On the possibility of attaining environmental and trade objectives simultaneously

With the greening of political debate around the world, large nations — precluded from using trade instruments explicitly — have become aware of the fact that they can manipulate their domestic tax structure to attain environmental and trade objectives simultaneously. In this note we show how such nations can attain these two targets with one instrument. Specifically, we show how to construct dual purpose taxes. We then focus on the empirical determinants of these taxes.     

On the Double Dividend under Imperfect Competition

We investigate whether, and under which conditions, a revenue-neutral environmental tax reform may yield an employment double dividend, i.e., an improvement of environmental quality and an increase in aggregate employment. Using a model with two market imperfections – a rigid real wage and imperfect competition in one industry – we show that an employment dividend is plausibly obtained. However, for countries where labor taxes are high and households spend a large share of their income in favor of environmentally harmful consumption goods a double dividend can nevertheless not be obtained, for under these conditions environmental quality deteriorates.     

Environmental regulation of households: An empirical review of economic and psychological factors

The literature on sustainable consumption and environmental regulation of household behavior is dominated by conceptual and normative approaches. As a result, many suggestions lack a firm empirical basis. To overcome this deficiency, econometric studies in three areas of environmentally relevant activities of households are reviewed: residential use of energy, generation of solid waste and recycling, and residential use of water. Next to price and income elasticities, attention is devoted to individual socio-economic features and psychological factors, such as attitudes, knowledge, perceptions and values. Potential psychological determinants and related insights are further examined by discussing a range of representative and illustrative statistical–psychological studies of environmental behavior. One important general finding is that there are very few empirical studies that systematically combine socio-economic and psychological determinants. A range of insights for environmental policy is derived, and research recommendations are offered.     

Dynamic environmental policy in developing countries with a dual economy

We analyze a dynamic model of environmental policy in a stylized developing country (DC) with a dual economy. This DC's economy is distorted in part because the government subsidizes the exports of the nonpolluting sector of the economy. We analyze the employment and output effects of three different pollution taxes. These taxes incorporate alternate assumptions about the DC government's ability to commit to its announced course of action. We describe the taxes, we examine the dependence of these taxes on the extant distortion, and we stipulate the conditions which call for an activist policy, irrespective of the length of time to which the government can commit to its announced policy. Inter alia, our analysis shows why some DC governments may not be serious about environmental protection.     

Incentives for investment in energy efficiency: an econometric evaluation and policy implications

Technical studies suggest that there exist many opportunities to improve energy efficiency, and that a substantial proportion is profitable by current business standards. This study deals with the question why so many of these profitable opportunities are not used. Reasons for not implementing profitable opportunities are idetified, and their effect is estimated on the basis ofa survey among Dutch firms, designed specifically for this study. The reasons that prevail indicate what policy measures may accompany energy taxes in the pursuit of energy efficiency improvement. In addition, energy efficiency elasticities are estimated, as well as the factors that determine the elasticities. These too indicate opportunities for government policy, if it wants to improve the effectiveness of energy taxes.     

Is migration a good substitute for education subsidies?

Assuming a given educational policy, the recent brain drain literature reveals that skilled migration can boost the average level of schooling in developing countries. In this paper, we introduce educational subsidies determined by governments concerned by the number of skilled workers remaining in the country. Our theoretical analysis shows that developing countries can benefit from skilled emigration when educational subsidies entail high fiscal distortions. However when taxes are not too distortionary, it is desirable to impede emigration and subsidize education. We then investigate the empirical relationship between educational subsidies and migration prospects, obtaining a negative relationship for 105 countries. Based on this result, we revisit the country specific effects of skilled migration upon human capital. We show that the endogeneity of public subsidies reduces the number of winners and increases the magnitude of the losses.     

Using Empirical Point Elasticities to Teach Tax Incidence

Using point elasticities rather than using either arc elasticities or slopes of demand and supply curves provides the best method for teaching students about the economic impacts of excise taxes. Not only does a point-elasticity approach simplify theoretical analysis of tax impacts, but it also allows instructors to take advantage of publicly available empirical estimates of demand and supply elasticities to show students how theoretical results can be applied to real-world tax policy issues. To illustrate these advantages, the authors use several available estimates of point elasticities of demand and supply of raw sugar to calculate the economic impacts of a recently proposed penny-per-pound tax on raw cane sugar grown in the Florida Everglades.     

