Bank loan losses-given-default: A case study

The empirical literature on credit risk has relied mostly on the corporate bond market to estimate losses in the event of default. The reason for this is that, as bank loans are private instruments, few data on loan losses are publicly available. The contribution of this paper is to apply mortality analysis to a unique set of micro-data on defaulted bank loans of a European bank. The empirical results relate to the timing of recoveries on bad and doubtful bank loans, the distribution of cumulative recovery rates, their economic determinants and the direct costs incurred by that bank on recoveries on bad and doubtful loans.     

Bank Debt versus Bond Debt: Evidence from Secondary Market Prices

This paper uses a new data set of daily secondary market prices of loans to analyze the specialness of banks as monitors. Consistent with a monitoring advantage of loans over bonds, we find the secondary loan market to be informationally more efficient than the secondary bond market prior to a loan default. Specifically, we find that secondary market loan returns Granger cause secondary market bond returns prior to a loan default. In contrast, secondary market bond returns do not Granger cause secondary market loan returns prior to a loan default.     

Credit derivatives and loan pricing

This paper examines the relation between the new markets for credit default swaps (CDS) and banks’ pricing of syndicated loans to US corporates. We find that changes in CDS spreads have a significantly positive coefficient and explain about 25% of subsequent monthly changes in aggregate loan spreads during 2000–2005. Moreover, when compared to traditional explanatory factors, they turn out to be the dominant determinant of loan spreads. In particular, they explain loan rates much better than same rated bonds. This suggests that CDS prices contain, beyond general credit risk, to a substantial extent information relevant for bank lending. We also find that, over time, new information from CDS markets is faster incorporated into loans, but information from other markets is not. Overall, our results indicate that the markets for CDS have gained an important role for banks.     

Macroeconomic effects of corporate default crisis: A long-term perspective

Using an extensive data set on corporate bond defaults in the US from 1866 to 2010, we study the macroeconomic effects of bond market crises and contrast them with those resulting from banking crises. During the past 150 years, the US has experienced many severe corporate default crises in which 20–50% of all corporate bonds defaulted. Although the total par amount of corporate bonds has at times rivaled the amount of bank loans outstanding, we find that corporate default crises have far fewer real effects than do banking crises. These results provide empirical support for current theories that emphasize the unique role that banks and the credit and collateral channels play in amplifying macroeconomic shocks.     

Bank loans during the 2008 quantitative easing

We examine the effect of quantitative easing on the supply of bank loans. During the Fed’s quantitative easing programs, lending banks reduced relatively more loan spreads, offered longer loan maturities, provided larger loans, and loosened more covenants for firms whose long-term bond ratings were below BBB and were lower than those with investment-grade bond ratings. Furthermore, we find that new bank loans in this period were associated with a reduction in a firm’s value and an increase in default risk. These results indicate that banks took greater risk during the 2008 quantitative easing by relaxing lending standards to relatively riskier borrowers.     

Regional redistribution through SBA guaranteed loan programs

We document and quantify a new implicit transfer mechanism in the SBA 7(a) loan program that redistributes funds between US states. We use SBA 7(a) loan data in conjunction with Dealscan private corporate loan data to show that SBA 7(a) loan interest rates are much less responsive to predicted local loan default risk compared to private corporate loans. This redistributes funds from states with low default risk to states with high default risk. These transfers are positively correlated with the severity of local economic shocks during the Great Recession and the COVID-19 Recession. Therefore, even though it was unintended, the interest rates on SBA 7(a) loans acted as an automatic stabilizer mitigating regional economic shocks.     

A factor analysis approach to measuring European loan and bond market integration

By using an existing and a new convergence measure, this paper assesses whether bank loan and bond interest rates are converging for the non-financial corporate sector across the euro area. Whilst we find evidence for complete bond market integration, the market for bank loans remains segmented, albeit to various degrees depending on the type and size of the loan. Factor analysis reveals that rates on large loans and small loans with long rate fixation periods have weakly converged in the sense that, up to a fixed effect, their evolution is driven by common factors only. In contrast, the price evolution of small loans with short rate fixation periods is still affected by country-specific dynamic factors. There are few signs that bank loan rates are becoming more uniform with time.     

