To Cheat or Not To Cheat: Moral Hazard and Agri‐environmental Policy

This Address examines the moral hazard problem in agri‐environmental policy. It begins with a theoretical analysis of moral hazard in this context, including the identification of eight potential causes of cheating behaviour among farmers. But is cheating behaviour among farmers actually a problem for agri‐environmental policy? And if it is, which are the statistically significant causes of concern? The answer seems to be: “we don't know” as there are currently no empirical analyses of the moral hazard problem and its causes in agri‐environmental policy. On this basis I analyse a set of policy solutions – to a problem for which we have no evidence of its causes or extent!     

Moral Hazard,Targeting and Contract Duration in Agri‐Environmental Policy

This article extends the multi‐period agri‐environmental contract model of Fraser (Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 55 , (2004) pp. 525–540) to include a more realistic specification of the inter‐temporal penalties for non‐compliance, and therefore of the inter‐temporal moral hazard problem in agri‐environmental policy design. It is shown that a farmer has an unambiguous preference for cheating early over cheating late in the contract period based on differences in the expected cost of compliance. It is then shown how the principal can make use of this unambiguous preference to target monitoring resources intertemporally, and in so doing, to encourage full contract duration compliance.     

The Potential for Cross‐Compliance in Canadian Agricultural Policy: Linking Environmental Goals with Business Risk Management Programs

Environmental cross‐compliance links agricultural program payments to producer commitments to achieve agri‐environmental policy goals. The objective of this study is to determine the feasibility of using cross‐compliance to achieve environmental goals in a Canadian policy context. While Canadian policy makers have flirted with cross‐compliance, with the exception of phosphorus regulations for Quebec hog farms, they have never adopted this approach. The potential for effective cross‐compliance depends on producer participation, producer compliance with regulations, environmental performance, and overall welfare implications. This study reviews the application of cross‐compliance in the United States and EU with regard to the potential application to Canadian agriculture. Policy options are considered which link current business risk management (BRM) programs to alternative environmental regulations (wildlife habitat preservation, nutrient management plans, and beneficial management practices for nutrient management). In general, individual Canadian agricultural support program do not provide sufficient incentives for farmers to participate in cross‐compliance. However, if support programs are combined, it is better to link programs that redistribute income with environmental programs than to link agriculture programs that already address specific market failures.     

Moral hazard and adverse selection effects of cost‐of‐production crop insurance: evidence from the Philippines

This article examines the moral hazard and adverse selection effects of cost‐of‐production (COP) crop insurance products. Building on existing crop insurance models of moral hazard, as well as a survey‐based data set that allows us to separately identify moral hazard from adverse selection, we find evidence that farmers insured under COP contracts spend more on chemical fertilizers and pesticides (i.e. those inputs whose costs determine the indemnity payments). However, since these same COP insured farmers are still likely to use less inputs (like effort) whose costs do not enter the indemnity payment formula, and yield depends on both types of inputs (i.e. the determinants and non‐determinants of the indemnity payments), the final moral hazard effect of COP insurance on yields is ambiguous. Our analysis also suggests that farmers who tend to spend less on chemical fertilizers and pesticides are the ones with private information on soil conditions and pest incidence. These are the types of farmers who adversely select into COP contracts that only cover weather related losses.     

On the Use of Targeting to Reduce Moral Hazard in Agri‐environmental Schemes

This paper investigates the role of targeting in the context of agri‐environmental schemes involving monitoring and penalties. By separating participants into a target and a nontarget group the aim of targeting is to reduce the moral hazard problem. The paper analyses three approaches to targeting which have different implications for the level of monitoring resources and the focus is on reducing the extent of cheating by participants in the nontarget group. By complementing the adoption of targeting with appropriate adjustments to the monitoring/penalty parameters, it is shown how such an approach can exploit the risk aversion of participants to completely eliminate cheating by those participants in the nontarget group. The implementation of such a system of targeting is discussed in the context of existing agri‐environmental policies.     

