上市公司股票期权激励制度研究

股票期权激励制度从本质上说是以产权制度为基础,旨在解决公司所有权与控制权分离情况下委托代理问题的激励机制.只有在公司内部构建起有效的约束公司相关利益主体间相互关系的机制,并结合相应的制度环境和市场条件,股票期权激励制度才可能充分发挥其积极作用.由于我国并不具备推行股票期权激励制度的前提条件,我们必须对上市公司实施股票期权激励制度进行引导与规范,控制股票期权激励机制的滥用.本文认为,要有效实施股票期权激励,除修改法律法规、科学设计业绩评价体系与股票期权激励制度方案外,更重要的是完善公司治理机制,加强证券监管,培育资本市场与职业经理人市场,提高中介机构的独立性.     

国有控股公司经营者股票期权作用及配套机制建设

传统薪酬制度经营者的收入与股票市场价值不存在相关性，不存在长期激励，经营者通常不能从公司的长期发展中获取收益。但在经营者股权制度下，经营者拥有按某一固定价格购买本公司普通股的权利，而且有权在规定的有效期内将所购入的股票在市场上出售，同时获得收益，但期权本身不可转让。经营者股票期权使经营者能够享受公司股票增值所带来的利益增长并承担相应的风险。在经营者看来，最重要的不是已经实现的收益，而是他们持有未行权的股票期权的潜在收益，从而可以实现经理人利益的长期化。一、实行股票期权对国有控股公司的作用（一）国…     

Black-Scholes模型与经理股票期权的实证研究

经理股票期权(Exexutive Stock Options,ESOs)做为企业高管人员的一种激励方式,是从金融衍生工具股票期权发展而来,其理论起点为传统委托--代理框架下的最优契约理论.本文以经理股票期权作为研究对象,结合Black-Scholes期权定价模型,对中国2006～2008年88家实施股票期权激励的上市公司进行实证研究,得出中国上市公司样本企业股票期权价格与股票期权行权价、授予时股票价格、股票价格波动丰、无风险利率、股票期权有效期的相关变化关系,为经理股票期权契约设计提供参考.     

股票期权激励契约合理性及其约束性因素——基于中国上市公司的实证分析

股权激励是完善上市公司治理的重要环节。设计适合中国上市公司特征的股权激励方案并规避其所带来的风险是使其发挥作用的关键。本文以2006—2008年公布与实施股票期权激励方式的中国上市公司为样本,对股票期权激励契约的合理性特征及其内生约束性因素进行了理论探讨与实证检验,研究表明,激励期限与绩效条件是体现股票期权契约合理性的关键要素,除外部法律与监管约束之外,大股东、债务融资与独立董事等内生性因素对两者具有显著的约束作用,进一步证实了公司内部治理机制的互补效应假说,为上市公司股票期权契约的设计与实施提供有益参考。     

股票期权的操作

股票期权作为一种薪酬制度和长期激励方式,在发达国家普遍推行,近几年来在国内也日益引起关注并开始实践。从国外的实践情况看,股票期权的操作要点大致如下:１．赠予计划。股票期权的赠予计划是关于一些具体条款的规定性问题,包括股票期权授权和行使、股票期权的赠予时机和数目、股票期权行权价的确定、权利变更及失效、股票期权计划的管理等。该计划的制定与实施必须经过股东大会的批准,其中参与计划的人不能在股东大会上投票。２．股票期权授予。股权方案均规定获授人范围,一般仅限于公司决策层人员和科技开发人员。具体人员由董事会选择,…     

剥夺员工期权的代价是什么？——股票期权的生效与持权员工的解聘补偿

随着股票期权激励措施的开始普及,被解聘雇员的股票期权价值损失已经受到了广泛关注近来,百度的裁员事件闹得沸沸扬扬,而其中重要原因就与百度员工手中的股票期权相关。股票期权什么时候才能生效,如何生效?一般而言,公司授予员工股票期权之后,一般     

