Sovereign risk,interbank freezes,and aggregate fluctuations

This paper shows how spillovers from sovereign risk to banks׳ access to wholesale funding establish a bank-sovereign nexus. In a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium set-up, heterogeneous banks give rise to an interbank market where government bonds are used as collateral. Government borrowing under limited commitment is costly ex ante as bank funding conditions tighten when the quality of collateral drops. These spillovers, by impeding interbank intermediation, lower the penalty from defaulting due to an interbank freeze during a recession and propagate aggregate shocks to the macroeconomy. The model is calibrated using Greek data and is capable of reproducing stylized facts from the European sovereign debt crisis. In an application, we show that the ECB׳s non-standard financing operations mitigate the adverse feedback mechanism.     

Mispricing of Risk in Sovereign Bond Markets with Asymmetric Information

The likelihood that a government will repay its sovereign debt depends both on the amount of debt it issues and on the government's future ability to repay. Whilst the former is publicly observable, the government may have more information about the latter than investors. This paper shows that this asymmetric information problem impairs the market's ability to differentiate economies according to their fiscal sustainability, and can lead to a disconnect between bond prices and default risk. The model can help rationalise the behaviour of Eurozone bond prices prior to the recent European sovereign debt crisis.     

美国债务违约风波的深层原因探析——基于权力流散的角度

根据国际政治经济学的权力流散理论,导致美国联邦政府控制财政赤字和主权债务融资的行动能力被削弱的深层次原因是:权力从政治权威流散至市场权威、从政府流散至国会等权力机构以及国际范围的权力流散和权力重新配置。美国主权债务违约风险虽然在最后时刻被暂时化解,但美国债务问题仍将是世界经济体系中的重大不确定性因素。化解美国主权债务风险,需要美国的政治权威、市场权威以及国际社会的长期不懈努力。     

Sovereign debt, structural adjustment, and conditionality

The lack of a proper enforcement mechanism for sovereign debt generates a commitment failure. As a result, a sovereign may seek to improve its position in debt renegotiations and thus evade its debt obligations by reducing exports. Conditionality seeks to provide a solution to the incentive problem by addressing the commitment failure. Formalizing this argument, we show that conditionality helps the repayment of sovereign debt. In certain circumstances, it can eliminate debt overhang, especially when it is coupled with concessionary lending of sufficient magnitude. It is, however, unable to restore first best. When it is anticipated by lenders, conditionality may get international financial institutions and sovereign debtors into a trap where the debt overhang persist, debt rescheduling takes place periodically, and conditionality continues indefinitely.     

Sovereign bond market dependencies and crisis transmission around the eurozone debt crisis: a dynamic copula approach

We examine the dependency between the European government bond markets around the recent sovereign debt crisis. A dynamic copula approach is used to model the time-varying dependence structure of those government bond markets, evaluate the nature and strength of their dependencies over time, and gauge the transmission of the crisis shocks. Our results can be summarized as follows: i) the eurozone sovereign bond markets under consideration have a significant and positive dependence with the Greek and the EMU benchmark sovereign bond markets; ii) the dynamic-BB7 copula function best describes the dependence structure between these sovereign bond markets and provides evidence of asymmetric tail dependence; iii) the conditional probability of crisis transmission from Greece to other eurozone countries is higher than the other way around; and iv) Greece is the most vulnerable country when the eurozone entered into the sovereign debt crisis.     

Fiscal adjustment and the costs of public debt service: evidence from OECD countries

We use a panel of 21 OECD countries from 1970 to 2009 to investigate the effects of different fiscal adjustment strategies on long-term interest rates – a key fiscal indicator reflecting the costs of government debt service. As Europe’s sovereign debt crisis has shown, governments confronted with high deficits and rising debt may be forced to enact fiscal adjustments in order to avoid increasing market pressure and solvency problems. Over the last four decades, such measures taken by governments in OECD countries have varied in duration, size, composition and in their success to re-establish fiscal sustainability. We find that large and expenditure-based adjustments lead to substantially lower long-term interest rates. Small and revenue-based measures do not have an effect on interest rates. Financial markets thus only seem to value strict and decisive measures – a clear sign that the government’s pledge to cut the deficit is credible.     

