Incentives for Managing Accounting Information: Property-Liability Insurer Stock-Charter Conversions

Incentives to manage accounting information are examined within 63 property‐liability insurance company conversions from mutual ownership to common stock charter. In the conversion process, policyholders' embedded equity claims must be valued. Since mutuals have no separately traded equity, accounting numbers are a critical input in this valuation. Incentives for surplus management vary across firms; the strongest evidence of surplus management is observed among firms where the mutual's executives become the firm's principal stockholders following conversion. The evidence suggests that converting firms manage accounting information primarily by adjusting liabilities and selectively establishing investment losses—not by altering claims settlement policy.     

Exclusions and the Demand for Property Insurance

The paper examines property insurance contracts in which consumers choose the upper limit on coverage. Exclusions are of two types, and both reduce the demand for insurance of the included perils. A practical implication is that an insurer can raise the demand for fire insurance by offering an earthquake rider, and profit from the rider even when the premia are ceded in such a way that the rider does not raise profit directly. The results do not require assumptions about correlations between included and excluded losses, which is interesting because correlations are decisive in most of the other literature on background risk.     

To Hedge or Not to Hedge: Managing Demographic Risk in Life Insurance Companies

Demographic risk, i.e., the risk that life tables change in a nondeterministic way, is a serious threat to the financial stability of an insurance company having underwritten life insurance and annuity business. The inverse influence of changes in mortality laws on the market value of life insurance and annuity liabilities creates natural hedging opportunities. Within a realistically calibrated shareholder value (SHV) maximization framework, we analyze the implications of demographic risk on the optimal risk management mix (equity capital, asset allocation, and product policy) for a limited liability insurance company operating in a market with insolvency‐averse insurance buyers. Our results show that the utilization of natural hedging is optimal only if equity is scarce. Otherwise, hedging can even destroy SHV. A sensitivity analysis shows that a misspecification of demographic risk has severe consequences for both the insurer and the insured. This result highlights the importance of further research in the field of demographic risk.     

A Gentle Introduction to Risk Aversion and Utility Theory

While the topics of risk aversion and utility theory have been discussed extensively in the academic literature on risk and insurance, this literature does not include a pedagogical discussion that is widely accessible for classroom use. This article provides a practical introduction to risk aversion that is designed for readers with little prerequisite course work in economics or statistics. We describe a simple model of insurance demand that can be applied to the property, liability, life, and health insurance markets. We also demonstrate how risk aversion affects a variety of real-life insurance decisions made under conditions of uncertainty, including how much the market will bear to pay for insurance administrative expenses and how demand varies for different types of auto insurance coverage. Exercises and practice problems are provided so that readers can test their mastery of the concepts presented in the article. An instructional note on using this article to teach risk aversion in the classroom is also provided.     

Estimating the Cost of Equity for Property-Liability Insurance Companies

Due to the highly skewed and heavy‐tailed distributions associated with the insurance claims process, we evaluate the Rubinstein‐Leland (RL) model for its ability to improve the cost of equity estimates of insurance companies because of its distribution‐free feature. Our analyses show that there is as large as a 94‐basis‐point difference in the estimated cost of insurance equity between the RL model and the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) for the sample of property‐liability insurers with more severe departures from normality. In addition, consistent with our hypotheses, significant differences in the market risk estimates are found for insurers with return distributions that are asymmetrically distributed, and for small insurers. Third, we find significant performance improvements from using the RL model by showing smaller values of excess return of the expected return of the portfolio to the model return for a portfolio of insurers with returns that are more skewed and for a portfolio of small insurers. Finally, our panel data analysis shows the differences in the market risk estimates are significantly influenced by firm size, degree of leverage, and degree of asymmetry. The implication is that insurers should use the RL model rather than the CAPM to estimate its cost of capital if the insurer is small (assets size is less than $2,291 million), and/or its returns are not symmetrical (the value of skewness is greater than 0.509 or less than ?0.509).     

地理分散化降低了多少保险经营风险?

