Innovations in financing: The impact of anchor investors in Indian IPOs

In 2009, the Securities Exchange Board of India allowed qualified institutional investors to anchor initial public offerings (IPOs) by participating in the issue at a price and allocation publicly disclosed preceding the issue. We study anchor investors (AIs) in Indian IPOs during 2009–2017. We find the share allotment and the number of AIs separately have significant impacts on valuation and underpricing; however, the net effect is nonsignificant. Further, AIs significantly influence other institutional investors' participation in the IPO and induce lower aftermarket volatility. Overall, our evidence suggests that AIs boost demand for and mitigate ex ante information uncertainty of IPOs.     

The strategic reallocation of IPO shares

In this work, we study the reallocation of shares to retail and institutional investors, measured as the difference between the allocation declared before the initial public offering (IPO) and the effective allotment decided by the underwriter after the bookbuilding process. The reallocation is disaggregated into three components, two of which are under the direct control of the underwriter: the initial allocation, and the demand satisfaction ratio. The empirical analysis is based on a sample of 193 hybrid IPOs issued in Italy between 1997 and 2012. Controlling for firm and IPO characteristics, we find that the IPO shares are typically shifted toward institutional investors when positive information is collected during the bookbuilding process. The IPO pricing and share reallocation are found to be interdependent, and reallocation is used in combination with partial adjustment to reward institutional investors.     

A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and Allocations

We review the theory and evidence on IPO activity: why firms go public, why they reward first–day investors with considerable underpricing, and how IPOs perform in the long run. Our perspective is threefold: First, we believe that many IPO phenomena are not stationary. Second, we believe research into share allocation issues is the most promising area of research in IPOs at the moment. Third, we argue that asymmetric information is not the primary driver of many IPO phenomena. Instead, we believe future progress in the literature will come from nonrational and agency conflict explanations. We describe some promising such alternatives.     

IPO price performance and block-trading activities: Evidence from Hong Kong

This research studies whether the trading behavior of IPO block holders is informative to small investors. The results show that IPOs have more block trades initiated by sellers on the first trading day than seasoned stocks do, and the level of block-trading activities is negatively associated with IPOs' long-term performance. This research also examines the impacts of the change in rules for IPO share allocations – which aimed at realizing a more even allocation between large and small investors – on IPO block-trading activities. The findings support the hypothesis that IPO block holders may have superior information on newly-listed companies.     

Auctioned IPOs: The US evidence

Between 1999 and 2007, WR Hambrecht completed 19 initial public offerings (IPOs) in the US using an auction mechanism. We analyze investor behavior and mechanism performance in these auctioned IPOs using detailed bidding data. The existence of some bids posted at high prices suggests that some investors (mostly retail) try to free-ride on the mechanism. But institutional demand in these auctions is very elastic, suggesting that institutional investors reveal information in the bidding process. Investor participation is largely predictable based on deal size, and demand is dominated by institutions. Flipping is at most as prevalent in auctions as in bookbuilt deals. But, unlike in bookbuilding, investors in auctions do not flip their shares more in “hot” deals. Finally, we find that institutional investors, who provide more information, are rewarded by obtaining a larger share of the deals that have higher 10-day underpricing. Our results therefore suggest that auctioned IPOs can be an effective alternative to traditional bookbuilding.     

The Benefit of Excluding Institutional Investors from Fixed-Price IPOs: Evidence from Taiwan

A simple way to mitigate the winner's curse in initial public offerings (IPOs) is to reduce the number of informed investors in IPO markets. In Taiwan, institutional investors are not permitted to subscribe to fixed-price IPOs. Excluding institutional investors raises uninformed investors' allocation rates. We show that the winner's curse is still present in Taiwan's fixed-price IPO markets even without the participation of institutional investors, but that IPO underpricing is reduced by at least 4 percent due to alleviating the winner's curse, as institutional investors are excluded from the fixed-price offerings.     

The world cup in football and the US IPO market

We document that US IPOs that take place during a world cup in football (soccer), compared to IPOs before or after, exhibit 9% lower underpricing and 6% lower price adjustment. IPOs during world cups receive less attention from foreign investors and exhibit significantly higher long-run returns. Our results are robust to excluding the IPO bubble period of 1999 and 2000, including only listings during summer months, controlling for overall market sentiment and market conditions, and to using various matched samples of non-world cup IPOs. Firm characteristics of world cup IPOs are indistinguishable from those of non-world cup IPOs, suggesting that selection is not driving the results. Consistent with prior studies showing that world cups affect market sentiment, we show that this extends to US IPOs, where lower sentiment, driven by foreign investors, leads to reduced investor attention and lower valuations.     

