Cognitive abilities and portfolio choice

We study the relation between cognitive abilities and stockholding using the recent Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), which has detailed data on wealth and portfolio composition of individuals aged 50+ in 11 European countries and three indicators of cognitive abilities: mathematical, verbal fluency, and recall skills. We find that the propensity to invest in stocks is strongly associated with cognitive abilities, for both direct stock market participation and indirect participation through mutual funds and retirement accounts. Since the decision to invest in less information-intensive assets (such as bonds) is less strongly related to cognitive abilities, we conclude that the association between cognitive abilities and stockholding is driven by information constraints, rather than by features of preferences or psychological traits.     

Sushi or Fish Fingers? Seafood Diversity,Collapsing Fish Stocks,and Multispecies Fishery Management*

We present a model of a multispecies fishery, and we show the following. (i) Consumer preferences for seafood diversity can trigger a sequential collapse of fish stocks under open‐access fishery. (ii) The stronger the preferences are for diversity, the higher is the need for coordinated multispecies regulation. (iii) Second‐best optimal management of only one (or a few) species is less strict than socially optimal management of the same species. (iv) Myopic regulation of one species, ignoring spillovers to other species, can cause depletion of other stocks that would not be depleted under open access.     

Household investment decisions and offspring gender: parental accounting

Numerous behavioural factors have been identified as having an impact on household stockholding decisions. Given there is both theoretical and empirical evidence to support the premise that offspring gender can influence specific types of parental preferences, I test the theory that offspring gender has an effect on parental investment decision-making. I find that offspring gender does influence household stock market participation. Specifically, I find that having only female offspring can significantly increase the probability of stockholding. Given stockholding can have large effects on household wealth levels and that family wealth levels affect intergenerational transfers, this finding could have important implications for understanding distributional welfare issues.     

On the role of consumer expectations in markets with network effects

We analyze the role of consumer expectations in a Hotelling model of price competition when products exhibit network effects. Expectations can be strong (stubborn), weak (price-sensitive) or partially stubborn (a mix of weak and strong). As a rule, the price-sensitivity of demand declines when expectations are more stubborn. An increase of stubbornness (i) increases (decreases) the parameter region with a unique duopoly equilibrium (multiple equilibria), (ii) reduces competition, (iii) reduces the conflict between consumer and social preferences for de facto standardization, and (iv) reduces the misalignment between consumer and social preferences for compatibility.     

Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions

For the case of two buyers we show that equilibrium in the sealed high-bid auction is unique when (i) buyers' reservations prices are drawn independently from distributions with finite support and positive mass at the lower endpoint; (ii) buyers have private values; and (iii) buyers' preferences are log supermodular. For more than two buyers, we obtain the same result under the additional assumptions that (iv) buyers with the same reservation price have the same preferences; (v) buyers are risk neutral or risk averse with non-increasing absolute risk aversion; and (vi) the supports of the different buyers' distributions of reservation prices have the same upper endpoint.     

WHY SOCIAL PREFERENCES MATTER – THE IMPACT OF NON-SELFISH MOTIVES ON COMPETITION, COOPERATION AND INCENTIVES

A substantial number of people exhibit social preferences, which means they are not solely motivated by material self-interest but also care positively or negatively for the material payoffs of relevant reference agents. We show empirically that economists fail to understand fundamental economic questions when they disregard social preferences, in particular, that without taking social preferences into account, it is not possible to understand adequately (i) effects of competition on market outcomes, (ii) laws governing cooperation and collective action, (iii) effects and the determinants of material incentives, (iv) which contracts and property rights arrangements are optimal, and (v) important forces shaping social norms and market failures.     

Business cycle, unemployment benefits and productivity shocks

The dimension of aggregate fluctuations is quite different between the European and US economies. Such a result fully justifies attention to non-Walrasian features for improving the empirical performance of the RBC model. In this paper, we introduce two features, present in European economies, into the standard general setting of the infinite-horizon stochastic growth paradigm: trade union behavior and unemployment benefits. We show that this non-Walrasian economy (i) improves the ability to account for the stylized facts, (ii) displays realistic features in explaining the employment and productivity puzzles, (iii) may account for contractions.     