本文定量分析了地理分散化对中国保险公司经营风险的影响。收集我国1998~2017年间各省市区的财产保险业和人身保险业的收入和支出数据,基于投资组合原理,比较了三种地理布局战略下保险公司的赔付风险。研究发现:无论是财产保险业还是人身保险业,各省区市之间赔付风险的差异性较大,在华北、东北、华东、中南、西南和西北这六大区域内部经营并不能显著地分散风险,但扩大到全国范围内经营,便能够较好地分散风险。进一步,采用Bootstrap随机模拟方法分析发现:财产保险公司在约10个省区市经营能够分散掉约80%的赔付风险,而人身保险公司在约5个省区市经营能够分散掉约40%的赔付风险。鉴于财产保险公司经营的各条产品线之间的风险差别较大,本文还发现:农业保险的地理分散化效果最强,短期健康险的地理分散化效果最弱。研究结果既支持保险公司跨地域经营以降低风险,也为监管资本设计中考虑地理分散化效应提供了经验证据。     

Optimal terms of contingent capital,incentive effects,and capital structure dynamics

Contingent Convertible Bonds (CoCos) with conversion ratios that dilute issuer's shareholders generate incentives to preemptively raise equity capital to avoid triggering conversion. Our dynamic model provides an interior solution for the unique optimal conversion ratio and the capital structure policies that maximizes issuer's value net of deadweight costs. Preemptive recapitalization induced by moderately dilutive conversion terms leads to fewer defaults, lower borrowing rates, and higher debt capacity when compared to less dilutive terms. However, highly dilutive conversion ratios do not always enhance efficiency because issuers facing very high dilution risk recapitalize too frequently, generating excessive adjustment costs. Conversely, if CoCo's principal is written-down at the conversion without diluting shareholders, then the issuer will have perverse incentives to destroy a portion of its capital (“burn money”) to force conversion and generate windfall gains for shareholders.     

Do U.S. Insurance Firms Offer the “Wrong” Incentives to Their Executives?

We examine the relation between executive compensation and market‐implied default risk for listed insurance firms from 1992 to 2007. Shareholders are expected to encourage managerial risk sharing through equity‐based incentive compensation. We find that long‐term incentives and other share‐based plans do not affect the default risk faced by firms. However, the extensive use of stock options leads to higher future default risk for insurance firms. We argue that this is because option‐based incentives induce managerial risk‐taking behavior, which seeks to maximize managerial payoff through equity volatility. This could be detrimental to the interests of shareholders, especially during a financial crisis.     

Reforming Banks Without Destroying Their Productivity and Value

Government‐protected banking systems tend to blow up, imposing huge losses on taxpayers. In a recent much‐publicized book, The Bankers' New Clothes, Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig propose to fix this problem by forcing banks to maintain 25% of their assets in the form of equity rather than debt. But this author argues, the book overstates the benefits and understates the costs of the proposed reform, while also failing to identify additional necessary reforms. Because bank equity is not true equity, and equity must be evaluated only in relation to risk, increasing required book equity ratios will not necessarily reduce the risk of bank failure significantly. Raising equity requirements is also socially costly because it reduces banks' willingness to lend. When banks need to raise their equity‐to‐asset ratios, they often choose to do so by cutting back on new loans, rather than paying the high costs of raising new equity. The reduction in loan supply that comes from raising equity ratios can be substantial, and is not just a one‐time cost. Balancing the costs and benefits of higher equity implies a much lower required equity ratio than the 25% posited in The Bankers' New Clothes. Finally, because equity ratios relative to risk should be the focus of prudential regulation, additional regulatory policy reforms that strengthen incentives for more effective risk management are needed in addition to higher capital ratios.     

Lessons from the Financial Crisis on Risk and Capital Management: The Case of Insurance Companies

This article proposes that risk management be viewed as an integral part of the corporate value‐creation process— one in which the concept of economic capital can provide companies with the financial cushion and confidence to carry out their strategic plans. Using the case of insurance and reinsurance companies, the authors discuss three main ways that the integration of risk and capital management creates value:

• 1 strengthening solvency (by limiting the probability of financial distress);
• 2 increasing prospects for profitable growth (by preserving access to capital during post‐loss periods); and
• 3 improving transparency (by increasing the “information content” or “signaling power” of reported earnings).

Insurers can manage solvency risk by using Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) models to limit the probability of financial distress to levels consistent with the firm's specified risk tolerance. While ERM models are effective in managing “known” risks, we discuss three practices widely used in the insurance industry to manage “unknown” and “unknowable” risks using the logic of real options—slack, mutualization, and incomplete contracts. Second, risk management can create value by securing sources of capital that, like contingent capital, can be used to fund profitable growth opportunities that tend to arise in periods following large losses. Finally, the authors argue that risk management can raise the confidence of investors in their estimates of future growth by removing the “noise” in earnings that comes from bearing non‐core risks, thereby making current earnings a more reliable guide to future earnings. In support of this possibility, the authors provide evidence showing that, for a given level of reported return on equity (ROE), (re)insurers with more stable ROEs have higher price‐to‐book ratios, suggesting investors' willingness to pay a premium for the stability provided by risk management.     

