Heterogeneous labor skills,the median voter and labor taxes

This paper analyzes the median voter?s most preferred sequences of labor taxes in the standard neoclassical growth model. We consider an infinite horizon economy in which agents are heterogeneous with respect to both initial wealth and labor skills. We start by providing a set of sufficient conditions for the existence of a Condorcet winner. We then characterize the most preferred tax sequence by the median agent. First, we show that marginal labor taxes depend directly on the absolute value of the distance between the median and the mean value of the skills? distribution. Second, we find that in contrast to the intuition stemming from standard representative agent economies, labor taxes are more volatile and counter-cyclical taxation (e.g., increasing taxes in recession) might be optimal depending on the correlation between inequality and TFP. To assess the quantitative relevance of these findings, we calibrate the model economy to six countries and find that counter-cyclical labor taxation is optimal for all but the US.     

Optimal climate and fiscal policy in an OLG economy

This paper develops a climate–economy model to study the joint design of optimal climate and fiscal policies in economies with overlapping generations (OLGs). I demonstrate how capital taxation, if optimal, drives a wedge between the market costs of carbon (the net present value of marginal damages using the market interest rate) and the Pigouvian tax (the net present value of marginal damages using the consumption discount rate of successive OLGs). In contrast to deterministic infinitely lived representative agent models, at the optimum, the capital income tax is positive, the carbon price equals the market costs of carbon but it falls short of the Pigouvian tax when (i) preferences are not separable over consumption and leisure; and (ii) labor income taxes cannot be age-dependent. I also show that restrictions on climate change policy provide a novel rationale for positive capital income taxes.     

Redistribution with Unobservable Bequests: A Case for Taxing Capital Income

This paper addresses the question of the optimal taxation of labour and interest income in an overlapping generations model with two unobservable characteristics, ability and inheritance. We assume realistically that saving can only be taxed anonymously, whereas the tax on labour earnings can be individualized and made non-linear. In such a setting, we show that a withholding tax on interest income along with a non-linear tax on labour income is desirable. The role of interest income taxation is to indirectly tax inherited wealth.
JEL Classification D 63, H 2     

Nonseparable preferences and optimal social security systems

In this paper, we consider economies in which agents are privately informed about their skills, which evolve stochastically over time. We require agents' preferences to be weakly separable between the lifetime paths of consumption and labor. However, we allow for intertemporal nonseparabilities in preferences like habit formation. In this environment, we derive a generalized version of the Inverse Euler Equation and use it to show that intertemporal wedges characterizing optimal allocations of consumption can be strictly negative. We also show that preference nonseparabilities imply that optimal differentiable asset income taxes are necessarily retrospective in nature. We show that under weak conditions, it is possible to implement a socially optimal allocation using a social security system in which taxes on wealth are linear, and taxes/transfers are history-dependent only at retirement. The average asset income tax in this system is zero.     

Exploitation,skills, and inequality

Abstract

This paper uses a computational framework to analyse the equilibrium dynamics of exploitation and inequality in accumulation economies with heterogeneous labour. A novel index is presented which measures the intensity of exploitation at the individual level and the dynamics of the distribution of exploitation intensity is analysed. Various taxation schemes are analysed which may reduce exploitation or inequalities in income and wealth. It is shown that relatively small taxation rates may have significant cumulative effects on wealth and income inequalities. Further, taxation schemes that eliminate exploitation also reduce disparities in income and wealth but in the presence of heterogeneous skills, do not necessarily eliminate them. The inegalitarian effects of different abilities need to be tackled with a progressive education policy that compensates for unfavourable circumstances.     

Taxation of capital income in overlapping generations economies

Whether capital income should be taxed in overlapping generations economies is vividly discussed. It is shown that intergenerational lump‐sum taxes cannot implement the Golden Rule allocation when agents have private information on their earnings potential. Hence, the seminal Atkinson–Stiglitz result that optimal income taxation pre‐empts any role for indirect taxation cannot be interpreted to imply that capital income taxation (affecting intertemporal relative prices) should not be taxed. Specifically, capital income should unambiguously be taxed in small open economies, and the optimal tax rate depends inversely on the elasticity of total savings to disposable income and the after‐tax rate of return.     

Subsidies versus Public Provision of Private Goods as Instruments for Redistribution

The literatures on differential commodity taxes and on quantity controls to supplement income taxation have developed separately. This paper combines these two strands in the standard framework of optimal non-linear income taxation. We use a model with two types of households where the government has access to both subsidy policy and public provision of a good substitutable for leisure, and ouseholds can supplement the publicity provided good from the market. We present conditions under which policy should involve one or both of these two instruments alongside income taxation. The model is extended to many ability types.     

