Financing UK democracy: a stocktake of 20 years of political donations disclosure

Political donations in the UK have been subject to comprehensive disclosure since 2001. We study the data produced as part of this disclosure policy to evaluate the role of private and public political finance over time. Total political donations have grown by nearly 250 per cent since 2001, reaching over £100 million in real terms for the first time in 2019. This increase has been driven by donations from private individuals, who now account for approximately 60 per cent of donations in election years compared to 40–50 per cent up to the late 2010s. Furthermore, ‘super-donors’ (those contributing more than £100,000) have been a prominent driver of the rise, increasing their own share from approximately 31 per cent in 2017 to 45 per cent in 2019. We also show that private donations to the Labour Party fell sharply in the final stages of Jeremy Corbyn's leadership. These trends have benefited the Conservative Party, leading to a historic donation gap between the two main parties emerging circa 2019. We calculate that this gap between parties now stands at approximately £27 million compared to a historic average of £8–£10 million. This gap remains even after considering publicly funded ‘Short’ money provided to the opposition, which aims to increase competitive balance in the UK's democratic system.     

More long-term care for better healthcare and vice versa: investigating the mortality effects of interactions between these public sectors

Public healthcare (HC) and long-term care (LTC) sectors coexist in several OECD countries. Economic interactions between these two sectors have been found to occur even in the absence of formal integrated care arrangements. We investigate whether and how interactions between the HC and LTC sectors impact mortality. We analyse data on English local authorities in 2014–15 and employ a sequence of cross-sectional econometric specifications based on instrumental variables to identify the effect that LTC expenditure has on mortality through its interactions with HC services, and vice versa. Our findings suggest that any effect of LTC expenditure on mortality is likely to run through the HC sector by allowing the latter to reallocate resources from less to more effective services. A 10 per cent increase in LTC expenditure per user can indirectly save, on average, about three lives per million individuals. In addition, on top of the known HC direct mortality effects, we find that investing an extra £42 million in the HC sector – equivalent to a 10 per cent increase in HC expenditure per capita for the average local authority – can decrease the use of LTC services, producing around £7.8 million of savings. These can generate mortality effects if invested in services having an impact on mortality.     

The Economic Cost of Growing Up Poor: Estimating the GDP Loss Associated with Child Poverty*

One of the motivations for the UK government's target to reduce (and eventually eliminate) child poverty is the perception of a significant long‐term economic cost of growing up in poverty. This perception arises from the observation that individuals who experience poverty in their childhood earn less as adults, are less likely to be in employment, are more likely to engage in criminal or anti‐social activities and are more likely to experience poor health and lower life satisfaction. This paper quantifies these effects, and expresses them in terms of GDP losses to the nation. We begin by focusing on lost earnings that arise from poorer skills and reduced employment opportunities, and then move on to the wider costs associated with the higher crime rates, poorer health and reduced well‐being that are linked with growing up poor. We find a sizeable economic cost, with the cost of growing up in poverty amounting to at least 1 per cent of GDP.     

Universal Credit: A Preliminary Analysis of Its Impact on Incomes and Work Incentives*

Alongside a series of cuts that will reduce welfare spending by £18 billion per year by 2014–15, the UK government announced in November 2010 plans to integrate and simplify means‐tested welfare benefits and in‐work tax credits for working‐age adults into a single programme, to be known as Universal Credit and to be phased in from October 2013. The aims were to make it easier for claimants to claim benefits, to make the gains to work more transparent and to reduce the amount spent on administration and lost in fraud and error. More households will see entitlements rise from the move to Universal Credit considered in isolation than will see entitlements fall; in aggregate, entitlements will rise by nearly £1.1 billion a year. Low‐income families will see their entitlements rise by more than high‐income families, on average, and couples will gain more from the reform, on average, than single‐adult families, especially if there are also children in the family. In general, those facing the weakest incentive to work at all, or the weakest incentive to increase earnings, see their incentives strengthened, including those with very low earnings and hours worked per week and those who at present experience simultaneous withdrawal of multiple means‐tested benefits and tax credits. But a Council Tax Benefit that operates separately from Universal Credit, and that has rules that vary across English local authorities, could easily undermine many of the supposed advantages of Universal Credit.     

