Can investors time their exposure to private equity?

Private equity performance, both for buyouts and venture capital, has been highly cyclical: periods of high fundraising have been followed by periods of low performance. Despite this seemingly predictable variation, we find modest gains, at best, to pursuing realistic, investable strategies that time capital commitments to private equity. This occurs, in part, because investors can only time their commitments to funds; they cannot time when commitments are called or when investments are exited. There is a high degree of time-series correlation in net cash flows even across commitment strategies that allocate capital in a very different manner over time.     

Early indicators of fundraising success by venture capital firms

We show how a venture capital firm's fundraising is affected by its investment choices. We investigate three leading indicators that are calculated from the types of investments the venture capital firms make: style drift investments, follow-on investments, and investments in which the venture capital firm is not the lead investor in the portfolio company. We find that these investment characteristics are associated with lower fundraising. Characteristics and the reaction of fundraising to characteristics are both moderately stable through time. We also find some evidence that information about investment characteristics is more important for fundraising during bad states of the world and that ex-ante characteristics are related to eventual exit outcomes and financial performance.     

The performance of banks around the receipt and repayment of TARP funds: Over-achievers versus under-achievers

In this paper, we look at how the pre-crisis health of banks is related to the probability of receiving and repaying TARP capital. We find that financial performance characteristics that are related to the probability of receiving TARP funds differ for the healthiest (“over-achiever”) versus the least healthy (“under-achiever”) banks. We find that TARP under-achievers have some, but not consistent, weaknesses in income production. These banks also are experiencing liquidity issues as customers, shut out of public debt markets, get bank loans through drawdowns of loan commitments. Unlike TARP under-achievers, TARP over-achievers’ loans are performing well. Yet, liquidity issues (from low levels of liquid assets and core deposits and drawdowns of loan commitments) hurt the abilities of these banks to continue their lending. Differences between under-achiever and over-achiever banks are also found for repayment and deadbeat TARP banks.     

A theory of strategic venture investing

Some venture capital investors seek purely financial gains while others, such as corporations, also pursue strategic objectives. The paper examines a model where a strategic investor can achieve synergies, but can also face a conflict of interest with the entrepreneur. If the start-up is a complement to the strategic partner, it is optimal to obtain funding from the strategic investor. If the start-up is a mild substitute, the entrepreneur prefers an independent venture capitalist. With a strong substitute, syndication becomes optimal, such that the independent venture capitalist is the active lead investor and the strategic partner a passive co-investor. The expected returns for the entrepreneur are nonmonotonic, lowest for a mild substitute, and higher for a strong substitute as well as for a complement. The paper also explains why a strategic investor often pays a higher valuation than an independent venture capitalist.     

Entrepreneurs' financing choice between independent and bank-affiliated venture capital firms

This paper analyzes how the affiliation of a venture capital firm affects the deal terms for innovative entrepreneurial ventures. We develop a theory to explain the advantages of independent and bank-affiliated venture capital funds for entrepreneurs. We assume that independent venture capital firms provide better support quality while bank-affiliated firms are less financially constrained. The entrepreneur selects the optimal contract by trading-off these characteristics. The model allows several empirically testable predictions concerning the nature of projects financed by either type of venture capital firm. Entrepreneurs should seek capital from independent or affiliated venture capitalists contingent on the degree of sophistication of their project, their liquidation value, the importance of expected management support, and the remaining time to fundraising.     

人力资本财务激励与约束创新研究——基于美国风险投资的分析

对人力资本实施有效的财务激励和约束是风险投资运作过程中一项关键性制度创新.人力资本财务激励与约束的对象主要包括风险资本家人力资本和企业家人力资本,涵盖风险资本从筹资、投资到退出三个循环阶段.不同循环阶段的人力资本财务激励和约束都涉及到控制权收益、货币收益与声誉资本,但在具体的激励与约束方式上又存在着差异.     

DETERMINANTS OF PERSISTENCE IN RELATIVE PERFORMANCE OF MUTUAL FUNDS

Similar to previous studies, we investigate the relation between past and future fund performance. However, we deviate from previous studies by investigating the relation between persistent fund performance and four systematic factors: size, goal, load, and management fee. Results indicate no consistent relation between fund size and persistent fund performance. The existence of a sales charge does not affect persistent fund performance. The goal of a fund does affect persistent fund performance, with high-risk maximum capital gain funds' demonstrating a strong positive persistence in abnormal returns. In addition, funds with low management fees demonstrate significantly positive persistent fund performance, while funds with high management fees demonstrate significantly negative persistent fund performance. Further research into the relation between persistent fund performance and maximum capital gain funds indicates persistent fund performance in both inferior- and superior-performing funds. However, persistence in funds with low management fees occurs only in funds with superior past performance.     

