Price Performance Following Share‐Repurchase Announcements by Closed‐End Funds

We investigate the price performance of closed‐end funds that announce share‐repurchase programs. Closed‐end funds experience positive average stock‐price reactions to the announcements. The long‐run buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns of repurchasing funds over the subsequent three years are significantly higher than a nonrepurchasing control sample matched by size, type, investment style and geographic diversification. Funds with larger discounts, international funds, equity funds, and funds that announce larger repurchases or frequently announce repurchases, experience more positive stock‐price reactions. Except for larger repurchases, the same characteristics are associated with more positive long‐run buy‐and‐hold returns.     

Insider trading and share repurchases: Do insiders and firms trade in the same direction?

Signaling undervaluation is often considered a primary motive for repurchasing stock, but insider trading activity by repurchasing firms is not always consistent with undervaluation. Net insider buying and selling are both more frequent in quarters when firms are repurchasing non-trivial amounts of stock, with the odds of observing a repurchase the highest in quarters with net insider selling. In multinomial logit models, share repurchases associated with net insider selling are positively related to illiquidity, option exercises by insiders, and pre-repurchase returns and negatively correlated with industry-adjusted book to market ratios when compared to other repurchases. Hence, repurchases when insiders are selling stock are more likely done to support share prices or avoid dilution and are less likely undervaluation signals. We find that insider trades either validate or mitigate the undervaluation signal of the repurchase. Abnormal returns of repurchasing firms with net insider buying versus net insider selling in a given quarter are significantly higher for the quarter immediately after the repurchase and the three subsequent years. For repurchases accompanied by net insider selling, abnormal returns are negligible after only one year.     

Do Share Buybacks Provide Price Support? Evidence From Mandatory Non-Trading Periods

Abstract:  Financial regulators, analysts and journalists have expressed concern that open market share repurchases may help support share prices. We test this conjecture by examining repurchasing firms' share price patterns on entering mandatory non-trading periods imposed by the London Stock Exchange. If buybacks provide price support, we would expect to observe price declines when trading bans force firms to suspend their buyback program. Consistent with claims that open market buybacks provide price support, we document average price declines when repurchasing firms enter mandatory non-trading periods. We also find that the magnitude of the price decline varies cross-sectionally with proxies for the price support impact of repurchases in the predicted manner. However, economic and statistical significance levels are moderate and largely confined to non-trading periods preceding interim results announcements, casting doubt on whether trading profits could be earned by exploiting this information.     

Risk,Mispricing, and Value Investing

We evaluate the stock return performance of a modified version of the book-to-market strategy and its implications for market efficiency. If the previously documented superior stock return of the book-to-market strategy represents mispricing, its performance should be improved by excluding fairly valued firms with extreme book-to-market ratios. To attain this, we classify stocks as value or glamour on book-to-market ratios and accounting accruals jointly. This joint classification is likely to exclude stocks with extreme book-to-market ratios due to mismeasured accounting book values reflecting limitations underlying the accounting system. Using both 12-month buy-and-hold returns and earnings announcement returns, our results show that this joint classification generates substantially higher portfolio returns in the post-portfolio-formation year than the book-to-market classification alone with no evidence of increased risk. In addition, this superior stock return performance is more pronounced among firms held primarily by small (unsophisticated) investors and followed less closely by market participants (stock price <$10). Finally, and most importantly, financial analysts are overly optimistic (pessimistic) about earnings of glamour (value) stock, and for a subset of firms identified as overvalued by our strategy, the earnings announcement raw return, as well as abnormal return, is negative. These last results are particularly important because it is hard to envision a model consistent with rational investors holding risky stocks with predictable negative raw returns for a long period of time rather than holding fT-bills and with financial analysts systematically overestimating the earnings of these stocks while underestimating earnings of stocks that outperform the stock market.     

Is the market underreacting or overreacting to open market share repurchases? A UK perspective

Using UK open market repurchases, we reject the market underreaction hypothesis and the market overreaction hypothesis proposed by Ikenberry et al. (1995) and Peyer and Vermaelen (2009), respectively. The evidence suggests that the UK market reacts slowly to actual repurchases made by value firms. UK repurchases on average do not suffer from share undervaluation prior to the announcement. Value firms perform just as well as glamour firms during the authorisation period but outperform glamour firms significantly 2 years following the announcement. It turns out that value firms repurchase over 6% more shares than glamour firms during the authorisation period.     

Flexibility in share repurchases: Evidence from UK

Although firms cite flexibility as important when repurchasing shares, we know little about how or why firms vary repurchases. We use an extensive sample of daily repurchase transactions from the United Kingdom to investigate how the number of repurchase days and volumes of shares repurchased change based on several known motivations. We find that stock price changes, liquidity, leverage, takeover activity and earnings per share targets impact share repurchasing patterns. Further, we compare actual repurchases to alternative share accumulation strategies and find that firms utilize flexibility without paying higher costs.     

