Accounting for Growth in the Australian Wine Industry, 1987 to 2003

A computable general equilibrium model of the Australian economy is used to account for the dramatic growth in Australia's wine industry between 1987 and 1999, and to project grape and wine volumes and prices to 2003. Export demand growth has made a major contribution to total output growth in premium wines, and accounts for most of the increase in the producer price of premium red wine. Domestic consumer preferences have shifted, mainly towards premium red wine, but there is also some evidence of growing demand for premium white wine since the mid 1990s. From the perspective of producers, productivity growth, while being less important than growth in domestic demand, appears to have more than offset the negative effects on suppliers of wine consumer tax increases. From the domestic consumers' perspective, however, tax hikes have raised retail prices much more than productivity gains have lowered them. The high and sustained levels of profitability resulting from export demand growth have led to a massive supply response in Australia. Even so, by 2003 Australian wine output will still be less than 5 per cent of global production.     

Wine Tax Reform: The Impact of Introducing a Volumetric Excise Tax for Wine

The recent Henry tax review recommended substantial changes to Australian alcohol taxation policy. Here, the implications for the Australian wine industry of the Henry tax review's recommendations are explored using a computable general equilibrium model. The results show that: (i) replacement of the Wine Equalisation Tax (WET) with a revenue‐neutral volumetric excise tax would have a small negative impact on the wine industry; (ii) removal of the WET rebate would have a substantial negative impact on small wineries; and (iii) applying the packaged beer excise rate across all alcoholic beverages would have a notable negative impact on the wine industry.     

略论葡萄酒业的隐性营销策略

目前，我国饮酒习惯正在发生变化。但从红酒消费的主流来看，更多的还是集中在宴会、酒吧这类场所，离大众消费仍有一段距离。我国对葡萄酒文化认知以及饮酒消费习惯制约了葡萄酒产业的发展。采用隐性营销传播模式，立足于顾客心理价值的开发，塑造全新的葡萄酒文化，可促进我国葡萄酒业的快速发展。     

Optimal Commodity Taxes in Australia

The recent changes to commodity taxes in Australia have led to renewed interest in a classic question in public finance: should the tax rates be uniform or differentiated? This article attempts to answer this question by calculating optimal commodity taxes in Australia for a nine‐item disaggregation. The estimates point to non‐uniform commodity taxes, even from the viewpoint of an inequality‐insensitive tax planner. The optimal commodity taxes bear little resemblance with the pre‐GST or post‐GST tax rates. No less significant is our observation that even the purely efficiency‐driven optimal commodity taxes imply lower real expenditure inequality than the actual taxes.     

Globalization and Taste Convergence: the Cases of Wine and Beer

This paper investigates changes in cultural consumption patterns for a low‐concentration industry: wine and beer. Using data on 38 countries from 1963–2000, there is clear convergence in the consumption of wine relative to beer between 1963 and 2000. Convergence occurs even more quickly within groups of countries that have a higher degree of integration. A key prediction of international trade is confirmed in the data: greater trade integration weakens the association between production and consumption patterns—although the relative consumption of wine can be explained well in 1963 by grape production and latitude, these variables are much less significant in 2000. Despite these “scientific” explanations, there is also a cultural angle to wine consumption. While the relative wine consumption of France and Germany is converging, several Latin American countries fail to converge. The patterns of convergence are consistent with dynamics of adjustment in overlapping generation habit formation models.     

Distance Decay in the Willingness to Pay for Wine: Disentangling Local and Organic Attributes

This paper investigates how the residents of a French wine-producing region value the attributes of wine. We elicit the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for organic/non-organic and local/non-local wines with increasing levels of information on the impact of agricultural practices at both global and local scales. The analysis shows that there is a significant organic premium associated with both local and non-local wines. This organic premium significantly increases with information and significantly decreases with the distance between the consumer’s home and the vineyard. Based on the econometric predictions of the WTP, we show that a per-unit tax on non-organic wines or a standard imposing organic practices increases welfare through the internalization of the attributes revealed by the experiment.     

Trade Policy in Lobbying Equilibrium: With Non‐Traded and Traded Final Goods and Intermediate Inputs

The paper derives trade policies endogenously for final consumption and intermediate input industries in the presence of a non‐traded sector. Contrary to what the existing literature suggests, results show that there is no definite relation between lobbying status and the direction of trade policy of an industry. Trade protection of an industry depends on how its consumption (horizontal) and production (vertical) linkages with other industries reinforce or cancel out its lobbying efforts. To cite a few results, (i) an organized industry may face trade tax, whereas an unorganized one may obtain protection; (ii) an organized downstream industry may not be able to impose trade tax to an unorganized upstream industry, (iii) an organized upstream industry may not hurt unorganized downstream industry, (iv) lobby for non‐traded industry alone can influence trade policies, and (v) lobby for traded industry affects the size of the non‐traded sector in the economy.     

WILL TAX‐BASED HEALTH INSURANCE REFORMS HELP THE SELF‐EMPLOYED STAY IN BUSINESS?