优化中山政策性农业保险体系的研究——基于道德风险视角的思考

道德风险对政策性农业保险体系的稳定至关重要,农业互助保险能较好地控制道德风险,有助于政策性农业保险体系的可持续发展。近年来,中山市积极开展了政策性农业保险的试点,稳定了农产品价格,帮助农户科学管理农业生产风险,促进农民收入稳步增长,推动了中山农业产业化的发展。为有效控制道德风险,中山市政策性农业保险开始探索向农业互助保险模式转型,尝试独具特色的互助政策性农业保险体系,但是还需要在法律环境、制度构建、风险控制和产品设计等方面进行农业互助保险体系的优化。本文结合国内外经验,提出了优化中山政策性农业保险体系的对策建议。     

Worth the Risk? The Behavioural Path to Well‐Being

There is increasing interest in the ‘economics of happiness’, reflected in the volume of articles appearing in mainstream economics journals exploring the major determinants of self‐reported well‐being. We contribute by exploring the factors influencing how satisfied farmers are with their quality of life. We find that farm income, subjective perceptions relating to the adequacy of household income, debt, health and personal characteristics such as age and relationship status are significantly associated with farmers’ self‐reported life satisfaction. While significantly associated with farm income, farm structural variables such as farm size, farm type and the presence of a farm successor were not found to be significantly related with life satisfaction. Our results also suggest that farmers who are more risk averse enjoy significantly lower levels of both life satisfaction and farm income than their more risk seeking or risk neutral counterparts. We suggest that, in the same way that risk aversion inhibits farmers from making choices that could lead to an increase in their income, it may also constrain farmers (and the wider public at large) from engaging in certain types of behaviours that could lead to an increase in their self‐reported quality of life. Finally, we find that while farm income is significantly related to self‐reported life satisfaction, the direct correlation between these variables is weak, suggesting that farmer life satisfaction can be distinct from business success.     

Use of Compliance Rewards in Agri‐environmental Schemes

Ensuring that farmers comply with the terms of agri‐environmental schemes is an important issue. This paper explores the use of a ‘compliance–reward’ approach under heterogeneous net compliance costs with respect to cost‐share working lands programmes such as the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) in the United States. Specifically, we examine the use of a reward under asymmetric information and output price uncertainty. We examine two possible sources of financing under the assumption of budget neutrality: (i) funds obtained by reducing monitoring effort; and (ii) money saved by reducing the number of farmers enrolled. We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each source of funding and analyse these numerically for both risk‐neutral and risk‐averse farmers. We also examine the trade‐off between increased expenditure on monitoring effort and compliance rewards when additional budgetary resources are available. We show that under certain conditions a compliance reward can increase compliance rates. For risk‐averse farmers, however, conditions that ensure a positive outcome become more restrictive.     

Technological and financial approaches to risk management in agriculture: an integrated approach*

In the present paper, risk‐management problems where farmers manage risk both through production decisions and through the use of market‐based and informal risk‐management mechanisms are considered. It is shown that many of these problems share a common structure, and that a unified and informative treatment of a broad spectrum of risk‐management tools is possible within a cost‐minimisation framework, under minimal conditions on their objective functions. Fundamental results are derived that apply regardless of the producer's preference towards risks, using only the no‐arbitrage condition that agricultural producers never forego any opportunity to lower costs without lowering returns.     

粮食补贴政策对农户收入的影响分析——来自安徽省天长市的实证检验

提高农户收入是我国粮食补贴政策的重要目标之一,然而当前这一政策目标能否实现是一个值得探讨的问题。本文利用安徽省天长市农户的实地调研数据,运用多元线性回归模型实证检验粮食补贴政策对农户收入的影响。结果表明：（1）粮食补贴金额对农户家庭人均纯收入具有显著的负向影响,粮食补贴金额越高,农户农业生产积极性越高,非农就业时间相对越短,在非农报酬率高于农业报酬率的情况下,农户总体收入水平反而会降低。（2）农户收入更多地受到非农收入的正向影响,非农收入已经成为农户收入的主要来源。因此,要提高农户收入水平,国家应实施相应措施,推进现代农业发展,促进农业报酬率的提高,并积极采取有效措施促进农户非农就业合理发展。     

Farmers’ Income and Production Responses to Rural Taxation Reform in Three Regions in China

The relationship between agricultural taxation and production efficiency has been thoroughly explored for many countries. Recently, China has taken various measures including the rural taxation reform (RTR) to promote grain production and to increase farmer incomes. In this study, we investigate whether the Chinese policy of abolishing rural taxation has improved farm households’ incomes and affected their production decisions. Using household survey data obtained from three regions in China, we estimate the effect of the RTR on farmers’ income. Results show that the RTR has significantly improved farmers’ post‐tax net income by 9.2% in Shandong, 16.9% in Shanxi and 16.8% in Zhejiang. These increments, mostly from farm income rather than from off‐farm income, are much higher than the direct income increase from the tax savings. In addition, we examine the dynamic impact of farmers’ net income, and find that the RTR has a sustained positive income effect in Shandong and Shanxi, whereas its positive effect in Zhejiang appears temporary. We also examine farmers’ production responses to the RTR. Results show that farmers in the three regions respond in different ways: farmers in Shandong significantly increase their labour input, farmers in Zhejiang increase intermediate inputs, whereas Shanxi farmers augment their intermediate inputs and enlarge their crop acreage. It appears that the farmers’ responses to the taxation reform vary due to the agronomic and economic factors in these three regions, suggesting that diverse post‐RTR supplemental policies should be implemented in different regions.     