IPO flipping in Australia: cross-sectional explanations

We access electronic share settlement records for each subscriber and aftermarket investor in 419 Australian IPOs to investigate whether initial subscribers flip their allocations, and we relate this flipping behaviour to issuer, shareholder, underwriter and market characteristics. We find that the main determinants are underpricing (consistent with the disposition effect, i.e., a tendency to realise gains before losses), whether the IPO market is “hot” (a proxy for the representativeness heuristic) and ex ante risk characteristics. When flipping is analysed separately for underpriced and overpriced IPOs we find that the most overpriced IPOs are flipped more than the less overpriced ones, a result which contrasts the disposition effect. This result is due to the action of institutional, rather than individual, investors. We also relate flipping activity to the firm's long-run return, and find that the flipping behaviour of large (informed) investors is unrelated to long-run returns, while uninformed investors consistently flip more of the IPOs that have better long-run returns.     

Conversions of mutual savings institutions: Do initial returns from these IPOS provide investors with windfall profits?

We examine initial returns of fully underwritten IPOs of converting thrifts for evidence that managers and depositors of conversion-related offers earn significantly greater returns than investors in IPOs of other financial institutions. Regulators have suggested that new guidelines for conversion from a mutual to a stock thrift are designed to curb “windfall profits” earned by insiders investing in conversion-related IPOs. While there are reports of average initial returns of more than 20% for conversion-related IPOs, our results suggest that investors earn average initial returns of about 7%, which is not significantly different than returns from IPOs of other thrifts and commercial banks.     

Management of the IPO performance in Thailand

This research aims to explore the relationships between six major IPO elements in Thailand: underwriter reputation, ownership concentration, book-building, IPO allocation, the length of the lock up period, and investor interest and underpricing. The sample comprises 153 IPOs listed between 2001 and 2011. Cross-sectional analysis reveals that IPO allocation appears to be the strongest factor with a negative relation to underpricing. The length of the lock up period, issue size, industry, and hot issue market show significant and positive relationships with underpricing. Underwriter reputation is not associated with underpricing as the choice of underwriter is restricted by the Thai regulator's requirements. Book-building does not explain underpricing. Institutional investors play very limited roles in Thai IPOs. A small change in ownership concentration does not affect underpricing. Nevertheless, a longer lock up period can yield a higher initial return. Such a provision can restrain insider dealing.     

Transparency in IPO mechanism: Retail investors’ participation,IPO pricing and returns

Using data from the transparent Indian IPO setting, the paper examines retail investors’ participation, their influence on IPO pricing and the returns they make on IPO investment. The transparency in the mechanism, which allows investors to observe prior investors’ participation, leads to demand which is concentrated at either one or two points of the offer price range. Analysis of investors’ demand during the offer period shows that the participation of retail investors is significantly influenced by the participation of institutional investors. We examine IPO pricing and find that favourable demand by retail investors is positively associated with a high IPO price even after controlling for demand by institutional investors. Further, we find that due to aggressive bidding by overconfident investors, retail investors are, on average, unlikely to make positive allocation weighted initial returns even in a setting where they do not have to compete with institutional investors. Retail investors, however, can earn significant positive allocation weighted initial returns if they limit their participation in IPOs with above average institutional investors’ demand.     

How Much Do REITs Pay for Their IPOs?

Previous studies have documented the reversal in the initial returns of REIT IPOs from overpricing in the 1980s to underpricing in the 1990s. We find that the gross spreads of REIT IPOs decreased significantly in the 1990s. In particular, there is a bimodal clustering for gross spreads at 6.5 and 7.0%. Moreover, in the 1980s around 94% of REIT IPOs had integer offer prices, most of which were priced at either $10 or $20. However, the proportion of integer offer prices decreased to 64% in the 1990s. Higher gross spreads, overpricing, and high frequency of integer offer prices for REIT IPOs in the 1980s are consistent with the marketing hypothesis that in the 1980s REIT IPOs were mainly marketed to less-informed individual investors. Our results explain the dynamic process employed by underwriters in the setting of gross spreads and the pricing of REIT IPOs as a new financial product in response to various structural changes in REITs.     

Allocation to Anchor Investors,Underpricing, and the After‐Market Performance of IPOs

We study bidding by anchor investors in a two‐stage initial public offering (IPO) process and document a negative, causal relation between allocation to anchor investors and underpricing. We find that anchor investors are likely to invest in hard‐to‐place offerings characterized by valuation uncertainty. We also document a positive relation between allocation to reputed anchor investors and returns up to lock‐up expiration. Our evidence provides support for information revelation and targeting specific investors’ theories of book building. Anchor‐backed IPOs earn superior returns mainly due to monitoring. Who bids in an IPO seems to matter just as particular types of bids do.     

Are IPOs Really Underpriced?

While IPOs have been underpriced by more than 10% during thepast two decades, we find that in a sample of more than 2,000IPOs from 1980 to 1997, the median IPO was significantly overvaluedat the offer price relative to valuations based on industrypeer price multiples. This overvaluation ranges from 14% to50% depending on the peer matching criteria. Cross-sectionalregressions show that "overvalued" IPOs provide high first-dayreturns, but low long-run risk-adjusted returns. These overvaluedIPOs have lower profitability, higher accruals, and higher analystgrowth forecasts than "undervalued" IPOs. Ex post, the projectedhigh growth of overvalued IPOs fails to materialize, while theirprofitability declines from pre-IPO levels. These results suggestIPO investors are deceived by optimistic growth forecasts andpay insufficient attention to profitability in valuing IPOs.     

