Gordon Tullock: economic gadfly

This article discusses Gordon Tullock’s impact on the economics profession and on public choice in particular. It measures this impact through his publications, his editorship of the journal Public Choice, and his association with the Center for Public Choice.     

Introduction

This Journal of Bioeconomics Special Issue celebrates the life and accomplishments of Gordon Tullock (February 13, 1922–November 3, 2014), who was instrumental in establishing the Journal of Bioeconomics and was one of the founders of the discipline. He also deserves much of the credit for public choice theory and the theory of rent-seeking. We present ten tribute papers and three bioeconomics papers—from scholars in Canada,China, Norway, Singapore, and the US—in his honor.     

Understanding Gordon Tullock

Gordon Tullock was rational to a fault, and he tried to insist that others be fully rational, confronting all with any inconsistency in their thinking. He loved to be shocking. He was also quite generous. Tullock’s willingness to take a chance, as editor of Public Choice, on a paper that he did not understand led to the publication of the most widely cited paper ever published in the journal.     

Old (Chicago) school,new century: the link between Knight and Simons’ Chicago plan to Buchanan’s constitutional money

James Buchanan had long been a champion of the early Chicago school’s emphasis on the essential role that institutions play in framing the market process. In his post-2009 analysis of the financial crisis, Buchanan echoed his old Chicago mentors like Frank Knight and Henry Simons in arguing that the Great Recession, like all previous financial crises, was primarily a failure of the rules governing our monetary-financial system. This “old Chicago” emphasis on the institutional “rules of the game” formed the basis of his essential post-2009 argument that the financial crisis fundamentally represented not a market failure, per say, but a constitutional failure. In this paper, I connect the dots in Buchanan’s post-2009 analysis of the Great Recession and his reaffirmation of the need for “constitutional money” to his old Chicago mentor’s strikingly similar calls for a radical restructuring of the monetary-financial system in the Chicago Plan of the 1930s. Though Buchanan’s twenty-first century resurrection of these ideas has yet to conjure up the academic support of his predecessors, certain elements of his “old school” monetary-financial reforms have experienced a strong revival since the financial crisis, as has Buchanan’s more general call to “constitutionalize money.”     

Human agency and convergence: Gaus’s Kantian Parliamentarian

Public reason is justified to the extent that it uses (only) arguments, assumptions, or goals that are allowable as “public” reasons. But this exclusion requires some prior agreement on domains, and a process that disallows new unacceptable reasons by unanimous consent. Surprisingly, this problem of reconciliation is nearly the same, mutatis mutandis, as that faced by micro-economists working on general equilibrium, where a conceit—tâtonnement, directed by an auctioneer—was proposed by Leon Walras. Gaus’s justification of public reason requires the “as if” solution of a Kantian Parliamentarian, who rules on whether a proposal is “in order.” Previous work on public reason, by Rousseau, Kant, and Rawls, have all reduced decision-making and the process of “reasoning” to choice by a unitary actor, thereby begging the questions of disagreement, social choice, and reconciliation. Gaus, to his credit, solves that problem, but at the price of requiring that the process “knows” information that is in fact indiscernible to any of the participants. In fact, given the dispersed and radical situatedness of human aims and information, it is difficult for individuals, much less groups, to determine when norms are publicly justified or not. More work is required to fully take on Hayek’s insight that no person, much less all people, can have sufficient reasons to endorse the relevant norm, rule or law.     

Buchanan’s constitutional political economy: exchange vs. choice in economics and in politics

This article discusses the methodological foundations of Buchanan’s constitutional political economy. We argue that Buchanan is a constitutional economist because he is an economist or a political economist. In other words, Buchanan is a constitutional economist—he insists on the necessity of focusing on constitutions and to analyze the “rules of the social game”—because he defines economics as a science of exchange. Buchanan’s definition of economics is not only specific, it is also opposed to the definition of economics that other economists retain and, above all, opposed to the definition of economics that many public choice theorists use. The latter have, in effect, adopted the Robbins 1932 definition of economics as a science of choice that Buchanan criticizes and rejects. Buchanan’s constitutional economics can be a branch of public choice only under certain conditions.

