The currency denomination of external European Union imports after European Union expansion

Using a multiple market model I examine the impact of euro expansion on the optimal currency denomination of external EU imports. Results suggest euro invoicing will increase more in the EU-expansion country than in the original EU. Exporting firms from dollar bloc countries (the U.S. or countries with fixed exchange rates with the dollar) are more likely to invoice in the euro if price discrimination is already optimal. Firms from outside the dollar bloc are more likely to use the euro when the original EU market is relatively large or transaction costs of exchanging the euro are relatively small.     

The future of the dollar–euro exchange rate

Monetary unification in Europe is expected to produce a major new international currency, which may compete with the U.S. dollar as the currency of choice in foreign exchange transactions, financial asset markets and central bank reserves. This study considers two important issues regarding the euro: its global role as medium of exchange, unit of account, and store of value and its position relative to the U.S. dollar. Among the main considerations are differences in cyclical behavior, inflation differentials, trade patterns and capital flows, and risk-return assessments. External diversification of private portfolios and of central banks’ reserve holdings will play a key role in determining the euro’s exchange rate. Overall, despite its rough start, we argue that the euro may emerge as a challenger to the U.S. dollar.     

Britain at the crossroads: the single currency

The concept of the single currency, to be adopted by the majority of the members of the European Union, is difficult for the general public to understand because of the lack of coherence of the objectives of its advocates (bureaucrats, ex-bureaucrats, academics, labour leaders, multinational business, and politicians). The general economic arguments for the single currency do not add up. Europe is not an 'optimal currency area.' A one-size-fits-all monetary policy will impose great strains. It is not necessary for Britain to participate in this enterprise. Britain does not need the euro, any more than Canada needs the US dollar. The ideal role for Britain is to be at the margin of Europe as the interface between Europe and North America     

Dynamic interactions between Central European currencies and the euro

We argue that the non-euro EU currencies of Central European countries have moved increasingly together with the euro in foreign exchange markets. To prove this point, we examine the dynamics of cross-elasticity between selected Central European currencies (the Czech koruna, Polish zloty, and Hungarian forint) and the euro exchange rates in U.S. dollar terms using daily data for the January 4, 2000 to April 5, 2019 sample period. We adopt the cross-elasticity model originally proposed and tested for the EU currencies by Orlowski (2016). To test the currency co-movements over time, we employ the Bai-Perron multiple breakpoint regression and two-state Markov switching tests. We find evidence of increasing co-movements between the Central European currencies and the euro that become particularly pronounced in times of financial distress. Co-movements of local exchange rates with the euro are also more pronounced during the euro-periphery sovereign debt crisis.     

Did China diversify its foreign reserves?

This paper takes a novel approach to detect the latent currency portfolio of Chinese foreign exchange reserves and the underlying portfolio management strategies during 2000 and 2007. Based on a portfolio accounting identity and the budget constraint of the Chinese central bank's holding of foreign assets, the monthly growth rate of reserves can be decomposed into monthly rate of return, valuation effects of exchange rates, and monthly net purchase rate. The valuation effect reveals the value share of each currency. Bayesian inference is adopted to estimate the state‐space model with a mixture of Gaussian distributions. The results show that China significantly and dramatically diversified its reserves out of the US dollar in 2002: both the euro's value and quantity shares increased from 5% to more than 20%. By the end of 2007, China held about (at most) 67.3% of its reserves in the US dollar, 22% in the euro, 2.5% in the Japanese yen, 4.7% in the Australian dollar, and 3.5% in the British pound. The average annual rate of return was about 3%. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Jump probability using volatility periodicity filters in US Dollar/Euro exchange rates

The discrete daily and intraday jump probabilities of US dollar/euro returns from February 2010 to February 2018 are analyzed using five-minute returns considering several periodicity filters of volatility. When the max outlying statistics are used with Gumbel distribution with periodicity filters such as weighted standard deviation, shortest half scale, and median absolute deviation, the empirical estimates show that the five-minute US dollar/euro returns have lower daily jump probabilities by 13–28% at common critical levels. To detect intraday jumps using the max outlying Gumbel jump statistics, the five-minute US dollar/euro returns have lower daily jump probabilities by 2–10% when the periodicity filters are included at common critical levels. Therefore, when the periodicity filters of volatility are considered, the five-minute US dollar/euro returns have significantly lower daily and intraday jump probabilities than when the periodicity filters are not considered.     

Incorporating the RMB internationalization effect into its exchange rate volatility forecasting

Recently, the Chinese government has launched the renminbi (RMB) internationalization policy as an impetus to foster China’s global economic integration. The RMB internationalization effect on China’s economy and the RMB exchange rate has attracted massive attention in recent financial research. In this paper, we adopt a genetic programming (GP) method to generate new RMB exchange rate volatility forecasting models incorporating the RMB internationalization effect. Our models are proved to have significant accuracy improvement in predicting both RMB/US dollar and RMB/euro exchange rate volatilities, compared with standard GARCH volatility models, which are incapable of capturing the RMB internationalization effect. Furthermore, our models display salient practical implications for policy makers to formulate monetary policies and currency traders to design effective trading strategies.     

