Protecting consumers through protection: The role of tariff-induced technology transfer

We consider a duopolistic trade model where a tariff induces the foreign firm to transfer its superior technology to the domestic rival. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, such a tariff raises consumers’ surplus relative to the free trade situation. We characterize the optimal tariff with and without precommitment on the part of the local government. Possibility of technology transfer reduces the optimal tariff rate compared to the no-transfer situation.     

南方最优知识产权保护水平与南方企业自主创新

构建了一个扩展的南北贸易模型,讨论了南方知识产权保护的决定因素及其对南北双方福利的影响。在模型中,南方政府内生决定知识产权保护水平,北方厂商内生决定研发投资水平和市场竞争策略,南方厂商内生决定自主创新或模仿。研究发现:南方的最优知识产权保护水平与北方存在差异;当南方厂商模仿北方厂商的技术时,南方执行最严格的知识产权保护对北方福利和南方福利都造成损害;当南方厂商的创新效率较高时,严格的知识产权保护能激励南方厂商进行自主创新、改善南方福利。     

The Location of Firms in Unionized Countries*

This paper develops a two‐country economic geography model with Cournot competition, where the labor markets are unionized so that trade unions bargain efficiently with each firm over wages and employment. Agglomeration forces are present due to wage premia obtained by the trade unions. It is shown that if the bargaining power of unions differs across countries then, as trade costs are reduced, the country with relatively weak unions gradually acquires all firms. However, for a range of trade costs, it is also a locally stable equilibrium for all firms to locate in the country with strong unions.     

Strategic trade policy under asymmetric information with screening

The design of strategic rent-extracting trade policies requires information that may be private, such as the cost structure of an industry or parameters of the demand function. As a consequence, under asymmetric information, the design of these policies is problematic. We propose screening menus consisting of different instruments (tariff vs. quota) designed to solve this informational issue. We first use a simple model that examines a Cournot duopoly between a domestic firm and a foreign firm with linear demand and cost functions, with both firms supplying a homogeneous good on the domestic market. In this scenario, if the government does not have information regarding the demand parameter, which is known by both firms, a menu consisting of a rent-extracting tariff for a low demand parameter and a rent-extracting quota for a high demand parameter maximizes the government's objective function. This menu leads the domestic firm to reveal private information. We then generalize this framework to a scenario with imperfect information regarding the firms' marginal cost. Finally, we discuss the issue of quotas generating public revenues and study the case of a menu consisting of a tariff and a free quota.     

Reconciling Observed Tariffs and the Median Voter Model

Median voter theory applied to trade policy predicts positive tariffs in capital‐abundant countries and negative tariffs in labor‐abundant countries. Negative tariffs are rare, and this paper reconciles the median voter theory with observed protectionism across countries. By considering large countries, I show the optimal tariff is a sum of the median voter component and a positive term of trade component. Positive terms of trade effects raise tariffs in all countries, and can overcome the negative median voter component in labor‐abundant countries. Testing the tariff prediction with cross‐section and panel data from the 1990s, I show the median voter component is negative in labor‐abundant countries and positive in capital‐abundant countries. As expected, terms of trade effects raise tariffs across all countries and are stronger among nonmembers of the WTO.     

Progressive Tax and Inequality in a Unionized Economy*

In this paper, we develop a heterogeneous-agent, endogenous growth model of a unionized economy with distinct progressive tax schedules on labor and capital income. With time preference heterogeneity, the effective labor force, balanced growth, and income inequality are endogenously determined, and these interact with each other. A reduction in the degree of progressive labor tax yields a “double-dividend” in terms of reducing income inequality and boosting economic growth, while capital income progressivity displays the usual growth–inequality trade-off. Particularly, the double-dividend effect becomes more pronounced when unionization is declined or trade unions become more wage-oriented, leading to the so-called “Cheshire cat” phenomenon.     

Trade Sanctions and the Incidence of Child Labor

The purpose of this paper is to develop an imperfect competition model of a small open developing country to analyze the effects of trade sanctions on the incidence of child labor. We show that a uniform tariff levied by the developed countries on imports produced with the help of child labor is a failure in terms of reducing child labor. A more effective course of action would be a firm‐specific tariff where the tariff rate varies with the amount of child labor incorporated in a single good. While such an instrument reduces child labor, however, it worsens the children’s well‐being due to lower income and consumption. Contrary to expectations, the entrepreneurs in the developing countries, supposedly the main beneficiaries of child labor, are better off under trade sanctions as they realize higher profits.     

