The impact of employers' recruitment behaviour on the allocation of vacant jobs to unemployed job seekers

This paper is focused on the allocation of vacant jobs to job seekers from a demand side perspective by studying the recruitment behaviour of employers. A model is developed to analyze the role of search and selection methods of employers as determinants of the probability that an unemployed person will be hired for a certain type of job. In an empirical application for the Dutch labour market, we have examined the effect of employer's recruitment behaviour on the allocation of vacant jobs to employed, unemployed and school-leaving job seekers.We find that job requirements for the applicants with respect to work experience are the most important determinant of the probability that an unemployed person will be selected to fill a vacant job. In addition, the use of advertisements by employers for jobs requiring high skill levels does also have a significant effect.     

CHOOSY SEARCH AND THE MISMATCH OF TALENTS*

This article proposes a multi‐sector matching model where workers have (symmetric) sector‐specific skills and the search market is segmented by sector. Workers choose the range of markets they are willing to participate in. I identify a composition externality: Workers do not take into account the impact of their choice on sector‐specific mean productivity among the pools of job‐seekers. Consequently, workers prospect too many market segments, and there is room for public policy even when the so‐called Hosios condition holds.     

Optimal unemployment insurance and redistribution

We characterize optimal income taxation and unemployment insurance in a search‐matching framework where both voluntary and involuntary unemployment are endogenous and Nash bargaining determines wages. Individuals decide whether to participate as job seekers and if so, how much search effort to exert. Unemployment insurance trades off insurance versus search and participation incentives. We also allow for different productivity types so there is a redistributive role for the income tax and show that a piecewise linear wage tax internalizes the macro effects arising from endogenous wages. Type‐specific lump‐sum taxes and transfers can then redistribute between individuals of differing skills and employment states. Our analysis embeds optimal unemployment insurance into an extensive‐margin optimal redistribution framework where transfers to the involuntarily and voluntarily unemployed can differ, and nests several standard models in the literature.     

WHAT AFFECTS EFFICIENCY IN LABOUR MARKET MATCHING AT DIFFERENT TERRITORIAL AGGREGATION LEVELS IN POLAND?

We analyse efficiency of a labour market matching process at different levels of territorial aggregation and in different time horizons. We apply a stochastic matching frontier to random, job queuing and stock‐flow models. We use data for Poland, a country with highly regionally diversified unemployment. We find that search and matching mechanisms significantly differ with territorial aggregation. Higher efficiency in small regions results from lower frictions. Larger regions enjoy better structural matching if only labour market participants have time to search. Different policy measures should be designed to improve labour market matching efficiency at different regional levels.     

Do Lower Caseloads Improve the Performance of Public Employment Services? New Evidence from German Employment Offices

The caseworker‐to‐clients ratio is an important, but understudied, policy parameter that affects both the quality and cost of public employment services that help job seekers find employment. We exploit a large‐scale pilot by Germany's employment agency, which hired 490 additional caseworkers in 14 of its 779 offices. We find that lowering caseloads caused a decrease in the rate and duration of local unemployment as well as a higher re‐employment rate. Disentangling the mechanisms that contributed to this improvement, we find that offices with lowered caseloads increased monitoring and imposed more sanctions but also intensified search efforts and registered additional vacancies.     

Choice and success of job search methods

Job seekers influence the arrival rate of job offers by the choice of search effort and the search methods they use. In this paper we empirically investigate the effect of different search methods on search outcomes. We use unique data on the search behavior of job seekers in Austria, which matches survey information with administrative records. We analyze the quality of job matches in terms of wages and job durations for employed and unemployed workers. We find that the public employment office specializes in the support of low quality workers. For them it is equally efficient as other search channels.     

The Effects of Marginal Employment on Subsequent Labour Market Outcomes

Abstract. Unemployed workers in Austria do not lose their unemployment benefits (UI) if they work in a job where their earnings are below a certain threshold [‘marginal employment’ (ME)]. ME might improve their labour market status by signalling effort, or worsen it through reduced job‐search effort. Those who work in ME while claiming UI have less employment and lower earnings afterwards than those who do not. The penalty lessens over time but is still present after three years.     

