不完全竞争下区际贸易政策选择

大国的国内区际贸易可以为该国产业和企业在国际市场提供竞争力支撑。我国作为一个大国,区际贸易因贸易壁垒的广泛存在而受阻,难以为我国产业和企业在国际市场提供竞争力支撑。本文分析了不完全竞争产业区际贸易壁垒存在的经济驱动力,其基本结论是:区际贸易壁垒不仅有利于本地区厂商在本地市场中获得较大的市场份额(即地方保护效应),而且还可以增加本地区厂商的利润(即利润转移效应),并增加本地区的福利;但当所有地方政府都采取贸易保护政策时,会导致所有区域福利水平的降低,从而导致一国整体国民福利的损失。这一结论为中央政府采取相应的措施协调国内区际贸易政策以消除国内市场分割提供了理论依据。     

多种纤维协定与中国纺织品贸易

<正> 多种纤维协定是在关贸总协定的主持下,作为专门部门的一种特殊的贸易体制,由进口纺织品(包括服装,下同)的发达国家和出口纺织品的发展中国家所达成的控制纺织品贸易的一项协议,也就是关于工业国家从发展中国家进口纺织品配额的谈判。当一国的纺织品的进口引起国内市场混乱时,在许多严格的条款和多边监督的约束下,多种纤维协定的保护条款允许实行纺织品进口限制。由于该协定背离了关贸总协定第11条规定的给予所有缔约方相同的关税待遇和取消数量限制的规定,因而它事实上已成为发达国家长期保护其国内纺织工业利益的一种手段,它是以保证其纺织业有秩序的发展来确保贸易的可预测性和避免单方面限制。     

后配额时代来临 中国纺织业路在何方

2005年1月1日,全球纺织品贸易进入“后配额时代”,统治世界纺织品贸易40多年的配额体制终于走到了历史的尽头,世界纺织品贸易将如期迎来自由化。这对深受配额限制的纺织品生产大国中国而言,无疑是一次生产力的解放。但去年4月以来,美国和欧盟为保护本国中小纺织品生产商,分别宣布对中国出口的纺织品设限和进行“特殊保障”调查,美国更是在5月13日和18日不到一周的时间内两次对我国的7种纺织产品设置进口限制。一时间,贸易争端硝烟四起。     

中国农产品市场准入政策改革的福利效应——基于贸易限制指数方法的分析

本文基于Anderson-Neary贸易限制指数理论,通过加入世界价格内生的条件,将贸易限制指数的小国模型扩展到大国开放经济中,得到市场准入政策改革的福利效应模型.通过理论分析得到,在一定的前提条件下,降低关税率的关税政策改革会导致社会福利水平的提升,放松配额、增加配额量的非关税壁垒政策改革也会增进社会福利水平.我国农产品市场准入政策改革的实证研究表明,关税的边际成本为负,非关税壁垒政策的影子价格为正,也就是说,我国降低关税率的关税政策改革和增加配额量的非关税壁垒政策改革都会促进社会福利水平的提升.     

诊治"兜圈子"

国货复进口兜了圈子,或多或少地产生了浪费.从中国经济整体的大局和企业自身发展需要看,对国货复进口的情况还是应当采取适当的限制措施.不少舆论建议"取消国货复进口的加工贸易进口保税政策,并对国内能够生产供应的料件限制以加工贸易方式保税进口",提出"对于区外加工贸易项目在国内销售的加工贸易产品,应按规定征税,货物最终出口后再按规定退税"等等,认为此乃治根之本.     

我国油料进口的Armington弹性估计与进口福利波动分析

近年来,油料成为了我国第一大类的进口农产品,为了衡量油料进口对国内生产和整体福利的影响,本文以大豆和油菜籽为例,选取1991-2005年的时间序列数据,测算了其Armington替代弹性和进口福利波动值。从短期来看,大豆和油菜籽进口对国内生产的冲击不大,进口福利的减少主要是由进口价格上涨引起的;而长期替代弹性则较大,如果不重视发展国内生产,提高国内产品的国际竞争力,掌握进口定价权,进口就会对国内生产造成较大冲击,降低整体福利水平。     

