六大“到位”力促政府采购

据统计,国家统计局2003年参加政府集中采购的中央预算采购支出1759万元,全年实际采购金额比年初采购预算节约资金190多万元,资金节约率约为9.8%;2004年到2007年参加政府集中采购的中央预算采购支出分别为15778万元、9193万元、20042万元和27762万元;节约资金分别为1172万元、446万元、1816万元和472万元;资金节约率分别为7%、5%、9%和2%。     

三河市政府采购金额过亿元

三河市政府采购工作本着“公正、公平、公开”的原则，从政府采购制度建设入手，稳健起步，积极推进，不断探索科学、合理的政府采购程序和方法，通过加强管理和监督，规范政府采购行为，使政府采购工作取得了显著成效。截至8月份累计采购金额11160.38万元，节约采购资金1180.18万元，综合节约率为9.56%。     

鸡泽县政府采购步入规范化

鸡泽县辣椒工贸城建设、行政事业单位冬季取暖用炭、公务用车实行定点投保等大额集中采购活动，再次使政府采购“少花钱多办事”的效力显现。2005年。该县政府采购金额累计达300万元，同比增长36％，占预算任务220万元的136%，节约资金45万元，平均节约率为15%。     

香河县财政局不断规范政府采购行为

香河县政府采购工作狠抓制度建设，不断规范政府采购行为，扩大政府采购范围和规模，2002年，实现政府采购支出324万元，节约资金51万元；2003年完成政府采购支出448万元，(其中：货物类采购支出407万元，服务类支出41万元)，节约资金57万元；2004年上半年，在原有采购范围的基础上，对办公微机、公务用车和农业开发工程进行了政府采购，采购金额实现307．8万元，节约资金36．1万元。     

新乐市财政局“阳光采购”措施到位效果好

河北省新乐市财政局从规范管理、完善制度建设入手，坚持“公开、公平、公正、规范、效益、廉洁”的原则，积极推行“阳光采购”。2004年共计招标80次，采购金额3594万元，节约资金501万元。今年以来，共计招标采购62次，     

衢州市政府采购规模首次突破10亿元大关

据统计,“十一五”期间,衢州市共签订采购金额63．1亿元,与74．6亿元的预算资金相比,节约资金11．4亿元,资金节约率达15．34％。其中,市级共签订采购金额13．3亿元,节约资金1．9亿元,资金节约率达14．6％。在“十一五”收官的2010年,衢州市政府采购规模更上新台阶,全市共签订政府采购合同金额117383万元...     

北戴河区：政府采购成绩显著

从1999年开展政府采购工作以来，北戴河区的采购范围和规模都在不断扩大，节约资金效果明显，采购资金数额逐年递增，从1999年的年采购额175万元，递增到2003年的年采购额2191.8万元，截至2003年底4年累计采购金额4445.1万元，累计节约资金526.7万元，节支率11%。取得了良好的经济效益和社会效益，达到了规范采购行为、遏制腐败现象、节约财政资金的目的。     

抚宁县：政府采购金额大幅增加

今年以来，抚宁县政府采购办公室从规范管理，扩大采购范围入手，与相关股室密切配合，多措并举在提高采购工作质量的基础上，实现采购金额大幅增长。上半年共完成政府采购56批次，合同金额517万元，比上年同期增加159万元，节约财政性资金80万元。节约率达到13%。     

武安2005年政府采购节资突破两千万元大关

2005年河北省武安市政府采购工作在上级领导高度重视和关心支持下，紧紧围绕“抓规范、上规模、高效率、强素质”，实现在制度下规范，在规模中发展的工作目标。充分挖掘采购潜力，严格采购监管，出色地完成了全年各项采购任务，尤其是采购金额比往年有较大幅度的增长，节资首次突破两千万元大关。截至今年12月底，全年共组织政府采购项目5240批次，累计采购金额达8476万元，比预算10717万元节约财政性资金2241万元，综合平均节约率为20．91％。     