Financing public goods and attitudes toward immigration

We study a model where individuals choose both the level of provision of a public good and the quota of low-skilled immigrants that are allowed into the country. Individuals can supplement the public good in the private market. Immigrants affect natives through three channels: (i) the labor market; (ii) tax collection; (iii) the quality of the public good. We find that the higher the political weight of the rich (highly skilled) is, the less tolerant the poor and the middle-class are toward immigration and the more demanding they are toward increasing public spending. The rich are the most favorable to immigration. As they have more weight, the political outcome is closer to their preferences and further from the preferences of the other groups. We use data from the European Social Survey to test the implications of our model.     

When sunspots don't matter

Summary We show that a finite, competitive economy isimmune to sunspots if (i) preferences are strictly convex, (ii) the set of feasible allocations is convex, and (iii) the contingent-claims market is perfect. The conditions (i)–(ii) cover some, but not all, economies with nonconvex technologies. Based on an indivisible-good example, we show that even economies with strictly convex preferences and full insurance arenot in general immune from sunspots. We also show that (1) the sufficient conditions (i)–(iii) are not necessary for sunspot immunity and (2)ex-ante efficiency is not necessary for immunity from sunspots.This paper is based on an earlier paper, Indivisibilities in Production, and Sunspot Equilibrium, presented at the 1990 S.E.D.C. Meetings, Minneapolis-St. Paul, June 1990. The research support of NSF Grant SES-9012780, the Center for Analytic Economics, and the Thorne Fund is gratefully acknowledged.     

Changes in Technology and Preferences: A General Equilibrium Explanation of Rapid Growth in Trade

We use a computable general equilibrium model in an explanation of the recent rapid growth in Australia's trade, particularly intra-industry trade. Relative to previous studies of trade growth based on multiple regression analysis, our approach allows us to: (i) work at a detailed industry level; (ii) use primary variables to represent changes in technology and preferences rather than proxies; and (iii) use a framework based on explicit microeconomic foundations. We find that most of the growth in Australia's trade relative to GDP is explained by changes in technology and preferences.     

Revisiting the Relationship between Ethnic Diversity and Preferences for Redistribution: Comment

In this paper, we revisit the question raised in Dahlberg et al. ( 2012 , Journal of Political Economy 120, 41–76) concerning a causal relationship between ethnic diversity and preferences for redistribution. We find that their results are based on (i) an unreliable and potentially invalid measure of preferences for redistribution, (ii) an endogenously selected sample, and (iii) a mismeasurement of the refugee placement program. Correcting for any of these three problems reveals that there is no evidence of any relationship between ethnic diversity and preferences for redistribution. We also discuss what is currently known about the refugee placement program, and to what extent it can be used for estimating causal effects more generally.     

What do uncertainty-averse decision-makers believe?

Summary. This paper introduces the concept of firm belief, which is proposed as a new epistemic model for a wide class of preferences. In particular, firm beliefs are shown to have the following desirable properties: (i) they are derived from preferences according to a plausible rule of epistemic inference; (ii) they satisfy standard logical properties; and (iii) tractable representations of firm belief are available for all (suitably continuous) biseparable preferences [13, 14], including the Choquet expected utility [30] and maxmin expected utility [16] classes. We also use firm belief to construct a generalization of Nash equilibrium for (two-player) normal form games. Received: December 14, 1999; revised version: February 26, 2001     

Duality theory for dynamic optimization models of economics: The continuous time case

This paper establishes that the competitive allocation process is the only informationally decentralized mechanism for exchange environments which (i) achieves Pareto optimal allocations; (ii) gives each consumer an allocation which is, according to his preferences, at least as good as his endowment; (iii) satisfies certain regularity conditions; and (iv) has a message space of the smallest dimension necessary to satisfy (i–iii).     

