专利保护宽度和累积创新竞赛中的信息披露

本文将专利保护宽度定义为累积创新厂商之间的许可比率，考察其对累积创新竞赛中厂商信息披露决策的影响。我们发现：强的专利保护宽度有利于信息披露，但其对社会福利和技术进步率的影响却呈近似的倒U型，故在不同的情况下都存在一令专利保护宽度的最优取值区间。与事后许可相比，事前许可能在反托拉斯法的框架下导致社会福利的帕累托改进。如果双方对专利诉讼的结果具有相同的预期，则专利保护宽度的确定和实施就是无成本的。     

独立许可条款下竞争性专利联盟累积创新效应比较研究

由于技术标准间竞争加剧,在高新技术产业内形成了基于不同技术标准的多个竞争性专利联盟并存的格局。此外,随着对专利联盟垄断性审查的加强,同时为了更好地保护联盟内企业利益,鼓励其创新,很多联盟采用了独立许可条款。为此,运用动态博弈理论分别构建无独立许可条款和有独立许可条款下竞争性专利联盟累积创新效应的分析模型,对阻碍性专利的创新效应进行比较研究。结果表明：竞争性专利联盟创新效应受独立许可条款、专利类型、专利联盟技术标准间差异化程度、联盟内企业所持有的必要专利数量等因素影响,具有复杂性。但总体上,竞争性专利联盟可降低专利许可费,促进专利的使用,有利于提高社会福利,促使企业增加研发投入,鼓励企业创新。     

累积性创新、知识产权保护策略与最优政策

建立了一个两阶段研发（R&D）竞赛模型,分析在累积性创新市场上厂商选择不同知识产权保护策略对其创新决策及最优政策的影响。研究表明：当商业秘密能够作为创新的有效保护机制时,政府应该对初始创新实行宽专利保护政策,以刺激创新信息的披露;如果此时专利政策仍不能奏效,那么政府就应该实行宽松的反垄断政策,允许初始创新者和后续创新者达成同盟协议。     

专利保护、补充性资产与创新企业技术许可选择

创新企业采用什么方式阻止竞争对手的模仿创新是创新战略的重要部分,分析专利保护和补充性资产对创新企业技术许可的影响,发现专利保护和补充性资产对创新企业选择技术许可,阻止模仿创新有着重要的影响,在此基础上,本文建立库诺特模型分析了市场主导型创新企业的最优技术许可战略.     

专利许可对区域创新绩效的影响

根据中国知识产权局收录的2012 年度国内专利实施许可合同备案登记信息,采用社会网络分析方法和线性回归模型,构建专利许可关系网络,实证分析不同来源专利许可数量对区域创新绩效的影响。研究发现,来自国外和三资企业的专利许可数量对区域创新产出具有显著促进作用,来自国内跨省区的专利许可数量对区域创新产出的促进作用略小于外资专利,省区专利许可网络位置对区域创新产出也具有正向影响。     

知识披露策略:专利竞赛中的厂商策略性行为

专利竞赛是产业组织理论的重要内容。在专利竞赛中,披露研发知识是落后厂商常用的策略性行为,其目的通常是延长竞赛时间,为其追赶领先厂商提供机会。落后厂商的知识披露策略能够降低领先厂商在专利竞赛中获胜的概率,并迫使领先厂商与落后厂商进行合作研发。我国企业的研发力量尽管在某些技术领域比国外大型企业弱,但可采取知识披露策略,迫使国外厂商与我国企业进行合作创新。     

空间框架下的专利许可:创新激励与福利分析

专利许可在某种程度上可以寻求鼓励创新和减少净损失之间的折中,提高资源配置效率。本文基于Hotelling模型,考虑产品价格变化对消费者需求的影响,构建了一个三阶段博弈模型,结果显示:消费者的需求变化、产品市场的竞争程度、创新的大小、创新市场上的竞争程度都会影响到创新激励、消费者剩余和社会福利水平。因而,创新方应当综合分析各种因素,确定使自身利润最大化的许可策略;决策机构应当从许可的本身特征出发,系统分析许可策略的内在机制,在不损害消费者剩余的前提下,提高技术交易效率,促进技术扩散,最大化社会福利。     

专利是否影响公司的盈利预测信息披露

基于迎合专利带来的投资者信息需求增长和规避信息披露成本及风险的权衡,选择既受投资者关注又能反映专利转化应用结果的盈利预测信息,考察获得的专利是否影响公司盈利预测信息披露决策。以我国上市公司2012—2021年数据进行的实证检验发现,随着专利数量的增加,公司进行了数量更多、质量更好的自愿盈利预测信息披露;且其中代表实质性创新和探索式创新的高质量专利的数量对自愿盈利预测披露的积极影响更大。此外,在创新型公司、机构投资者持股比例高的公司、面临相对弱的市场竞争的公司,专利数量对自愿盈利预测披露的积极影响作用更强,显示了公司以盈利预测披露去迎合投资者信息需求、传递专利价值信号的作用。     

累积创新框架下的知识产权保护研究

本文通过构建累积创新框架下的拍卖模型来探讨知识产权制度的社会福利效应,比较各种具体制度的效率及在各种特殊的产业中的应用保护。基于存在领先厂商情况下累积创新过程中的创新竞赛问题的分析,可以得到三种不同策略情形下的社会福利函数,并确定知识产权保护程度的适用范围。研究结论的应用扩展表明:以生物技术、电子和医药等为主的行业,适用比较严格的保护制度进行保护,如专利制度;以计算机软件、音乐、书籍和期刊等为主的行业,适用比较宽松的保护制度进行保护,如版权制度。     