The self‐employed face a tax‐induced disadvantage relative to wage and salary workers when it comes to the payment of health insurance premiums. This paper uses a panel of individual tax return data to test whether lower health insurance premium costs because of an expanded tax incentive result in longer periods of self‐employment. The results suggest that households claiming the deduction are indeed less likely to exit self‐employment. Equalizing the treatment of health insurance premiums for the self‐employed and wage workers by allowing full deductibility from Self‐Employment Contributions Act (SECA) taxes would result in a 7% decrease in the probability of exit. (JEL H32, I18, L26)     

THE ECONOMICS OF INTRODUCING WINE INTO GROCERY STORES

The repeal of the Prohibition Act in 1933 introduced many state‐specific regulations in wine markets. For example, 15 states currently have laws that restrict wine sales in grocery stores. Several of these states have proposed changes that would expand the distribution of wine; however, the proposals have met significant resistance from key stakeholders and none have resulted in legislation. It is widely expected that additional proposals will be initiated, but with more attention given to mechanisms that would address some of the transitional issues. A simulation model is developed here to assess the likely economic effects of introducing wine into grocery stores in New York State. Results indicate that tax revenue would increase by $22 million annually, revenue for in‐state wineries would increase by approximately 13%, and revenue for liquor store owners is calculated to fall by 28%. Simulation results are subsequently used to develop a framework for evaluating the transitional costs of policy reform in this highly regulated industry. (JEL K23, Q18)     

Effect of the Tax System ON R&D Intensity,Growth, Wages and Consumption Share

We propose a general equilibrium knowledge‐driven (semi‐)endogenous‐growth model with horizontal R&D, which is extended to consider two types of labour, skilled and unskilled, and exogenous government expenditure, financed through taxes on financial assets and on labour income, to analyse the implications of the tax system on R&D intensity, economic growth, wage inequality and consumption share in the output. In particular, we show that: (i) taxes have negative influence in the consumption share, being higher the marginal effect of the labour‐income tax; (ii) for any given government expenditure share, an increase (a decrease) in financial‐assets tax decreases (increases) the labour‐income tax; (iii) only the financial‐assets tax affects negatively the R&D intensity and the skill‐premium; thus, to reduce the skill‐premium the financial‐assets tax must increase; (iv) ignoring the effect on wage inequality and on R&D intensity, taxes are substitutes.     

Twenty-first century bootlegging: unlawful wine shipments and direct-to-consumer laws

Direct to consumer (DTC) shipping has been a burgeoning segment of the wine industry for some time. However, regulatory policy has not kept pace with the growing reach and availability of these wines which has left this sector of economic activity prohibited in states that historically disallowed DTC wine shipping. Using detailed shipping records of wine shipments into the state of Oklahoma, a state that explicitly disallows direct shipping, we describe the nature of illegal wine purchasing in the face of prohibition by linking economic data from the American Community Survey at the zip code level for each purchase. We find that zip codes with 10% higher incomes purchase 7.4–9.3% more DTC wine, and that race is not a useful predictor in DTC demand. Our results have forward-looking relevance as well as more states amend their laws to allow DTC wine shipping. In just a 6-month period, an estimated $186,629 may not have been collected in excise and sales taxes in Oklahoma. This figure is plausibly a lower bound of future tax collections due to DTC prohibition.     

THE IMPACT OF INSURANCE SUBSIDIES ON SELF‐EMPLOYMENT: DO STATE NON‐GROUP HEALTH INSURANCE REGULATIONS MATTER?

This paper tests whether the effect of tax‐based subsidies for self‐employed health insurance on the level of self‐employment differs with the type of non‐group insurance regulatory regime at the state level. Using a panel of tax returns from 1999 to 2004, we estimate fixed effects instrumental variable regressions for the probability of being self‐employed, allowing the effect of the after‐tax price of self‐employed health insurance to differ by regulatory regime. Our results suggest that states with community rating and guaranteed issue regulations had significantly smaller increases in the fraction of taxpayers reporting some amount of self‐employment income as a result of a decrease in the after‐tax price of self‐employed health insurance. However, there is suggestive evidence that heavily regulated states experienced a larger increase in exclusive self‐employment, particularly among older taxpayers. (JEL J24, H24, I18)     

THE FISCAL DIVIDEND MYTH OF AN INCOME/GST TAX SWITCH*

Reaping a windfall fiscal dividend from the taxation of the ‘underground’ economy's expenditures on ‘legitimate’ commodities is often seen as a significant advantage for a goods and services tax (GST) over an income tax. This claim ignores the changes in prices in the underground economy which would arise from the introduction of a GST. Employing a general equilibrium model which allows for tax evasion, we show that any ‘dividend’ arising from a change in the income tax/GST mix is equivalent to a rise in the income tax rate without a GST.     

Regulating a Polluting Oligopoly: Emission Tax or Voluntary Agreement?