Assessing the Fiscal Costs and Benefits of A8 Migration to the UK*

This paper assesses the fiscal consequences of migration to the UK from the Central and Eastern European countries that joined the European Union in May 2004 (A8 countries). We show that A8 immigrants who arrived after EU enlargement in 2004 and who have at least one year of residence, and are therefore legally eligible to claim benefits, are 59 per cent less likely than natives to receive state benefits or tax credits and 57 per cent less likely to live in social housing. Furthermore, even if A8 immigrants had the same demographic characteristics as natives, they would still be 13 per cent less likely to receive benefits and 29 per cent less likely to live in social housing. We go on to compare the net fiscal contribution of A8 immigrants with that of individuals born in the UK, and find that in each fiscal year since enlargement in 2004, irrespective of the way that the net fiscal contribution is defined, A8 immigrants made a positive contribution to the public finances despite the fact that the UK has been running a budget deficit over the last few years. This is because they have a higher labour force participation rate, pay proportionately more in indirect taxes and make much less use of benefits and public services.     

The Real Reasons Enron Failed

Why did Enron fail? Was it the criminality of key corporate executives, and their resort to deceptive bookkeeping and off‐balance sheet financing, as the popular accounts suggest? This article argues that the popular accounts may confuse causes and consequences and suggests that the seeds of Enron's demise were sown years before criminal behavior took root. The more fundamental causes appear to have been matters of organizational design—in particular, bonus plans that paid managers to increase reported earnings; the use of mark‐to‐market accounting, with the blessing of the SEC, in generating those earnings; and CEO Skilling's decision to permit CFO Fastow to make finance a “profit center”—all of which happened five to ten years before Enron's bankruptcy filing. In desperate attempts to keep up with aggressive earnings targets, Enron's managers became so indiscriminate in committing the firm's capital that, in 1999, the international energy division presented Skilling with a plan that contemplated earning just $100 million in profit on a capital base of $7 billion. With that kind of performance—which amounts to a loss of several hundred million in terms of economic profits—the CFO faced considerable pressure to use deceptive tactics to put off the day of reckoning. The real Enron story may thus be more than the morality play told in press accounts. A major part of the blame must be assigned to the design of the company's performance measures and internal controls.     

Testing for a Debt‐Threshold Effect on Output Growth

Using the Reinhart–Rogoff dataset, we find a debt threshold not around 90 per cent but around 30 per cent, above which the median real gross domestic product (GDP) growth falls abruptly. Our work is the first to formally test for threshold effects in the relationship between public debt and median real GDP growth. The null hypothesis of no threshold effect is rejected at the 5 per cent significance level for most cases. While we find no evidence of a threshold around 90 per cent, our findings from the post‐war sample suggest that the debt threshold for economic growth may exist around a relatively small debt‐to‐GDP ratio of 30 per cent. Furthermore, countries with debt‐to‐GDP ratios above 30 per cent have GDP growth that is 1 percentage point lower at the median.     

NHS purchasing and the supply council

The Defence budget is over‐stretched. The scope for greater efficiency is large, but only radical and unpalatable action ‐ possibly at the expense of the UK defence‐industry ‐ can produce enough savings in existing programmes.     

农村贫困地区支付环境建设中存在的问题及建议--以吉林省长岭县为例

长岭县位于吉林省西部,国土面积5728.4平方公里。长岭全年平均风速每秒3.5米以上,是吉林省有名的贫困地区。2015年,长岭县生产总值实现300亿元,全口径财政收入实现8.2亿元,地方级财政收入实现5.6亿元;完成固定资产投资224亿元;规模以上工业总产值实现374万元,增加值实现11%。新增规模以上工业企业没有;社会消费品零售总额实现115.7亿元;城镇居民人均支配收入达到2.2万元;农民人均纯收入达到1.1万元。全县乡级行政区22个,全县村级行政区232个,农村地区人口数量53.69万人,农村地区银行网点数量60个。     

Particulate matter air pollution control programs in Japan — an analysis of cost savings in the absence of future remediation

