavior by individual agents and incorporate Taylor-style policy rules. A few papers have suggested that some of the particular indeterminacy arguments are misleading or irrelevant. For the most part, however, there has been little dissent from the position that these indeterminacies present a genuine problem for monetary policy makers. The purpose of the present paper, by contrast, is to argue that conclusions based on multiple-solution indeterminacy findings are of dubious merit rather generally.     

A Note on Simple Strategic Bargaining for Models of Money or Credit

Many papers on liquidity have bilateral trade with buyers constrained by their money holdings or debt limits. Axiomatic bargaining, typically Nash, determines the terms of trade. However, there are reasons to prefer strategic bargaining. I analyze a bargaining game that is useful in models of liquidity. Advantages include (i) it has simple microfoundations, both in and out of steady state; (ii) it is more tractable than Nash, but the outcomes share interesting features; (iii) the benchmark version is consistent with axiomatic approaches in the literature, while another version is not, but can still be used; and (iv) it is arguably realistic.     

Debt, bargaining, and credibility in firm–supplier relationships

We examine optimal leverage for a downstream firm relying on implicit (self-enforcing) contracts with a supplier. Performing a leveraged recapitalization prior to bargaining increases the firm's share of total surplus. However, the resulting debt overhang limits the range of credible bonuses, resulting in low input quality. Optimal financial structure trades off bargaining benefits of debt with inefficiency resulting from overhang. Consistent with empirical evidence, the model predicts that leverage increases with supplier bargaining power (e.g., unionization rates) and decreases with utilization of non-verifiable inputs (e.g., human capital).     

运营时滞、债务协商和可转债融资企业投资决策研究

在运营时滞的背景下,将债务协商机制引入到利用股权和可转债融资的上市企业,建立动态模型分析企业的投资问题。数值分析表明：在相同的运营时滞下,如果股东谈判能力较弱（强）,相比于破产清算,债务协商会加速（推迟）投资;项目首次投资成本和股东谈判能力会同时影响运营时滞与企业投资水平之间的关系。当首次投资成本低时,随着运营时滞增加,较强（弱）的股东谈判能力会推迟（加速）投资;当首次投资成本较高时,运营时滞增加会推迟投资,但股东谈判能力越强,推迟程度越小;债务协商可以提高实物期权价值,并且实物期权价值和股东谈判能力成正比,和运营时滞成反比。     

MONETARY POLICY INDICATORS AS PREDICTORS OF STOCK RETURNS

We explore the linkage between stock return predictability and the monetary sector by examining alternative proxies for monetary policy. Using two complementary methods, we document that failure to condition on the Fed's broad policy stance causes a substantial understatement in the ability of monetary policy measures to predict returns. Industry analyses suggest that cross‐industry return differences are also linked to changes in monetary conditions, as monetary policy has the strongest (weakest) relation with returns for cyclical (defensive) industries. Overall, we find that monetary conditions have a prominent and systematic relation with future stock returns, even in the presence of business conditions.     

Real effects of anticipated and unanticipated money: Some problems of estimation and hypothesis testing

The paper addresses two issues that arise in estimation and testing of the real effects of anticipated and unanticipated money. First it is shown that identification of the effects of unanticipated (or unperceived) monetary growth on real output is possible only if the a priori restriction is imposed that monetary growth does not depend on unanticipated (or unperceived) output. Second, the existing empirical work of Barro and others does not allow for three known channels through which money can affect real variables. These are (1) past and present anticipations of future monetary growth (the inflation tax channel), (2) expectations of monetary growth in a given period conditioned at various preceding dates (the Fischer-Phelps-Taylor effect) and (3) past and present revisions in forecasts of future monetary growth. The presence of the first of these would mean that alternative open-loop monetary growth rules have real effects. The presence of the other two implies that monetary feedback rules can have real effects. Omission of the first channel can lead to biased estimates of the effects of past anticipated monetary growth. Potentially serious observational equivalence problems are associated with the other two.     

美联储货币政策对我国资产价格的影响

本文利用事件研究法考察了美联储货币政策对我国资产价格的影响。研究发现美联储货币政策会显著影响我国资产价格,美联储加息会降低我国债券和股票回报,降息则会提高债券和股票回报。将美联储货币政策进行细分后发现,预期到的货币政策调整对债券市场和股票市场的回报都有显著影响,而未预期到的货币政策调整和前瞻性指引只影响债券市场。进一步的研究表明,未预期到的美联储货币政策调整和前瞻性指引还会加剧我国金融市场的波动率。本文的研究结论为美联储货币政策对我国经济金融的影响提供了新的证据,对于投资者提高投资收益、降低投资风险以及货币当局完善我国货币政策调控和维护我国金融市场稳定具有重要意义。