关于股票期权激励的思考

一、我国股票期权激励的现状自 1993年起 ,我国已在上海、杭州、武汉、北京、厦门等地的企业中试行股票期权或类似于股票期权的激励方式。其主要形式有 :1 “期股”激励方式。方式一 :以经营者的年度奖金购买企业股权。以广东福地、天津泰达股份、电广传媒等上市公司为代表。方法是用获奖者的年度奖金的一部分来购买本公司的股票。方式二 :经营者以年薪奖励购买企业股权。以武汉市国资公司为代表。年薪制由基薪收入、风险收入、年功收入、特别年薪奖励四部分组成。其中 ,风险收入根据企业完成净利润情况核实 ,将其中 30 %以现金形式当年兑付…     

中国实行经理股标期权的可行性分析

股票期权又称认股权证 ,是指公司给予员工的 (主要是高级管理人员 )一种权利 ,拥有这种权利的人可以在一定时期内 (一般为 3— 1 0年 )以一定的价格 (行权价 )购买一定数量本公司股票的权利。经理股票期权 ( ESO)指的是股票的授予对象为公司的经理人员。经理人股票期权作为一种对经理人的长期激励制度在美国已经比较成熟 ,它对经理人的激励作用也是明显的。但是在中国 ,由于现实的相关政策、法规方面的缺陷 ,还不能全面实行经理股票期权。基于经理人员在一个公司中的重要作用 ,本文主要就经理股票期权在中国的可行性进行分析。股票期权作…     

发电企业上市公司引用股票期权激励机制探讨

分析了股票期权激励制度给上市公司带来的效益以及在中国的应用模式,并按九个方面阐述了股票期权激励制度设计。     

股票期权激励制度关键要素的优化设计

股票期权制度的内在缺陷影响了其激励的有效性，其制度设计的不合理之处在于以单一的股票价格作为衡量业绩和确定价格的指标。本文重新设计了业绩评价模型和行权价格定价模型。以期能够发挥股票期权制度的应有效果，为企业制定股票期权计划提供有益的参考。     

权变视角下现代企业激励机制研究

传统激励理论以人的共性为出发点,忽视了不同个体间的差异性及情境因素的影响,激励效果较差。权变激励针对个体特殊性、情境多样性和社会复杂性,通过情感激励、按需激励、培训激励、股票期权激励等几种运行方式,以动态、多维的新视角寻找激励结构中各种关系的最佳匹配。从而优化激励过程,提高激励的有效性。     

Leveraging foreign institutional logic in the adoption of stock option pay among Japanese firms

Research summary : We investigate why Japanese firms have adopted executive stock option pay, which was developed with shareholder‐oriented institutional logic that was inconsistent with Japanese stakeholder‐oriented institutional logic. We argue that Japanese managers have self‐serving incentives to leverage stock ownership of foreign investors and their associated institutional logic to legitimize the adoption of stock option pay. Our empirical analyses with a large sample of Japanese firms between 1997 and 2007 show that when managers have elite education, high pay inequality with ordinary employees, and when firms experience poor sales growth, foreign ownership is more likely associated with the adoption of stock option pay. The study shows the active role of managers in facilitating the diffusion of a new governance practice embodying new institutional logic. Managerial summary : Why have Japanese firms adopted stock option pay for executives? Inconsistent with Japanese stakeholder‐oriented tradition in corporate governance, such pay has been believed to prioritize managerial attention to the interests of shareholders over those of other stakeholders. However, to the extent that shareholders' interests are legitimate in the Japanese context, executives who have self‐serving incentives to adopt such pay can leverage the need to look after shareholders' interest in their firms to legitimize their decisions. In a large sample of Japanese firms, we find that foreign ownership (representing shareholders' interests) is more likely to be associated with the adoption of stock option pay when managers are motivated to receive such pay, such as when they have elite education, high pay inequality with ordinary employees, or poor sales growth. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A model of person‐pay interaction: how executives vary in their responses to compensation arrangements

A wealth of research indicates that both executive characteristics and incentive compensation affect organizational outcomes, but the literatures within these two domains have followed distinct, separate paths. Our paper provides a framework for integrating these two perspectives. We introduce a new model that specifies how executive characteristics and incentives operate in tandem to influence strategic decisions and firm performance. We then illustrate our model by portraying how executive characteristics interact with a specific type of pay instrument—stock options—to affect executive behaviors and organizational outcomes. Focusing on three individual‐level attributes (executive motives and drives, cognitive frame, and self‐confidence), we develop propositions detailing how executives will vary in their risk‐taking behaviors in response to stock options. We further argue that stock options will amplify the implications of executive ability, such that option‐heavy incentive schemes will increase the performance of talented executives but worsen the performance of low‐ability executives. Our framework and propositions are meant to provide a starting point for future theorizing and empirical testing of the interactive effects of executive characteristics and incentive compensation on strategic decisions and organizational performance. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