Implications of Debt Renegotiation for Optimal Bank Policy and Firm Behavior

This paper analyzes the problems associated with the renegotiation of debt contracts involving a bank (the lender) and a firm (the borrower) when the latter is operated by a risk averse manager. Firms undertake risky projects with loan capital borrowed from the bank. When a firm cannot pay off a loan it is technically bankrupt. Both the borrower and the lender may however experience a Pareto-improvement in their positions by renegotiating the loan. By renegotiating the terms of the debt the financially distressed firm can avoid the stigmatization of bankruptcy and the bank can avoid the costs of seizing the borrower's assets. However, our main finding is that, from the bank's point of view, renegotiating as a policy of recovering loan payments may be inefficient in practice because of false bankruptcy claims and moral hazard problems associated with exposure of the borrowing firm to the risk of default. We present a solution to the false bankruptcy claim problem that involves a mixe d strategy between asset seizure by the bank and debt renegotiation.     

Monitoring and bank loan pricing

In this paper, we examine the influence of contract costs on the pricing of bank loans. We find that the loan spread depends on a bank's screening and monitoring incentives, which varies across differentially regulated classes of banks. This leads to significant price disparities in the loan market. In particular, the US branches of Japanese banks participate in syndicated lending to US firms that charge significantly higher spreads compared to syndicated loans to US firms without Japanese participation. This pricing disparity is primarily due to regulatory differences. We also find that as specialized intermediaries, banks price loans based primarily on their own monitoring.     

What Drives Default and Prepayment on Subprime Auto Loans?

This paper uses novel data on the performance of loan pools underlying asset-backed securities to estimate a competing risks model of default and prepayment on subprime automobile loans. We find that prepayment rates increase rapidly with loan age but are not affected by prevailing market interest rates. Default rates are much more sensitive to aggregate shocks than are prepayment rates. Increases in unemployment precede increases in default rates, suggesting that defaults on subprime automobile loans are driven largely by shocks to household liquidity. There are significant differences in the default and prepayment rates faced by different subprime lenders. Those lenders that charge the highest interest rates experience the highest default rates, but also experience somewhat lower prepayment rates. We conjecture that there is substantial heterogeneity among subprime borrowers, and that different lenders target different segments of the subprime market. Because of their higher default rates, loans that carry the highest interest rates do not appear to yield the highest expected returns.     

THE INFORMATIONAL ROLE OF BANK LOAN RATINGS

We analyze the relatively new phenomenon of credit ratings on syndicated loans, asking first whether they convey information to the capital markets. Our event studies show that initial loan ratings and upgrades are not informative, but downgrades are. The market anticipates downgrades to some extent, however. We also examine whether public information reflecting borrower default characteristics explains cross‐sectional variation in loan ratings and find that ratings are only partially predictable. Our evidence suggests that loan and bond ratings are not determined by the same model. Finally, we estimate a credit spread model incorporating bank loan ratings and other factors reflecting default risk, information asymmetry, and agency problems. We find that ratings are related to loan rates, given the effect of other influences on yields, suggesting that ratings provide information not reflected in financial information. Ratings may capture idiosyncratic information about recovery rates, as each of the agencies claims, or information about default prospects not available to the market.     

Internal and external analysis of community banks' performance

This study explores the efficiency of US community banks and factors that affect it. We present a slacks-based measure model for data envelopment analysis to analyze the efficiency of 3171 community banks in the US, and then conduct a panel data analysis to investigate the factors that affect banks' efficiency. The results show that bank size, community size, and unemployment rate of the region where the community bank is located are positively related to the efficiency, whereas relative affluence of a community has a negative relationship with the community bank efficiency. In addition, community banks providing real estate loans or diversifying their loan services perform better than those concentrating on agricultural loans, which account for a large proportion of the loans provided by US community banks whose traditional role is to provide banking services to rural communities and act as major credit providers for agricultural producers.     

Bank loans and bond prices

We test whether bank loans change public bond yields. A 25% increase in bank debt raises bond yields by 8 bps, reflecting a trade-off between the benefits of bank cross-monitoring and higher bond risk. This effect is smaller for firms with no credit default swaps (CDSs) and with junk debt—scenarios where bank monitoring is most valuable. It is unlikely that firms with bank debt are riskier, because they are less likely to be downgraded and have lower loan spreads. We find similar results using a natural experiment around the 2014 oil shock. Our results highlight how bond yields depend on incentive conflicts among creditors.     