A Value at Risk Approach to Background Risk

This paper studies the effects of an uninsurable background risk (BR) on the demand for insurance (proportional and with deductible). We study both the case of BR uncorrelated with the insurable one and the perfectly correlated one, in a Gaussian world. In order to perform our study, we exploit the new risk measure known as Value at Risk (VaR) and consider insurance contracts which are Mean-VaR efficient. We obtain results which depend on the parameters (moments) of both risks and on the magnitude of loadings charged by the insurance company, instead of depending on the risk attitudes of the insured, such as risk aversion and prudence.We demonstrate that, if loadings are not too high, the demand for insurance increases with positively correlated BR; it decreases with BR negatively correlated if the latter is less risky than the insurable one (in this case it can even go to zero, if loadings are too high); it goes to zero with BR which is negatively correlated and more risky than the insurable one.     

Money,Bargaining, and Risk Sharing

We investigate the dual role of money as a self‐insurance device and a means of payment when perfect risk sharing is not possible, and when the two roles of money are disentangled. We use a variant of Lagos–Wright (2005) where agents face a risk in the centralized market (CM): in the decentralized market (DM) money’s main role is as a means of payment, while in the CM it is as a self‐insurance device. We show that state‐contingent inflation rates can improve agents’ ability to self‐insure in the CM, thereby improving the terms of trade in the DM. We then characterize the optimal monetary policy.     

Liquidity Risk and the Dynamics of Arbitrage Capital

We develop a continuous‐time model of liquidity provision in which hedgers can trade multiple risky assets with arbitrageurs. Arbitrageurs have constant relative risk‐aversion (CRRA) utility, while hedgers' asset demand is independent of wealth. An increase in hedgers' risk aversion can make arbitrageurs endogenously more risk‐averse. Because arbitrageurs generate endogenous risk, an increase in their wealth or a reduction in their CRRA coefficient can raise risk premia despite Sharpe ratios declining. Arbitrageur wealth is a priced risk factor because assets held by arbitrageurs offer high expected returns but suffer the most when wealth drops. Aggregate illiquidity, which declines in wealth, captures that factor.     

The Strategic Uses of Value at Risk

In contrast to alternative measures of risk, value at risk (VaR) has important virtues–intelligibility, comparability, and practicality–that make it a potentially valuable tool for strategic decision making and capital management in a wide variety of industries. However, capital-management decisions in most industries–including financial services, such as property/casualty insurance–have time horizons far longer than the one-day horizon that prevails in commercial and investment banking, where the use of VaR is now concentrated. For VaR to be usefully applied to longhorizon decisions, it must address three fundamental problems unique to that context: estimation risk, adaptive risk modification, and franchise risk. This paper describes each of these problems, shows how they can be solved, and provides examples applicable to property/casualty insurance.     

经济政策不确定性、地区文化与保险需求

本文在拓展背景风险理论研究的基础上,揭示了经济政策不确定性对保险需求的影响及其受地区文化制约的理论机制。并利用2007-2017年中国30个地区的月度面板数据,检验了经济政策不确定性、地区文化与保险需求间的内在联系。结果发现:第一,经济政策不确定性会对保险需求产生显著正影响,且这种效应在地区人身险需求上表现更明显;第二,将地区文化指标集纳入经济政策不确定性与保险需求关系的研究框架,发现地区文化差异会对经济政策不确定性影响保险需求产生调节效应。因此政府需在充分重视经济政策波动和文化对经济活动的双重影响基础上,加强国内社会保障体系建设,建立更透明的信息传递渠道,培育人们主动抵抗风险的意识和文化习惯,调整保险供给结构,以减少不确定性对社会经济行为的负面冲击。     

Equity‐Based Incentives,Risk Aversion,and Merger‐Related Risk‐Taking Behavior

We find that post‐merger equity risk is negatively related to the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility (vega), but is concentrated in CEOs with high proportions of options and options that are more in‐the‐money. The probability of industrial diversification also increases in vega. Additional tests show that the decline in post‐merger equity risk results in a significant decrease in shareholder wealth. This decrease is concentrated among firms with CEOs having the highest delta and the highest delta and vega. Our results suggest that the increased convexity provided by option‐based compensation does not necessarily increase risk‐taking behavior by CEOs.     