高管海外背景与企业专利国际化 ——基于P CT申请的经验证据

在当前我国PCT(《专利合作条约》)国际专利申请(以下简称PCT申请)快速增长的背景下,本文使用2009~2019年创业板企业的数据,实证分析了高管海外背景对企业专利国际化的影响效果。研究发现:高管海外背景会正向促进企业专利国际化,且当高管既有海外求学背景又有海外任职背景时促进作用最强;相较于非CEO高管海外背景,CEO海外背景更能促进企业专利国际化;从内部治理因素看,高管股票期权激励正向调节高管海外背景对企业专利国际化的促进作用;从外部治理因素看,在知识产权保护程度低的地区,高管海外背景对企业专利国际化的推动作用更明显。本文的研究拓宽了国际专利申请的影响因素以及高管海外背景领域的相关文献,对企业开拓国际市场实现专利国际化具有指导意义。     

Executive turnover in the stock option backdating wave: The impact of social context

While boards are known to react to corporate misconduct by removing the executives responsible, little is known about whether the board's response is shaped by the firm's social context. Using the 2006 stock option backdating scandal, in which firms manipulated stock option grant dates, we examine the impact of two dimensions of social context—the pervasiveness of the misconduct and the media attention to the misconduct. We find that firms implicated later in the backdating scandal are less likely to experience executive turnover than those implicated earlier. We also find that the amount of media attention to backdating at the time a firm is implicated in the scandal increases the likelihood that the firm experiences executive turnover.Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Role of Managerial Stock Option Programs in Governance: Evidence from REIT Stock Repurchases

This article examines the role of stock option programs and executive holdings of stock options in real estate investment trust (REIT) governance. We study the issue by analyzing how the market reaction to a stock repurchase announcement varies as a function of the individual REIT's governance structure. In particular, we examine how executive and employee stock option holdings influence the market reaction to a firm's announcement of a stock repurchase. Using a sample of REIT repurchase announcements, we find that the market reacts more favorably to announcements by firms where executives have larger option holdings and the chief executive officer is not entrenched. Our results with respect to the roles of stock option holdings of executives and nonexecutives differ from those reported for a cross-section of non-REIT firms. While we find evidence supporting the importance of executive stock options in aligning the incentives of management and reinforcing the positive signaling associated with a repurchase announcement, we find little evidence that the market views REIT repurchases as being used primarily to fund option exercise. We attribute these findings to greater dependence by REIT investors on internal governance mechanisms (such as stock option programs) as a result of regulatory restrictions that limit external monitoring such as hostile takeovers.     

高管持股的风险偏爱与R＆D投入动机

从研发投入风险和决策者风险偏爱出发,以委托代理理论为框架,分析高管持股对企业R＆D投入的影响。研究结果显示：股东比管理者更愿意进行R＆D投入,高管持股对企业R＆D投入有激励作用,但这种激励在持股比例很低时不显著,只有当高管持股达到0．1％时,R＆D投入强度才显著提高。这说明对高风险的研发投入,只有那些与企业长远发展相关的利益群体,首先是股东,其次是持股达到一定比例的高管才有动机加大R＆D投入．促进企业的创新。     

公司融资结构与委托代理机制设计研究

以现代财经理论为出发点,建立了非对称信息条件下基于融资结构的委托代理模型,并将财务风险和经理持股两个因素纳入模型中,对模型进行了求解,研究了在此背景下的激励机制的设计,并通过对模型的分析,阐述了经理在股权激励和债务约束两种背景下的行为特征。     

The Impact of Employee Stock Option Adoption and Incidence on Productivity: Evidence from U.S. Panel Data

This paper examines the productivity effect of broad‐based and executive stock option programs in adoption year and five subsequent years. The findings include a positive impact on productivity, which is maintained over a five‐year period after adoption for executive plans but diminishes immediately for broad‐based plans. We interpret these findings as evidence of stock option usage being of benefit to organizations. However, to sustain the impact of broad‐based plans options, grants may need to be made with the same frequency as executive option grants.