Positive arithmetic of the welfare state

This paper argues that social security enjoys wider political support than other welfare programs because: (i) retirees constitute the most homogeneous voting group, and (ii) the intragenerational redistribution component of social security induces low-income young to support this system. In a dynamically efficient overlapping generation economy with earnings heterogeneity, we show that, for sufficient income inequality and enough elderly in the population, a welfare system composed of a within-cohort redistribution scheme and an unfunded social security system represents the political equilibrium of a two-dimensional majoritarian election. Social security is sustained by retirees and low-income young; while intragenerational redistribution by low-income young. Unlike unidimensional voting model, our model suggests that to assess how changes in inequality affect the welfare state, the income distribution should be decomposed by age groups.     

Transfers in a polarized country: bridging the gap between efficiency and stability

We consider a political economy model of country whose citizens have heterogeneous preferences for a national policy and some regions may contemplate a threat of secession. The country is efficient if its breakup into smaller countries leads to an aggregate utility loss. We show that in an efficient country whose citizens' preferences exhibit a high degree of polarization, a threat of secession cannot be eliminated without inter-regional transfers. We also demonstrate that if majority voting is used to determine the redistribution schemes within the country, then a high degree of polarization yields the full-compensation scheme as the unique political equilibrium.     

Voting for Burden Sharing Rules in Public Goods Games

We experimentally investigate whether groups of heterogeneous agents can reach an agreement on how to share the costs of providing a public good. Thereby, we explore the performance of different burden sharing rules being implemented either endogenously or exogenously. In case of an endogenously implemented burden sharing rule, subjects vote for different burden sharing schemes either by unanimity or majority vote. Despite the fact that preferences for the allocation schemes differ among agents, most groups agree upon a common scheme, and consequently avoid an uncoordinated action. Our results reveal both the opportunities and risks of burden sharing negotiations. We find average efficiency levels to increase in case an agreement is reached. If groups however fail to agree upon a common rule, cooperation collapses and efficiency levels decrease compared to a voluntary contribution mechanism being exogenously imposed. Most importantly, agents who face a voting decision on average receive higher payoffs than agents in an exogenously implemented voluntary contribution mechanism and do not earn less than participants in any externally determined burden sharing rule.     

Public goods,voting, and growth

We study a parametric politico‐economic model of economic growth with productive public goods and public consumption goods. The provision of public goods is funded by a proportional tax. Agents are heterogeneous in their initial capital endowments, discount factors, and the relative weights of public consumption in overall private utility. They vote on the shares of public goods in gross domestic products (GDP). We propose a definition of voting equilibrium, prove the existence and provide a characterization of voting equilibria, and obtain a closed‐form solution for the voting outcomes. Also we introduce a “fictitious” representative agent and interpret the outcome of voting as a choice made by a central planner for his benefit. Finally, we undertake comparative static analysis of the shares of public goods in GDP and of the rate of balanced growth with respect to the discount factors and the preferences for public consumption. The results of this analysis suggest that the representative‐agent version of our model is capable of capturing the interaction between many voting heterogeneous agents only if the heterogeneity is one‐dimensional.     

Modeling Effort and Lobbying in a Heterogeneous Common Pool Resource Setting

Extraction from a common pool resource (CPR), such as a fishery, can lead to socially inefficient and undesirable outcomes as a result of appropriation problems. Through regulation of the CPR, users may achieve a more profitable and socially efficient outcome. Feeny et al. (Land Econ 72(2):187–205, 1996) delve into some of the assumptions made by traditional CPR models and how use of those assumptions provides an incomplete framework to guide fishery policy. In the theoretical models we develop, we relax two of those assumptions: CPR users are homogeneous and are unable to create, or influence, management of the resource. We note a case where regulation of the individual user can induce others to harvest more, and relate this to the slippage effect concept. Regarding resource sustainability, we document situations where incentives exist for CPR users to lobby for tighter regulations and thus increase profits by limiting the tragedy of the commons influence.     

Voting in small committees

We analyze the voting behavior of a small committee that has to approve or reject a project proposal whose return is uncertain. Members have diverse preferences: some of them want to maximize the expected value, while others have a bias towards project approval and ignore their information on the project value. We focus on the most efficient use of scarce information when members cannot communicate prior to voting, and we provide insights on the optimal composition of the committee. Our main result is that the presence of biased members can improve the voting outcome, by simplifying the strategies of unbiased members. Thus, committees with diverse members perform as well as homogeneous committees, and even better in some cases. In particular, when value-maximizing members outnumber biased members by one vote, the optimal equilibrium becomes unique.     

Invasive species management in a spatially heterogeneous world: Effects of uniform policies

The spread of invasive species (IS) is an inherently spatial process, and management of invasive species occurs over spatially heterogeneous regions, but policy constraints can restrict management responses to be homogeneous across regions. Using a spatial bioeconomic model that includes a representation of invasive species ecology based on heterogeneous environments that are linked across space and time by human and ecological pathways, we compare optimal spatially heterogeneous policy to spatially uniform policy. We explore the magnitude and pattern of the policy differences with emphasis on the influence of different types of underlying heterogeneity across locations.     