林业补贴政策对浙江林农营林投入和收入影响分析

基于浙江省3县368户农户的调查数据,采用双重差分模型(DID)研究实施中央财政林业补贴政策对林农营林投入和收入的影响。结果表明:实施林业补贴政策可以显著增加农户的营林投入,但对农户的营林增收没有显著带动作用,这证明林业补贴能够有效刺激林农的营林积极性,但增收效果仍有待观察。因此,选取林业补贴对象应注重"普惠+特惠"制、林业补贴政策需长期稳定执行、政府部门应加强林业补贴政策的宣传力度。     

Does Intensive Tillage Enhance Productivity and Reduce Risk Exposure? Panel Data Evidence from Smallholders’ Agriculture in Ethiopia

We analyse the impact of intensity of tillage on wheat productivity and risk exposure using panel household‐plot level data from Ethiopia. In order to control for selection bias, we estimate a flexible moment‐based production function using an endogenous switching regression treatment effects model. We find that tillage has a complementary impact on productivity and risk exposure. As the intensity of tillage increases, productivity increases and farmers’ exposure to risk declines. Our results suggest that smallholder farmers use tillage as an ex‐ante risk management strategy. The main policy implication of this study is that the opportunity cost of switching to reduced tillage in wheat production seem rather high unless farmers are supported by appropriate incentive schemes.     

Equivalence of Input Quotas and Input Charges under Asymmetric Information in Agri‐environmental Schemes

A model of adverse selection and moral hazard in agri‐environmental schemes is developed based on the input quota mechanism of Moxey et al. (Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 50, (1999) pp. 187–202) and Ozanne et al. (European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 28, (2001) pp. 329–347), rather than the input charge mechanism of White (Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 53, (2002) pp. 353–360), but the variable fine of the latter rather than the fixed fine assumed by Ozanne et al. (European Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 28, (2001) pp. 329–347) is used. Incentive‐compatible contracts, including the optimal probabilities of detection (and, therefore, monitoring frequencies and costs) for more and less efficient farmers, are identified. It is shown that the input charge and input quota approaches lead to identical outcomes – in terms of abatement levels, compensation payments, monitoring costs and probabilities of detection – confirming the equivalence of input quotas and input charges under asymmetric information. It is also shown that the optimal contracts are independent of the risk preferences of farmers with regard to being caught cheating.     

Crop Insurance in a Political Economy: An Alternative Perspective on Agricultural Policy

Lawmakers often subsidize farmers in times of financial distress. This article models this political impulse as a constraint on government farm policy, describing how ex ante government farm insurance can deter ex post "disaster relief" and improve production incentives by countering the moral hazard that otherwise prevails. Absent ex ante government policy, ex post relief takes the form of revenue insurance, which prompts excessive entry into farm production and under-production by operating farmers. Ex ante government policy can raise economic and political welfare by buying out low productivity farmers and offering profitable farmers a combination of revenue insurance, price supports, and a program participation fee.     

Endogenous institutional innovation and agroindustrialization on the Peruvian coast