对纺织品配额取消后的思考

<正>中国作为世界第一纺织品服装生产大国,是受纺织品配额限制最严的国家,其生产能力和贸易长期受到最大扭曲,因此,继续了40多年的世界纺织品配额制度取消后,理应可以获得良好的贸易环境,更好地发挥优势。然而,一些发达国家并不愿意看到在纺织品配额取消后中国成为世界纺织品市场的主导,纷纷上演新一轮的贸易保护主义措施,这从美国和欧盟两个主要进口市场近期所制定或采取的     

入世对我贸易自由化的影响

入世对贸易自由化的影响 受保护行业利润下降随着我国进口关税的降低,我国进口企业的最初反应就是用更便宜的外国商品来替代成本较高的国内商品.受到保护的行业会因面对更激烈的外国竞争而利润下降,因此关税削减的最初冲击主要由受到更高程度保护的行业承担.我国的进口可能会因为关税的削减而增加,同时,受到较少保护以及较依赖进口的行业会因进口货物税赋的减轻而提高利润,而利润有所增加的行业将得到扩展,并以更高的工资来吸收更多的工人.     

“国货复进口”现象分析

近年来我国国货复进口规模不断扩大,对我国的对外贸易形成了重大影响,引起了相关各方面的高度关注。国货复进口的大量产生,根本在于中国现行贸易政策、税收政策和管理政策的不完善,也与中国目前的投资和服务环境有着不可分割的关系。因此,为了减少国货复进口的消极影响,并有效控制其规模的扩大,应该积极调整宏观贸易和税收政策,改善投资环境,使其能够更好地适应我国对外贸易的发展。     

快速Internet小波图像传输

对发展中国家的经济发展来说,当贸易因自由化而可能致使国家总体利益遭受损失时,对自由进行限制的修正自由规则是所取对应措施中最常见的做法,诸如补助金制度、投资限制政策、环境政策、竞争政策等.应该看到这些强有力的限制手段在束缚自由贸易而保护了自身利益的同时,却有悖于通过世界贸易的扩大可以增进宏观福利.在WTO这一多边贸易组织一时还难以协调发展中国家的国家利益与发达国家的自由贸易利益时,区域联合不失是对发展世界贸易的一种补充.     

The (non)equivalence of optimal tariffs and quotas under uncertainty

Tariffs and quotas are compared as instruments for restricting imports to improve the terms of trade in a world in which domestic and/or foreign supply and demand conditions are stochastic. The two instruments are not generally equivalent in their welfare effects, and furthermore there is no general presumption in favour of one instrument over the other. In a particular model, characterized by linear supply and demand curves for imports, quotas are more likely to be superior when the predominant source of uncertainty is with respect to foreign supply conditions and when the supply of imports is inelastic.     

Buy Local? Governmental Incentives to ‘Inform’ Consumers

This paper considers governmental incentives to provide information to local consumers about the relative merits of local versus foreign goods. We construct a model in which a local firm in a small, open economy competes in its domestic market with imports. Consumers are willing to pay an idiosyncratic premium for the local product, drawn from some support that the importing country government can affect through a costly information campaign. We examine incentives to undertake such a campaign in autarky and in the case of trade. We show, inter alia, that while a national welfare‐maximising government will always wish to shift this distribution upwards, it may not wish to reduce the variance of valuations, and that the optimal response of a foreign government will be to increase any support it offers to its exporters. Furthermore, falling world prices generally reduce the attractiveness of such a campaign both to a welfare‐maximising government and to one that cares only for domestic profits.     

Parallel trade with an endogenous market structure

This paper sets up a two‐country model in which there is one domestic manufacturer authorising its product to a distributor in the foreign country. The distributor can sell the product not only to its own market (i.e., the foreign market) but also back to the domestic market. The latter is called parallel trade (PT). The paper investigates the effects of PT on the profits of the manufacturer and social welfare if the domestic market structure is endogenously determined. It is found that PT should be encouraged rather than banned as it increases not only the profits of the manufacturer but also the welfare of both the domestic and the foreign countries.     

