Entry and Exit Decisions with Switching Regime Excess Capacity

This paper examines how expected excess capacity fosters impediments to entry and incentives to exit. To examine this phenomenon, we apply the switching regime methods of Goldfeld and Quandt to a logit model using data from the U.S. aluminum industry over the period 1954 through 2010. The results show that both entry and exit decisions are statistically significantly affected by excess capacity. However, the correlation of entry and exit with capacity is more significant than with production. The evidence implies that excess capacity in the aluminum industry rises to be a substantial threat to entry only when the company produces ahead of demand growth. Excess capacity is also an impetus to exit during the later stage after primary aluminum production reverts to a declining trend.     

煤矿建设工程造价控制研究

随着市场经济的发展,煤炭市场在经过黄金十年的辉煌后,受产能过剩、环境保护压力以及进口煤激增等因素影响,煤价下跌、库存增加、成本上升,整个行业陷入亏损的泥潭中。在当前的煤矿建设过程中,如何应对严峻的市场形势及时代发展潮流,以辩证发展的眼光看待煤炭工程建设造价管理工作显得尤为重要。做好煤炭建设工程造价管理工作在整个经济社会及企业发展中具有至关重要的作用与意义。     

Licensing versus assignment: Innovation transfer in an asymmetric duopoly

Suppose that the relatively inefficient firm in an asymmetric duopoly market develops a nondrastic process innovation. To maximize returns on the innovation, the innovator must determine the most lucrative commercial policy. Should it be in‐house exploitation, or licensing or assignment? It turns out that the innovator never uses innovation exclusively. The choice of licensing or assignment depends on the size of the initial cost difference. When the initial cost difference is relatively small, the innovator would resort to licensing, whereas when there is a significant initial cost gap, the innovator would rather assign the property rights of the innovation to the rival. In the case of assignment, the assignee may license the innovation back to the assignor. With the option of reverse licensing, an assignment will always be more profitable than (direct) licensing. Interestingly, if the initial cost gap were sufficiently large, the innovator would exit the market postassignment, and thus act as an outside nonoperating licensor.     

An evaluation of excess demand,actual cost and normal cost pricing hypotheses using non-nested tests

This paper has emperically analyzed three versions(zero lag,geometric lag and almon lag) of three price change hypotheses – namely the excess demand, actual cost and the normal cost hypothesis – the goal being to select the hypothesis that describes the underlying price dynamics for manufactured goods. The rival models are specified as non-nested alternatives and each version is estimated by using an efficient estimator. The traditional discrimination criteria which clearly reject the zero lag version, are found to be impotent in discriminating between the dynamic versions of the models. A sequential cross-evaluation of the two dynamic versions using both pairwise and multiple non-nested hypothesis tests proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon reveals a systematic domination by the almon version of normal cost pricing over both the excess demand and the actual cost pricing mechanisms in the Canadian manufacturing sector during the period 1961:1–87:4. This result is robust under alternative specifications of the desired stock of inventories for the excess demand model. The finding implies that short–run variations in demand conditions or in actual unit costs arising from temperoary changes in productivity may not paly a significant role in manufactured goods pricing decisions.     

Strategic delay in market entry

Abstract.  Two firms are contemplating entry into a market that is viable for only one firm in a good state. We show that even if each firm receives a signal that perfectly reveals a good state, both might strategically delay entry, owing to the fear that the other firm might enter in the same period as well. We also find the conditions where the informed firm will let the rival firm know about the market's profitability and the two will merge to enter the market. We discuss the applications of this model to the oil industry and the generic drug industry.     

Inventories and Risk in African Manufacturing

Using a panel data set for Zimbabwe which includes firm-specific measures of contractual risk, we show that contractual risk has a major effect on the holding input stocks and, to a lesser extent, the constitution of cash reserves. This is consistent with inventories being a hedge against stockout risk. By contrast, firms facing more inter-annual market risk hold less inventories. This suggests that African manufacturers prefer adapting to long-term market fluctuations as they materialise rather than building up inventories. This interpretation is consistent with the finding that high market risk firms also have a low capacity utilisation rate.     