On choosing which game to play when ignorant of the rules

This paper suggests a theory of choice among strategic situations when the rules of play are not properly specified. We take the view that a “strategic situation” is adequately described by a TU game since it specifies what is feasible for each coalition but is silent on the procedures that are used to allocate the surplus. We model the choice problem facing a decision maker (DM) as having to choose from finitely many “actions”. The known “consequence” of the ith action is a coalition from game f _i over a fixed set of players \(N_i\cup\{d\}\) (where d stands for the DM). Axioms are imposed on her choice as the list of consequences (f ₁,..., f _m ) from the m actions varies. We characterize choice rules that are based on marginal contributions of the DM in general and on the Shapley Value in particular.     

Schumpeter’s Split Between “Pure” Economics and Institutional Economics: Why Methodological Individualism Was Not Fully Considered

While Joseph A. Schumpeter is classified as a pioneer of evolutionary economics in a wide sense and of entrepreneurship and innovation management in a narrower sense, Schumpeter is less known for his contributions in the area of scientific methodology and history of science. The paper deals with methodological premises in Schumpeter’s scientific positioning. In 1908, in his Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der theoretischen Nationalökonomie, Schumpeter developed and pioneered his methodological individualism which is very much acknowledged. However, comparing these early positions with methodological writings in his History of Economic Analysis (1954) shows that he has not really shifted from methodological individualism to an institutional perspective that addresses the academic interplay and sees economic action rooted in historical predispositions, paths and social constraints.     

Tullock on the organization of scientific inquiry

In (Tullock, The organization of inquiry, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 1966), Gordon Tullock sets out to establish how knowledge is developed and dispersed in science, to such a high degree of reliability, despite the lack of formal organizational structure. He contrasts this against the unreliability of the “non-sciences”. In this essay, I review his perspective and consider the validity of his proposed reforms.     

Gordon Tullock and experimental public choice

In this paper, I discuss Gordon Tullock’s views on Experimentation in Economics, his own research experiment, and his influence on the field of experimental public choice. I argue that Tullock can credibly claim to have been an early supporter of the method and that his work is cited more often than that of other public choice scholars active in the same period. His work on rent seeking forms the basis of an extensive experimental literature and studies on trust, demand revelation and voter turnout have been strongly influenced by Tullock’s work.     

Algebra of Integrated Time Series: Evidence from Unit Root Analysis

It is argued if x_t ~ I(1) and y_t ~ I(1), then running a regression x_t on y_t would produce spurious results because e _t would generally be I(1). However, there may exist a ‘b’ such that e _t  = x _t - by _t is I(0), then running a regression x _t on y _t would not produce spurious results. This special case of two integrated time series is known in the literature as cointegration. In this particular case, x _t and y _t are said to be cointegrated. In our review of the development of the concept of cointegration, we identified that the underlying reason for this special case to arise is the proposition that if x _t  ~ I(d _x ), y _t  ~ I(d _y ), then z _t  = bx _t  + cy _t  ~ I(max(d _x ,d _y )). In this research, we offer evidence against this proposition.     

Unintended Effects of Targeting an Environmental Rebate

When designing schemes such as conditional cash transfers or payments for ecosystem services, the choice of whom to select and whom to exclude is critical. We incentivize and measure actual contributions to an environmental public good to ascertain whether being excluded from a rebate can affect contributions and, if so, whether the rationale for exclusion influences such effects. Treatments, i.e., three rules that determine who is selected and excluded, are randomly assigned. Two of the rules base exclusion on subjects’ initial contributions. The third is based upon location and the rationales are always explained. The rule that targets the rebate to low initial contributors, who have more potential to raise contributions, is the only rule that raised contributions by those selected. Yet by design, that same rule excludes the subjects who contributed the most initially. They respond by reducing their contributions even though their income and prices are unchanged.     