Job search and academic achievement

The paper develops a structural model for the labor market behavior of students entering the labor market. We explicitly model the trade-off between devoting effort to studying and to job search. Furthermore, we allow for on-the-job search. The model is estimated using a unique data set of individuals who completed undergraduate education in the Netherlands between 1995 and 2001. Our estimation results show that labor market returns of high grades are low. Wage increases between jobs are explained by labor market friction rather than returns of early work experience. Our results indicate that a 1 percentage point decrease in the unemployment rate increases wage offers on average by 3 percent, but that the amount of job search effort is not very sensitive to business cycle fluctuations. Policy simulations show that study effort and hence academic achievement are much more sensitive to financial incentives than job search effort and labor market outcomes.     

Determinants of Labor Market Participation and Wages of North Korean Female Refugees in South Korea

This paper uses data from a survey on 289 North Korean female refugees who arrived in South Korea in 2007 to understand the determinants of their economic adaption in the South Korean labor market. More specifically, we look at the effects of job finding channels and government policies on the labor market participation and wages of these women. We find that job finding through both personal contacts and public employment networks increases the probability of finding employment, but the former, especially job finding through contacts with South Koreans, is the most effective route to finding employment. In addition, jobs with higher wages are acquired in employment attained from South Korean referrals, followed by South Korean government agencies and those from North Korean refugee contacts. We further find that labor market participation is negatively affected by both public benefits and private transfers possibly because of increases in the reservation wages of job seekers.     

The Nature of Unemployment among Young Men in Urban Ethiopia

This paper investigates the nature of unemployment among young men in urban Ethiopia and finds that it is concentrated among relatively well‐educated first‐time job seekers who aspire to a public sector job and spend on average close to four years in unemployment. This is consistent with a segmented labor market model where youngsters queue in unemployment for a good job, as confirmed by an empirical test of the theoretical prediction. We observe a negative (causal) relationship between household welfare and both the incidence and duration of unemployment, indicating that unemployment is concentrated among the relatively worse off urban households, which from a national perspective represent the middle classes, and find suggestive evidence that part of this effect is due to malnutrition during childhood. Job search through social networks is only effective after one has become unemployed, suggesting that networks provide insurance only after exposure to the risk.     

Monitoring Job Offer Decisions,Punishments, Exit to Work,and Job Quality

Unemployment insurance systems include the monitoring of unemployed workers and punitive sanctions if job search requirements are violated. We analyze the causal effect of sanctions on the ensuing job quality, notably on wages and occupational level. We use Swedish data and estimate duration models dealing with selection on unobservables. We also develop a theoretical job search model that monitors job offer rejection versus job search effort. The empirical results show that, after a sanction, the wage rate is lower and individuals move more often to a part‐time job and a lower occupational level, incurring human capital losses.     

Does population density matter in the process of matching heterogeneous job seekers and vacancies?

This paper studies the matching of job seekers and vacant jobs using data on local labour markets. We estimate differences in the ability of the local markets to form new matches and trace whether these differences can be explained by the differing population densities across markets or by the heterogeneity of job seekers measured by the distribution of their education level. We find that high-density areas are more efficient in forming matches than other areas despite frictions caused by the wider heterogeneity of job seekers in those areas than elsewhere.

Participation,Recruitment Selection,and the Minimum Wage

In this paper, we re‐examine the efficiency of participation with heterogeneous workers in a search‐matching model with bargained wages and free entry. Assuming that firms hire their best applicants, we show that participation is always too low. The reason for this is a hold‐up phenomenon: to be active, a worker must pay the entire search cost whereas part of the gain from this investment goes to the firm. As a consequence, introducing a (small) minimum wage raises participation, job creation, and employment. Therefore, net aggregate income of the economy is increased.     