A competing risks analysis of firms’ exit

Firms may exit the market in several ways and each form of exit is likely to be caused by different factors (Schary in RAND J Econ 22:339–353, 1991). This paper explores the determinants of different exit routes. Using a sample of Spanish manufacturing firms for 1990–2000, we estimate a competing risks proportional hazards model to identify the factors leading firms to exit the market through (the mutually precluding events of) liquidation/bankruptcy and acquisition/merger. Our results show the existence of a sharp difference between the determinants of these two exit routes in terms of firm and industry characteristics.     

The information content of reorganization procedures: contagion or competitive effects?

Based on a consideration of the whole process from reorganization filing to confirmation, this paper examines the impact of corporate reorganization on both filing firms and industry rivals, and how it changes the competitive landscape of the industry. Results show that there exist intra-industry information transfers throughout the whole course of the reorganization proceedings that result in an incessant downward revaluation of the rival firms’ values. Specifically, the market reassesses the prospects of not only the filer but also of its industry rivals simultaneously. Results also show that whether a rival firm has a contagious or a competitive reaction is largely decided by firm-specific rather than industry-specific characteristics.     

Further Evidence from Survey Data on Australian Manufacturing Price Changes*

Three data sets from two different quarterly surveys have been used in estimating six standard models of price change behaviour. Results for Total Manufacturing Industry, for all three data sets, show prices respond to both actual cost movements and commodity market excess demand conditions. For most ASIC two-digit industries, prices respond rapidly to actual cost movements, and for many industries they also respond directly to excess demand conditions. No single excess demand measure is appropriate for all industries. The magnitude of orders and inventories influences is very small, but capacity utilization contributions seem far from trivial. Industry results are frequently sensitive to the survey used and/or to the method used to weight individual firm's responses.     

Excess capacity as a policing device

A great deal of recent work has been devoted to the question of whether an incumbent firm can successfully deter entry by investing in excess capacity. This paper demonstrates that a dominant firm may invest in excess capacity even when it is certain that this will not deter entry. Rather, the excess capacity is held by the dominant firm in order to ensure that its competitors will exercise appropriate restraint in their own output decisions. An example is provided that illustrates that the rate of return on the capital invested in excess capacity may be very high.     

Risk sharing and inventories

The paper shows how various features of market organization, such as existence of retail chains, the centralized warehousing of inventories by wholesalers, and the arrangements whereby suppliers partially reimburse sellers for unsold inventories can be explained in terms of optimal contracts for sharing the risks of excess inventories. When retailers face heterogeneous demands, the paper demonstrates the optimality of shared inventories and obtains optimal incentive properties for the risk sharing policy.     

Export rivalry,vertically-related markets,and optimal public ownership policy

This paper considers the optimal public ownership policy of an upstream firm which competes with a foreign private rival. Both firms supply a produced input to the domestic and foreign downstream firms that compete in an export market. The paper shows that complete privatization of the domestic upstream firm is never optimal. It will likely be fully nationalized if its market share is high, the domestic downstream firms' market share is low, and the total number of firms in the downstream is large. Simulation results reveal that the public firm's optimal profit margin may be negative and that the government ownership level may exhibit a reswitching phenomenon as the number of domestic downstream firms keeps growing. The paper sheds light on the possibility of using government ownership policy as a pseudo-trade and industrial policy.     