Taxation and labour supply: Evidence from a representative population survey

We study how taxation influences labour supply using a specifically designed representative survey of the German population. First, we investigate whether taxes generally matter for the labour supply decisions of our respondents. Around 41 per cent report taking taxes into consideration, implying that the majority of the German population is unresponsive to taxation. Second, we look at self-reported labour supply adjustments following a recently enacted payroll tax change. Only around 12 per cent of our respondents report an actual labour supply response, but we find evidence of an income, as well as a substitution, effect of the tax change. Our conclusion is that the effects of taxes on labour supply in Germany are likely small. We analyse the correlation with economic and socio-demographic variables and find that the self-employed are relatively more sensitive to taxation and that low interest rates reduce incentives for expanding the labour supply.     

The composition effects of tax-based consolidation on income inequality

Many advanced economies have recently embarked on fiscal austerity. As this has come at a time of high and rising income disparities, policy-makers have fretted about the inequality effects of fiscal consolidations. We shed new light on this issue by empirically investigating the (composition) effects of tax-based consolidations on income inequality, output and labour market conditions for a sample of 16 OECD countries over the period 1978–2012. We find that tax-based consolidations reduce income inequality, but at the cost of weaker economic activity. However, tax composition does matter. Indirect taxes reduce income inequality by more than direct taxes, possibly due to the operation of a positive labour supply channel. Higher indirect taxes increase the price of the consumption basket and create incentives for agents to increase their labour supply. We find this effect to be stronger for middle-aged women. Looking at specific instruments, general consumption taxes and personal taxes are the most suited to reduce inequality while at the same time minimizing the equity-efficiency trade-off.     

Optimal Dynamic Taxation with Distinctive Forms of Social Status Attainment

We examine the role of both consumption‐ and wealth‐induced social comparisons in setting dynamic optimal income taxation. Under complete information, state‐invariant labor income taxes are used to remedy the externality caused by consumption‐induced social comparisons, while state‐contingent capital income taxes are used to remedy the externalities caused by both consumption‐ and wealth‐induced social comparisons. Under incomplete information, distinct types of agents are subject to an identical marginal capital income tax, which removes social comparisons. To solve the information problem, low‐productivity agents could be subject to a lower marginal labor tax than high‐productivity agents, which contradicts the traditional result in the Mirrlees–Stiglitz models.     

Optimal taxes on wealth and consumption in the presence of tax evasion

This article incorporates tax evasion into an optimum taxation framework with individuals differing in earning abilities and initial wealth. We find that despite the possibility of its evasion a tax on initial wealth should supplement the optimal nonlinear income tax, given a positive correlation between initial wealth and earning abilities. Further, even if income and initial wealth are taxed optimally, it is still desirable to levy a tax on commodities, though it can be evaded as well. Thus, our result provides a rationale for a comprehensive tax system. Optimal tax rates on commodities differ in general, however for the special case of a uniform evasion technology equal rates are optimal if preferences are homothetic and weakly separable.     

On Optimal Commodity Taxes When Consumption Is Time Consuming

This paper studies the problem of optimal taxation of commodities when consumption is a time‐consuming activity. This is done under two distinct preference separability assumptions: between goods and labor supply, and between goods and leisure. It argues that with the labor separability, the traditional uniform taxation results of optimal tax theory continue to hold. With leisure separability, on the other hand, consumption time is a major ingredient of optimal tax rates. However, the relationship between consumption time and optimal tax rates depends crucially on the representation of the economy. In representative consumer economies, time differences determine the pattern of optimal tax rates so that goods whose consumption take more time are subjected to higher tax rates. When individuals have different earning abilities, redistributive, incentive, and efficiency considerations also come into play resulting in a complex relationship. The paper derives formulas for optimal commodity taxes in this case on the basis of three different tax structures: linear commodity taxes in combination with linear and nonlinear income taxes, and nonlinear commodity taxes in combination with nonlinear income taxes.     

Redistribution and the marginal cost of public funds

Discussions of the marginal cost of public funds with distortionary taxation are often cast in the framework of a one-consumer economy, while the main justification of distortionary taxes is that they are needed for redistribution. This paper analyzes the issue in a model with heterogeneous consumers and a linear income tax, focusing on the tradeoff between labour market distortions and the redistribution from high-wage to low-wage workers. In an optimal tax system the MCF will be the same for all sources of funds and under certain assumptions less than one. Without optimality the MCF will in general differ between different sources of finance.     

