Sources of real exchange rate movements in Saudi Arabia

The paper investigates the sources of real exchange rate movements in Saudi Arabia by decomposing real exchange rate movements into those attributable to real and nominal shocks. Using a popular structural VAR model and assuming long-run neutrality of nominal shocks, we find that real shocks play a significant role in explaining real exchange rate movements in Saudi Arabia. Using a more disaggregated model, we also find that oil production shocks rather than real oil price shocks are responsible for real exchange rate movements. In order to stabilize the real exchange rate, Saudi Arabia should focus on stabilizing oil production.(JEL F3, C5)     

OPEC and political considerations when deciding on oil extraction

Two oil price shocks changed the pattern of cheap oil. The first was the Arab embargo on oil exports in 1973. Oil prices rose five fold. In 1978, the second was the fall of Shah Iran. Prices soared to $80–$100 a barrel in today’s prices. In 1960, OPEC was established and since then it has been a considerable political and economic force in the oil market. Two thirds of the world’s oil reserves belong to OPEC members. OPEC is accused of being responsible for most of the price increases due to their production cuts and market power. This paper provides a general framework to examine the role of OPEC in affecting oil prices through the extracted quantities. A mathematical model is developed to explore the objective function of OPEC, which includes economic and political considerations. The idea is that OPEC members consider both the political support of their citizens and profits when determining oil extraction rates. This support is represented by a “harm function” which was added to the objective function of OPEC. The solution of the model lends some support for inclusion of this harm function, through which OPEC benefits from the cuts in production aimed at harming the western countries. For this harm function to be meaningful empirically, OPEC members should have a high harm indicator, α_t. With high harm indicator values, OPEC harms itself financially. The results suggest that OPEC appears to be accepting considerable monetary setbacks to appease its citizens’ taste for harming the West. At different discount rates, the monetary losses range from about 10–20%. Solving the mathematical model required estimation of the residual demand that OPEC faces plus the cost function that applies to OPEC production. This paper reports the results of these estimations.     

Co-movement of oil and stock prices in the GCC region: A wavelet analysis

This paper examines the short term and long term dependencies between stock market returns and OPEC basket oil returns for the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) and two non-oil producing countries in the region (Egypt and Jordan), over the period 2002–2011. We utilize the wavelet coherency methodology in our empirical analyses. The empirical evidence indicates lack of market dependencies in the short term in these countries, indicating that oil and stock returns are not strongly linked in this interval. However, we show that oil returns and the stock markets returns co-move over the long term. The results also suggest that the long term dependencies are much stronger for OPEC oil returns and Jordan stock market returns relative to OPEC oil returns and Egypt stock market returns, implying a variation in the dependencies between oil prices and stock markets across countries. We further note an increasing strength in the market dependencies after 2007, signifying enhanced diversification benefit for investors in the short term relative to the long term.     

WORLD OUTLOOK

The world recovery, now three years old, has proved more resilient than many expected and will be sustained in 1986 by lower oil prices. Fears that the early-1985 slowdown would turn into renewed recession have proved unfounded, as output in both the United States and Europe picked up in the second half of the year. The improvement stemmed from lower interest rates, falling inflation and weak commodity prices and was further helped by the sharp correction to the value of the dollar following September's G5 agreement. To these factors, which will remain supportive this year, is now added a lower oil price. The recovery in world output has not produced an increase in oil demand and, as the oil price rise of 1979-80 gave a further boost to supply from non-OPEC sources, a severe imbalance has emerged in the oil market. To maintain a £26 marker price (itself cut from £29 last July) has required a cutback in production of ever-increasing magnitude from Saudi Arabia in its role as OPEC's swing producer. Now that Saudi Arabia has abandoned this role in favour of stabilising its market share, oil prices have fallen sharply. We assume that the oil price will fall to £20 by the end of this year, a fall in real terms of 30 per cent. As a result the world recovery is given renewed impetus and output accelerates over the next twelve months. A cyclical peak in activity emerges in 1987, after which output growth settles at 2%-3 per cent and inflation at 4–5 per cent.     

