企业招聘中的教育信号博弈研究

企业进行就业市场招聘中,通过学历信号进行求职者能力判别是企业招聘所运用的策略之一,仅从学历信号无法获得更多的求职者的资料,企业因此陷入到信息不对称的情况中。文章通过博弈论对企业招聘过程中人员招聘的分析,证明学历信号并不是决定企业招聘的关键因素,为企业招聘求职者提供参考。     

基于双边市场理论的网络招聘行业定价分析

本文在经典Hotelling模型的基础上,结合Armstrong(2006)提出的竞争性瓶颈模型,分析网络招聘市场平台企业该如何定价。本文创造性地放松两边用户单归属的假定。求职方单归属,招聘方多归属。本文得出结论:招聘网站的定价使得自身和求职方福利最大化,而忽略了招聘方的利益。招聘网站在求职方市场竞争求职者的加入,而在招聘方市场不相互竞争。     

印象管理在企业面试中的影响研究

招聘面试质量影响企业所招聘到人员的综合素质,对企业长远发展、人才培养都有着重要作用。本文从印象管理角度分析其在企业面试中的作用,希望企业能够营造一个高质量的面试环境,使求职者找到自己的理想工作,企业也因此吸引了人才,提高了企业的竞争实力。     

SNS招聘：坦途还是陷阱

目前,一种简称SNS的招聘形式广受企业和求职者青睐,QQ、MSN、博客、论坛等人们常用的网络软件都成为它招聘的工具。然而,SNS招聘,是坦途还是陷阱呢?求职者张乾林和记者分别踏上SNS招聘之旅,为读者揭开其神秘面纱。     

个人信息谁来保护

据中央电视台2004年10月16日播出的《今日说法》节目，一家企业在一次大型招聘会上不慎遗失了一位女求职者的求职登记表格，上面记载有该求职者的基本个人信息。一个犯罪分子根据拾得的该登记表格，冒充该企业的招聘人员，对求职者实施了犯罪，并杀害了求职者。为此，有关人士呼吁，通过立法在我国尽快建立和完善个人信息保护制度已是刻不容缓的一件大事。     

员工求职的博弈分析

文章从博弈的角度分析大学生与有经验者的应聘过程,解释大学生就业中的阻力;然后又分析了招聘方与求职方的博弈过程,可以发现,招聘方与求职者博弈的过程存在着因为信息不对称造成的逆向选择.     

基于RSS的个性化求职系统的分析与设计

个性化在线求职系统是基于网络的信息媒介，本系统的设计提供了发布职位空缺和求职者信息的平台，在线更新以及招聘和求职信息的提交等基本功能，为求职者和招聘者提供了便利高效的沟通平台。     

影响大学生对互联网招聘态度的实证研究

文章以应届毕业生作为研究对象,尝试将互联网招聘作为一个整体,从源头发现求职者对互联网招聘的态度及其影响因素。在采用科学规范方式展开调查的基础上提出了研究假设。然后,结合研究对象的特征,提炼出互联网招聘态度的三个维度:互联网渠道态度,互联网测试态度和互联网面试态度。得出如下结论:互联网招聘态度与性别、学历、专业等个体因素存在显著正相关关系;互联网招聘态度与个体期望薪酬水平存在显著正相关关系,但与个体期望企业类型,期望工作地点等个体期望方面并不存在相关关系。     

招聘立法缺位之惑

眼下,求职者不仅因就业岗位“僧多粥少”而遭遇寒潮,还遭遇了来自招聘方的明枪暗箭、诸多非难,致使不少应聘者如履薄冰。有人对此已习以为常,甚至抱着“存在即合理”的消极观察态度。“求职黑名单”网站的出现,犹如平地一声雷,炸醒了一些对招聘“黑招”视而不见、听而不闻的昏睡者的迷梦。作为处于弱势地位的求职者的一种无奈的抗争和自助,其根源还是用人单位招聘行为的失范和无序。     

雨夜求职

2011年2月21日，深圳富士康清湖招募中心，凌晨两点，一些求职者开始排队等候应聘。他们早起，或走路、打车，赶在8点开始招聘前排上队等待应聘。为了不饿肚子，求职者也只能提前吃路边小贩卖的早餐。路边的照相复印摊位因为没有照明用电，启用发电机工作。2011年，富士康公司大幅提高员工工资福利待遇，很多求职者慕名而来，在有些企业招工难的状况下，深圳富士康招工不愁。白大年初四开始，每天都有万余人排队求职。     

The effects of competition on the nature of cheating behavior

Competition among individuals comes in a variety of forms: for mates, for resources, and for prestige and recognition. Such competitive pressure can lead individuals to engage in unethical behavior in an effort to get ahead. There are several forms of cheating in which individuals may engage to improve their own outcome: they may lie about their own performance in a task and they may lie about others’ performance in a task. Our research is the first to examine how competition affects each of these two types of cheating behavior. We find that individuals are much more willing to cheat by lying about themselves than they are willing to sabotage another when under competitive pressure.     

