Private equity portfolio company performance during the global recession

We assess the recent economic and financial performance of U.K. private equity (PE) backed buyouts. Our empirical evidence, which is based on thousands of transactions, reveals that PE-backed buyouts achieved superior economic and financial performance in the period before and during the recent global recession, relative to comparable firms that did not experience such transactions. Our regression results imply positive differentials of 5–15% in productivity and approximately 3–5% in profitability for buyout firms, relative to non-buyout firms. Another key finding is that revenue and employment growth for PE- backed firms were positive during the sample period.     

What drives leverage in leveraged buyouts? An analysis of European leveraged buyouts’ capital structure

This paper examines leverage in European private equity‐led leveraged buyouts (LBOs). We use a unique, self‐constructed sample of 126 European private equity (PE)‐sponsored buyouts completed between June 2000 and June 2007. We find that determinants derived from classical capital structure theories do not explain leverage in LBOs, while they do drive leverage in a control group of comparable public firms. Rather, we document that leverage levels in LBOs are related to the prevailing conditions in the debt market. In addition, our results indicate that reputed private equity sponsors use more debt and that secondary buyouts have higher leverage levels.     

Secondary buyouts: Why buy and at what price?

This paper studies the economic logic and pricing of secondary buyouts, a form of leveraged buyout that has become increasingly popular. I investigate three potential explanations for secondary buyouts: efficiency gains, liquidity-based market timing, and collusion. The results are most consistent with the liquidity-based market timing hypothesis. Specifically, firms are more likely to exit through secondary buyouts when: the equity market is “cold”, the debt market condition is favorable, and the sellers face a high demand for liquidity. While this hypothesis shows a constrained optimal strategy for private equity firms, I do not find any strong efficiency gains for the target firms. Further, my analyses on pricing show that secondary buyouts are priced higher than first-time buyouts due to favorable debt market conditions. Overall, the results are consistent with the notion that secondary buyouts serve no purpose aside from alleviating the financial needs of private equity firms.     

Drivers of holding period firm-level returns in private equity-backed buyouts

We extend the research on the drivers of holding period firm-level returns in private equity (PE)-backed buyouts by examining deal-, industry-, and macroeconomic-level drivers and their interaction. To conduct our study, we use a comprehensive and hand-collected dataset covering exited buyouts in the UK between 1995–2004, and we control for sample selection and investment risk. Our study shows that governance variables generally have a limited role in driving value creation but that use of a ratchet is positively related to both equity and enterprise value returns; we also find that leverage has a positive impact on median and top-quartile equity returns. Moreover, returns are driven by the size of the buyout and the acquisitions made during the holding period. With respect to macroeconomic and industry level factors, industry growth particularly drives buyout returns. However, the effect of industry growth is not uniform; its influence is particularly strong in insider-driven and divisional buyouts, in addition to top-quartile transactions.     

Private Equity and Portfolio Companies: Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis

Critics of private equity have warned that the high leverage often used in PE‐backed companies could contribute to the fragility of the financial system during economic crises. The proliferation of poorly structured transactions during booms could increase the vulnerability of the economy to downturns. The alternative hypothesis is that PE, with its operating capabilities, expertise in financial restructuring, and massive capital raised but not invested (“dry powder”), could increase the resilience of PE‐backed companies. In their study of PE‐backed buyouts in the U.K.—which requires and thereby makes accessible more information about private companies than, say, in the U.S.—the authors report finding that, during the 2008 global financial crisis, PE‐backed companies decreased their overall investments significantly less than comparable, non‐PE firms. Moreover, such PE‐backed firms also experienced greater equity and debt inflows, higher asset growth, and increased market share. These effects were especially notable among smaller, riskier PE‐backed firms with less access to capital, and also for those firms backed by PE firms with more dry powder at the crisis onset. In a survey of the partners and staff of some 750 PE firms, the authors also present compelling evidence that PEs firms play active financial and operating roles in preserving or restoring the profitability and value of their portfolio companies.     

