SHIRKING,STANDARDS AND THE PROBABILITY OF DETECTION

By relaxing the common efficiency wage assumption of exogenous shirking detection probabilities, we demonstrate how standards and efficiency wages are related. In a more general setting where the probability of detection depends upon the equilibrium effort level of non‐shirkers, we show that the uniformly positive (negative) supply‐side relationship between wages (unemployment insurance) and effort is no longer guaranteed. Profit maximization on the part of the firm, however, ensures that effort will depend positively (negatively) on wages (unemployment insurance) in equilibrium.     

The Choice of Technology and Equilibrium Wage Rigidity

In this general equilibrium model, firms engage in oligopolistic competition and choose increasing returns technologies to maximize profits. Capital and labor are the two factors of production. The existence of efficiency wages leads to unemployment. The model is able to explain some interesting observations of the labor market. First, even though there is neither long-term labor contract nor costs of wage adjustment, wage rigidity is an equilibrium phenomenon: an increase in the exogenous job separation rate, the size of the population, the cost of exerting effort, and the probability that shirking is detected will not change the equilibrium wage rate. Second, the equilibrium wage rate increases with the level of capital stock. Third, a higher level of capital stock does not necessarily reduce the unemployment rate. That is, there is no monotonic relationship between capital accumulation and the unemployment rate.     

Fair wages in a New Keynesian model of the business cycle

We build a New Keynesian model of the business cycle with sticky prices and real wage rigidities motivated by efficiency wages of the gift exchange variety. Compared to a standard sticky price model, our Fair Wage model provides an explanation for structural unemployment and generates more plausible labor market dynamics—notably accounting for the low correlation between wages and employment. The fair wage induced real wage rigidity also significantly reduces the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output. The smoother dynamics of real marginal cost increase both amplification and persistence of output responses to monetary shocks, thus remedying the well-known lack of internal propagation of standard sticky price models. We take these improvements as a strong endorsement of the addition of real wage rigidities to nominal price rigidities and conclude that the fair wage extension of this paper constitutes a promising platform for an enriched New Keynesian synthesis.     

A note on Keynesian unemployment as a worker discipline device

Keynesian sales constraints are introduced into a model with endogeneous wages and involuntary equilibrium umemployment. The result is a lower real wage and a higher unemployment rate.     

Analysis of wage flexibility across the Euro Area: evidence from the process of convergence of the labour income share ratio

This article analyses wage flexibility as a factor in the unemployment rate across 12 Euro Area countries. We use extensive evidence pertaining to the countercyclical behaviour of the labour income share ratio to estimate its equilibrium value in the long run. This measure is calculated using a hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve. Additionally, by using spatial econometrics, we can incorporate into the study the interdependence in the inflation among the countries. As a result, we identify countries that might see an improvement in their employment rates by improving their wage flexibility. We also identify countries with high unemployment that is not a consequence of a lack of wage flexibility.     

A tale of two traditions: Pierre Force's Self-interest before Adam Smith

Abstract

The paper compares different strands of New Keynesian Economics with regard to Keynes' original work. Two issues are analysed in detail. First, the explanations provided by Keynes and New Keynesians of nominal and real wage behaviour. Second, the different theories concerning the ability of flexible nominal wages in assuring full employment. It is argued that, although involuntary unemployment is a central problem both in Keynes' and New Keynesians' views, referring to the role of nominal and real wages in explaining unemployment, New Keynesians theories present important features that differ, sometimes substantially, from the concepts developed by Keynes in his General Theory.     

Involuntary unemployment,macroeconomic policy,and a behavioral model of the firm: Why high real wages need not cause high unemployment

The perspective of modern macroeconomic theory, be it new classical or old and new Keynesian, is that unemployment can be reduced only if real wages are cut. The modern Keynesians, basing themselves upon the microfoundations of efficiency wage theory, argue that real wages cannot and will not be cut by firms for efficiency wage reasons. This generates involuntary unemployment based on a market coordination problem. A behavioral model that contrasts with efficiency wage theory is presented here which suggests that reducing real wages need not affect the marginal cost of labor and, therefore, the number of individuals employed. In the behavioral model, wherein there exists some linearity in the relationship between real wages and working conditions and labor productivity, a lower real wage rate is not a necessary condition for reducing the unemployment rate nor is a higher real wage an obstacle to reducing it. In this scenario, unemployment, to the extent that it is demand-side induced, is not related to movements in real wages. Therefore, restoring full employment after a negative demand shock becomes a matter for demand management, not demand management that must be coordinated with measures designed to reduce real wages.     