工人阶级化与市民化:新生代农民工转化的两个问题

与第一代农民工相比,新生代农民工有更为积极的城市定居意愿。但要实现城市定居的意愿,必须实现两个转化:一是工人阶级化,真正成为工人群体;二是市民化,真正成为城市居民。从当前的实际情况来看,新生代农民工的工人阶级化还未完成,其主要表现是只完成了职业身份转变、未完成地位身份的转化,角色意识混乱及其缺乏工人阶级的权利享有;新生代农民工的市民化还难以融入,其主要原因是受到制度隔离、市场压力和社会排斥三要素的阻碍。     

Gender Discrimination and Worker Selectivity: A Comparison of the Self-employed and Wage Earners

This study compares the size and nature of the gender earnings differentials for the self-employed and wage earners in Korea, taking into account the workers’ self-selection of each employment type. The two-stage estimates of the earnings equation, corrected for worker selectivity, are used to decompose the gender earnings differentials into productivity-related and discriminatory factors. Our results suggest that the size of the gender earnings gap is larger in the wage sector than in the self-employment sector, but not by large margin, and so is the discrimination effect when not controlled for worker selectivity. With worker selectivity controlled, the discrimination effect is greatly intensified in the wage sector, while it becomes not significant in the self-employment sector. These findings imply that the observed gender earnings gap in the wage sector is largely ascribed to discrimination against women, while the gender earnings gap in the self-employment sector is mostly due to productivity difference that, in part, is caused by worker selectivity.     

重庆可持续发展与循环经济的建立

在资源有限的前提下,人类生存环境与经济发展之间存在矛盾,人们必须对资源的分配做出选择和取舍,两者的矛盾在短期似乎不可调和。发展循环经济可以解决经济和环境之间长期存在的矛盾,为经济与环境协调发展提供了新思路。     

科技工作者如何传承奥运精神

本文联系奥运精神的基本内涵,就现代科技工作者如何理解并传承奥运精神进行阐述,希共勉之。     

Adverse Selection and Pay Compression

A fundamental result of the principal-agent literature is that pay will be linked to performance when it is difficult for the principal to monitor the agent's actions. However, performance pay can lead to adverse incentives. In these models, high-powered incentives encourage workers to neglect some aspects of their job or to sabotage their coworkers' efforts. This paper offers another explanation for the weak link between pay and performance: worker heterogeneity. When workers are heterogeneous and labor contracts are contests, the Nash equilibrium often pools workers. I show that this implies that the link between pay and performance is weaker than would be the case if firms could observe workers' types before contracting and offer each type their respective optimal contests.     

房价与地价关系及上海的数据检验

文章运用房地产经济学的理论对房地产发展中房价和地价的关系进行分析论证,阐明了长期中房价对地价的影响更加显著的机制.并且针对上海房地产业发展的实际情况,通过时间序列分析,对以上观点加以检验,得出短期内房价与地价互相影响而长期中房价影响地价的结论.     

Gross worker flows and unemployment dynamics in Japan

This paper studies the dynamics of worker flows in Japan between 1980 and 2009. We construct gross worker flows data using the monthly Labor Force Survey. Our data enables us to examine the size and cyclical patterns of the flows and transition rates between employment, unemployment, and not being-in-the labor force. We find that the cyclical pattern of worker flows is similar to that found in other countries; however, worker flows in Japan are generally smaller than those in the US and European countries. We also decompose changes in unemployment into contributions from unemployment inflow and outflow rates. We find that both inflow and outflow rates significantly affect variations in unemployment.     

探究中国城镇化进程中劳资关系新趋势

2010年上半年中国连续出现大规模工人停工事件。这是因为中国以劳动力集约型为主的产业发展模式在经过30年超速发展后,制度时滞、产业布局滞缓等因素导致劳资冲突进入零存整取新时期。这对国家城镇化进程中的产业布局,公共政策等产生深刻影向。文章提出了以人为本让利于民,梯度转移战略布局和国际合作互动共赢的三方面建议。     

Delayed firm‐paid general training

This article adds the empirically verified, but analytically neglected, fact of delayed worker training to a model of general training. By delaying training, firms can gain partial information on worker‐firm matches, generating wage compression. Analytical results differ from those of other training models. In the noncooperative regime, all firm‐paid training is delayed, all worker‐paid training is immediate. With no externalities to other firms, the cooperative result is Pareto‐optimal. In a continuous‐time extension, firms choose a probationary period after which workers are trained. With longer probations, fewer bad‐match workers are trained and wage compression rises. Government training mandates are also studied.