最优专利制度研究

本文构建了一个动态一般均衡模型来研究最优专利长度和最优专利宽度的问题。研究结论表明,最优的专利长度和专利宽度都是有限的。专利长度的增加会通过促进创新来提高社会福利水平,同时,也会导致市场扭曲,从而降低社会福利水平,但随着专利长度的不断增加,前者的效应会小于后者的效应,因此,有限的专利长度是最优的。有效的专利宽度应该一方面使得模仿产品的质量水平不要太低,从而保证模仿产品对专利产品形成潜在的威胁,逼迫专利产品的价格低于垄断价格,减小市场扭曲;另一方面使得模仿产品的质量不要太高,从而保证专利产品能够制定较高的垄断价格,促进创新。     

Patent term extensions and commercialization lags in the pharmaceutical industry: A growth-theoretic analysis

Due to the lags in commercialization, the effective life of a patent is generally less than its statutory term. We introduce commercialization lags into the Schumpeterian growth model and explore the effects of patent term extensions on pharmaceutical R&D and social welfare. Our results show that extending patent terms stimulates the consumption of homogeneous goods but generates an ambiguous effect on the consumption of pharmaceuticals. When patent extensions have an inverted-U effect on social welfare, the optimal patent extension increases with the length of commercialization lags but decreases with the input intensity of commercialization lags. Finally, we calibrate the model and find that increasing patent breadth reduces the optimal patent extension.     

Effects of a blocking patent on R&D with endogenous survival activities

This study analyzes the effect of strengthening patent protection for innovation and economic growth by introducing a blocking patent into the endogenous growth model developed by Furukawa (Econ Lett 121(1):26–29, 2013a), which features survival activity of patent holders in the R&D sector with a variety-expansion model. Results show that strengthening patent protection can raise the economic growth rate and social welfare through an endogenous survival investment. Additionally, this study examines the effects of increasing subsidies for R&D. We find that increasing R&D subsidy rate can negatively affect economic growth and social welfare because of the investment for survival activities. This result shows the novel role of a blocking patent in determining innovation effects of R&D subsidies. Furthermore, we analyze the effect of patent breadth which is another patent instrument in this model on innovation and economic growth. Results show that the growth and welfare effects of the profit-division rule and the subsidy rate for R&D may vary with the size of patent breadth.     

Dynamic analysis of patent policy in an endogenous growth model

In this paper, we explore the dynamic properties of an endogenous growth model with finite patent length. We show that there exists a unique equilibrium growth path and that this path exhibits damped oscillations in contrast to the equilibrium path of an endogenous growth model with infinite patent length. We also examine the effects of patent policy on social welfare and show that infinite patent length does not maximize social welfare. Furthermore, we show that, in a growth model that does not exhibit scale effects, a finite patent length maximizes social welfare on the balanced growth path.     

Patent Policy in an Endogenous Growth Model

We investigate how the patent policy affects economic growth and social welfare based on an endogenous growth model with R&D activities. We show that the patent length that maximizes the social welfare is finite. Moreover, by introducing compulsory licensing, we also show that the patent length that maximizes the social welfare is not infinite even if the royalty rate can be controlled. Received June 29, 2001; revised version received February 5, 2002 Published online: February 17, 2003 We wish to thank two anonymous referees for their constructive comments. We also thank Akira Yakita for his helpful comments.     

产业特性与专利联盟经济效率

由互补性专利形成的专利联盟能够克服“专利丛林”问题、提高纵向产业链经济效率,这一结论是对专利联盟的一般共识。以生物技术产业为例,从产业特性角度,分析在存在溢出效应和产品差异化的情况下,由互补性专利组成的专利联盟经济效率问题。研究发现,当专利联盟的形成导致溢出效应很大且最终产品近似可替代时,由互补性专利组成的专利联盟会降低社会总福利水平,这为专利联盟的反垄断规制审查提供了一种新的理论见解。     

Patent claims and economic growth

This study introduces a blocking patent on horizontal R&D into the endogenous growth model of Chu et al. (2012), which features a blocking patent on vertical R&D. Results show that strengthening patent protection on horizontal R&D promotes vertical innovation (quality improvement) but hinders horizontal innovation (variety expansion). This effect of a horizontal blocking patent on directionality of innovation is opposite to that of the vertical blocking patent analyzed by Chu et al. (2012). Results also show that under mild conditions, strengthening a blocking patent on horizontal innovation as well as on vertical innovation can increase economic growth and social welfare.     

企业研发与专利保护——基于企业间策略性竞争的分析视角杨

本文使用空间价格歧视模型,分析了企业研发决策与政府专利保护之间的关系。结果不仅证明了企业在专利保护程度较高、研发环境较好时会进行研发,研发数量与政府的专利保护呈倒U型关系,而且发现,企业研发后,在专利保护程度极低和极高时,企业会采用特许权方式对外专利授权,中间状态下企业不对外授权。从社会福利和社会创新的角度来看,专利保护不是越多越好,而是存在一个临界的拐点。该拐点随着社会研发环境和行业交易费用的增加而递增。     

Does intellectual monopoly stimulate or stifle innovation?

This study develops an R&D-based growth model with vertical and horizontal innovation to shed some light on the current debate on whether patent protection stimulates or stifles innovation. We analyze the effects of patent protection in the form of blocking patents. We show that patent protection changes the direction of innovation by having asymmetric effects on vertical innovation (i.e., quality improvement) and horizontal innovation (i.e., variety expansion). Calibrating the model and simulating transition dynamics, we find that strengthening the effect of blocking patents stifles vertical innovation and decreases economic growth but increases social welfare due to an increase in horizontal innovation. In light of this finding, we argue that in order to properly analyze the growth and welfare implications of patents, it is important to consider their often neglected compositional effects on vertical and horizontal innovation.