高级管理人员激励契约研究

本文首次通过收集上市公司披露的高级管理人员激励契约，对我国现阶段高级管理人员激励契约的现状和存在的问题进行了分析和研究。研究发现：我国上市公司中高级管理人员职责不清，容易出现高级管理人员自己给自己制定报酬、考核业绩的现象；我国高级管理人员业绩评价主要依赖财务指标（净利润、利润总额、净资产收益率），非财务指标与主观评价指标在高级管理人员业绩评价中使用较少；高级管理人员的业绩标准主要是董事会制定的预算指标：高级管理人员业绩评价指标的确定比较简单，往往没有考虑高级管理人员操纵会计指标的可能性。以及不可控因素对评价指标的影响。     

Strategic orientations,incentive plan adoptions,and firm performance: evidence from electric utility firms

This study examines the performance implications of the fit between strategic orientations and incentive plan characteristics. Research hypotheses are based on a framework that draws upon managerial discretion and agency theories to identify the links between firm strategy, managerial motivation and control, managerial risk-bearing, and incentive plan characteristics. A pooled cross-sectional, time series research design is used to test hypotheses in a sample of 50 electric utility firms. Consistent with theory, results indicate that annual bonus plans that use cash incentives and accounting measures of performance lead to better performance among firms with Defender strategic orientations. In contrast, firms with Prospector strategic orientations realize performance benefits when they adopt stock-based incentive plans and use market measures to evaluate managerial performance. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Incentive pay for non-executive directors: The direct and interaction effects on firm performance

To improve corporate governance and firm performance, institutional investors and influential activists in the US recommend the use of incentive pay for non-executive directors. Policy makers in the UK and Australia, however, recommend against it. Motivated by stark contrast in the recommendations from these Anglo-Saxon countries, this paper investigates the impacts of incentive pay for non-executive directors on firm performance. The findings based on data from 178 listed Australian companies support both recommendations. Firm performance tends to be better when no incentive or high-power incentives are offered to non-executive directors than when low-power incentives are offered. This paper also investigates how incentive pay interacts with monitoring by large shareholders and debtholders to influence firm performance. This paper shows that large shareholder monitoring interacts negatively while debtholder monitoring interacts positively with incentive pay for non-executive directors to affect firm performance. Overall, the findings suggest that governance mechanisms recommended by agency theorists such as performance-contingent pay and monitoring can backfire if they are not designed properly. Both the direct and interaction effects should be considered when practitioners design corporate governance systems.     

Using simulated mergers to evaluate corporate diversification strategies

This study suggests that simulated mergers can be used to help evaluate the effects of diversification on corporate performance. The results, which are consistent with a risk-reduction motive for conglomerate diversification, imply that conglomerate strategies focused on fewer and larger units may be advantageous in terms of certain measures of risk and return. Forecast error is used here to measure strategic risk, and return on equity is used to measure return.     

Performance Measurement and Incentive Plans

This paper explores performance measurement in incentive plans. On the basis of theory, we argue that differences in the nature of jobs between blue‐ and white‐collar employees lead to differences in incentive systems. We find that performance measurement for white‐collar workers is broader in terms of the performance measures, the organizational level of performance measurement, and the time horizon. The intensity of incentives is also stronger for white‐collar employees. All of these findings are consistent with theory.     

Labour Market Incentive Structures and Employee Performance

Abstract : This paper uses data from the International Social Science Programme Work Orientations Module to investigate whether there is empirical support for Soskice's (1990, 1991) hypothesis that there is a difference in labour market incentive structures between northern European 'flexibly co-ordinated' systems and the 'uncoordinated' or 'deregulated' systems of the UK and the USA, which generates improved employee co-operation and performance in the former. Labour markets in 'uncoordinated' systems are found to generate the better employee work performance. Little support is found for the existence of a 'flexibly co-ordinated' type of labour market incentive structure. Instead, labour market incentive structures are found to be heterogeneous.     

Effectiveness of Individual and Aggregate Compensation Strategies

Based on a sample of 175 scientists and engineers, this study shows that individual-based rewards (either in the form of merit pay or individual bonuses) are perceived as less effective than aggregate incentive strategies for R & D workers. The pay effectiveness measures used here include pay satisfaction, propensity to leave, project performance, and individual performance. All things considered, team-based bonuses are perceived as the most effective rewards in an R & D setting. The findings also indicate that employees with a low willingness to take risks are more likely to experience withdrawal cognition if they work for a firm that relies on variable compensation.     

AUTHORITY,RISK, AND PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES: EVIDENCE FROM DIVISION MANAGER POSITIONS INSIDE FIRMS*

I show that performance incentives vary by decision‐making authority of division managers. For division managers with broader authority, i.e., those designated as corporate officers, both the sensitivity of pay to global performance measures and the relative importance of global to local measures are larger, relative to non‐officers. There is no difference in sensitivity of pay to local measures by officer status. These results support theories suggesting that authority over project selection combined with incentives designed to maximize firm performance, as well as induce effort for the division, are important in incentive design for division managers. Consistent with earlier findings, the evidence strongly supports one of the main predictions of the principal‐agent model, that is, a negative tradeoff between risk and incentives.     