Consensus Consumer and Intertemporal Asset Pricing with Heterogeneous Beliefs

The aim of this paper is to analyse the impact of heterogeneous beliefs in an otherwise standard competitive complete market economy. The construction of a consensus probability belief, as well as a consensus consumer, is shown to be valid modulo an aggregation bias, which takes the form of a discount factor. In classical cases, the consensus probability belief is a risk tolerance weighted average of the individual beliefs, and the discount factor is proportional to beliefs dispersion. This discount factor makes the heterogeneous beliefs setting fundamentally different from the homogeneous beliefs setting, and it is consistent with the interpretation of beliefs heterogeneity as a source of risk.
We then use our construction to rewrite in a simple way the equilibrium characteristics (market price of risk, risk premium, risk-free rate) in a heterogeneous beliefs framework and to analyse the impact of beliefs heterogeneity. Finally, we show that it is possible to construct specific parametrizations of the heterogeneous beliefs model that lead to globally higher risk premia and lower risk-free rates.     

The political economy of urban transport-system choice

This paper analyzes the political economy of transport-system choice, with the goal of gaining an understanding of the forces involved in this important urban public policy decision. Transport systems pose a continuous trade-off between time and money cost, so that a city can choose a fast system with a high money cost per mile or a slower, cheaper system. The paper compares the socially optimal transport system to the one chosen under the voting process, focusing on both homogeneous and heterogeneous cities, while considering different landownership arrangements. The analysis identifies a bias toward underinvestment in transport quality in heterogeneous cities.     

Heterogeneous learning

There is by now a large literature characterising conditions under which learning schemes converge to rational expectations equilibria (REEs). It has been claimed that these results depend on the assumption of homogeneous agents and homogeneous learning. This paper analyses the stability of REEs under heterogeneous adaptive learning, for the class of self-referential linear stochastic models. Agents may differ in their initial perceptions about the evolution of the economy, the degrees of inertia in revising their expectations, or the learning rules they use. General conditions are provided for local stability of an REE. In general, it is not possible to show that stability under homogeneous learning implies stability under heterogeneous learning. To illustrate how to apply the results, several examples are provided.     

A RETROSPECTIVE VOTING MODEL WITH HETEROGENEOUS POLITICIANS

This paper extends the performance-based voting models of Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986), and Austen-Smith and Banks (1990) by including heterogeneous politicians. The introduction of heterogeneous politicians has three major implications. First, the act of voting must now simultaneously address both "moral hazard" and "adverse selection" problems. Accordingly, this paper demonstrates that voters will usually have to trade off the twin goals of (i) securing the optimal performance from a given type of politician, and (ii) insuring that only the best types of politicians are selected to office. Second, both equilibrium reelection rates and the tenure-performance relationship are shown to depend on the value of holding office. For example, when the value of holding political office is large relative to other employment opportunities. incumbents will experience very high reelection rates: and longer-serving politicians will perform poorer, on average, than shorter-serving politicians. Finally, we demonstrate the surprising result that increased heterogeneity of politicians can make voters worse off.     

Collective Choice in the Commons: Experimental Results on Proposed Allocation Rules and Votes

We analyse and empirically examine a multi-level common-pool resource (CPR) game consisting of a collective-choice level game and an operational-level game. In the collective-choice game, participants anonymously propose allocation rules to be used in the operational game and vote anonymously on the proposed rules. Majority and unanimity rules are investigated. Our major finding is that both types of voting rules substantially increase efficiency relative to a baseline with no opportunity for collective choice, but the distributional consequences of the rules differ. To understand the process by which efficiency is improved better, we examine four predictive theories related to proposals, votes, and outcomes.     

Heterogeneous Preferences, Education Expenditures and Income Distribution

This paper introduces heterogeneous preferences to a growth model which incorporates human capital, accumulated through either public or private education. The implications of heterogeneous preferences for income and its distribution are the focus of the paper. Public education expenditure is determined through a voting mechanism where the median preference rather than median income household is the decisive voter. The paper extends the work of Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and shows first, that heterogeneous preferences increase income inequality in the private education model and second, public education can overcome the added heterogeneity and reduce income inequality. The results strengthen the arguments for public education as a redistributive mechanism.     

Trade and industrial structure with large firms and heterogeneity

We develop a model of trade and firm heterogeneity in an oligopolistic setting. This setting generates key differences in terms of modelling setup, modelling predictions and welfare implications with respect to the existing literature on trade and firm heterogeneity. In terms of modelling setup our approach allows us to explore interaction between potentially large heterogeneous firms, in contrast to recent trade literature with heterogeneity and atomistic firms. As a result variables like market price and total sales vary endogenously as different firms enter the market. We offer a solution for the integer problem inherent in small group models, based on stochastic dominance. The model generates testable predictions deviating from the benchmark firm heterogeneity model of Melitz (2003) in terms of the effect of trade liberalisation on markups, market shares, the market price. We also derive predictions on the effect of distance and market size on the probability of zero trade flows and export prices. Our model features the possibility that welfare declines as a result of trade liberalisation. The result in Brander and Krugman (1983), the benchmark model for trade under oligopoly, that welfare unambiguously rises with free entry and might decline without free entry due to increased cross-hauling is reversed. In a setting with heterogeneous instead of homogeneous firms, welfare might decline with free entry. A negative welfare effect without free entry can be ruled out if the firm size distribution is sufficiently dispersed.     