Quotas versus tariffs

This paper examines the nonequivalence of tariffs and quotas under uncertainty, when the expected level of imports is constrained for noneconomic reasons. Tariffs and quotas are ranked according to their effect on expected social welfare. In the case of a stochastic foreign supply curve, the ranking will depend upon the height of the tariff. In the case of a stochastic import demand curve, a tariff will always yield greater social welfare than a quota.     

When and how should infant industries be protected?

This paper develops and analyzes a welfare maximizing model of infant industry protection. The domestic infant industry is competitive and experiences dynamic learning effects that are external to firms. The competitive foreign industry is mature and produces a good that is an imperfect substitute for the domestic good. A government planner can protect the infant industry using domestic production subsidies, tariffs, or quotas in order to maximize domestic welfare over time. As protection is not always optimal (although the domestic industry experiences a learning externality), the paper shows how the decision to protect the industry should depend on the industry's learning potential, the shape of the learning curve, and the degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign goods.Assuming some reasonable restrictions on the flexibility over time of the policy instruments, the paper subsequently compares the effectiveness of the different instruments. Given such restrictions, the paper shows that quotas induce higher welfare levels than tariffs. In some cases, the dominance of the quota is so pronounced that it compensates for any amount of government revenue loss related to the administration of the quota (including the case of a voluntary export restraint, where no revenue is collected). In similar cases, the quota may even be preferred to a domestic production subsidy.     

International mergers: Incentives and welfare

Information asymmetry creates incentives for firms from different countries to merge. To demonstrate this point, we develop a model of international oligopolistic competition under demand uncertainty and asymmetric information. We show that when domestic firms but not foreign firms are completely informed of local market demands, information sharing enhances the profitability of a merger between a domestic firm and a foreign firm. We also examine how such a merger affects the non-merging firms' profits, consumer surplus and social welfare.     

双向知识产权保护与企业出口动态

本文将产品质量引入多产品企业模型,构建双向知识产权保护影响企业出口动态的微观机制。理论分析发现,国内知识产权保护会通过创新激励效应促进本国企业出口产品质量提升,并促进企业出口产品种类和出口总量增加;国外知识产权保护会通过质量选择效应导致本国出口产品质量被动提升,进而降低本国企业出口总量,加速低质量产品退出。通过中国企业微观数据检验发现,国内和国外知识产权保护都会提升企业出口产品质量,并且国内知识产权保护增强会促进企业出口总量和出口产品种类增加,而国外知识产权保护增强会降低企业出口总量,对企业出口产品种类影响不显著,但是会加速企业旧产品退出;中介效应检验发现,国内和国外知识产权保护都存在创新激励效应,并且国内知识产权保护的创新激励效应更大,国外知识产权保护同时存在明显的质量选择效应。异质性考察发现,与总体回归相比,当国内知识产权保护强于国外时,国外知识产权保护增强会促进企业出口总量和出口种类增加;而国内知识产权保护水平弱于国外时,国外知识产权保护增强会降低企业出口总量和出口种类。     

Optimal revenue-raising trade restrictions under uncertainty

A country seeks to achieve a fixed expected revenue by restricting trade when it faces uncertainty about domestic demand for a good and about foreign supply. If the uncertainty in the demand and supply functions is multiplicative then the policy which maximises domestic expected surplus is a fixed schedule of tariffs depending only on world price. Under additive uncertainty the ranking of ad valorem tariffs and quotas depends systematically on the targeted expected revenue and the degree of uncertainty in demand and in world price but a specific tariff is superior to both these policies.     

Welfare and quality improvement in an international market

This paper analyzes the optimal uniform and discriminatory quality requirements under Cournot competition when two firms produce high-quality and low-quality products, respectively, in an international market. The quality requirements in our paper are not set for the foreign firm but are set to regulate products of different qualities, since in the real world a domestic firm could be a high- or low-quality producer. We find that whether the government should raise the quality requirements depends on the type of competition in which firms engage and the adopted quality requirements. By and large, the government should always set quality requirements raising both firms’ quality directly or indirectly, regardless of the quality of the product of the domestic firm. However, if the domestic firm is a high-quality producer, the government should set a quality requirement that enables the domestic firm to monopolize the market when a discriminatory quality requirement is adopted, and should not set any quality requirement when a uniform quality requirement is adopted. Moreover, we show that the quality requirement can actually improve global welfare in most cases.