The objectives of this study were to assess avoided economic costs (or anticipated ‘benefits’) of not implementing new environmental policies for particulate matter (PM) in Japan and compare these future benefits to estimates of future health risks developed in a separate analysis. The estimates for the benefits of avoided PM pollution control in the year 2010 were (1) $27 billion USD for stationary source controls, (2) $2.1 billion to $3.3 billion USD for diesel motor vehicle controls, (3) $41 million USD for governmental employee salaries, (4) $470 million USD for governmental financial assistance, (5) $510 million USD for special diesel vehicle control measures in Tokyo, and (6) $31 billion USD for total costs.

Using human health and productivity risks, calculated in a separate study to be $56 billion USD, the best net ratio of benefits to costs was 1.8 to 1. Inexpensive control options include road watering or paving for unpaved dirt roads and road vacuuming for paved roads. Intermediate options include differential road pricing, retrofitting diesel particulate filters, and reformulating diesel fuel. High cost options include adding particulate controls, such as wet scrubbers, baghouses, and electrostatic precipitators on uncontrolled stationary sources.     

Modelling the dynamics,structural breaks and the determinants of the real exchange rate of Australia

This paper examines the dynamics, structural breaks and determinants of the real exchange rate (RER) of Australia derived from an inter-temporal general equilibrium model. Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) modelling results show that a one per cent increase in: (1) terms of trade appreciates the RER by 0.96–1.05 per cent in the long-run; (2) government expenditure appreciates the RER by 0.53–0.46 per cent in the long-run; (3) net foreign liabilities appreciates the RER by 0.18–0.22 per cent in the long-run; (4) interest rate differential depreciates the RER by 0.007–0.01 per cent in the long-run; (5) openness in trade depreciates the RER by 1.15–1.31 per cent in the long-run; and (6) per-worker labour productivity depreciates the RER by 0.38–0.55 per cent in the long-run. The two endogenously determined structural breaks are positive but are statistically insignificant. The speed of adjustment towards equilibrium is high with short-run disequilibrium correcting by nearly 39–47 per cent per quarter. These results add new insights to the literature on the determinants of RER in Australia. Apart from the terms of trade, the effects of other determinants of RER are contrary to the results obtained in previous studies.     

The price of fear: Estimating the financial cost of bullying and harassment to the NHS in England

Using a spectrum of measures, this paper estimates some of the financial costs of bullying and harassment to the NHS in England. By means of specific impacts resulting from bullying and harassment to staff health, sickness absence costs to the employer, employee turnover, diminished productivity, sickness presenteeism, compensation, litigation and industrial relations costs, we conservatively estimate bullying and harassment to cost the taxpayer £2.281 billion per annum.     

Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? A Study of Acquiring‐Firm Returns in the Recent Merger Wave

Acquiring‐firm shareholders lost 12 cents around acquisition announcements per dollar spent on acquisitions for a total loss of $240 billion from 1998 through 2001, whereas they lost $7 billion in all of the 1980s, or 1.6 cents per dollar spent. The 1998 to 2001 aggregate dollar loss of acquiring‐firm shareholders is so large because of a small number of acquisitions with negative synergy gains by firms with extremely high valuations. Without these acquisitions, the wealth of acquiring‐firm shareholders would have increased. Firms that make these acquisitions with large dollar losses perform poorly afterward.     

The welfare loss from differential taxation of sectors in Germany

In the spirit of Harberger, we apply a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model and estimate the excess burden stemming from the tax-induced distortion in the allocation of capital across the corporate and the non-corporate sectors in Germany. In doing so, we perform a counterfactual analysis and ask how the allocation of capital across sectors would change compared with a sector-neutral tax system which assures an identical effective tax burden on both sectors. Our estimates suggest that the excess burden per-period amounts to approximately 2.2 billion Euros or to about 0.1 per cent of GDP. In present value terms, the excess burden translates to about 89 billion Euros or 4.0 per cent of GDP. In order to identify the impact of the firm’s financial behaviour on the size of the emerging excess burden, we perform several sensitivity analyses with regard to debt financing, external equity financing and debt constraints via agency cost.     