Equilibrium capital taxation in open economies under commitment

This paper analyzes equilibrium capital taxation in open economies with strategic interaction in a neo-classical growth model. Under perfect commitment, I show that non-cooperative capital taxes are zero in the long run for a large open economy, thereby generalizing the result previously established only for the special cases of a closed and a small open economy. This does not represent a race to the bottom, though, since the result is independent of the degree of capital mobility, the number of countries, or a country׳s size relative to the rest of the world. Moreover, when countries cooperate, they still set capital taxes to zero in the long run. These outcomes are robust to different equilibrium specifications, the inclusion of endogenous government spending, and heterogeneous agents and non-linear labor income taxation. Governments find it optimal to implement the efficient capital allocation in the long run, both in a closed and an open economy; this trumps incentives to tax foreigners’ domestic capital holdings by raising capital taxes and attracting capital from abroad by lowering capital taxes.     

Optimal oil taxation in a small open economy

The international oil market has been very volatile over the past three decades. In industrialized economies, especially in Europe, taxes represent a large fraction of oil prices and governments do not seem to react to oil price shocks by using oil taxes strategically. The aim of this paper is to analyze optimal oil taxation in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of a small open economy that imports oil. We find that in general it is not optimal to distort the oil price paid by firms with taxes, neither in the long run nor over the business cycle. The general result could be reversed depending on environmental considerations and available fiscal instruments. We provide simulations to illustrate the optimal response to shocks in such cases.     

Capital income taxation,tax criteria,and intergenerational welfare

In a two-period overlapping-generations model, residence criteria are shown to be optimal with lump-sum transfers to the younger generation in a dynamically efficient open economy even if all wage income, corresponding to rent income under exogenous labor supply, is not taxed away. When tax revenues are also distributed to the older generation — which indeed may be desirable for short-term intergenerational welfare distribution reasons — a weighted average rule is derived for optimal international taxation. The taxation of domestic savings income follows the inverse elasticity rule in respect to savings and, surprisingly, higher investment elasticity increases the tax level. Finally, for a small open economy and for large identical economies, tax competition with a mixed scheme of residence-based taxes and source-based subsidies yields the same tax policy as tax cooperation with no restrictions on the domestic and international capital income tax instruments.     

A Synthesis of Contour and Flexible Wage Hypotheses

Economic instability has risen in emerging economies after capital account liberalization. A more progressive income tax policy could offer a stabilizing alternative. It could result in more revenue, more countercyclical policy, and more income equality and thus more stable demand growth. We test the effects of progressive taxes on stability using univariate and multivariate analyses based on panel data for emerging economies from 1982 to 2002 and compare those to the effects of a value added tax (VAT). We also consider possible constraints on tax policy design, such as government spending, international tax competition, and openness. Progressive taxes are associated with greater income equality and a higher likelihood of countercyclical fiscal policies. The potential benefits from progressive income taxation, though, are lower with VAT. Tax policy is also constrained by government expenditures and openness, but not by lower corporate taxes, suggesting that all income tax rates are constrained by openness.     

Indirect taxation and the welfare effects of altruism on the optimal fiscal policy

This paper analyzes the welfare effects of altruism on the optimal fiscal policy. The existence of positive bequests links present and future generations in the economy. We show that these altruistic links provide a new role for indirect taxation (consumption and estate taxes) with important welfare implications. We use three different altruistic approaches (warm-glow, dynastic, and family) to illustrate how the presence of bequests in the budget constraint of the donee gives the government the ability to use indirect taxation to mimic lump-sum taxes and to implement the first-best outcome in the long-run. This channel is not present in economies without altruism, such as the infinite-lived consumer economy or the overlapping generations economy, where long-run welfare is suboptimal and indirect taxation is irrelevant.     

Corporate taxes, growth and welfare in a Schumpeterian economy

I take a new look at the long-run implications of taxation through the lens of modern Schumpeterian growth theory. I focus on the latest vintage of models that sterilize the scale effect through a process of product proliferation that fragments the aggregate market into submarkets whose size does not increase with the size of the workforce. I show that the following interventions raise welfare: (a) granting full expensibility of R&D to incorporated firms; (b) eliminating the corporate income tax and/or the capital gains tax; (c) reducing taxes on labor and/or consumption. What makes these results remarkable is that in all three cases the endogenous increase in the tax on dividends necessary to balance the budget has a positive effect on growth. A general implication of my analysis is that corporate taxation plays a special role in Schumpeterian economies and provides novel insights on how to design welfare-enhancing tax reforms.