This paper presents an analysis of endogenous institutional innovations that have recently emerged in the agroindustrial zone of Chincha, on the coast of Peru. These innovations include: (1) contracts between agroindustrial firms and large farmers, introduced by the firms themselves to assure timely delivery and compliance with strict requirements implied by the emerging demanding quality and safety standards for agro‐export of processed asparagus; (2) management services exchanged for labor supervision and land collateral in share tenancy contracts between a management company and “farmer companies” of small cotton farmers. These contracts introduced by the management company illustrate those described theoretically by Eswaran and Kotwal [Am. Econ. Rev. 75 (3), 352–367]. The nature and importance of these institutional changes are twofold: (1) They were induced institutional innovations driven by the requirements of agroindustrialization itself. (2) Together they had ambiguous employment and income impacts (tending to the negative). On the one hand, the emergence of asparagus and firm‐farm contracts reduced employment through exclusion of small farms and shifts to capital‐intensive crops. On the other hand, the reinforcement of smallholder cotton and the emergence of farmer companies increased employment and income of smallholders. The institutional innovation allowed them to reduce risk and increase profits and thus access some of the benefits of agroindustrialization and globalization. While processing firm‐farm contracts are common in Peru, as is the presence of NGOs bringing subsidized credit, the private management firm innovation is rare and new in Peru and apparently also in the region, and of great interest. In fact, policymakers and NGOs have recently discovered that this innovation is taking place and are asking hard questions about whether this innovation can and will be diffused. The interest in the private for‐profit institutional change is sharpened by growing doubts about how economically sustainable and widespread a response NGO help can be to small farmers in maintaining their participation in income‐enhancing agroindustrialization. Moreover, with changes in land laws and markets the fluidity of the situation is apparent, with agroindustrial firms even starting to ask themselves whether contracts with large farms are necessary and best.     

农民人均纯收入与农业生产结构的关系研究

基于改革开放以来的宏观数据,运用SVAR模型主要进行脉冲响应分析、方差分析。结果显示,农民人均纯收入与农业生产结构的几个指标之间存在长期稳定的均衡关系,农业(种植业)产值对农民人均纯收入的影响最大,农民人均纯收入对农业生产结构变动的响应具有一定的滞后性。因此,提出转变发展思想,以工业的形式发展农业;推进产业改革,调优农业生产结构;调整产业政策,增添农民人均纯收入增长动力。     

Implications of CAP reform for land management and runoff control in England and Wales

WTO negotiations, as well as problems associated with intensive agriculture, such as overproduction, dependency on high levels of subsidies, diffuse pollution, soil degradation and loss of wildlife, have led to a reconsideration of agricultural policies in Europe. In April 2005, the new common agricultural policy (CAP)-reform came into force in the United Kingdom, decoupling financial support to farmers from agricultural production. Farm income support payments are now linked to compliance with standards (cross-compliance rules) which protect the environment, animal health and welfare. In the light of these policy changes, semi-structured interviews were carried out with 36 farmers in five catchments in the UK to explore interrelationships between CAP-reform, agricultural land management and runoff-related problems. Results from three catchments are specifically highlighted because of their relevance for soil policy.The CAP-reform appears to facilitate and accelerate changes in the agricultural sector that were already happening. It is likely that upland livestock farms will extensify further, which will reduce environmental burdens such as diffuse pollution, soil compaction and runoff. The uptake of agri-environment schemes by individual farmers has increased since the CAP-reform. However, additional impacts are limited as there is a tendency among participants to enter these schemes based on existing features and practices.Although most farmers interviewed for this study appear to recognise the need to reduce soil erosion and diffuse pollution, they are less convinced they should be held responsible for controlling storm-water runoff from farmland that might contribute to flooding downstream. However, there are opportunities to achieve several objectives simultaneously, including improved soil management, runoff control and reduced pollution. Lessons can be learned from farmers’ opinions about CAP-reform, from successful interventions that aimed to reduce soil erosion and diffuse pollution, and also from failures. Recommendations are made for improvements to the current agri-environment schemes and to promote land management practices with less environmental burden.     

Forty years of irrigation development and reform in China

This study reviews 40 years of irrigation development in China including the transformation of the institutional and incentive structures in irrigation management. After rural reforms in the 1970s, irrigation investments slowed until the late 1990s. In North China, farmers became major investors in groundwater irrigation, leading to property rights’ transfer of tube wells from collective to private ownership. Despite positive effects in cropping patterns, farmer income and development of groundwater markets, privatisation has accelerated groundwater table deterioration. Since the middle of 1990s, Water User Associations have replaced village collective management of surface irrigation. This approach was adopted by most provinces by early 2001 with mixed results; only institutions with water‐saving incentives realised efficient irrigation. The Government is reforming water price policies to provide water‐saving incentives to farmers while not hurting their income. While China has focused on water rights and markets, and despite regulations and pilot projects, full implementation of water rights has been slow. Research reveals greater policy scope for expanding irrigation technologies that generate real water saving to rural areas. Given pressure associated with water scarcity and concern for food security, further effective reforms in irrigation and policy incentives are expected. The Government has also initiated some pilot projects to resolve increasing water scarcity problems through adjusting agricultural production activities.