Tops-only domains

In this paper we consider the standard voting model with a finite set of alternatives A and n voters and address the following question: what are the characteristics of domains \({\mathcal D}\) that induce the property that every strategy-proof social choice function \({f: {\mathcal D}^n \rightarrow A}\) satisfying unanimity, has the tops-only property? We first impose a minimal richness condition which ensures that for every alternative a, there exists an admissible ordering where a is maximal. We identify conditions on \({\mathcal D}\) that are sufficient for strategy-proofness and unanimity to imply tops onlyness in the general case of n voters and in the special case, n = 2. We provide an algorithm for constructing tops-only domains from connected graphs with elements of A as nodes. We provide several applications of our results. Finally, we relax the minimal richness assumption and partially extend our results.     

Indirect higher order beliefs and cooperation

This study experimentally examines the role of indirect higher order beliefs in sequential psychological games. We consider a three-player sequential game in which the first and third players do not interact sequentially, but only through an intermediary, the second player. We posit that the third player’s decision to cooperate depends on his indirect higher order belief, namely, his belief about what the first player believes the second player would choose. We employ pre-play communication between the first and third players as a way to influence the third player’s indirect higher order belief. The evidence demonstrates that communication can effectively induce cooperation from the third player by shaping his indirect higher order belief.     

Gordon Tullock: A Nobel Prize left unbestowed

Gordon Tullock (1922–2014) contributed substantially to public choice theory and bioeconomics. This paper discusses some of these contributions. His scientific contributions have left a Nobel Prize unbestowed.     

Persistency of Turkish export shocks: a quantile autoregression (QAR) approach

This study analyzes the persistency of total and disaggregated Turkish exports for different shock magnitudes using the quantile autoregression (QAR) method in line with Koenker and Xiao (J Am Stat Assoc 99:775–787, 2004). The results suggest that the persistence of shocks are not similar across different quantiles of Total Exports and disaggregated export sectors, indicating an asymmetry in the case of negative and positive shocks across different export sectors. The persistency behavior of Total Exports as well as Food and Beverages, Chemicals, Basic Metals, Raw Materials, Motor Vehicles and Radio & TV exports are asymmetric to negative versus positive shocks, which cannot be captured by traditional unit root tests. Thus, sound interpretation of QAR results is necessary for policy makers to identify shock characteristics and thereby pursue appropriate policies for overcoming adverse impacts on the economy.     

The epistemic claim to the life-world: Alfred Schutz and the debates of the austrian school of economics

The aim of this article is to make a contribution to the reflection on the “interpretive turn” within Austrian economics going back to Alfred Schutz’s notion of life-world sketched out in his first book The Phenomenology of the Social World. In the context of the discussions on how hermeneutics can enrich economics, the problem of objectivism in the production of knowledge is emphasized, i.e., the danger of substitution of social reality upheld by social scientists. Although Schutz’s links with the Austrian School are well known, specialized literature, has not found in Schutz’s work comprehensive solution to the problem that objectivism sets forth regarding the production of knowledge in social sciences. In this article we aim to recover the radical character that Schutz granted his project on phenomenological foundation of social science concepts based on a thorough philosophical analysis of the features of the life-world. We will argue that Schutz sets off based on the problem objectivism in the production of knowledge and offers an answer geared towards the epistemic claim to the life-world. In this regard Schutz draws up a solution that brings together both at the life-world level and at the scientific reflection level, the subjective and objective, the aprioristic and the historical aspects of experience in a phenomenologically based continuum. Finally, and deeply connected to these considerations, new conceptual elements are brought forth to think of the problem of social order.     

Joint misrepresentation with bribes

We study the problem of assigning objects to buyers. Monetary transfers are allowed. Each buyer’s preference space contains, but is not limited to, the linear additively separable preferences. A rule maps each preference profile to an allocation. We are concerned about the possibility that a group of buyers may engage in the following kind of manipulation: They make side payments internally and then carry out a joint misrepresentation. A rule is strongly group strategy-proof if no group can gain by engaging in such operations. We also consider several other appealing requirements. We find that the posted-price rules are the only one that satisfies non-triviality, non-imposition, envy-freeness, and strong group strategy-proofness.