Coping with oil price shocks - the case of Japan

The world economy has now suffered two major oil price shocks. Although the percentage increase in 1973-74 (OPEC I) was much larger than in 1979-80 (OPEC II). the potential effect on the level of world prices - and hence on the real economy - was about the same in each case. One lesson that was learned from OPEC I was that the impact of the oil price increase on individual economies depended on the policies followed by each country. For example, in the UK the inflation rate rose to 27 per cent in 1975 whereas in West Germany - which was just as dependent on imported oil - inflation rose to 7 per cent. In this Economic Viewpoint we consider the example of one country - Japan - which changed its policies between the two events. As a result it changed from being one of the least successful to being one of the most successful in coping with the oil price increase.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

Output has stagnated in the main industrialised countries this year but we expect the benefits of lower oil prices to show up in rapid growth from now on. The present weakness in the world economy stems from tighter US fiscal policy and the oil price shock itself. These have combined to reduce domestic demand in the United States, and hence to cut the market for Japanese exports in particular, and also to reduce expenditure by energydependent countries and companies. A further factor is that, with prices of oil-based products falling, there is an incentive to delay expenditure. We expect this impact effect of OPEC III to be short-lived and to give way to its positive effects in the second half of this year. Specifically, we expect consumer spending to lead the recovery as real incomes will be boosted by the terms of trade gain from lower oil prices - equivalent to 3 per cent of GNP in the OECD area as a whole. On the basis of oil prices holding at $15. we forecast OECD output growth of 3 per cent this year, rising to 41/2 per cent in 1987. Additionally, we expect lower oil prices to produce a significant reduction in world inflation. Zero growth of producer prices is forecast on average this year arid consumer price inflation is expected to fall to wards 2 per cent in the course of the year.     

The Effects of Industry Governance on Offshore Oil Development in the Gulf of Mexico

This article presents an historical analysis of the way governance arrangements in the petroleum industry have affected development of offshore oil resources in the Gulf of Mexico. Global competition over differential rents and natural value available from petroleum extraction were instrumental in the construction of oil prices high enough to support profitable investment offshore. Attention to the social construction of oil prices illustrates how political discourse on national security and conservation helps translate economic logic into strategic political coalitions and state action. The article shows how the unequal flow of resources in a global extractive industry, as organized by transnational corporations and states, interacts with marginal costs and differential rents to influence economic development. Development of Louisiana offshore oil after the second world war was protected by a private international price cartel, federally enforced import quotas and tax laws. Competition in the industry and the OPEC price increases of the 1970s undermined US domination of world oil, but higher oil prices further stimulated investment offshore. The subsequent breakdown of stable governance in the 1980s drove down oil prices, hastened restructuring of the petroleum industry and caused a rapid decline in Louisiana offshore investment.     

The macro-financial factors behind the crisis: Global liquidity glut or global savings glut?

It has been argued that the global financial crisis 2007–2009 was intrinsically related to two largely unprecedented phenomena in the global economy: (i) exceptionally benign financial market conditions as mirrored in historically low risk premia and buoyant asset price developments as well as (ii) an unprecedented widening of external imbalances. This paper explores to what extent these global trends can be understood as a reaction to three structural shocks to the macro-financial environment of the global economy: (i) monetary shocks (“excess liquidity” hypothesis), (ii) preference shocks (“savings glut” hypothesis), and (iii) investment shocks (“investment drought” hypothesis). In order to uniquely identify these shocks in an integrated framework, we estimate structural VARs for the two main regions with widening imbalances, the United States and emerging Asia, using sign restrictions that are compatible with standard New Keynesian and Real Business Cycle models. Our results show that (US) monetary policy shocks explain the largest part of the variation in imbalances and financial market prices. We find that savings shocks and investment shocks explain less of the variation. Hence, a “liquidity glut” may have been a more important driver of real and financial imbalances in the US and emerging Asia that ultimately triggered the global financial crisis.     

Oil prices,stock returns,and exchange rates: Empirical evidence from China and the United States

Employing the diagonal BEKK model as well as the dynamic impulse response functions, this study investigates the time-varying trilateral relationships among real oil prices, exchange rate changes, and stock market returns in China and the U.S. from February 1991 to December 2015. We highlight several key observations: (i) oil prices respond positively and significantly to aggregate demand shocks; (ii) positive oil supply shocks adversely and significantly affect the Chinese stock market; (iii) oil price shocks persistently and significantly impact the trade-weighted US dollar index negatively; (iv) the US and China stock markets correlate positively just as the dollar index and the exchange rate does; (v) a significant parallel inverse relation exists between the US stock market and the dollar and between the China stock market and the exchange rate; and (vi) the Chinese stock market is more volatile and responsive to aggregate demand and oil price shocks than the US stock market in recent years.     