Measuring technological capability and performance

The relation between technological capability and firm performance is more complex than what is generally assumed. Researchers have not been able to consistently find empirical support for this apparently 'simple' relation. The objective of this study is to illustrate the theoretical and empirical complexity of this relation and explain why the use of different measures can lead to dramatically different results. In this study, we analyse the technological capability–performance relation in 201 large US public manufacturing companies. A variety of patent statistics and a measure of research & development (R&D) intensity are used as indicators for technological capability. The following six measures of performance are used as dependent variables: return on assets, return on equity, return on sales, market value, market value added, and economic value added. The results vary substantially, depending on which measures are used for the independent and dependent variables. A detailed understanding of precisely what each measure represents and the shortcomings of each measure is needed to explain why these differences exist. We conclude by discussing the effectiveness of a variety of technological capability measures using patent citations, and illustrate why a measure of R&D spending and the total number of patents are usually not valid measures of a firm's technological capability.     

Pay dispersion and workforce performance: moderating effects of incentives and interdependence

The compensation literature is replete with arguments, but lacking in empirical tests, regarding the effects of pay dispersion on organizational outcomes. Pay dispersion may increase effort and provide incentives for high workforce performance levels, but may also inhibit cooperation and goal orientation among employees. Drawing on several theoretical perspectives (individual motivation, institutional theory, organizational justice, and neoclassical economics), this study predicts that pay dispersion will be associated with higher levels of workforce performance when accompanied by formal individual incentive systems and independent work, while pay compression is desirable in the absence of individual incentive systems and when work is interdependent. Survey research studies in two industrial sectors (the motor carrier and concrete pipe industries) were conducted to address these issues. Interactive regression results were generally supportive of the predictions across several measures of workforce performance (accident rates, safety violations, and productivity). Implications of these studies for strategy implementation in terms of compensation theory and practice are addressed. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An Interim Report on Measuring Product Development Success and Failure

This article represents findings of a PDMA task force studying measures of product development success and failure. This investigation sought to identify all currently used measures, organize them into categories of similar measures that perform roughly the same function, and contrast the measures used by academics and companies to evaluate new product development performance. The authors compared the measures used in over seventy-five published studies of new product development to those surveyed companies say they use. The concept of product development success has many dimensions and each may be measured in a variety of ways. Firms generally use about four measures from two different categories in determining product development success. Academics and managers tend to focus on rather different sets of product development success/failure measures. Academics tend to investigate product development performance at the firm level, whereas managers currently measure, and indicate that they want to understand more completely, individual product success.     

Using Incentive Pay and Providing Pay Supplements in U.S. Job Markets

This article investigates whether the earnings premium found with use of incentive pay is offset by lower supplemental pay. More comprehensive measures of employer costs for employee compensation are used to test the hypothesis. These data indicate that bonuses, overtime work, pension provision, and shift differentials can be less common in jobs with incentive pay, but the lower incidence of these forms of compensation does not offset the higher earnings associated with incentive pay.     

经理人股票期权价值的理论及应用

股票期权激励的研究和实践中广泛应用布莱克——斯科尔斯模型进行股票期权的公允价值计价,然而对经理人而言的股票期权价值还要考虑经理人的风险偏好、财富的多元化程度等因素的影响。经理人期权价值不等于公司期权成本的基本理论可以解决及解释在股票期权实践中的一些关键性问题,如期权激励有效性的衡量、激励期权的风险溢价、最优行权价的确定、行权时间的确定。该理论的应用对我国上市公司股权激励的实施也有重要启示。     

Incentives for employed inventors: an empirical analysis with special emphasis on the German Law for Employee's Inventions

This paper evaluates the use of incentive systems in R&D to stimulate the motivation potential of R&D personnel. Special emphasis is given to the German Employee's Inventions Act, enacted in 1957 which is applicable to all enterprises under German law and provides guidelines for a mandatory compensation of employed inventors. The law's major content, its advantages and disadvantages are presented and discussed in detail. It is shown that the general consensus in industry is unfavourable to the German Act. A significant time lack between the invention and it's compensation, the lack of transparency of the compensation guidelines, the calculation of an adequate compensation level, and a high administrative effort of calculating the compensation are only some of the drawbacks of this law. The consequences of these problems are the encouragement of secrecy among R&D professionals and the negative impact on their individual motivation potential. We also report on an experiment that measures the individual preferences of R&D personnel for different incentive variables. The method of conjoint measurement is applied to this area, it's technique is described and assessed. It is found that different segments of respondents with different preferences exist. The empirical findings also indicate the need to increase the flexibility of existing incentive systems in German industry.     