The Elasticity of Taxable Income in New Zealand*

This paper reports estimates of the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net‐of‐tax rate for New Zealand taxpayers. The relative stability of the New Zealand personal income tax system, in terms of marginal rates, thresholds and the tax base, provides helpful conditions for deriving these estimates. The elasticity of taxable income was estimated to be substantially higher for the highest income groups. Changes in the timing of income flows for the higher income recipients were found to be an important response to the announcement of a new higher rate bracket. The marginal welfare costs of personal income taxation were consistent across years, being relatively small for all but the higher tax brackets. For the top marginal rate bracket of 39 per cent, the welfare cost of raising an extra dollar of tax revenue was estimated to be well in excess of a dollar. Implications of the findings are that: disincentive effects of high top marginal rates can be substantial even when labour supply responses are small; the welfare costs of increases in top marginal tax rates can be high; and announcement effects of tax policy changes can lead to considerable income shifting between time periods.     

Openness,Ownership, and Regional Economic Growth in Vietnam

ABSTRACT

In this article, we examine the influences of exports, multinational corporations (MNCs), and the share of state-owned enterprise (SOE) production in regional economic growth in Vietnam for the years 1996–2006. Various estimations, without and with considering the endogeneity problem, confirm that exports and the presence of MNCs are influential factors on promoting economic growth. Crucially, provinces with a higher ratio of SOE production have experienced higher economic growth. However, the positive relationship between SOE share and economic growth should be carefully interpreted.     

The Effects of EU Formula Apportionment on Corporate Tax Revenues*

The European Commission proposes to replace the current system of taxing corporate income using separate accounting by a two‐step ‘consolidation and apportionment’ procedure. This paper uses a large set of unconsolidated firm‐level data to assess the likely impact on corporate tax revenues in each member state. Taking pre‐tax profit as given, overall tax revenues would be likely to drop by 2.5 per cent if companies could choose whether to participate. By contrast, if they were forced to participate, total tax revenues would be likely to increase by more than 2 per cent, leaving some European countries ‐ most notably, Spain, Sweden and the UK ‐ better off. We investigate how sensitive these results are to the apportionment factors used.     

Exchange volatility and trade performance in Morocco and Tunisia: what have we learned so far?

This paper attempts to assess two interesting issues for two small open economies (Morocco and Tunisia). First, it analyses the historical behaviour of nominal exchange rate, differential price and real exchange rate uncertainties. Second, it investigates the stability of the interaction between exchange volatility and exports in nominal and real terms. Our main results reveal that the effect of differential price volatility on exports exceeds that of nominal exchange rate by a large margin in terms of duration of persistence, ARCH and GARCH effects and intensity of shock. The relationship appears complex. In Morocco, it is negative and significant in 75.82% (as average) of cases in nominal terms and in 77.22% in real terms. This link is stronger in Tunisia with averages, respectively, equal to 85.88% and 89.99%. We associate the apparently mixed results to the differential price uncertainty itself sensitive to ups and down oil price movements, switching regime and leverage effects.     

美国量化宽松货币政策对中国溢出效应研究——基于贸易渠道分析

基于2008年10月~2014年3月的30个工业行业出口面板数据,运用FGLS方法,根据不同工业行业要素密集度考量美国量化宽松货币政策对我国工业出口贸易的影响。结果表明,美国量化宽松货币政策通过人民币汇率对我国资本密集型、劳动密集型和技术密集型行业的出口呈现出显著负面影响,通过国际大宗商品价格指数对我国劳动密集型和技术密集型行业出口产生显著负面影响,美国实际工业产出对我国三类工业行业出口呈现出显著正面影响。     

Debate: Local councils' dilemma of planning for uncertainty

The public expenditure implications of PFI projects in Scotland's NHS are substantial. This article compares PFI capital expenditure with projected unitary charges, examines the annual cost of existing PFI schemes and looks at future costs arising from the planned expansion of PFI. Unless the new Scottish National Party-led administration applies the breaks, the annual cost of PFI to Scotland's NHS is to increase almost five-fold, from £107.1 million in 2005/06 to £500 million by the early part of the next decade.