This paper compares, in a polluting oligopoly, an emission tax and a form of environmental policy called voluntary agreement (VA). Here there are two ways of reducing pollution: output contraction and end‐of‐pipe abatement. Given the imperfect competition, firms’ reaction to the tax is sub‐optimal. They reduce output excessively in order to raise the price and do not abate enough. The VA is a take‐it‐or‐leave‐it contract on abatement effort, offered to the firms with the threat of a tax. It has a limited effect on output and always allows higher abatement than the tax. We find that this kind of VA may be more efficient than the tax in a concentrated industry, when pollution is not too harmful and when the abatement technology is rather efficient and cheap.     

Analysing Firm‐level Price Effects for Differentiated Products: The Case of Australian Wine Producers

The paper discusses and illustrates estimation methods for identifying and modelling the influence of producers on the prices for a differentiated product. A two‐step fixed effects approach is contrasted to the random effects specification. The techniques are employed to analyse prices for over 260 Australian premium wine producers. The fixed effects specification is preferred given significant correlation between wine attributes and random producer effects. The estimation of fixed producer price effects identifies statistically significant price premiums and discounts, which average 15%. Fixed producer price effects are estimated to depend on the quality reputation of the producer, its level of experience, producer size and the use of multibrands by conglomerates. In part, results indicate that price discounts are associated with producers who have low‐quality reputations, are small and recently established.     

Smoke screen: Estimating the tax pass‐through to cigarette prices in Pakistan

This article estimates and compares the speed and magnitude of the tax pass‐through across major cigarette brands at different price points (budget, mainstream, and premium) in Pakistan by using a novel dataset of monthly observations on cigarette prices in 50 cities during the period 2004 to 2015. The empirical analysis indicates that the pass‐through of cigarette taxes to the final consumer price is fast but incomplete in Pakistan. The pass‐through coefficient is estimated to be in the range of 70 to over 90 percent across four major cigarette brands, and most of the pass‐through occurs contemporaneously within a period of 2 months. The results imply that a 1‐Pakistan rupee (PR ) increase in taxation leads to an increase of PR s 0.8, on average, in cigarette prices. In other words, cigarette taxes are undershifted to consumers in Pakistan. With respect to the tax pass‐through at different price tiers (budget, mainstream, and premium), I find significant variation in the pass‐through coefficient, which is close to one for the premium cigarette brand and significantly lower for the budget and mainstream cigarette brands.     

Implementing partial tax harmonization in an asymmetric tax competition game with repeated interaction

This paper investigates the conditions under which partial harmonization for capital taxation is sustained in a repeated interactions model of tax competition when there are three countries with heterogenous capital endowments. We show that regardless of the structure of the coalition (i.e., full or partial tax coordination), whether partial tax harmonization is sustainable or not crucially depends on the extent to which the capital endowment of the medium‐sized country is similar to that of the large or small country. The most noteworthy finding is that the closer the capital endowment of the median country is to the average one, the less likely the tax harmonization including the median country is to prevail and the more likely the partial tax harmonization excluding the median country is to prevail. We also show that partial tax harmonization makes the member countries of the tax union better off and non‐member countries worse off, which stands in sharpe contrast with previous studies, such as Konrad and Schjelderup (1999) and Bucovetsky (2009).     

MODELING INTERNAL DECISION MAKING PROCESS: AN EXPLANATION OF CONFLICTING EMPIRICAL RESULTS ON BEHAVIOR OF NON‐PROFIT AND FOR‐PROFIT HOSPITALS

This article develops multiobjective models of hospital decision making that incorporate the internal decision process in both a for‐profit and a non‐profit hospital (NPH). Predicted output and quality for an NPH differ from those for a for‐profit hospital under some conditions but converge under others. Convergence may be the result of a complex internal decision structure with decision control primarily by physicians, similar objectives across different organizational forms, or differing constraints. The mechanisms underlying these outcomes provide explanations for conflicting results in empirical studies of non‐profit and for‐profit hospitals and provide a different rationale for convergence than non‐profit response to competition from for‐profit hospitals. Understanding the source of convergence is important for policies directed toward the tax treatment of NPHs.(JEL D21, D23, I11, L3, L21)     

Trade between symmetric countries,heterogeneous firms,and the skill premium

Abstract This paper examines the effects of trade liberalization between symmetric countries on the skill premium. I introduce skilled and unskilled labour in a model of trade with heterogeneous firms à la Melitz (2003) and assume a production technology such that more productive firms are more skill intensive. I show that the effects of trade liberalization on wage inequality crucially depend on the type of trade costs considered and on their initial size. While fixed costs of trade have a potentially non‐monotonic effect on the skill premium, a drop in variable trade costs unambiguously and substantially raises wage inequality.     

Competing for a duopoly: international trade and tax competition

Abstract We analyse the tax/subsidy competition between two potential host governments to attract the plants of firms in a duopolistic industry. While competition between identical countries for a monopolist's investment is known to result in subsidy inflation, two firms can be taxed in equilibrium with the host countries appropriating the entire social surplus generated within the industry, despite explicit non‐cooperation between governments. Trade costs mean that the firms prefer dispersed to co‐located production, creating these taxation opportunities for the host countries. We determine the country‐size asymmetry that changes the nature of the equilibrium, inducing concentration of production in the larger country.