苏州市吴中区2007年1～3季度政府采购信息统计分析

截至2007年第三季度,吴中区政府采购在扩展采购范围,扩大采购规模等方面取得较大进步。1～3季度政府采购预算36574.71万元,实际支付30287.67万元,节约资金6287.04万元,节约率为17.19%,采购规模比上年同期增长22286.23万元,增长率为278.53%,采购金额占财政支出的17.28%。     

Fiscal rules, budget deficits and budget projections

Fiscal rules are mentioned as instruments to commit political actors on long-term fiscal sustainability. However, fiscal rules may have stronger effects on projected than on realized fiscal outcomes because of window-dressing measures or because they alter the bargaining situation in the budget process. In our analysis for Swiss cantons, fiscal rules significantly lower the probability of projected and realized deficits with the former effect being twice as large. Projections are generally over-pessimistic but fiscal rules increase the probability of accurate projections. Thus, fiscal rules seem to substitute for finance ministers’ over-pessimistic projections intended to reign in fellow ministers and legislatures (100 words).     

A note on the government budget restraint

In a recent article in this Journal, Christ presented a dynamic macroeconomic model which has the striking implication of instability under bond financing of budgetary deficits. In this paper, we show that the stability (and other fundamental) properties of Christ's model are closely related to the specification of the exogenous fiscal variables. This point is demonstrated through an analysis of Christ's model in which several definitions of government spending are taken as exogenous. As an alternative to this approach, we explore the implications of models in which alternative policy goals are specified as exogenous — goals such as a balanced or a zero gap between actual and potential output.     

The impact of extreme weather events on budget balances

This paper explores implications of climate change for fiscal policy by assessing the impact of large scale extreme weather events on changes in public budgets. We apply alternative measures for large scale extreme weather events and conclude that the budgetary impact of such events ranges between 0.23% and 1.4% of GDP depending on the country group. Developing countries face a much larger effect on changes in budget balances following an extreme weather event than advanced economies. Based on these findings, our policy conclusions point to the enhanced need to reach and maintain sound fiscal positions given that climate change is expected to cause an increase in the frequency and severity of extreme weather events.     

The effect of rankings on honesty in budget reporting

We conduct an experiment to investigate the effect of rankings, which are pervasive in practice, on the honesty of managers’ budget reports, which is important for sound decision making in organizations. Participants in our experiment are ranked in one of four ways: (1) firm profit, (2) own compensation, (3) both firm profit and own compensation, and (4) randomly, which serves as our baseline condition. None of the rankings affect participants’ remuneration. Compared to our baseline (random rankings) setting, where participants indeed exhibit honesty concerns, we find that rankings based on firm profit significantly increase honesty and that rankings based on own compensation significantly decrease honesty. Participants who received both rankings were significantly more honest than participants in the own compensation rankings condition. We did not, however, find significant differences in honesty between the both rankings and firm profit rankings conditions. As such, participants in the both rankings condition seemed to focus more on the firm profit metric than on the financially congruent own compensation metric. We also find that our results are stable across periods, suggesting that the effects of rankings neither increased nor dissipated over time. We discuss the contributions of our study and concomitant findings to accounting research and practice.     

Organization size, budget cycle, and budget related influence in city governments: An empirical study

This paper explores the relationship between budgeting and perceived power in city government organizations. Data are reported from a survey of perceived budget influence in six city governments in Texas. The findings suggest that perceived influence varies by stage of budget cycle, city size, level of hierarchy, department function, and vertical vs horizontal direction of influence. For example, during budget formulation city managers were perceived as having the most vertical power. During budget implemetation, there was a perceived increase in department head vertical power and a decrease in city council power. Perceptions of horizontal power suggested that budget departments generally had greater perceived influence than operating departments for budget formulation, but not for budget implementation. The findings are used to develop a strategic contingencies model of budget-related power, and to suggest some research steps for testing the proposed model.     

Size, spillovers and soft budget constraints

There is much evidence against the so-called “too big to fail” hypothesis in the case of bailouts to subnational governments. We look at a model where districts of different size provide local public goods with positive spillovers. Matching grants of a central government can induce socially-efficient provision, but districts can still exploit the intervening central government by inducing direct financing. We show that the ability and willingness of a district to induce a bailout and district size are negatively correlated. Furthermore, we argue that these policies can be equilibrium strategies.