Unbundling and infrastructure competition for broadband adoption: Implications for NGA regulation

The common idea of open access policy is that it refers to the sharing of particular elements, such as wholesale access networks, backhaul, under-sea cable and internet exchange points in fixed and mobile networks. In broadband networks, the use of open access policy usually refers to the infrastructure parts, which are considered a bottleneck. Many regulators have generally focused open access policy on fixed broadband networks, especially digital subscriber line (DSL) technology, in the last decade. Local loop unbundling (LLU) regulation is one of the main strategies for the regulator to open access to an incumbent’s bottleneck network in order to soften its monopoly power and encourage competition in the DSL broadband market. The OECD countries have different strategies regarding unbundling local loop and infrastructure competition, as the characteristics and infrastructure networks of countries vary. There are currently more choices of next generation network (NGN) technologies to develop. While local loop unbundling may not be applied fully to NGN development (the cost is not sunk, more technologies are available to implement, incentive of investment by operator), it can indicate benefits and drawbacks of open access policy in the past decade that can be adapted to NGN.The empirical results of this study show that during 2002–2008, LLU regulation was one of the strategies used to increase broadband adoption in countries that had difficulty encouraging infrastructure competition. Unbundling regulation can therefore be implemented carefully and differently in each country that has inefficiency that is harmful to consumers in its market from a monopoly incumbent. Infrastructure competition, on the other hand, is introduced as another strategy to increase broadband adoption. The empirical results of this study indicate that infrastructure competition can be used as a strategy when there are already enough infrastructures in the area or country. These results support the idea of using open access and infrastructure competition policy depending on the existing competition of broadband infrastructure in each country.     

OECD unbundled local loop pricing

This study examines OECD fully unbundled and line sharing monthly wholesale prices for 2002–2008. The results are informative with economic analysis appearing to inform regulator decision making. However, with the cost proxy (viz., copper-wage relative price, population density, urbanisation and business line penetration), regulator costing methods (long run incremental and fully allocated cost), and time trend arguments only explaining approximately 40% of the price variation there remains ample unexplained variation, and political and institutional variables may help reduce this. Finally, both price series are subject to increasingly rapid value declines, although the patterns are somewhat distinct. This suggests that initial prices are truly transitory.     

欧盟电力市场化改革最新进展及启示

欧盟推进电力市场化改革的主要目标是要建立欧洲统一电力市场。根据欧盟电力市场化改革第2号指令的要求,2007年7月开始全部用户市场开放,在2004年7月和2007年7月分别实现输电运行机构和配电运行机构从竞争性业务中分离出来。为进一步加强跨国电力交易,欧盟加快了泛欧洲输电网建设进程,推进统一的输电交易和阻塞管理机制,推动各国深化电力改革和各国电力市场之间的融合。而欧盟电力市场化改革及推进面临挑战。对中国而言,建立统一开放的电力市场体系是电力市场化改革方向,但业务分拆和电力市场机制建设必须协调推进。     

国际电力体制改革经验及对中国的启发

迄今世界上100多个国家的电力改革实践对我国电力改革有几点基本的启示。(1)电力、经济、资源、政治、社会和文化价值等多方面的起始条件不同,决定了各国改革选择了不同的路径和垂直垄断结构的分拆顺序。没有一个模式是中国可以照搬的。(2)电力改革不仅有特性,而且有共性。我国电力改革在坚持因地制宜原则的同时,必须遵守电力市场改革的共同原则。(3)按照主要的原则,我国下一步改革需要进一步明确改革的多重目的及主次关系,对症施治;加强电网发展,为电力市场提供基本物质保证;着眼于电力市场运作,无论如何分拆必须坚持电网运营与市场参与者相独立的原则。     

非线性控制器在聚丙烯装置上的应用

介绍了Aspentech非线性控制器、Apollo生产控制软件包在200 kt/a聚丙烯装置(第二代国产化环管工艺)上实施先进过程控制项目的过程、技术难点和应用成果,阐述了Apollo生产控制软件包的主要技术特点。     

The role of competition and regulation in stimulating innovation – Telecommunications

The telecommunications sector is innovative and its innovations strongly affect the growth of the rest of the economy. While regulatory policy has therefore shifted towards innovation as its major goal besides enabling competition, there appear to be tensions between regulation, competition and innovation. This paper identifies as the roots of these tensions the consumer protection objective enshrined in regulatory legislation and the regulatory neutrality issues arising from stranded assets, loss of labor rents, loss of services by captive customers, and the threat to regulators from looming deregulation, all of which are associated with innovations. This paper identifies some similar threats to innovation in unregulated sunk-cost industries with a monopolistic incumbent. A very simple model shows that a comparison of innovation incentives in such an unregulated industry with a regulated one leads to ambiguous results. However, the prospect of converting a regulated industry into an unregulated one after the innovation has occurred will unambiguously increase innovation incentives.     

美国分布式风力发电政策研究及启示

美国的分布式风力发电起步较早,其在技术水平、市场份额等方面取得的成绩引人注目。推动美国分布式风电快速发展的关键因素之一是政府在支持分布式风力发电发展方面制定了一揽子政策。通过研究美国分布式风力发电的政策法规,对其经济刺激、资金援助、技术支持、电网接入及行业规范等政策进行了深入分析。美国在该领域的成功经验对促进我国分布式电源开发具有一定的借鉴意义。     

Long term risk sharing contracts as an approach to establish public–private partnerships for investment into next generation access networks

This paper develops an investment/pricing model for the deployment of basic broadband networks which, along with other applications, is applicable to public–private partnership projects. In particular, a new investment model is suggested to be used for finance deployment over a longer term by enabling both private and public investors to participate in the roll-out of next generation access (NGA) infrastructure. This so-called “long-term risk sharing concept” has several notable benefits compared with the traditional regulatory approach. Above all, the model enables both private operators and public authorities to share the risk of investing in NGA infrastructure. Thus the model offers a way for public authorities to achieve a timely and countrywide roll-out of NGA networks, including in areas where NGA investment would otherwise not occur.     

发电企业竞价上网的成本测算模型研究

对发电企业的会计成本和边际成本测算模型进行了分析,并提出分时段的固定成本分摊模型,同时对算例进行了具体测算。     

Using the economics of platforms to understand the broadband-based market formation in the New Zealand Ultra-Fast Broadband Network

The government of New Zealand is currently building a nation-wide fibre-optics network, a project known as the Ultra-Fast Broadband (UFB) initiative. The UFB network will cover 75 percent of New Zealanders over 10 years and will cost NZD $1.5 billion to the New Zealand government. The technical and economic characteristics of the new network will have a deep impact on the current landscape of the telecommunications markets. Institutional arrangements are in place for the development of the New Zealand's UFB: a government-owned agency, Crown Fibre Holdings (CFH); private investors who jointly with CFH own the Local Fibre Companies (LFCs) which will operate the UFB; and Retail Service Providers (RSP) that will provide end-user services by purchasing wholesale services to the LFCs. Relying on a normative economics approach that uses recent advances in the theory of platform-based markets with cross-network effects – also known as theory of two-sided platforms – the paper proposes a novel view of the way markets over the UFB will unfold. On one hand, the theory is used to explain the rationale behind regulatory decisions already made and their effect on the development of UFB-based markets for contents and services. Such analysis is followed, on the other hand, by the introduction of a simple taxonomy for the RSPs which provides the framework to argue about the most likely scenarios for service deployment and competition to develop over the UFB. The analytical framework reveals that the UFB ecosystem will be fraught with cross-network externalities which are the basis for regulatory decisions already adopted and the source of particular forms of strategic behavior adopted by the UFB-based market innovators.