The integration of bank syndicated loan and junk bond markets

This paper hypothesizes that the special role of banks as corporate quasi-insiders has been changing due to developments in informational, legal and institutional infrastructures of syndicated loan markets. We investigate the integration of intermediated and disintermediated financial markets through highly leveraged transaction (HLT) syndicated loans during the 1990s. We demonstrate that, with the emergence of traded HLT syndicated loans as an alternative high-yield asset to high-yield bonds, market integration has dramatically increased. Taking the late 1980s and 1990s together, different factors explain the movement of credit spreads of the two markets. HLT loan market’s spreads are strongly affected by bank liquidity. Bank liquidity’s effect on HLT loan spreads disappears after 1993. From 1994–1999, junk bond market liquidity factors affect bank loan pricing. We interpret these changes as evidence of the erosion of bank specialness.     

Interbank competition and information production: Evidence from the interest rate difference

In this paper, using firm-level cross-sectional data in the US, we report that interest rates on loans extended by inside banks are significantly lower than those on loans extended by outside banks for younger firms in concentrated loan markets, while such loan rate differences are not clearly observed in competitive loan markets. The analytical model presented in this paper predicts that an inside bank is more likely to quote rates lower than those of outside banks to capture a customer in order to gain time to establish exclusive access to the customer’s private information, counting on the consequent future rent from informational advantages over rival banks, if the inside bank intends to acquire private information about the borrower’s creditworthiness. In light of this prediction, we conclude that the above empirical finding is consistent with the hypothesis that increased competition discourages banks from collecting borrower-specific private information.     

Improvements in loss given default forecasts for bank loans

An accurate forecast of the parameter loss given default (LGD) of loans plays a crucial role for risk-based decision making by banks. We theoretically analyze problems arising when forecasting LGDs of bank loans that lead to inconsistent estimates and a low predictive power. We present several improvements for LGD estimates, considering length-biased sampling, different loan characteristics depending on the type of default end, and different information sets according to the default status. We empirically demonstrate the capability of our proposals based on a data set of 69,985 defaulted bank loans. Our results are not only important for banks, but also for regulators, because neglecting these issues leads to a significant underestimation of capital requirements.     

Uncertainty and the Cost of Bank versus Bond Finance

How does uncertainty affect the costs of raising finance in the bond market and via bank loans? Empirically, this paper finds that heightened uncertainty is accompanied by an increase in corporate bond spreads, whereas spreads on bank loans remain unchanged. This finding can be explained with a model that includes costly state verification and in which banks maintain long-term relationships with borrowers and acquire information beyond what is publicly available. After an unexpected increase in uncertainty, the probability of borrower default increases. Banks leave the loan spread unchanged to maintain the relationship. In contrast, bond spreads increase because investors demand compensation for the increased default risk.     

Financial Distress and Bank Lending Relationships

We use a unique data set of bank loans to examine the wealth effects on lead lending banks when their borrowers suffer financial distress. We find a significant negative announcement return for the lead lending bank when a major corporate borrower announces default or bankruptcy. Banks with higher exposure to the distressed firm have larger negative announcement-period returns. The existence of a past lending relationship with the distressed firm results in larger wealth declines for the bank shareholders. Finally, financial distress also has a significant negative effect on borrower's returns.     

The Resiliency of the High-Yield Bond Market: The LTV Default

This paper investigates the resiliency of the new-issue high-yield bond market by examining the changes in implied default rates of such bonds before and after the largest high-yield bond default, i.e., the LTV bankruptcy. Specifically, the paper compares implied default probabilities of high-yield bonds during the post-LTV period calculated from actual new-issue yields with instrumental default probabilities calculated on the assumption that the default had not occurred. A comparison of these probabilities reveals that the market's perception of default on the high risk segment of the bond market increased significantly after the LTV bankruptcy. However, the effect was transitory, lasting only six months. Thus, the market was resilient to a major default.     

A Test of the Law of One Price in Retail Banking

This paper investigates the level and the determinants of retail banking interest rate differences among Spanish banks in the period 1989–2003. We find that the interest rates of twenty five different bank loan and deposit products adjust rather rapidly to their long-term values in response to external shocks, as the relative version of the Law of One Price predicts, but the evidence runs contrary to the absolute version of the Law. Credit risk premium, part of the marginal cost of the loans granted by a particular bank, is an important source of interest rate dispersion across banks and loan products, both before and after Spain joined the Euro zone. Therefore, differences in credit risk policies across banks must be taken into account when forming expectations about European retail banking integration.