Macroeconomic responses of emerging market economies to oil price shocks: An analysis by region and resource profile

We analyze the impact of oil price shocks on the macroeconomic fundamentals in emerging economies in three regions that have different resource endowments. The existing literature on emerging economies remains inconclusive on how regional factors and resource characteristics affect the response of macroeconomic variables to oil price shocks. We show that (1) exports in Europe and Central Asia are driven by oil more than East Asia and the Pacific and that (2) policy makers in East Asia and the Pacific should be concerned about real exchange appreciation following a positive oil shock to mitigate losses in the non-oil export market. Analysis by resource endowment further reveals that, in less-resource-intensive economies, an oil price shock causes large variations in consumption and has a negative and persistent impact on the real gross domestic product (GDP). In mineral-exporting economies, real GDP and interest rates are driven largely by oil price shocks. The response of real GDP in mineral-exporting economies is short lived. In oil-exporting economies, only real GDP has a large variation in response to oil price shocks. Our findings highlight the need for customized policy responses to oil price shocks, depending on resource endowments, as we show that a “one size fits all" policy does not exist.     

Commodity house prices

This paper studies how commodity price movements have affected the local house prices in commodity-dependent economies, Australia and New Zealand. We build a geographically hierarchical empirical model and find that the commodity prices influence local house prices directly and also indirectly through macroeconomic variables. The impacts of commodity price changes are analogous to “income shocks” rather than “cost shocks”. Regional heterogeneity is also observed in terms of differential dynamic responses of local house prices to energy versus non-energy commodity price movements. The results are robust to alternative approaches. Directions for future research are also discussed.     

LOWER OIL PRICES AND THE UK ECONOMY

Demand for oil remains weak, and OPEC production is running ahead of quota in most member countries, so the possibility that oil prices could fall in the near future has increased. In this Forecast Release we examine the medium-term impact on the UK economy of lower oil prices. We find that, if the government does not intervene to protect the exchange rate, there is an immediate stimulus to output growth. The inflation rate, though, is 1–2 percentage points higher after three years.     

WORLD OUTLOOK

After six years of steadily rising OECD output, fears of a significant rise in world inflation are now increasing. In the last year there has been a slight pick-up in inflation with producer prices up nearly d per cent. But prompt action by the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates before the presidential election appears to have damped inflationary expectations in the US and has given Japan and Germany an opportunity to tighten monetary policy without causing major currency fluctuations. It is also apparent that the other possible source of world inflation, commodity prices, is not a problem. OPEC over-production has ensured that the oil price remains weak and other commodity prices appear to have stopped rising after a brief acceleration at the beginning of the year. Nevertheless the major imbalances in world trade are declining only slowly and without a change in fiscal policy in the major economies it is difficult to believe that minor changes in monetary policy will be sufficient if the process of adjustment begins to falter. Despite these risks, we take a sanguine view of world prospects. Tighter monetary policy should effect a slowdown in world growth next year (already indicated by recent developments, particularly in the US) and this should be sufficient to control inflation which we expect to peak at just under 5 per cent at the beginning of next year. From 1990 onwards we see steady growth accompanied by low inflation.     

The shale oil revolution and the global oil supply curve

We focus on the implications of the shale oil boom for the global supply of oil. In order to derive testable implications, we introduce a simple stylized model with two producers, one facing low production costs and one higher production costs but potentially lower adjustment costs, competing à la Stackelberg. We find that the supply function is flatter for the high cost producer and that the supply function for shale oil producers becomes more responsive to demand shocks when adjustment costs decline. On the empirical side, we apply an instrumental variable approach using estimates of demand-driven oil price changes derived from a standard structural VAR of the oil market. A main finding is that global oil supply is rather vertical, with a short-term elasticity around 0.05. A rolling sample reveals that the shale oil boom does not appear to have fundamentally changed the contours of global oil production, but there is evidence for the oil supply curve to become more vertical in Saudi Arabia and more price responsive in the United States.     

Oil price shocks and credit spread: Structural effect and dynamic spillover

This study analyzes the heterogeneous response of U.S. credit spread to global oil price shocks by building an extended structural vector autoregressive model (SVAR), which can distinguish among the U.S. and non-US oil supply shocks, aggregated demand shocks and oil market-specific demand shocks behind the real oil prices. Meanwhile, a spillover index model developed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) (hereafter D.Y. (2012)) is used to estimate the link between oil price shocks and the U.S. credit spread over time. The results show that (i) the credit spread does not respond to global oil supply shocks and non-US oil supply shocks, but has a negative reaction to the U.S. oil supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks, and oil-market-specific demand shocks. (ii) There exists a close connectedness between oil price shocks and the U.S. credit spread, and the link fluctuates cyclically and relates to the economic cycle and the U.S. shale oil revolution. (iii) The spillover from different oil price shocks to the U.S. credit spread shows significant heterogeneity over time. Our findings suggest that policymakers and investors can better track the U.S. credit spread changes using oil price information.     