Regional versus global integration of euro-zone retail banking markets: Understanding the recent evidence from price-based integration measures

We investigate the integration of euro-zone retail banking markets by comparing convergence and cointegration measures. As an innovation to the literature convergence measures are exposed to a difference-in-differences methodology which allows both, identifying the impact of the single currency and benchmarking euro zone-specific from global integration effects. We find that euro-zone convergence has largely been a result of integrating wholesale markets after the elimination of exchange rate risks. After 1999 integration is mainly observed for a restricted “convergence club” excluding Germany, Ireland and Belgium. Moreover, convergence is at least partly a global rather than euro zone-specific process.     

What are the Implications of a Weaker Dollar?

The dollar has finally fallen to below parity against the euro. Such a depreciation has long been expected but, for all that, the suddenness of this fall — triggered by a loss of confidence in US equities in the wake of recent accounting scandals — has been a surprise. This article explores the impact of that shock on the prospects for the global recovery.     

Intraday effect of news on emerging European forex markets: An event study analysis

We analyze the impact of euro zone/German and U.S. macroeconomic news announcements and the communication of the monetary policy settings of the ECB and the Fed on the forex markets of new EU members. We employ an event study methodology to analyze intraday data from 2011–2015. Our comprehensive analysis of the wide variety of macroeconomic information during the post-GFC period shows that: (i) macroeconomic announcements affect the value of the new EU country exchange rates, (ii) the origin of the announcement matters, (iii) the type of announcement matters, (iv) different types of news (good, bad or neutral) result in different reactions, (v) markets react not only after the news release but also before, (vi) when the U.S. dollar is the base currency the impact of the news is larger than in the case of the euro, (vii) announcements on ECB monetary policy result in stronger effects than those of the Fed, (viii) temporary inefficiencies are present in new EU country forex markets, (ix) new EU country exchange rates react differently to positive US news during the EU debt crisis compared to the rest of the period.     

House price convergence in the euro zone: A pairwise approach

The adoption of the euro common currency was expected to lead to convergence for a number of economic and financial variables across national borders, including house prices. We apply a probabilistic pairwise approach to the question of whether home values converge across eight euro zone housing markets. Contrary to previous studies, we find only marginal evidence that euro housing markets converge. Moreover, for what convergence there appears to be, there is no evidence that the adoption of the euro itself played a role in creating such convergence. Finally, Germany, the largest and most dominant economy of the currency union, is rarely found to be convergent with other nations.     

Currency Mismatching

This paper considers a firm domiciled in an emerging market, modeling its decision to denominate its debt in a combination of its domestic currency and a foreign currency, that is, the dollar. The objective is to determine those situations when the firm is motivated to engage in currency mismatching, that is, denominating a higher percentage of its debt in dollars than what is warranted by its dollar‐denominated sales. The following factors are shown to induce greater currency mismatching: speculative capital flows into the emerging market, reduced ability to price discriminate between domestic and foreign customers, increased exchange rate stability, and lower risk‐aversion. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

关于国际本位货币历史沿革与发展趋势研究的文献综述

从布雷顿森林体系建立开始,美元就一直在国际货币体系中占据核心位置,本轮全球性金融危机中亦深刻体现了现有体系难以有效"约束"美元,并最终酿成了世界性的恶果。有关美元垄断地位的可持续性以及未来的国际本位货币格局再次成为关注的焦点,成为摆在我们面前非常值得研究的课题。文章试图系统梳理百年发展史中国际本位货币的基本特征、运行机制、演变过程,引出对国际本位币历史沿革的全面了解。并归纳总结国内外学术界关于国际货币体系改革的几种主流观点,以基于演变规律的基础上,探讨国际本位货币的未来走向、拟遵循什么样的改革原则和改革方案以顺应国际本位货币的发展趋势。     

Monetary integration in the Southern Cone

The effect of exchange-rate volatility on the domestic economy depends in part on the importance of trade in total economic activity. Unlike the European Union (EU), trade among the Mercosur countries is less highly integrated, so that movements in intra-area exchange rates are less important than exchange rates vis-à-vis the dollar and the euro. This paper analyzes the impact of exchange-rate and interest-rate volatility on investment and labor markets in the Southern Cone and finds that both volatility against the dollar and the euro and variability of interest rates have significant dampening effects on employment and investment.     

STERLING AND THE DOLLAR: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

In the first two years of the Conservative government elected in May 1979 sterling rose 25 per cent on a trade weighted basis. It then fell back and is currently little changed from the level inherited by the Conservatives. In the first two years of the Reagan administration the dollar rose 30 per cent on the same basis. It too fell back thereafter, but only briefly - throughout 1983 the rise of the dollar has been resumed and it now stands at its highest level for at least twenty years. In this Forecast Release we examine the similarities and differences between these two currencies. We argue that a crucial element explaining the performance of the currency has been the size and expected development of the public sector deficit and that prospects for the dollar depend crucially on this. A sharp fall in the dollar could occur in the next year or two if rapid growth of output begins to produce a signijcant reduction in federal borrowing.     