Limited attention,share repurchases,and takeover risk

We hypothesize that announcing open market share repurchases (OMRs) to counter negative valuation shocks reveals repurchasing firms’ lost growth opportunities or underperforming assets to potential bidders, making them more likely to become takeover targets. This also leads their investors to face higher takeover risk, a systematic risk associated with economic fundamentals that drive takeover waves, as proposed by Cremers et al. (2009). Indeed, we find that repurchasing firms tend to face higher takeover probability in the first few years following their OMR announcements, and that the increase in takeover risk can largely explain their post-announcement long-run abnormal returns documented in the literature. The increase in takeover risk is larger for smaller firms, firms with poorer pre-announcement stock performance, and those attracting more attention of market participants. Our results suggest that OMRs, which are used by many firms to counter undervaluation, could make the firms more sensitive to takeover waves and raise their cost of equity capital.     

THE INTRA-INDUSTRY EFFECTS OF OPEN MARKET SHARE REPURCHASES: CONTAGION OR COMPETITIVE?

We examine the extent to which announcements of open market share repurchase programs affect the valuation of competing firms in the same industry. On average, although firms announcing open market share repurchase programs experience a significantly positive stock price reaction at announcement, portfolios of rival firms in the same industry experience a significant and contemporaneous negative stock price reaction. This suggests that perceived changes in the competitive positions of the repurchasing firms occur at the expense of rival firms and dominate any signals of favorable industry conditions. Thus, the competitive intra-industry effects of open market repurchases outweigh any contagion effects. In addition, cross-sectional tests indicate that these competitive effects are more pronounced in industries characterized by a lower degree of competition and less correlation between the stock returns of the repurchasing firm and its rivals.     

Takeover vulnerability and the credibility of signaling: The case of open-market share repurchases

There is debate in the literature focuses on whether open market repurchases can be taken as a signal of stock undervaluation. This research argues that takeover pressures before a repurchase announcement can be a credible signal of undervaluation. The empirical results indicate that repurchasing firms with a higher probability of takeover experience greater announcement effects, improvements in operating performance and long-run abnormal return, positive forecast revisions by financial analysts, and enhanced agreement between management and shareholders. These findings suggest that takeover probability and open-market share repurchases appear to constitute a double-signal for conveying stock undervaluation to the market.     

Information content of repurchase signals: Tangible or intangible information?

The outperformance of repurchasing firms with a high book-to-market (B/M) ratio is usually explained by investors’ undervaluation of the firm’s past performance. However, several studies suggest that the underestimation of future intangible value may explain the high return associated with the share repurchase. To better understand the actual information content of repurchases, I decompose the B/M ratio into past tangible information and future intangible information and find that repurchase signals an undervaluation of the intangible return. In addition, I investigate several potential proxies for intangible information—R&D expenses, intangible assets, and future operating performance. My results show that intangible information signals the undervaluation of future operating performance.     

Repurchasing Shares on a Second Trading Line

This paper studies a unique buyback method allowing firms toreacquire their own shares on a separate trading line whereonly the firm is allowed to buy shares. This share repurchasemethod is called the Second Trading Line and has been extensivelyused by Swiss companies since 1997. This type of repurchaseis unique for two reasons. First, unlike open market programs,the repurchasing company does not trade anonymously. Second,all transactions made by the repurchasing firm are publiclyavailable in real time to every market participant. This isa case of instantaneous disclosure which contrasts sharply withother markets characterized by delayed or no disclosure. Wedocument that the daily repurchase decision is statisticallyassociated with short-term price changes and the release offirm-specific news. We also find that repurchases on the secondtrading line have a beneficial impact on the liquidity of repurchasingfirms. Exchanges and regulators may consider the second tradingline an attractive share reacquisition mechanism because ofits transparency and positive liquidity effects.     

The Price Impacts of Open Market Repurchase Trades

Abstract:  This paper analyzes a database of 60,000+ individual repurchase trades from the Toronto Stock Exchange. The average intraday price impact of repurchase trades is negative, since, because of execution rules, 60% are seller-initiated. Prices fall less following repurchase than matched non-repurchase trades—there is an abnormal price impact. We find evidence consistent with two hypotheses: repurchases provide price support, and the market learns that the shares are undervalued. Consistent with the latter, we find that repurchasing companies have superior timing. Share prices show abnormal losses (gains) before (after) the repurchase trades. We find no significant market reaction to the mandatory public disclosure of the trade details.     

Share repurchases and institutional supply

Consistent with the predictions of Brennan and Thakor's (1990) model of shareholder preferences, we find that, on average, institutional shareholders are net sellers during share repurchases. After controlling for liquidity provision and characteristics investing, we find that a one standard deviation increase in share repurchases during a given quarter is associated with a 0.11 standard deviation decrease in institutional investor demand. We estimate that 37% of the inverse relation is attributed to institutional investors executing liquidity provision strategies, 8% is explained by institutions reacting to the investment characteristics signaled by a repurchasing firm. We attribute the majority, 55%, to the information asymmetry between institutions and individual investors. This work is one of the first to exploit the SEC mandate requiring firms to report the actual number of shares they repurchase each quarter, beginning in 2004. Using actual number of shares repurchased, we find evidence of institutional investors increasing their selling as firms increase their repurchasing. This finding is robust to models of endogeneity and autocorrelation in share repurchases and institutional investor trading.     