Globalisation, capital mobility and tax competition: theory and evidence for OECD countries

Are the predictions of tax competition theory wrong? While the tax competition literature predicts that taxes on income from capital decrease with increasing globalisation, past empirical studies on various data find contradicting evidence. By using different data and additional elements of economic theory, this paper aims to challenge the empirical contributions. For a panel of 14 OECD countries and for the period 1967–1996, we find that globalisation has indeed a negative and significant impact on corporate taxes. Furthermore, globalisation tends to raise labour taxes and social expenditures. As a consequence, the so-called “efficiency” and “compensation” hypotheses of globalisation are not competing, but rather, both appear to apply at the same time. Efficiency has an impact on the tax-mix, whereas compensation is provided through increased social expenditures.     

Environmental policy instruments and imperfectly competitive international trade

Policy makers, industrialists and environmentalists express concern that the imposition of tough environmental policies in some countries displaces production, and hence pollution, to countries which impose less tough environmental policies. Yet empirical studies of such impacts suggest they are small. However, these findings are derived from models in which international trade is modelled as being perfectly competitive. In this paper I model trade as imperfectly competitive with scope for strategic behavior by producers, in this case investment in capital. I show that the choice of environmental policy instrument can have a marked impact on the incentives for producers to act strategically, with environmental standards significantly reducing the incentives for strategic overinvestment relative to environmental taxes or no environmental policy at all. Whether welfare is higher using standards or taxes depends on whether producing countries are also significant consumers of the polluting product, and on whether all producing governments act to reduce emissions or only some subset of governments. To assess the quantitative significance of these theoretical results I conduct policy simulations on a calibrated model of the world fertilizer industry. These simulations show that the impact of environmental policy on strategic behaviour can be large.     

Micro and macro elasticities in a life cycle model with taxes

We build a life cycle model of labor supply that incorporates changes along both the intensive and extensive margin and use it to assess the consequences of changes in tax and transfer policies on equilibrium hours of work. We find that changes in taxes have large aggregate effects on hours of work. Moreover, we find that there is no inconsistency between this result and the empirical finding of small labor elasticities for prime age workers. In our model, micro and macro elasticities are effectively unrelated. Our model is also consistent with other cross-country patterns.     

Optimal export taxes in a multicountry framework

This paper extends the optimum export tax analysis to multicountry partial (PE) and general equilibrium (GE) frameworks, using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the global cocoa market. Analyzing myopic optimum, Nash optimum and Nash revenue maximizing taxes, we show that optimum and revenue maximizing taxes obtained in the GE framework differ from their PE counterparts, as they are determined not only by the elasticity of the residual demand curve facing the country, but by domestic supply conditions as well. Second, not only are Nash revenue maximizing taxes higher than Nash optimum taxes in the GE, but, paradoxically, the society attains a higher level of welfare under Nash revenue maximizing taxes than under Nash optimum taxes. Finally, we show that the frequent use of Lerner symmetry [Lerner, A.P., 1936. The symmetry between import and export taxes. Economica 11, 306–313.] in the policy-oriented analysis of optimum export taxes is not warranted.     

Environmental Taxes and First-Mover Advantages

This paper studies whether governments prefer to be leaders or followers in environmental policies. To analyze this question I assume transboundary pollution and two countries that have to decide whether to set environmental taxes sequentially or simultaneously. When taxes are set sequentially an effect, denoted as the sequential setting effect, arises that raises the equilibrium taxes. I show that whether governments prefer to be leaders or followers in taxes depends on the degree to which environmental pollution spills over to trading partners. When this overspill is low enough, taxes are strategic complements and both the leader and the follower obtain greater welfare than under a simultaneous tax setting. However, the leader country obtains greater welfare than the follower. In this case, governments set taxes sequentially. When the degree to which environmental pollution spills over to trading partners is high enough, taxes are strategic substitutes and governments set taxes simultaneously. In this case, each government wants to avoid becoming the follower in taxes.     

The “greening” of trade unions and the demand for eco-taxes

By embedding labour market bargaining considerations in an influence-seeking framework, we show how a union's stance on environmental policy depends on the exposure of their members to the risk of job loss. With a risk of unemployment, unions lobby with employers to resist stricter environmental policies. When employment is secure, unions may support policies that reduce employment opportunities for nonunion workers. “Environmentalism” can therefore arise without explicit environmental concerns among workers. Consequently, pollution taxes may yield a negative welfare dividend in the form of inefficiently high unemployment.     