Leveraged Buyouts in the U.K. and Continental Europe: Retrospect and Prospect

The markets for management buyouts in the U.K. and continental Europe have experienced dramatic growth in the past ten years. In the U.K., buyouts accounted for half of the total M&A activity (measured by value) in 2005. And as in the U.S. during the‘80s, the greatest number of U.K. buyouts in recent years have been management‐ and investor‐led acquisitions of divisions of large corporations. In continental Europe, by contrast, the largest fraction of deals has involved the purchase of family‐owned private businesses. But in recent years, increased pressure for shareholder value in countries like France, Netherlands, and even Germany has led to a growing number of buyouts of divisions of listed companies. Like the U.K., continental Europe has also seen a small but growing number of purchases of entire public companies (known as private‐to‐public transactions, or PTPs), including the largest ever buyout in Europe, the €13 billion purchase this year of the Danish corporation TDC. In view of the record levels of capital raised by European private equity funds in recent years‐which, until 2005, exceeded the amounts invested in any given year‐we can expect more growth in private equity investment in the near future. In continental Europe, the prospects for buyouts remain especially strong, given both the pressure from investors to restructure larger corporations and the possibilities for adding value in family‐owned firms. But, as the authors note, today's private equity firms face a number of challenges in earning adequate returns for their investors. One is increased competition. In addition to the increased activity of U.S. private equity firms, local private equity investors are also facing competition from hedge funds and new entrants such as government‐sponsored operators, family offices, and wealthy entrepreneurs. Another major challenge is finding value‐preserving exit vehicles. Although an IPO is an option for the largest buyouts with growth prospects, most buyout investments are harvested either through sales to other companies or, increasingly, other private equity firms. The latter transactions, known as “secondary” buyouts, now account for a significant share of new funds invested by private equity firms across Europe.     

The Case for Secondary Buyouts as Exit Channel

Do private equity firms have a clear pecking order when deciding on exit channels for their portfolio companies? Are secondary buyouts—that is, sales to other PE firms—always an exit of last resort? And are there company‐ or market‐related factors that have a clear and predictable influence on decisions to pursue secondary buyouts? Using a proprietary dataset of over 1,100 leveraged buyouts that exited in North America or Europe between 1995 and 2008, the authors attempt to answer these questions by analyzing the returns associated with public, private, and secondary (or “financial”) exits. Based on their analysis of the realized returns, there is no clear pecking order of exit types. Secondary buyouts deliver rates of return that are the equal of those achieved through public exits. In addition, the authors assess the relationship between the likelihood of choosing a financial exit and certain company‐related as well as market‐related factors. Portfolio companies with greater debt capacity are more likely to be sold in secondary buyouts. Furthermore, increases in both the liquidity of debt markets and the amount of undrawn capital commitments to the private equity industry increase the probability of exit through secondary buyouts.     

Why do firms issue private equity repeatedly? On the motives and information content of multiple PIPE offerings

This study examines why private equity issues tend to be a repeated source of financing for public firms. We test the recent operational needs theory of public equity issuance within the context of repeated private equity issues. We find that repeated PIPE issuers burn through cash quickly and do not reach the standards of information transparency or profitability needed for a successful public equity offering. This has implications for investor composition and the market response to a PIPE. Initial PIPE offerings are characterized by substantial diversity in investor type. In successive transactions firms increasingly rely upon hedge funds, who extract greater price discounts and more often require cash flow rights as opposed to control rights. As firms select a path of repeated PIPEs to raise funds, successive issues become uninformative to the market. We conclude that, for small public firms, the same motive underlies public equity offerings and repeated private equity offerings—an acute need for cash.     

Club deals in leveraged buyouts

We analyze the pricing and characteristics of club deal leveraged buyouts (LBOs)—those in which two or more private equity partnerships jointly conduct an LBO. Using a comprehensive sample of completed LBOs of U.S. publicly traded targets conducted by prominent private equity firms, we find that target shareholders receive approximately 10% less of pre-bid firm equity value, or roughly 40% lower premiums, in club deals compared to sole-sponsored LBOs. This result is concentrated before 2006 and in target firms with low institutional ownership. These results are robust to controls for target and deal characteristics, including size, Q, measures of risk, and time and industry fixed effects. We find little support for benign motivations for club deals based on capital constraints, diversification motives, or the ability of clubs to obtain favorable debt amounts or prices, but it is possible that the lower pricing of club deals is an inadvertent byproduct of an unobserved benign motivation for club formation.     

Institutional influence on syndicate structure and cross‐border leveraged buyouts

We explore the extent to which differences in countries’ formal and informal institutions reduce cross‐border leveraged buyout transactions and the potential influence these same institutions have on how private equity (PE) investors choose to enter these transactions. Although institutional differences have frequently been viewed as barriers to cross‐border investment, we find evidence that these same differences may motivate a PE firm's decision to enter the transaction with a syndicate of firms rather than undertaking the transaction on their own. Cultural differences between a PE firm and the target nation are significantly related to the choice to enter the deal via a multinational syndicate. The varying nationalities within the syndicate contribute to enhanced familiarity, with average institutional distances between the syndicate and target firms being significantly lower than for single‐PE‐led deals. Overall, deals undertaken by syndicates are more likely to be successfully completed and require less time in negotiation. These results persist even after accounting for selection bias with regard to target country choice. We explore whether other features of the syndicate are responsible for improved deal outcomes, such as repeated transactions with the same partners, but find no evidence that this is the case.     