Share repurchases on trial: Large-sample evidence on share price performance,executive compensation,and corporate investment

Using a large sample of US stocks covering more than three decades, we empirically examine common criticisms of and rationales for stock repurchases. Repurchases account for a tiny fraction of the trading volume in a typical stock, making their price impact too small to generate short-term price manipulation. Price appreciation following repurchases is modest and does not reverse on average, suggesting the small price increases following repurchases signal firms’ good prospects. Also, we find no evidence that CEOs of repurchasing firms are paid excessively or that repurchases crowd out valuable investment opportunities. Because repurchases do not appear to be systematically abusive, enforcement action should be sufficient to deal with any bad actors, and significant regulation seems unwarranted.     

Share issuance and cross-sectional returns: International evidence

Share issuance predicts cross-sectional returns in a non-U.S. sample of stocks from 41 different countries. Issuance predictability has greater statistical significance than either size or momentum, and is similar to book-to-market. As in the U.S., the international issuance effect is robust across both small and large firms. Unlike the U.S., the effect is driven more by low returns after share creation rather than positive returns following share repurchases. Issuance return predictability is stronger in countries with greater issuance activity, greater stock market development, and stronger investor protection. The results suggest that the share issuance effect is related to the ease with which firms can issue and repurchase their shares.     

A comprehensive examination of the wealth effects of recent stock repurchase announcements

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the wealth effect of stock repurchase announcements using a sample of 11,862 repurchase programs announced during 1994–2007. The results of several recent industry surveys indicate that managerial motivations for repurchasing shares may have changed in recent years. To better understand the reasons for repurchasing shares we classify our sample in various ways—by year, by the method used for repurchasing shares, and by the stated purpose of the program. We find that the median size of firms repurchasing shares has increased dramatically recently, and concomitantly, the announcement returns have declined. Signaling undervaluation of share prices appears to become less important than previously assumed. While smaller firms signal undervaluation using open market repurchases, tender offers are chosen to enhance shareholder values by other means.     

Financial constraints and share repurchases

We examine how the financial constraints of repurchasing firms affect their post-buyback performance. By every constraint measure we use, a set of constrained firms repurchase. They display significantly poorer post-buyback abnormal return and operating performance than unconstrained firms. Financial constraints are more important in explaining the performance of share buybacks for firms with high actual repurchase ratios. Constrained firms, especially those with high actual repurchase ratios, experience a significantly greater increase in post-buyback distress risk than unconstrained firms. Managerial hubris could explain why constrained firms buy back shares even if the buybacks do not improve shareholder wealth.     

On the Timing and Execution of Open Market Repurchases

Little is known about the timing and execution of open marketrepurchases. U.S. firms are under no obligation to disclosewhen they are trading, and generally report only quarterly changesin shares outstanding. We use 64 firms' supplementally disclosedrepurchase trading data to provide the first examination ofrepurchase timing and execution. Across the days reported inour sample, firms adopted a variety of execution styles rangingfrom immediate intense repurchasing to delayed and smoothedrepurchasing. We find no clear evidence that repurchases aretimed to coincide with, precede, or follow, days on which informationis released. We benchmark the costs and value of a given repurchaseprogram against naive accumulation strategies achieving thesame terminal portfolio. While there is considerable variationacross the firms, NYSE firms on average beat their benchmarks,whereas NASDAQ firms do not. Finally, we document the liquidityimpact of open market repurchases. We find that repurchasingcontributes to market liquidity by narrowing bid-ask spreadsand attenuating the price impact of order imbalances on dayswhen repurchase trades are completed.     

Cash holdings and share repurchases: International evidence

In this study, we examine the patterns and determinants of share repurchases using firm-level data from seven major countries—Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the U.K., and the U.S.—over the period 1998–2006. We find that while non-U.S. firms do not repurchase shares as much as U.S. firms do, both U.S. and non-U.S. firms display a common set of share repurchase behaviors. For example, across countries, firms use share repurchases as a flexible means of distributing cash. More importantly, large cash holdings are significantly associated with the amount of share repurchases in all countries. There is evidence that large cash holdings held by repurchasing firms represent excess cash. Firms tend to experience substantial increases in cash holdings prior to share repurchase as a result of reductions in capital expenditures. Overall, our evidence lends support to two hypotheses: (i) firms discharge excess capital to reduce agency conflicts and (ii) firms use repurchases to distribute temporary cash flows.     

Actual share repurchases,timing and liquidity

Research on the impact of open market share repurchases has been hindered by the lack of data available on actual share repurchases in many countries, including the US. Using a previously unused database containing detailed information on 36,848 repurchases made by 352 French firms, we show that corporate share repurchases have a significant adverse effect on liquidity as measured by bid–ask spread or depth. Our results also indicate that share repurchases largely reflect contrarian trading rather than managerial timing ability.