Optimum tariffs and patent length in a model of North–South technology transfer

We study a developing country's choice of optimum tariffs and patent length in a theoretical model of trade and technology transfer. A Northern firm chooses whether to export or produce a new good in a Southern country. In the absence of patent protection, a high tariff is required to induce FDI. This reduces Southern welfare when the good is imported. The Southern government can combine a positive patent length with tariffs to reduce this loss and induce FDI. Thus Southern countries may have an incentive to protect patents, although never to the same extent as Northern countries.     

Lobbying, corruption and “optimal” tariff

This paper explores how a government officer enacts “optimum” import policy when confronting lobbies on trade policies from both domestic and foreign firms in a transition economy. Two results are found: firstly, if the inducement from the foreign firm on the government officer works, then the optimum tariff is negative, that is, import subsidy. However, this subsidy will turn to a positive tariff rate with the increasing lobbying inducement from domestic firms. Secondly, zero tariff duty is not an optimum choice under most circumstances. Besides, an asymmetric result is that when these two firms’ marginal costs are different, the optimum policy is to levy an import tariff on the one whose marginal cost is relatively small, while the other firm will get an import subsidy.     

Trade policy and quality leadership in transition economies

Trade policy and quality leadership in transition economies are analyzed in a duopoly model of trade and vertical product differentiation. We first show that the incidence of trade liberalization is sensitive to whether firms in transition economies are producers of low or high quality. Second, we find that neither free trade nor the absence of a domestic subsidy are optimal: Both a tariff and a subsidy increase price competition and while the former extracts foreign rents the latter results in quality upgrading. Third, there exists a rationale for a government to commit to a socially optimal policy to induce quality leadership by the domestic firm when cost asymmetries are low. Finally, we establish an equivalence result between the effects of long-run exchange rate changes and those of trade policy on price competition (but not on social welfare).     

Rules of Origin in North–South Preferential Trading Arrangements with an Application to NAFTA

All preferential trading agreements (PTAs) short of a customs union use rules of origin (ROO) to prevent trade deflection. ROO raise production costs and create administrative costs. This paper argues that in the case of the recent wave of North–South PTAs, the presence of ROO virtually limits the market access that these PTAs confer to the Southern partners. In the case of NAFTA, we find average compliance costs around 6% in ad valorem equivalent, undoing the tariff preference (4% on average) for a large number of tariff lines. Administrative costs amount to 47% of the preference margin. These findings are coherent with the view that North–South PTAs could well be viewed like a principal–agent problem in which the Southern partners are just about left on their participation constraint.     

Labor Market Institutions and the Second-Best Tariff

Labor market distortions provide a second-best case for protection. However, the implications are less obvious when the product market is imperfectly competitive too, as suggested by several partial equilibrium studies. This paper adopts a general equilibrium approach, combining unionization in labor markets with monopolistic competition in product markets. Two labor market settings are considered: fully centralized wage bargaining ("Scandinavia", for short) and negotiation at the firm level ("Latin America"). The competitive labor market case is used as a benchmark. It is shown that in Latin America the second-best tariff is higher, and the welfare level lower, than in the benchmark case. Scandinavia reaches the first best under free trade.     

Why Free Trade May Hurt Developing Countries

This paper builds a general equilibrium trade model where a country produces two traded goods and one nontraded public consumption good. The government finances the provision of the public good by taxing the incomes of factors of production, and/or by imposing tariffs. Within this framework, the paper (i) shows that a small tariff or an income tax improves the country's welfare if there is an undersupply of public good, and (ii) identifies the circumstances in which an improvement in the country's terms of trade may reduce its welfare, and free trade can be inferior to autarky. A terms of trade improvement, or the movement from autarky to free trade, definitely improves the country's welfare if the government imposes a tariff that leaves the domestic relative price of the imported good unchanged.     

Wage bargaining,trade and growth

We construct a North-South product-cycle model of trade with fully-endogenous growth and union wage bargaining. Economic growth is driven by Northern entrepreneurs who conduct R&D to innovate higher quality products. Northern production technologies can leak to the South upon successful imitation. The North has two sectors: a tradable industrial goods sector (manufacturing) where wages are determined via a bargaining process and a non-tradable sector (services) where wages are flexible. The South has only a tradable industrial goods sector where wages are flexible.We find that unilateral Northern trade liberalization, in the form of lower Northern tariffs on industrial goods, increases the rate of innovation but decreases both the bargained wage in the industrial sector and the flexible wage in the service sector. The wage effects are relative to the Southern wage rate. We also consider a variant of the model with Northern unemployment, driven by a binding minimum wage in the non-tradable service sector. In this case, Northern tariff cuts decrease the innovation rate and the bargained wage rate. In addition, the Northern unemployment rate increases. The model thus highlights the role of labor market institutions in determining the growth and labor market effects of tariff reductions. We also study the effects of unilateral Southern trade liberalization.     