Fee Variation in Private Equity

We study how investment fees vary within private equity funds. Net-of-fee return clustering suggests that most funds have two tiers of fees, and we decompose differences across tiers into both management- and performance-based fees. Managers of venture capital funds and those in high demand are less likely to use multiple fee schedules. Some investors consistently pay lower fees relative to others within their funds. Investor size, experience, and past performance explain some but not all of this effect, suggesting that unobserved traits like negotiation skill or bargaining power materially impact the fees that investors pay to access private markets.     

Director expertise and co-option in industry superannuation funds?

This study examines whether independent directors who possess financial expertise and are independent from the CEO (i.e., non-co-opted) are associated with improved outcomes for industry superannuation funds. Our results highlight that independence alone is insufficient to improve fund outcomes. Instead, we find that only non-co-opted independent directors benefit fund members in terms of higher performance and lower fees. Moreover, we find that independent directors' financial expertise is not associated with fund performance and fees. Our study has implications for regulators and superannuation funds who are currently debating the need for one-third independent directors on the board of Australian superannuation funds.     

Regulation And The Rise In Asset-Based Mutual Fund Management Fees

In this article I explain why asset‐based fees are common for mutual fund management companies and why the average fee has increased recently. I argue that Securities and Exchange Commission fee regulations make alternative fee types illegal or unattractive. Management companies can maintain higher fees because regulations and brand‐name capital partly insulate them from competition and because investors cannot easily distinguish between performance‐oriented and marketing‐oriented fund companies. Index funds and unit investment trusts may offer competition to mutual funds in the future because they are designed to minimize management fees.     

VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE BY FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES: EVIDENCE FROM AUSTRALIAN LIFE INSURERS PROMOTING INVESTMENT-RELATED CONTRACTS

Voluntary financial disclosure by Australian life insurers promoting investment-related contracts is predicted to be related to fees, funds under management, investment risk and return, liability risk and marketing costs factors. The decision to voluntarily disclose various forms of financial data in documents promoting investment-related contracts was studied during 1989-90. Life insurance managers providing financial disclosures tend to: (a) charge lower fees, (b) hold larger funds under management, (c) are exposed to higher investment risk, (d) are exposed to lower liability risk and (e) bear lower marketing costs. This evidence supports Mayers and Smiths' [1981] positive theory of insurance-related contracting.     

Has persistence persisted in private equity? Evidence from buyout and venture capital funds

This paper presents new evidence on performance persistence for U.S. private equity (buyout and venture capital) funds. We use high quality cash-flow data from Burgiss's large sample of institutional investors (as of December 2020) which allows us to examine how persistence has changed over more than three decades of fundraising. Venture capital (VC) performance remains remarkably persistent across funds raised by the same general partner (GP). In contrast, buyout funds' performance persistence becomes noticeably weaker over time. The patterns are different when we restrict the analysis to information that would have been available to investors – interim performance on the previous fund at the time a new fund is raised – rather than using final, or latest, performance. We find little evidence of persistence for buyouts, especially post-2000. We continue to find persistence for VC funds though it declines post-2000. The differences are driven by interim performance reported at the time of fundraising being only moderately correlated to final performance and GPs avoiding fundraising when interim performance is poor. Finally, we look at GPs who introduce new fund styles and find that performance is noticeably lower for buyouts (but not VC). Exploring the reasons for these divergent trends in persistence between buyout and VC is a promising area for future research.     

Do stressed PE firms misbehave?

For private equity (PE) firms, follow-on funds provide additional streams of management fees for a considerable time. When prospective investors evaluate the performance of PE firms' latest funds, they have to rely on valuations reported by PE firms. The link between PE firms' fundraising and performance evaluation is thus an area susceptible to manipulation resulting in potentially high stakes. We examine the relationship between PE firms' fundraising pressure and earnings management in portfolio companies, along with heterogeneity in behaviour by reputation and dry powder. To proxy for the degree of fundraising pressure, we develop an index based on PE firms' affiliations, stage in the fundraising cycle, and fundraising frequency. Results suggest that the fundraising pressure leads to more earnings management in portfolio companies, regardless of PE firm reputation. While the reputational effect remains unchanged under a change in funding pressure, dry powder exhibits a strong moderating effect under extreme funding pressure. The results are robust to alternative proxies for earnings management, alternative fundraising indexes, and various controls for endogeneity concerns.     

Gains to Mutual Fund Sponsors Offering Multiple Share Class Funds

Although the number of mutual funds grew during the 1990s, much of the growth is attributable to the introduction of multiple share class (MS) funds. Proponents argue that the MS structure leads to cost savings, which can be passed onto investors as lower expenses. However, if the structure lowers costs, sponsors are likely to profit from it. Though investors are concerned about the base expense ratio, the sum of administrative and management fees, fund sponsors generate profits from the management fees. As such, they would prefer to increase the management fee if they can simultaneously lower administrative fees. Our results indicate that MS fund investors pay lower administrative fees, but management fees are approximately 7 basis points higher than single-class funds. Overall, base expense ratios are higher than for single-class funds, suggesting fund sponsors capture the cost benefits the MS structure provides. Our results are robust to different model specifications and different estimation techniques.     