House price convergence in euro zone and non-euro zone countries

This study investigates whether single currency use increased house price convergence among various countries. First, the panel unit root test results indicate that the house prices in euro zone countries were more correlated than the house prices in non-euro zone countries. Second, the house prices in various European countries converged towards the house prices in Germany, which uses the single currency, rather than towards those in the United Kingdom, indicating that single currency use increased the influence of the German housing market on other markets. Finally, the log t regression model, a new convergence test, was employed and determined that the house prices in various European countries were not converging before 1992 but began to do so after that year. After the euro was implemented as an official currency, the house prices in various countries converged towards a consistent level. On the basis of the relative transition paths, this study determines that the differences among housing markets in various countries have continuously decreased since 1992. The empirical results indicate that the law of one price is applicable to tradable goods and that single currency use can integrate housing markets, which include non-tradable goods.     

Reports of the dollar's demise greatly exaggerated

• ? Speculation that the dollar could lose its status as the world's main reserve currency “sooner rather than later”ⁱ looks, in our view, wide of the mark. Across a range of international uses, the dollar accounts for 40–60% of transactions – a share that has been stable or even increasing in recent years. Potential rivals are far behind, especially the Chinese renminbi, which accounts for just 1–2% of transactions. As a result, the dollar's pre‐eminence looks unlikely to be seriously threatened for many years to come. The US's gains from the dollar's global role may also be more modest than often thought.
• ? The dollar's position is supported by factors including its widespread use as a trading and commodity‐pricing currency, the size and liquidity of US financial markets, and the continued lack of a credible rival. None of these is likely to be significantly eroded in the near term, even with some moves afoot to shift away from dollar payments in oil and other areas. Historical evidence suggests that a world of multiple reserve currencies is possible but also shows it can take decades for reserve currencies to lose their dominant status.

     

Why ‘King dollar’ is reigning supreme

• ▀ After a pause in late 2017 and early 2018, the dollar has resumed its rise. Our analysis suggests the long-term factors influencing the dollar are likely to remain supportive in 2020, ebbing only in 2021.
• ▀ Alongside positive interest rate differentials, several key factors explain the recent dollar strength including relatively strong economic growth, a contained external deficit and significant equity market outperformance.
• ▀ Over 2018–2019 US growth has been faster than the rest of the G7, which suffered more downside surprises this year. Meanwhile, the deterioration in the US external deficit was less than expected, despite the Trump fiscal stimulus.
• ▀ The massive improvement in the US oil balance over recent years looks like an important long-term structural support for the dollar. It allows the US to grow faster and have a stronger currency than would otherwise have been the case.
• ▀ The dollar is also supported by its still-dominant position in global financial markets. Recent talk of ‘de-dollarisation’ looks to be largely hype - the dollar's share of cross-border transactions, trade invoicing, and FX reserves is high and either stable or rising.
• ▀ The conditions necessary to create another dollar bear market like that in 2002–2008 may be hard to reproduce. A period of relative underperformance in US stocks is conceivable, but the 2002–2008 period also featured large US basic balance of payments deficits and persistently negative long-term real yield differentials, which look less likely to materialise.

     

The Introduction of the Euro and Derivative Use in French Firms

In January 1999 several European countries adopted a common currency, the “euro”. This important economic event provided an opportunity to examine the determinants of risk management in an environment where exposure to foreign exchange (FX) risk was considerably reduced. For a sample of French firms we found the decline in the use of FX derivatives was greater for firms with substantial sales within the euro zone and less for firms in industries that still had significant imports from outside the euro zone. The focus on derivatives adds to existing research, as it is a more explicit indicator of a reduction in the resources devoted to hedging. The reduction in hedging was not in direct proportion to the reduction in FX exposure, implying that euro risk was hedged more intensely than French franc risk in the sample of French firms over the chosen years.     

推动澳大利亚入境游的宏观环境因素综述

澳大利亚不仅是南半球经济最发达的国家,还凭借其独特的自然风光和出色的人文景观吸引了全球游客的光临。本文针对澳大利亚入境游的文献资料进行了研究调查与分析,重点放在两大宏观因素上,社会文化因素(恐怖主义和兴趣旅游)和经济因素(汇率和中国市场)。通过调研本文指出,澳大利亚入境游人数在一个相对安全的国际环境下呈现出稳定增长的趋势,尤其在开发兴趣旅游方面表现出色,并且中国市场对澳大利亚入境游起到了不可小视的推动作用。全球经济回暖后,澳币汇率近五年的变化对入境游造成了附加影响,当澳币增值时澳大利亚入境游发展速度放缓,反之加快。