Comparative advantage and strategic specialization

This paper shows that a strong comparative advantage is necessary for free trade and specialization in a 2 × 2 symmetric Ricardian model to be achieved in a Nash equilibrium. Governments strategically control labor distribution across industries, and representative agents maximize Cobb–Douglas utilities. A Nash equilibrium with complete specialization is achieved if and only if relative productivity exceeds a key value of 3, which is considered a very large number based on previous empirical studies. This paper also introduces a two‐stage game where each government chooses labor distribution first and then tariffs. In this two‐stage game, complete specialization is never achieved for any relative productivity level. Finally, by generalizing the Cobb–Douglas model into constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences, I show that if immiserizing growth effects exist, complete specialization could not be achieved for any level of relative productivity.     

North–South asymmetry,unilateral environmental policy and carbon tariffs

This paper focuses on the potential impact of a carbon tariff on carbon emissions, North–South trade and welfare. We use a North–South trade model, where North implements a unilateral environmental policy on domestic carbon-intensive industries followed by a carbon tariff on imports from South. Unlike the existing studies, we allow asymmetry in clean production technologies and marginal environmental damage. We show that a carbon tariff can reduce the global carbon emission via the use of a more advanced clean production technology in North, which increases the firm profit and welfare. However, improvement in welfare of North is associated with a decrease in global trade flows and welfare of South. We find that, in the presence of asymmetry in clean production technologies between North and South, a carbon tariff introduced by the North can eliminate carbon leakage, but the exports of South decrease below the pre-unilateral environmental policy level and hence North can potentially use a carbon tariff for trade protectionism in the name of reducing carbon leakage in South.     

North South Trade and Supervision of the Social Quality of Goods from the South

This text presents a duopolistic North/South model where the Southern firm can choose to produce ethically or not and to lie or not about the real social quality of its production. The goods from the South are assumed to be ethically unsound (i.e. dubious social content) while those from the North ethically sound. We then study the consequences of monitoring ethics in the North on the nature (fair or unfair) and the volume of North–South trade. On the one hand, an increase in the probability of inspection of goods from the South leads to an increase in imports to the North from the South. This result goes against the idea that this kind of social monitoring is akin to a protectionist measure. On the other hand, if monitoring is large enough that leads the Southern firm to produce ethically and the trade to be fair.     

Trade policy and mixed enterprises

Abstract .  This paper demonstrates that the degree of state ownership affects neither the level of socially optimal activities nor welfare if the government chooses optimal trade policy instruments. In the case of rivalry in the home market, the optimal import tariff is independent of the degree of state ownership, and the optimal production subsidy decreases with state ownership if the optimal tariff is positive. For the case of Cournot rivalry in a third market, the optimal export subsidy increases with state ownership, while in the case of Bertrand rivalry with differentiated products, the optimal export tax increases with state ownership.     

发展中国家劳工标准的演进路径——对“社会倾销”指责的一种经济学解析

中国等发展中国家经常因低劳工标准而被指责为“社会倾销” ,而发展中国家则反对将劳工标准问题与贸易挂钩。本文提供了一种解释发展中国家劳工标准演进的框架。本文认为发展中国家的劳工标准必然经历一个逐步提升的过程 ,在此过程中市场机制对于劳工标准的改变有重要作用。发展中国家的劳动力由于劳动边际生产率低而向国外流动 ,同时外国资本也进入发展中国家 ,在此过程中劳工标准得到提高 ,而并不需要国际组织的外力干预。这个分析具有重要的政策含义。     

Asymmetric Labor Markets, Southern Wages and the Location of Firms

This paper studies the behavior of firms towards weak protection of labor standards in developing countries (South). A less than perfectly elastic labor supply in the South gives firms an oligopsony position in the labor market tempting them to strategically reduce output to cut wages. In an open economy, competitors operating where labor standards are recognized meanwhile enjoy less aggressive competitors and raise output. Delocation also increases Southern wages and triggers a competition effect, lowering ex post output and hence potential profits of a relocating firm. These effects reduce relative profitability of moving production to the South casting doubts on traditional beliefs that multinationals are attracted to regions with lower wages. Moreover, adopting a minimum wage policy in the South eliminates the oligopsony distortion and improves competitiveness of Southern firms in the world product market. It also enhances consumer and wage surplus in the South and hence unambiguously raises Southern welfare.