Performance of Private to Public MBOs: The Role of Venture Capital

Abstract:   Using a unique dataset, we examine financial performance, and venture capital involvement in 167 MBOs exiting through IPOs (MBO‐IPOs) on the London Stock Exchange, during the period 1964 –1997. VC backed MBOs seem to be more underpriced than MBOs without venture capital backing, based on average value‐weighted returns. MBOs backed by highly reputable VCs tend to be older companies, and exit earlier than MBOs backed by less reputable VCs. The results contradict 'certification' and 'grandstanding' hypotheses supported by US data ( Megginson and Weiss, 1991 ; and Gompers, 1996 , respectively). We found no evidence of either significant underperformance, or that VC backed MBOs perform better than their non‐VC backed counterparts in the long run. However, MBOs backed by highly reputable venture capital firms seem to be better long‐term investments as compared to those backed by less prestigious venture capitalist firms. The results remain robust after using different methods to measure performance, and after controlling for sample selectivity bias.     

Illiquidity Risk in Non-Listed Funds: Evidence from REIT Fund Exits and Redemption Suspensions

Managerial incentives are skewed in non-listed funds under finite horizons. Compensation structures are only indirectly related to shareholder wealth maximization when share prices are unobservable. Liquidity options for investors are limited in the absence of an exchange listing. Using a hand-collected database for public non-listed REITs, an empirical sequence considers the impact of management compensation contracts on equity fundraising and success in capital deployment. Evidence is provided that high asset management fees and high acquisition fees diminish managerial success at generating revenue from invested capital. Successful revenue flows are deterministic factor in the level of distributions paid and the likelihood of achieving a fund exit. Closing the gate on share redemption plans is synchronized with the slowdown in new equity flows. Retail investors are insensitive to maligned compensation structures that heighten illiquidity risk, even when observable in the prospectus.     

Strategic decertification in venture capital

An early-round investment delivers information about the quality of a project before more funds are needed. To obtain the best early-round financing offer, the entrepreneur should then approach a venture capitalist with highest screening ability. Going for the most accurate venture capitalist can however backfire in a follow-on round of financing. He could extract advantageous terms by threatening not to reinvest: the more accurate the incumbent, the more the signal sent by his non-participation to alternative financiers would be negative. Then, the most attractive early-round venture capitalist has only intermediate screening ability. The threat of strategic decertification enhances credit rationing.     

Incentive Fees and Mutual Funds

This paper examines the effect of incentive fees on the behavior of mutual fund managers. Funds with incentive fees exhibit positive stock selection ability, but a beta less than one results in funds not earning positive fees. From an investor's perspective, positive alphas plus lower expense ratios make incentive-fee funds attractive. However, incentive-fee funds take on more risk than non-incentive-fee funds, and they increase risk after a period of poor performance. Incentive fees are useful marketing tools, since more new cash flows go into incentive-fee funds than into non-incentive-fee funds, ceteris paribus.     

It Ain't Broke: The Past,Present, and Future of Venture Capital

This article presents a selective history of the U.S. venture capital (VC) industry, a discussion of the current state of the market, and some predictions about where the market is going. There is no doubt that the U.S. venture capital industry has been very successful. The VC model has provided an efficient solution to a difficult problem—that of enabling people with promising ideas but often limited track records to raise capital from outside investors. A large fraction of IPOs, including many of the most successful, have been funded by venture capitalists, and the U.S. VC model has been copied around the world. Armed with this historical perspective, the authors view with skepticism the recent claims that the VC model is broken. In the past, VC investments in companies have represented a remarkably constant 0.15% of the total value of the stock market; and commitments to VC funds, while more variable, have been consistently in the 0.10% to 0.20% range. Both of these percentages have continued to hold in recent years. And despite the relatively low number of IPOs, the returns to VC funds this decade have largely maintained their historical relationship to the overall stock market. To be sure, VC investment and returns continue to be subject to boom-and-bust cycles. But if the recent period has most of the features of a bust, the authors view today's historically low level of commitments to U.S. VC funds as a fairly reliable indicator of relatively high expected returns for the 2009 and (probably) 2010 vintage years. Perhaps the most promising future role for venture capital, as the authors suggest in closing, is to increase the productivity of the corporate research and development function through various kinds of partnerships and outsourcing arrangements.     

Assessing Selectivity and Market Timing Performance of Mutual Funds for an Emerging Market: The Case of Turkey

This paper derives and analyzes the selectivity and market timing performance of the mutual funds for the Turkish economy for the financial crisis period by employing high-frequency data. The determinants of these derived abilities are investigated within a regression analysis. The results suggest weak evidence about selection ability and some evidence about superior market timing quality. They also indicate that management fees are negatively correlated with the ability measure, which is quite surprising. Experience emerges as an important factor, especially for market timing ability.