Entry preemption through capacity expansion in the U.S. titanium industry

This study investigates the impact of expected excess capacity on the probability of firm entry into a single-product oligopoly, specifically, the U.S. titanium industry. Predicted values for excess capacity as well as its components, production, and capacity are generated. By disentangling the components of excess capacity and estimating them independently, it is possible to separate incumbents' discretionary actions regarding capacity expansion, which may preempt entry, from the effects of underlying cycles in demand, which subsequently affect production. These predicted values are utilized in logit models which indicate that expected levels of capacity expansion did appear to decrease the probability of firm entry, while expected levels of production and excess capacity had no effect on the probability of entry into the U.S. titanium industry.     

Employment Protection and Product Market Competition

A firm facing employment protection will defend its market position more fiercely than a rival firm operating without such restrictions. However, ex ante such firms may be more reluctant to expand. For the benchmark case of contest competition, the defensive effect dominates. A firm facing employment protection has a stronger average market position.     

Entry Deterrence in a Unionized Oligopoly

We investigate wage determination between an incumbent firm and its labour union under threat from another firm entering its product market. In equilibrium, it may be optimal for a labour union of the incumbent firm to lower its wage demand. This may make it possible for the incumbent firm to maintain a higher employment level, in that the lower wages can help the firm deter the entry of a rival firm. This will yield a higher profit for the incumbent firm and a lower utility level for the labour union compared with those in an equilibrium with no threat of entry.
JEL Classification Numbers: J51, L10     

Firm routines,customer switching and market selection under duopoly

This paper explores the dynamics of market selection for an industry in which firms employ relatively simple pricing, production and investment routines and in which consumers switch between rival firms in response to price differentials but do not all do so instantaneously. The key issue is whether market processes result in the elimination of less efficient firms by their more efficient rivals. That is to say, do such processes unfailingly increase the efficiency with which available economic resources are used? In the context of duopoly, we show that the survival of the more efficient firm is not guaranteed and that, more generally, the outcome depends upon the speeds with which firms adjust prices and capacities and with which customers switch between rival firms.     

Farm Survival and Growth in Transition Economies: Theory and Empirical Evidence from Hungary

Our conceptual model states that new individual farms may begin at a small, even sub-optimal, scale of production and then those farms that are successful will survive and grow, whereas those that are not will remain small and may ultimately be forced to exit from production. The samples of individual farms analysed throughout this article are drawn from the 1998 Farm Survey in Hungary. Our estimation results show that older and larger farms are more likely to survive, farm growth decreases with farm age when farm size is held constant and that learning considerations are important. Beside these standard results, in transition economies farmers', market and industry characteristics have a significant impact on the survival and growth rates of individual farm enterprises.     

Losing the lead: the patenting decision in the light of the disclosure requirement

Empirical findings state that the disclosure requirement might be a reason for firms to rely on secrecy rather than patents to protect their inventions. We choose a dynamic framework in which we can explicitly analyze the patenting decision reflecting the tradeoff between a positive protective effect and a negative effect due to the required disclosure of the protected invention. In spite of a patent, the inventor's rival may still enter the market with a non-infringing product. Measuring the technological lead of the inventor by a time advantage he has compared with his rival, we show that if his headstart exceeds a critical threshold, he will not patent and rather rely on secrecy.     

ON THE PROFITABILITY OF RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE WHEN DEMAND IS UNCERTAIN

A previous study finds that in a market where a manufacturer faces uncertain demand and sells to consumers through competitive retailers, the manufacture wishes to support adequate retail inventories by imposing resale price maintenance (RPM). I show that if retail inventories are allocated to consumers through first‐come‐first‐served rule rather than efficient rationing rule in the game with unconstrained retail competition, imposing RPM may not be profitable. It may not encourage more retail inventories either. RPM may also lower consumer surpluses and social welfare. This study casts some doubt on the demand uncertainty theory that supports RPM.     

理性进入和退出 走出微利经济

本文认为,过度竞争与企业的进入、退出有关。如果能够理性进入和退出,就能消除过度竞争,进而走出微利经济。在此基础上,本文就企业进入的内涵、条件、案例进行了论述和分析,并就企业退出的内涵、障碍、案例进行了论述和分析。