Is R&D risky?

Research summary : Many studies use research and development (R&D) intensity or R&D spending as a proxy for risk taking, but we have little evidence that either associates positively with firm risk. We analyze the relations between R&D intensity (R&D spending to sales) and R&D spending on the one hand and 11 different indicators of firm risk on the other, using data from 1,907 to 3,908 firms in various industries over 13 years. The analysis finds a general lack of consistent positive association between R&D and firm risk, making the use of R&D as an indicator of risk taking questionable. Furthermore, R&D intensity and spending do not correlate positively, suggesting they measure different constructs. We discuss potential reasons for these nonsignificant results. Our study demonstrates that researchers should avoid casual use of R&D as a proxy for risk taking without explicitly providing a clear definition and measurement model for risk. Managerial summary : Risk is a key construct in strategic management research. Many studies in this area measure risk taking by research and development (R&D) intensity (the ratio of R&D spending to sales) or R&D spending. However, since R&D intensity and spending have also been used to measure various other things such as information processing demands, this raises the question of whether R&D intensity and spending are valid indicators of firm risk. We examine this issue by considering the associations of R&D intensity and R&D spending with conventional measures of firm risk. We find a general lack of consistent positive association between R&D and firm risk, making the use of R&D as an indicator of risk taking questionable. Furthermore, R&D intensity and spending do not correlate positively, suggesting they measure different things. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Value creation and value capture under moral hazard: Exploring the micro‐foundations of buyer– supplier relationships

We combine the formalism of a principal–agent framework with a value‐based analysis in order to investigate the micro‐foundations of business partner selection and the division of value in contracting relationships. In particular, we study how the key contracting parameters such as efficiency, transactional integrity, incentive alignment, and gaming affect outcomes when buyers face competing suppliers. We show that integrity and efficiency increase value creation and capture for all parties and are complements. While incentive gaming is unambiguously bad for value creation, and reduces buyers' value capture, it can benefit some suppliers. For alignment, we find that neither party has an incentive to use fully aligned performance measures that maximize total value creation. We conclude by analyzing buyers' and suppliers' incentives to invest in integrity. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

专利执行保险、技术创新与企业绩效

作为知识产权保护重要制度之一,专利执行保险通过降低技术溢出损失和外部融资约束提升企业技术创新,进而对企业绩效产生深远影响。本文基于沪深A股2012~2019年上市公司微观数据,实证研究专利执行保险实施背景下专利保护对企业技术创新和财务绩效的影响。研究发现:专利执行保险对企业技术创新存在显著的“创新激励”效应,特别是对创新投入和创新产出的提升作用明显,在考虑控制内生性问题后,上述结论仍成立;技术溢出损失效应和外部融资约束是影响专利执行保险创新激励效应的重要机制和渠道;专利执行保险和企业技术创新对企业财务绩效影响显著,其中对滞后5期内的企业财务绩效提升最为明显。研究为完善知识产权保护对创新激励作用探讨,加快专利执行保险试点推广以及如何激发企业创新提供理论价值和政策启示。     

国有控股、最高决策者激励与公司绩效

国内研究认为股权结构、董事会和高管激励对公司绩效有影响，而上市公司“国有一股独大”的国情使前两者不会有实质性作用；对于后者的研究则忽略了最高决策者在公司中的重要性。本文以1993—2002年数据为样本，研究国有股代理人(董事长和总经理)激励对公司绩效的影响。发现董事长是公司最高决策者，除政治激励能显著改善绩效外，最高决策者金钱激励、国有股权性质、两职合一、债权人治理等都和绩效没有显著关系；意味着只有将政治激励所附带的财富效用降低到一定程度，金钱激励才可能成为有效治理机制。     

Regional Economic Stability and Mortgage Default Risk in the Netherlands

This paper investigates the relationship between regional economic diversification and stability, and residential mortgage default risk in the Netherlands. To describe and measure regional economic diversity and stability, methods from both the regional economics and the industrial economics literature are used. All measures are based on regional employment characteristics. Mortgage default rates were obtained from a database of the population of insured mortgage defaults in the Netherlands from 1983 through 1990. To test the relationship between the measures and mortgage default risk, cross sectional Seemingly Unrelated Regression was used. The paper concludes that the employed measures explain regional mortgage default rates to a significant extent, and that stability measures outperform diversity measures.     

激励扭曲与基于知识合约的团队生产力

对企业团队生产力的传统激励模式主要是基于委托人既定条件下的控制权安排展开的，但由此造成的不确定性导致了激励扭曲，存在成员监督条件下的隐性激励合同虽然有利于减少这种扭曲，但通过建立一种包括团队成员知识共享与创造并参与收益分享的知识性合约，则可以有效解决自我激励的难题，从而提高团队生产力。