Developing Country Second‐Mover Advantage in Competition Over Environmental Standards and Taxes

We show that, in competition between a developed country and a developing country over environmental standards and taxes, the developing country may have a “second‐mover advantage.” In our model, firms do not unanimously prefer lower environmental standard levels. We introduce this feature to an otherwise familiar model of fiscal competition. Four distinct outcomes can be characterized by varying the marginal cost to firms of an environmental externality: (1) the outcome may be efficient; (2) the developing country may be a “pollution haven”—a place to escape excessively high environmental standards in the developed country; (3) the developing country may “undercut” the developed country and attract all firms; (4) the developed country may be a pollution haven.     

Pollution Policy and Trade Liberalization of Environmental Goods

During the Doha Round at the World Trade Organization, reductions in trade barriers on environmental goods (EG) were put forward as a means of helping developed and developing countries alike deal with current environmental problems. We examine the potential effectiveness of such a strategy in a developing country that imports all its consumption of EG from an imperfectly competitive foreign eco-industry. We point out that trade liberalization of EG might in fact lead to less stringent pollution taxes, which can result in an actual rise in pollution levels. We then show that the environmental effectiveness objective of this trade reform can be achieved when the regulator uses quantitative abatement standards as an alternative pollution policy instrument. However, this environmental achievement comes at the expense of social welfare.     

Federal transfers, environmental policy and economic growth

We study the effects of commonly used cross-country transfer programs on uncoordinated national environmental policies, economic growth and natural resources in a federal economy. Natural resources are a federation-wide public good. In each member country, production degrades the environment, but clean-up policy can improve it. Clean-up policy is financed by taxes on polluting firms’ output and cross-country redistributive transfers. We solve for a symmetric Nash equilibrium among national governments. Transfer policies that lead to higher pollution taxes make existence harder, and are harmful not only to growth but also to the environment. The best way to improve environmental quality is to implement a taxation system that stimulates growth and broadens tax bases to finance national clean-up policies.     

Are Armington elasticities different across countries and sectors? A European study

CGE models are widely used for policy evaluation and impact analysis especially with respect to trade reforms, tax reforms, energy sector reform and development policy analysis. However, the results of such models are often argued to be sensitive to the choice of exogenous parameters such as trade elasticities. Several authors show that the choice of the so-called Armington elasticities in the demand function has a strong influence on the simulation results. Most existing estimates of Armington elasticities are only for the US. The few studies for other countries find substantially differing results. Nevertheless, many CGE modelers simply adopt the elasticities from other studies disregarding specific country and model characteristics. This paper aims at providing estimated elasticities based on recent data for a larger group of European countries. Using cointegration and panel fixed effects analyses we estimate the first order condition resulting from cost minimization or utility maximization subject to the CES utility or cost function in imports and domestic goods. The results show a rather large variation across sectors and countries and the magnitude is only partly comparable to the US elasticities. Moreover, in a small CGE application we are able to show that changing the elasticity set has a quantitative and even qualitative impact on CGE model results, which confirms the concern that one might end up with biased results due to a misspecification of the elasticities.     

Foreign investment and environmental regulations in LDCs

This paper examines the welfare and policy issues of pollution taxes and foreign-investment quotas for a small, developing economy. We consider each policy in isolation and joint optimum of them. We find that, for a country with capital inflows, an active environmental policy along with a liberal policy on foreign capital is optimal.     

Fiscal Effects of Minimum Wages: An Analysis for Germany

Abstract. Against the background of the current discussion of statutory minimum wages in Germany, this paper analyzes the potential employment and fiscal effects of such a policy. Based on estimated labor demand elasticities obtained from a structural labor demand model, the empirical results imply that minimum wages in Germany will be associated with significant employment losses among marginal and low- and semi-skilled full-time workers. Even though minimum wages will lead to increased public revenues from income taxes and social security benefits, they will result in a significant fiscal burden, due to increased unemployment benefits and decreased revenues from corporate taxes.     

Global environment and dynamic games of environmental policy in an international duopoly

This paper examines a differential game model of international pollution control in which polluting oligopolists compete in a third country market. Two alternative policy instruments (emission taxes and command-and-control regulations) are considered. A tougher emission policy in the home country enhances the foreign firm’s competitiveness because of the static “rent-shifting” effect. The foreign country also enjoys a future improvement of the global environmental quality by “free riding” on the home country’s emission reduction effort. Because of these strategic effects, the levels of environmental policy determined in the noncooperative policy game are distorted away from the socially optimal level. Moreover, the emission tax game produces a more distortionary outcome than that in the command-and-control game; it generates more pollution and lower welfare.