Representation of constitutions under incomplete information

We model constitutions by effectivity functions. We assume that the constitution is common knowledge among the members of the society. However, the preferences of the citizens are private information. We investigate whether there exist decision schemes (i.e., functions that map profiles of (dichotomous) preferences on the set of outcomes to lotteries on the set of social states), with the following properties: (i) The distribution of power induced by the decision scheme is identical to the effectivity function under consideration; and (ii) the (incomplete information) game associated with the decision scheme has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. If the effectivity function is monotonic and superadditive, then we find a class of decision schemes with the foregoing properties.     

Inflation bias and markup shocks in a LAMP model with strategic interaction of monetary and fiscal policy

This paper investigates the effects generated by limited asset market participation on optimal monetary and fiscal policy, where monetary and fiscal authorities are independent and play strategically. It shows that: (i) both the long run and the short run equilibrium require a departure from zero inflation rate; (ii) in response to a markup shock, fiscal policy becomes more aggressive as the fraction of liquidity constrained agents increases and price stability is no longer optimal even under Ramsey; (iii) overall, optimal discretionary policies imply welfare losses for Ricardians, while liquidity constrained consumers experience welfare gains with respect to Ramsey.     

Evolution of markets: a simulation with centralized,decentralized and posted offer formats

We apply standard evolutionary dynamics to study trader participation in three competing market formats —call market (CM), posted offer (PO) and decentralized market (DM). In our framework, heterogeneous buyers and sellers seek to transact a homogeneous good, which can be done by allocating their time among three different market formats. Our results show that (i) the final participation of traders in the CM is much higher, (ii) the PO can coexist with the CM, (iii) the DM unravels when competing against CM and (iv) the DM can coexist with the PO, depending on the initial participation conditions. Thus, we demonstrate that agent-based micro-simulations coupled with replication dynamics can reproduce most of the previously known theoretical results and have the potential to investigate other commonly used hybrid auction protocols.     

On the Econ within

This essay examines the critique of behavioral economics that Infante, Lecouteaux and Sugden (ILS) offer in:"Preference Purification and the Inner Rational Agent.” It identifies and questions three main criticisms that ILS make: (i) a methodological criticism, alleging that there is no psychological basis for the attribution of purified preferences, (ii) an epistemological criticism, alleging that there is little evidence for claims about purified preferences, and (iii) a normative criticism, arguing that policies should aim to facilitate people’s choices rather than to satisfy purified preferences. The essay also distinguishes the view of welfare economics defended in Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare from the claims of behavioral economists ILS criticize.     

Green certification,heterogeneous producers,and green consumers: a welfare analysis of environmental regulations

We develop a vertical differentiation model to analyze welfare implications of environmental policies in a competitive market with production and consumption heterogeneity. Consumers with heterogeneous preferences choose between non-green and certified green products, while producers with heterogeneous production costs decide whether to engage in green production. In order for green products to be recognized by consumers, producers must join a green club. Key findings are summarized as follows. (i) The number of green producers, environmental standard, and overall welfare under the market solution are all socially sub-optimal. (ii) The introduction of a subsidy policy for greener production and standards is shown to increase social welfare, but is not Pareto optimal. (iii) A dual policy, which combines abatement subsidizes for a greener production standard and a tax charge for green certification, is shown to be the Pareto-optimal outcome.     

Passing the Buck On the acceptance of responsibility

In the Passing the Buck game, the n members of a group decide in a given order whether or not to incur costs so that they can fix a certain problem for the benefit of the group. Passing the Buck means that one relies on the service of a successor. The decision is influenced by social preferences and by strategic considerations. We derive three main conclusions from experiments with n=3 and n=4. (i) The unique perfect Baysian equilibrium of the Passing the Buck game with incomplete information about the preferences of other players generally fits the data, however with two interesting exceptions. (ii) Backward induction breaks down if it requires more than two steps, i.e., for the first player in the game with n=4. (iii) Making one of the members of the group an “expert” who alone is competent to fix the problem is connected with a change of social preferences.