Monetary Policy,Financial Frictions,and Heterogeneous R&D Firms in an Endogenous Growth Model*

Motivated by empirical facts, I construct an endogenous growth model in which heterogeneous research and development (R&D) firms are financially constrained and use cash to finance R&D investments. I also examine the optimal monetary policy. The effects of financial constraint crucially depend on whether R&D firms are homogeneous or heterogeneous regarding R&D productivity. If R&D firms are homogeneous, then the zero nominal interest rate (i.e., the Friedman rule) is always optimal under severe financial constraint. Heterogeneity in R&D productivity leads to the opposite result. With heterogeneity, severe financial constraint makes the strictly positive nominal interest rate welfare-improving under a plausible condition.     

Heterogeneous beliefs and learning in forward looking economic models*

We study a class of forward looking economic models with heterogeneous agents in a bounded rationality setting. The agents employ the same recursive learning rule to update beliefs but are characterized by different memory parameters. The peculiarity of the learning mechanism is that the learning rate is not vanishing in the limit. Differently from what is obtained in the case of a vanishing learning step, i.e., the stability conditions in the heterogeneous agents case are those of the representative agent model, we show that heterogeneity matters for the expectational stability of a stationary perfect foresight equilibrium and that the stability parameter restrictions with heterogeneous agents are stronger than in the case of homogeneous agents.     

The heterogeneity of carbon Kuznets curves for advanced countries: comparing homogeneous,heterogeneous and shrinkage/Bayesian estimators

We investigate Carbon Kuznets Curves (CKC) relationships for advanced countries grouped in policy relevant groups – North America and Oceania, South Europe, North Europe – by means of various homogeneous, heterogeneous and shrinkage/Bayesian panel estimators. We try to provide an answer to the question ‘how sensitive are the CKC estimates to changes in the level of parameters' heterogeneity?’. We do find that in coherence with their ‘policy and economic’ commitment to carbon reductions and environmental market-based instruments implementation, bell shapes are present only for northern EU, which leads the group of advanced countries. The other two lag behind. We show for the first time that CKC shapes are present if we net out Europe of the southern and less developed countries. This is coherent with the Kuznets paradigm. The negative side of the tale is that they characterize a bunch of few countries. Other advanced countries lag behind and are far from reaching a CKC dynamics. Heterogeneous and Bayesian estimators clearly show this, with the EU presenting turning points closely around $13?000 per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Heterogeneous panel estimates also show that for lagging countries presumed bell shapes turn into linear relationships. The stability of outcomes across models is stronger when we compare heterogeneous rather than homogeneous models. If it is compared with other studies, our analysis highlights a relative lower variability across specifications.     

Market Integration,Choice of Technology,and Welfare

This paper develops an international trade model where firms in a duopoly may diversify their technologies for strategic reasons. The firms face the same set of technologies given by a tradeoff between marginal costs and fixed costs, but depending on trade costs firms may choose different technologies. Market integration may induce a technological restructuring where firms either diversify their technologies or switch to a homogeneous technology. In general, market integration improves welfare. However, a small decrease of trade costs which induces a switch from heterogeneous technologies to a homogeneous technology may locally reduce global welfare. The model also shows that productivity differences lead to intra‐industry firm heterogeneity in size and exports similar to the “new–new” trade models with monopolistic competition.     

Minority voting and long-term decisions

In this paper we propose minority voting as a scheme that can partially protect individuals from the risk of repeated exploitation. We consider a committee that meets twice to decide about projects including a first-period project that may have long-lasting impact. In the first period, a simple open majority voting scheme takes place. Voting splits the committee into three groups: voting winners, voting losers, and absentees. Under minority voting, only voting losers retain their voting rights in the second period. We show that as soon as absolute risk aversion exceeds a threshold value, minority voting is superior to repeated application of the simple majority rule.     

Transboundary Environmental Problems with Mobile but Heterogeneous Populations

Most of the literature on transboundaryenvironmental problems treats population ineach country or region as constant, ignoringpopulation mobility. We showed previously thatif there is perfect population mobility betweenregions, and populations are homogeneous, asocially efficient outcome can be supported asa Nash equilibrium of the game of uncoordinatedpolicy setting, even without any internationalenvironmental agreement. In the present paperwe introduce heterogeneous population, and showthat when people differ, a non-cooperativeoutcome is generally inefficient. We alsodemonstrate that for a particular set ofobjective functions for the regionalgovernments, there is an equilibrium of thegame of uncoordinated policy setting that isefficient. Finally, we give an example wherethe decentralized outcome is efficient whenthere is no population mobility, butinefficient when there is population mobility.