JOB FLOWS AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN AN EQUILIBRIUM UNEMPLOYMENT MODEL WITH FIRM‐SPECIFIC SKILL TRAINING*

We introduce productivity enhancing firm‐specific skill training into the labour search model in which the firm‐specific skill training intensity and the job destruction rate are endogenously determined. It is shown that the higher the intensity of such training, the lower the rates of unemployment, job creation and job destruction. The paper's model provides a theoretical framework to understand the often mentioned peculiarity of the Japanese labour market; prevalently low rates of unemployment, job creation and job destruction in Japan are due to its training system which promotes workers to acquire firm‐specific skills.     

DIRECTED SEARCH WITH PHANTOM VACANCIES

When vacancies are filled, the job ads often remain, creating phantom vacancies. Older listings more likely represent phantoms. We assume job seekers direct their search based on listing age. Forming a match with an age-a vacancy creates an age-a phantom with probability β and generates an externality affecting vacancies aged a and older. Thus, the externality decreases with the match's listing age. Relative to efficient behavior, job seekers overapply to younger listings. We calibrate using U.S. data. The contribution of phantoms to inefficiency is large, but, given their existence, the planner cannot improve much on the directed search allocation.     

Occupational Change and Mobility Among Employed and Unemployed Job Seekers

We use data from the Labour Force Survey to show that employed and unemployed job seekers in Great Britain originate from different occupations and find jobs in different occupations. We find substantial differences in occupational mobility between job seekers: employed job seekers are most likely to move to occupations paying higher average wages relative to their previous occupation, while unemployed job seekers are most likely to move to lower paying occupations. Employed and unemployed job seekers exhibit different patterns of occupational mobility and, therefore, do not accept the same types of jobs.     

Taxation of early retirement windows and delaying retirement: The French experience

This paper investigates the effect of the 2003 French pension reform on hiring, firing and employment rates among older workers. This reform increased the mandatory retirement age and simultaneously it set a tax levied on early retirement windows paid by firms to their older workers, to encourage them to leave their job early. We use a matching model with endogenous job destruction extended to account for a mandatory retirement age and we calibrate the model with data drawn from the French Labor Force Surveys for the years 2002 and 2003. We show that in the case of a high tax rate, delaying retirement raises job separation rates, which partially offsets its positive effect on job finding rates. Consequently, the combination of an increase in the retirement age and a taxation on early retirement windows may have negative effects on the employment rate among older workers.     

Directed search, unemployment and public policy

Abstract .  We examine the effects of public policy parameters in a simple directed search model of the labour market, and contrast them with those in standard random matching models with Nash bargaining. Both finite and limit versions of the directed search model are considered, and the value of the limit model as an approximation of the finite one is assessed. As with the random matching model, job creation is the key channel through which the policy parameters affect the equilibrium of the directed search model. Both comparative static effects of the policy parameters and optimal configurations are identified.     

Reducing Start‐up Costs for New Firms: The Double Dividend on the Labor Market*

Starting a firm with expansive potential is an option for educated and high‐skilled workers. If there are labor market frictions, this additional option can be seen as reducing the chances of ending up in a low‐wage job and hence as increasing the incentives for education. In a matching model, we show that reducing the start‐up costs for new firms results in higher take‐up rates of education. It also gives rise—through a thick‐market externality—to higher rates of job creation for high‐skilled labor as well as average match productivity. We provide empirical evidence to support our argument.     

Wage posting: evidence from job ads

Abstract Recent studies of search theory examine how employers use a wage‐setting mechanism – either by bargaining or through the posting of a non‐negotiable wage offer in a job ad – to facilitate search. We contribute to this literature by examining wage posting in job ads in the US, the UK, and Slovenia. Despite considerable differences in the incidence of wage posting, employers in all three markets are less likely to post a wage offer when searching for skilled workers. The decision on whether or not to post a wage offer is only weakly related to the outcomes of employers’ search.