FISCAL EXPANSIONS,UNEMPLOYMENT, AND LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE*

Structural VARs indicate that for many OECD countries labor force participation, employment, and the unemployment rate significantly increase following increases in government expenditures under a variety of specifications and identification schemes. Fiscal expansions also tend to increase real wages. Existing models have difficulties in generating such responses. We show that the empirical regularities can be reproduced with two additions into a standard New Keynesian model with matching frictions: (a) a labor force participation choice and (b) workers’ heterogeneity.     

Wages and Unemployment in Australia*

This paper reviews various models that may be used to analyze the inflation-unemployment problem in Australia. The focus is on the unemployment problem, rather than on inflation, and on the role of wages, nominal and real, in affecting this problem. Models discussed include the Popular Keynesian, Phillips Curve, Fixed Coefficient and Neoclassical Models. The possibility of increasing returns is considered. Australian evidence bearing on the appropriateness of these models is discussed. The effect of demand expansion on the exchange rate and hence real wages is stressed. Some emphasis is placed on the concept of ‘union-voluntary’ unemployment. At the end possible solutions to the unemployment problem are summarized.     

UNEMPLOYMENT POLICIES IN AN ECONOMY WITH ADVERSE SELECTION

This paper studies the effects of unemployment policies in a simple static general equilibrium model with adverse selection in the labour market. Firms offer a contract that induces the self‐selection of workers. In equilibrium, all unskilled workers are screened out and some skilled workers are rationed out. It is shown that the provision of unemployment insurance raises involuntary unemployment by encouraging adverse selection, while unemployment assistance – or subsidy to unemployment – reduces involuntary unemployment. A simple efficiency wage model is also presented to show that either of the two policies reduces employment by taxing effort and subsidizing shirking. The key is whether the social role of unemployment is a sorting device or a worker discipline device.     

Keynesian models of deflation and depression revisited

This paper extends Tobin's [Tobin, J., 1975. Keynesian models of recession and depression. American Economic Review 65, 195–202] Keynesian analysis of deflation to include a range of additional channels through which deflation exacerbates Keynesian unemployment. The paper provides further theoretical reasons why downward price level adjustment may not solve the Keynesian problem. These arguments challenge the received wisdom that Keynes’ General Theory is a special case resting on downwardly rigid prices and nominal wages. This conventional wisdom has led many economists to recommend policies promoting downward flexibility. These policies have created an environment in which deflation is more likely, giving new relevance to Keynesian analysis of deflation.     

Financial constraints and unemployment equilibrium

The aim of this paper is to show that a robust determination of unemployment equilibria can be based on the integration of credit rationing into a general equilibrium model. We first review some of the Keynesian macroeconomic models. We show that the problems bequeathed by Keynes’ legacy are only partially solved by the strand of the new Keynesian economics based on market imperfections and endogenous rigidities. In order to overcome these problems we refer to credit rationing. In particular, we build a simple general equilibrium model in which prices are–in principle–perfectly flexible and credit rationing implies unemployment equilibria.     

Shirking, Unemployment and Aggregate Fluctuations

Empirically, real wages exhibit relatively little cyclical variation and a weak cyclical pattern. Early real business cycle (RBC) models predict, to the contrary, large, procyclical real wage movements. Incorporating efficiency wages into a RBC environment would seem promising since one prediction from the efficiency wage literature is real wage rigidity. This paper evaluates a common microfoundation for efficiency wages, the shirking model, with respect to its predictions for real wages within a RBC-style model. Simulations of the model reveal that it can generate dampened but still strongly procyclical real wage behavior.     