Price and interest rate dynamics induced by multiperiod contracts

This paper suggests a mechanism by which nominal price rigidities can create a transmission mechanism for monetary shocks through relative price distortions in an economy with both spot and contract markets. The globally unique equilibrium time path of interest rates and prices following an impulse shock to the money supply is characterized. The model predicts that prices and interest rates cycle around the new steady state, with real interest rates initially falling and prices overshooting in the case of a positive shock. The volatility of spot prices and interest rates exceeds that of contract prices.     

Speculation in the Oil Market

The run‐up in oil prices since 2004 coincided with growing investment in commodity markets and increased price co‐movement among different commodities. We assess whether speculation in the oil market played a role in driving this salient empirical pattern. We identify oil shocks from a large dataset using a dynamic factor model. This method is motivated by the fact that a small‐scale vector autoregression is not informationally sufficient to identify the shocks. The main results are as follows. (i) While global demand shocks account for the largest share of oil price fluctuations, speculative shocks are the second most important driver. (ii) The increase in oil prices over the last decade is mainly driven by the strength of global demand. However, speculation played a significant role in the oil price increase between 2004 and 2008 and its subsequent collapse. (iii) The co‐movement between oil prices and the prices of other commodities is mainly explained by global demand shocks. Our results support the view that the recent oil price increase is mainly driven by the strength of global demand but that the financialization process of commodity markets also played a role. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Adjusting to the Oil Price Fall

In his Budget speech last March Mr. Lawson said “If we can survive unscathed the loss of half our North Sea oil revenues in less than 25 weeks, then the prospective loss of the other half over the remainder of the next 25 years should not cause us undue concern.” In this Viewpoint we ask whether Mr. Lawson's optimism was premature. Although we continue to believe that the fall in oil prices will have favourable effects on the UK economy, there will be problems of adjustment which could be painful. We ask the following questions: (a) What adjustment to the balance of payments is needed to compensate for the fall in oil prices? (b) How will the adjustment occur? (c) How far can the recent weakness of sterling be explained by the fall in oil prices, or is there a more alarming explanation?     

Factors attracting online consumers to choose e-Malls for e-procurement in Saudi Arabia

ABSTRACT

A large segment of consumers prefer e-procurement because it provides several advantages such as a variety of options and lower prices. The business-to-consumer approach is spreading on a global scale, but its role is limited in countries such as Saudi Arabia due to the size and strength of the economy. Saudi Arabia has the fourth highest level of economic growth in the Middle East and ranks 38th globally in terms of Internet infrastructure. Its rate of Internet growth is 12% yearly, and 40% of the population has access to the Internet. The volume of online trade in Saudi Arabia was USD 800 million in 2012, and 56% of this amount was for purchases through foreign websites.The end consumers are one of the most important target segments of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which constitute 90% of Saudi Arabian companies. These companies face limitations in establishing e-procurement channels because these channels require financial support beyond their funding capabilities. Therefore, one of the best low-cost solutions is the adoption of e-Malls, which provide various benefits to consumers and are a suitable environment for SMEs to present and sell their products. The e-Mall is a modern idea in Saudi Arabia; thus, it could be beneficial to adopt the diffusion of an innovative approach to the spread of e-Malls. This article focuses on determining the requirements and obstacles facing consumers who make purchases through e-Malls. A quantitative survey was conducted on a random sample of 381 residents of all ages in Saudi Arabia who had made online purchases. The main factors influencing the adoption of e-Malls were organisational, technical and cultural elements.     

Spillovers and directional predictability between international energy commodities and their implications for optimal portfolio and hedging

This study sheds a new light on the dependence and the directional predictability between eight major energy price returns, using the Cross-Quantilogram (CQ) and the Partial CQ (PCQ) analysis. The energy prices cover the time series for the U.S. natural gas and seven internationally traded crude oil types. The results reveal a significant directional predictability running from most of energy commodities returns to the OPEC basket and the very light Tapis crude oil returns. However, the quantile predictability in both directions is enabled only for the relations between the light Brent and the light WTI, and between the OPEC basket and the Malaysian Tapis. The time-varying predictability analysis reveals that there is a significant upper quantile dependence between these international energy commodities. Finally, we find that the TAPIS can be a good hedging vehicle for other energy markets. These findings may be instructive for both policymakers (in terms of financial stability) and market participants (in terms of performance).