Allocation of shares to foreign and domestic investors: Firm and ownership characteristics in Swedish IPOs

In this article, we analyze underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) and holdings following offerings in Sweden. By exploiting a unique hand-collected data set with information on the ultimate holdings by institutional and individual investors, as well as boards of directors, we find, as most prior studies, that IPOs on average are underpriced. IPOs with low (high) initial return have higher (lower) holdings by individual investors. Institutional investors are, to a greater extent than individual investors, also able to identify underpriced firms.     

Pursuing Value Through Liquidity in IPOs: Underpricing,Share Retention,Lockup, and Trading Volume Relationships

We argue that in an initial public offering (IPO), pre-IPO owners make decisions regarding underpricing, share retention, and share lockup simultaneously and optimally to maximize aftermarket liquidity. We predict that underpricing fosters higher trading volume in both the short run and the long run. Also, liquidity is negatively related to the proportion of shares retained by pre-IPO owners, ceteris paribus, so IPO underpricing should be positively related to the proportion of shares retained, as an offset. We document evidence consistent with these predictions. In addition, we find that, for IPOs with a lockup restriction, underpricing is more substantial and the positive relation between share retention and underpricing is much stronger. We also find that the relationship between underpricing and trading volume is stronger for IPOs with lockup. IPOs with lockup have higher trading volume, and a significant portion of this difference is associated with the effect of underpricing.JEL Classification: G10, G14, G24     

An empirical investigation of whether Australian capital gains tax reforms influence individual investor behaviour

This paper examines whether an asset's qualification for discounted tax treatment is associated with positive abnormal trading volumes and negative abnormal returns, as would be predicted if investors modified their behaviour to reduce their tax liability. Our examination of 152 initial public offerings (IPOs) documents that there is an incremental increase in abnormal trading volume for those IPOs that have experienced a significant increase in price since listing over those IPOs that have increased only marginally. Although we provide only limited evidence to suggest that this increase in trading volume is accompanied by a decrease in returns, this is not unexpected in a market that has anticipated this type of behaviour by the relatively small proportion of individual investors able to benefit from the discounted tax treatment.     

投资银行-机构投资者关系、“捧场”与IPO中的利益问题

投资银行是直接融资过程中最重要的中介机构,作为融资产品的“卖方”代表,其核心竞争力源于它所构建的投资者关系网络,但现有文献对于投行-投资者关系在证券发行中的作用还缺乏系统的实证研究。本文利用机构投资者在中国IPO新股发行中的完整询价记录,基于报价参与和报价水平两个维度提出了一种新的动态关系强度测算方法,并由此细致刻画了投行-机构关系对股票发行、定价的作用机制。结果发现:(1)投行可以驱动关系机构主动认购其承销的IPO新股,并引导关系机构给出与投行估值水平保持一致的高位报价,进而有效缓解了IPO拍卖制下的“投资者参与不确定性问题”。(2)关系机构的捧场报价显著提高了股票发行价格、增加了投行的承销收入;但是当新股交易价格在长期内逐渐向其内在价值水平收敛时,受到关系机构捧场支持越多的IPO新股,其长期回报率相对越低。(3)投行与机构的关系在本质上是互惠的,一旦投行被赋予新股分配权力,它明显倾向于将新股抑价发行带来的巨大利益分配给在前期捧场的关系机构,二者的关系越强,机构报价被认定为“有效报价”的概率越高,而一旦被认定为有效报价,关系机构的新股需求更是将被优先满足。     

Bids and Allocations in European IPO Bookbuilding

This paper uses evidence from a data set of 27 European IPOs to analyze how investors bid and the factors that influence their allocations. We also make use of a unique ranking of investor quality, associated with the likelihood of flipping the IPO. We find that investors perceived to be long‐term holders of the stock are consistently favored in allocation and in out‐turn profits. In contrast to Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) , we find little evidence that more informative bids receive larger allocations or higher profits. Our results cast doubt upon the extent of information production during the bookbuilding period.     

Earnings management in Malaysian IPOs: The East Asian crisis, ownership control, and post-IPO performance

We find evidence of income-increasing earnings management in Malaysian IPOs, which occurs primarily for IPOs during a period of severe economic stress (the East Asian crisis). Within the high-ownership-concentration Malaysian market, post-IPO control concerns also appear to constrain IPO earnings management: owners seem willing to accept reduced IPO proceeds and signaling opportunities to increase the likelihood of retaining control of the company post-IPO. The requirement to provide a profit guarantee does not seem to greatly affect earnings management. IPO companies engaging in aggressive income-increasing earnings management have significantly worse market-based performance than their more conservative counterparts, but again only for IPOs issued during the economic crisis period. Overall, the results suggest that personal liquidity concerns are an important factor in IPO decisions during the economic crisis.