On the theory of macroeconomic quasi-equilibria

Conclusion It has been shown that for the Classical System a quasi-equilibrium cannot exist, unless we make the ad hoc assumption of inflexible nominal wages⁸. The equilibrium in the classical regime corresponds to the general competitive equilibrium, and of course the validity of Walras' Law cannot be questioned. At the same time, however, it has been shown that to extend these conclusions to the Keynesian system as well is not justified. The Keynesian system has, in general, a quasi-equilibrium. The model constructed in this paper and the resulting conclusions are significant because the model: (a) Incorporates the Keynesian notion of effective demand, which includes the demand for capital goods (investment) as being performed by a group of people distinct from the consumers (and so, answering Negishi's point, there is a prince in Hamlet!), (b) Unlike other models (like the recent paper by Glustoff), it does not rely on nominal wage rigidity to explain unemployment, but instead, again answering Negishi's remark, it explains rather than postulates why real wages do not adjust in the presence of unemployment so as to eliminate it. (c) It verifies the validity of Clower's proposition that in the Keynesian System Walras' Law holds only in equilibrium. (d) It reconsiles Bent Hansen's original quasi-equilibrium model with the Keynesian proposition of an unemployment equilibrium, against the apparent view of Hansen that to do that would require the assumption of a Phillips curve, a view also shared by Arrow and Hahn, and many others.An earlier version of this paper was presented in the December 1974 meeting of the Econometric Society in San Francisco. The author wishes to thank Prof. R. Clower, Prof. B. Hansen, Prof. S. Black, and Dr. G. Winckler for their valuable comments, but he obviously claims any errors for himself.     

Equilibrium Unemployment in Australia: Concepts and Measurement*

This paper reviews some concepts of equilibrium unemployment and outlines the fundamental difficulties facing any attempt to produce estimates of the equilibrium rate of unemployment. It develops simple quasi-reduced form models of aggregate unemployment based on rival non market-clearing and market-clearing theories. These equations form the basis of an empirical model of aggregate unemployment in Australia since 1969. The empirical evidence suggests that most of the observed increase in unemployment can be attributed to cyclical rather than structural-frictional factors. However, stylized explanations of cyclical unemployment exclusively along the lines of Keynesian, Classical or equilibrium search theory are found inadequate.     

Growth and unemployment in a shirking efficiency wage model

Abstract.  The relationship between growth and unemployment in a general equilibrium shirking efficiency wage model is explored. In contrast to past work on this subject, detected shirkers are not dismissed but instead incur a monetary punishment. As a result of this modification, the model can account for a stable rate of unemployment when there is positive population growth and/or technological growth in the economy. Moreover, I show that institutions and policies that limit the ability of firms to punish detected shirkers or restrict their use of discretionary bonuses can increase unemployment and reduce the economy's long run growth rate. JEL Classification: E0, J41     

Equilibrium Unemployment Rate and Customs Union

This paper utilizes the macroeconomics concept of the equilibrium rate of unemployment for theorems on free trade and the formation of customs union. The notion of an equilibrium rate of unemployment appears in the literature on labour, macroeconomics, business cycles and trade theory. Such an equilibrium rate can be derived in a number of ways, for example, by introducing labor–leisure choice in the utility functions of the workers; a labor turnover model and/or by introducing shirking. We extend the two sector-two factor Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson model for a small open economy by relaxing the assumption of inelastic labor supply. Specifically, we consider the classical labor supply function obtained from the representative consumer's utility maximisation problem. This consideration allows for the existence of unemployment and we analyse the effects trade policies have on the equilibrium unemployment rate. Given the movement towards free trade (either via the implementation of GATT and/or formation of customs union) it is important to examine its implications for the equilibrium rate of unemployment.     

Uncertain vacancies and unemployment equilibria

The paper develops a dynamic implicit contracts model to consider the rationale for rejections of qualified applicants in the search process and to explore the implications for unemployment rates under equilibrium in the labor market. The implications are similar to traditional search models, although the effects of stochastic output prices upon equilibrium unemployment can be directly determined. A nearly invariant natural rate result pertains. A stochastic sales-rations variant of the model leads to equilibrium unemployment rates that depend upon both neoclassical and Keynesian factors.     

Informal incentive labour contracts and product market competition

This paper studies the dynamic interaction between product market competition and incentives against shirking. In contrast with standard results, efficiency wages paid by each firm can decrease when competition (i.e. the number of firms in the product market) increases. Discretionary bonuses, on the other hand, do not vary with competition. There is an upper threshold for the number of competing firms, however, above which such schemes are no longer sustainable as an equilibrium. Industry profits with bonuses are generally higher than with efficiency wages but, when information regarding firms’ misbehaviour flows at a low rate, a competition range exists for which firms can make a positive profit by only paying efficiency wages.     

Disequilibrium dynamics in a simple macroeconomic model

The dynamic behavior of a simple macroeconomic disequilibrium model is analyzed in which consumers' changes in money holdings constitute the dynamic link between any two periods. It is shown that, under constant government consumption, a constant production function (no investment), and fixed prices and wages, stationary states of Keynesian unemployment are stable whereas those of repressed inflation are globally unstable. Possibilities of unemployment and output cycles are indicated for fixed wages as well as for some very simple class of wage and price adjustment mechanisms.