Accrual Accounting,Informational Sufficiency,and Equity Valuation

This paper studies accrual accounting and equity valuation in the context of a firm that makes repeated and overlapping investments in productive capacity. The analysis identifies a particular accrual accounting (depreciation) rule that is termed replacement cost accounting because the book value of existing capacity assets is set equal to the value that such assets would have if a competitive market were to exist for used assets. It is shown that replacement cost accounting aggregates past investment decisions of the firm without a loss of value‐relevant information. The intrinsic value of the firm can then be expressed as a function of current accounting data and certain parameters of the firm’s operating environment. Further, it is shown that replacement cost accounting is essentially the only accounting rule with this informational sufficiency property.     

Risk aversion,prudence, and compensation

In a standard principal-agent setting, we use a comparative approach to study the incentives provided by different types of compensation contracts, and their valuation by managers with utility function u who are risk averse (u″<0) and prudent (u″′>0). We show that concave contracts tend to provide more incentives to risk averse managers, while convex contracts tend to be more valued by prudent managers. This is because concave contracts concentrate incentives where the marginal utility of risk averse managers is highest, while convex contracts protect against downside risk. Thus, managerial prudence can contribute to explain the prevalence of stock-options in executive compensation. However, convex contracts are not optimal when the principal is sufficiently prudent relative to the manager.     

Economic Effects of Risk Classification Bans

Risk classification refers to the use of observable characteristics by insurers to group individuals with similar expected claims, to compute the corresponding premiums, and thereby to reduce asymmetric information. Permitting risk classification may reduce informational asymmetry-induced adverse selection and improve insurance market efficiency. It may also have undesirable equity consequences and undermine the implicit insurance against reclassification risk, which legislated restrictions on risk classification could provide. We use a canonical insurance market screening model to survey and to extend the risk classification literature. We provide a unified framework for analysing the economic consequences of legalised vs banned risk classification, both in static-information environments and in environments in which additional information can be learned, by either side of the market, through potentially costly tests.     

How to Design a Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement That Helps Solve Our Too‐Big‐to‐Fail Problem*

As bank regulatory reform tries to come to grips with the lessons of the financial crisis, several experts have proposed that some form of contingent convertible debt (CoCo) requirement be added to the prudential regulatory toolkit. In this article, the authors show how properly designed CoCos can be used not just to absorb losses, but more importantly to encourage banks to recognize losses and replace lost equity in a timely way, as well as to manage risk more effectively. Their proposed CoCos requirement strengthens management's incentives to promptly replace lost capital and enhance risk management by imposing major costs on the managers and existing shareholders of banks that fail to do so. Key elements of the proposal are that conversion of the CoCos into equity would be (1) triggered at a high trigger ratio of equity to assets (long before the bank is near an insolvency point), (2) determined by a market trigger (using a 90‐day moving average market equity ratio) rather than by supervisory discretion, and (3) significantly dilutive to shareholders. The only clear way for bank managements to avoid such dilution would be to issue equity into the market. Under most circumstances—barring an extremely rapid plunge of a bank's financial condition—management should be able and eager to replace lost capital in a timely way; as a result, dilutive conversions should almost never occur. Banks would face strong incentives to maintain high ratios of true economic capital relative to risky assets, and to manage their risks effectively. This implies that “too‐big‐to‐fail” financial institutions would not be permitted to approach the point of insolvency; they would face strong incentives to recapitalize long before that point. And if they should fail to issue new equity in a timely manner, the CoCos conversion would provide an alternative means of recapitalizing banks well before they reach the brink of insolvency. Thus, a CoCos requirement would go a long way to resolving the “too‐big‐to‐fail” problem. Such a CoCos requirement would not only increase the effectiveness of regulation, but also reduce its cost. It would be less costly for banks to raise CoCos than equity, reflecting both the lower adverseselection costs of CoCos issuance and the potential tax advantages of debt. And precisely because of the low probability of CoCo conversion, the Cocos would be issued at relatively modest (if any) discounts to otherwise comparable but straight subordinated debt. Thus requiring a mix of equity and appropriately designed CoCos would be less costly to banks, and would entail less of a reduction in the supply of loans than would a much higher book equity requirement alone.