Playing to their strengths? Evidence that specialization in the private equity industry confers competitive advantage

The paper examines whether private equity (PE)-backed buyouts have higher post-buyout operating profitability than comparable companies as a result of the alleged superior governance mechanism of private equity (“The Jensen hypothesis”) and whether relative investment specialisation by industry or stage provides the PE firm with a competitive advantage over its peers (“The advantages-to-specialization hypotheses”). A sample of 122 UK buyouts over the period 1995–2002 and a matched sample of non-PE-backed UK companies are constructed to test the three hypotheses. We find that over the first 3 post-buyout years (i) operating profitability of PE-backed companies is greater than those of comparable companies by 4.5%, consistently with the Jensen hypothesis; (ii) industry specialization of PE firms adds 8.5% to this premium, consistently with the industry-specialization hypothesis; (iii) stage (buyout) specialization does not impact profitability but may provide a spur to growth, inconsistently with the stage-specialization hypothesis. Finally, initial profitability of the PE-backed company plays a major role in post-buyout profitability, suggesting that skill in investment selection and financial engineering techniques may be more important than managerial incentives in generating higher PE company performance.     

The risk appetite of private equity sponsors

Using a unique proprietary data set of 460 realized buyouts completed between 1990 and 2005, we examine the risk appetite of private equity (PE) sponsors in different states of the PE market and analyze key determinants of deal-level equity risk. We develop a new approach to mathematically model PE investment equity risk based on the Black-Cox default model. We find higher equity volatilities during boom periods. Further, deals conducted by more reputed PE sponsors have lower equity volatilities as they are unwilling to imperil their reputation by taking excessive risks. In addition, we find that PE sponsors' risk appetite is negatively related to the ownership stake in the buyout target company.     

Politically Connected Private Equity and Employment

We investigate the employment consequences of private equity buyouts. We find evidence of higher job creation, on average, at the establishments operated by targets of politically connected private equity firms than at those operated by targets of nonconnected private equity firms. Consistent with an exchange of favors story, establishments operated by targets of politically connected private equity firms increase employment more during election years and in states with high levels of corruption. In additional analyses, we provide evidence of specific benefits experienced by target firms from their political connections. Our results are robust to tests designed to mitigate selection concerns.     

Morgan Stanley Roundtable on The State of Global Private Equity

In this discussion led by Alan Jones, Morgan Stanley's head of Global Private Equity, the University of Chicago's Steve Kaplan begins by surveying 25 years of academic research on private equity. Starting with Kaplan's own Ph.D. dissertation on leveraged buyouts during the 1980s, finance academics have provided a large and growing body of studies documenting the ability of private equity firms to make “sustainable” (that is, maintained over a three‐ or four‐year period) improvements in the operating performance of their portfolio companies, whether operating abroad or in the U.S. Even more impressive, the findings of Kaplan's new study (with Tim Jenkinson of Oxford and Bob Harris of the University of Virginia) suggest that these improvements have been large enough to enable PE funds raised between 1990 and 2008 to deliver returns to their limited partners that have averaged 300 to 400 basis points higher per year than the returns to the S&P 500. And given the “persistence” of PE fund returns—the tendency of the funds of the same PE firms to show up in the top quartile of performers year after year—that Kaplan has documented in earlier work, the performance of private equity seems notably different from that of mutual funds and hedge funds, where there has been little if any consistency in the returns provided by the top performers. Following Kaplan's overview of the research, four representatives of today's leading private equity firms explore questions like the following:

• ? How do the best PE firms, after paying premiums to acquire their portfolio companies and collecting large management fees, provide such consistently high returns to their limited partners?
• ? How did PE portfolio companies perform during the last recession, when many popular business publications were predicting the death of private equity—and what, if anything, does that tell us about how private equity adds value?
• ? What can PE firms do to avoid, or at least limit the damage from, the overpricing and overleveraging that tend to occur near the end of the boom‐and‐bust cycle that appears to be a permanent feature of private equity?

As Jones notes in his opening comments, the practitioners' answers to such questions “should help investors distinguish between the alpha that the firms represented at this table have generated through active management from the ‘closet beta’ that critics say results when private equity firms simply create what amounts to a levered bet on the public equity markets.”     

IPO or SBO?: The Increasing Importance of Operational Performance for Private Equity Exits Following the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–08

The authors report the findings of their recent study of the role of portfolio company operating performance in determining the choice of exit options by private equity firms between initial public offerings (IPOs) and secondary buyouts (SBOs), and how that role may have changed since the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2008. Virtually all studies of PE exits in all countries have found that portfolio companies that exit through IPOs tend to be larger and have higher operating returns than companies that exit through SBOs or sales to other companies. After examining the exits of PE portfolio companies based in Denmark and Sweden during the period 2003–2013, the authors report that, although general market conditions continue to be a major factor, operating performance and size have become even more important requirements for IPO exits since the crisis. And thus PE firms that fail to make operating improvements in their portfolio companies are likely to find their exit options limited.     

Secondary Buyouts: Operating Performance and Investment Determinants

Secondary buyouts (SBOs) now represent over 60% of the overall buyout activity. In this paper, I investigate the possible determinants of such spectacular growth. I find that first round buyers generate a large and significant abnormal improvement in operating performance. In contrast, SBO operating growth is not different from that of its peer group. Returns to secondary private equity (PE) investors are positive, but significantly lower than those of first round buyers. I examine several alternative drivers of SBOs and find that favorable credit market conditions and PE reputation drive secondary investment volume.     

Do Private Equity Funds Increase Firm Value? Evidence from Japanese Leveraged Buyouts

The author summarizes the findings of his recent study of 62 buyouts of listed Japanese companies by both Japanese and “foreign” private equity funds that were transacted between 2000 and 2007. Roughly half of the author's sample of transactions were accomplished by means of takeover bids by PE funds, and such deals were transacted at prices that represented a premium (of roughly 12%) to current market values. Most of the other PE transactions were privately negotiated deals in which the purchase prices involved discounts (of about 15% on average) to current value. For both sets of deals, however, the announcements of such buyouts were associated, on average, with a significantly positive stock market reaction. By the cutoff date of the study (May 2010), 30 of the 62 acquired firms had realized “exits.” Those companies (though not the others) experienced significant average improvements in operating performance; and the extent of such improvements were roughly consistent with the size of the positive market reaction to the buyout announcements. The test results suggest that the value increases can be attributed to the more efficient use of assets and reduction of operating costs. Meanwhile, there was no evidence suggesting that the acquired firms cut back on their research and development, capital investments, or employee wages and growth. What's more, examination of the operating performance of the 30 companies after their exits showed no deterioration in profitability or investment spending.     

Buyout Transactions in the German‐speaking Region: Determinants of Abnormal Performance and Unlevered Returns

This is one of the first comprehensive studies of drivers of private equity performance in the German‐speaking region known as the DACH, made up of Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. It contributes three things to private equity research: First, it explains how operational value drivers affect operational performance (operational alpha) and unlevered rates of return. Second, it whether the same relationships hold across different kinds of private equity business models (those with either organic or inorganic growth strategies; or whether PE investments are small‐cap or mid‐to‐large‐cap). Third, it distinguished between the periods before and after the global financial crisis of 2008. The authors found that (1) annualised benchmark‐adjusted EBITDA margin growth (i.e. improvement in EBITDA margin) is the most significant determinant in abnormal operational performance and unlevered returns, regardless of the business model; (2) private equity firms executing a buy‐and‐build strategy generate lower unlevered returns than those executing an organic growth strategy when the benchmark company is clearly outperformed, most likely because of limited PE managerial resources; (3) mid‐to‐large‐cap private equity firms generate higher unlevered returns and operational alphas than small‐cap private equity firms when the benchmark company is clearly outperformed, because, we believe, larger companies have a higher fixed cost leverage than smaller ones; and we have found that (4) buyout transactions exited during or after the financial crisis yield higher operational alphas but lower unlevered returns compared to buyout transactions exited before the crisis, when the portfolio company underperforms its benchmark company.     

Value creation and pricing in buyouts: Empirical evidence from Europe and North America

Using a unique proprietary data set of 1980 realized and unrealized buyouts completed between 1986 and 2010, we examine entry and exit pricing in buyouts and its influence on private equity (PE) sponsors' returns. We find that besides leverage and operational improvements, EBITDA multiple expansion (i.e. the difference between entry and exit pricing) is a fundamental factor in explaining equity returns and the result of skill rather than pure luck. We also provide evidence that more experienced PE sponsors use more debt to finance a PE transaction and debt is positively related to entry buyout pricing. However, for a transaction with a given leverage level, more experienced PE sponsors are able to negotiate lower prices. In addition, our results show that deals conducted by first time funds which are realized in a later stage of a fund's life cycle are associated with lower exit prices which can be explained by the increased exit pressure for the PE sponsor.     

What determines the exit decision for leveraged buyouts?

How and when to exit portfolio company investments are critical choices facing private equity funds. In this paper we analyze 1022 European private equity exits, using information on fund and portfolio company characteristics, and on conditions in capital markets. For over 43% of the exits, private equity funds sold to each other and we analyze why such secondary buyouts have gained in popularity relative to IPOs and sales to corporate acquirers. We find that the exit route depends on various portfolio company characteristics, and that conditions in the debt and equity markets have a strong influence on exit choice. The existing literature has tended to portray the IPO is the “preferred” exit route. However, our analysis suggests this is mistaken: private equity funds take advantage of ‘windows of opportunity’, and the exit route that maximizes value varies with market conditions.