Financial stress and sovereign debt composition

Using a panel of 13 advanced economies for the period 1980–2012, we find that periods of impaired financial intermediation mainly accrue to maturity mismatches in sovereign debt. Thus, a higher (lower) share of short-term (medium and long-term) debt leads to an increase in the financial stress index. From a policy perspective, our work suggests that debt management policies translated into longer average maturities of sovereign debt not only reduce the expected debt servicing cost, but also mitigate strains in the financial sector.     

Sovereign default risk premia,fiscal limits,and fiscal policy

We develop a closed economy model to study the interactions among sovereign risk premia, fiscal limits, and fiscal policy. The fiscal limits, which measure the government's ability to service its debt, arise endogenously from dynamic Laffer curves. The state-dependent distributions of fiscal limits depend on the growth of lump-sum transfers, the size of the government, the degree of countercyclical policy responses, and economic diversity. The country-specific fiscal limits imply that the market perceives the riskiness of sovereign debt issued by different countries to be different, which is consistent with the observation that developed countries are downgraded at different levels of debt. A nonlinear relationship between sovereign risk premia and the level of government debt emerges in equilibrium, which is in line with the empirical evidence that once risk premia begin to rise, they do so rapidly. Nonlinear simulations show that fiscal austerity measures that aim to balance the government budget in the short run fail to contain the default risk premium, even with sizeable cuts in government purchases; but a long-term plan for fiscal reform, if it credibly changes the market's expectation about future fiscal policies, can alleviate the rising risk premium.     

Risks of Latin America sovereign debts before and after the financial crisis

We investigate the financial determinants of the return and volatility of sovereign CDS spread from six major Latin American countries before and after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Other than CBOE VIX index, we also find that global factors including US Baa–Aaa default yield, TED spread and US Treasury rate all contribute to the changes in these sovereign CDS spread. Although global risk aversion (VIX) is a significant determinant of sovereign debt spread, in the years after the crisis, the emphasis has shifted towards short-term refinancing risk (TED). Furthermore, the risk of Greek sovereign debt crisis also transmitted Latin American CDS spreads immediately, but only in the post-Lehman sub-period. These findings provide implications for international bonds and credit derivatives trading strategies.     

我国地方政府债务风险的 度量、评估与释放

本文度量和评估了我国地方政府的债务风险,结果显示,地方政府的债务余额虽在可控范围内,但新增债务比率已超过预警线,地方政府存在一定的潜在债务风险。本文从分权体制和道德风险两个层面剖析了引致地方政府债务风险的原因,梳理了应对地方政府债务风险的逻辑体系,从制度基础、事前审核把关、事中动态监控、事后反思改进等方面为解决地方政府债务风险提供了政策建议。     

Evaluating sovereign risk spillovers on domestic banks during the European debt crisis

Using a Markov-switching model with time-varying probabilities, spillovers from sovereign to domestic bank CDS spreads during the European debt crisis for a set of 14 European countries and 30 European banks are investigated. Our model is able to capture how the increased sovereign risk observed between 2010 and 2013 throughout Europe has impacted i) the probability that banks fall into a crisis regime and ii) the probability that banks stay in the crisis regime. The latter state is characterized by a high volatility and large positive returns of CDS spreads. Different regime-dependent indicators have been computed to assess heterogeneity within the region. The evidence indicates that the intensification of sovereign risk observed during the European debt crisis has positively and significantly driven the regime shifts in volatility of the bank CDS spreads due to increased risk aversion. The results show that the increase in sovereign credit risk seems to have generated second-round effects for some banks that have experienced a deterioration in their funding conditions due to a rise in the domestic sovereign default risk. Overall, our results suggest that sovereign CDS spreads can be considered good forewarning indicators for predicting the evolution of bank CDS spreads. We also find that the effects differ depending on the country and the financial institution. This result suggests that banks are heterogeneously exposed to sovereign credit risk within the same country. One argument relates to the size of these financial institutions and the domestic exposure to sovereign debt.     

Credit risk and sustainable debt: a model and estimations of why the Euro is stable in the long-run

Sustainable debt has become the key issue in rating of private as well as sovereign debtors. The problem of how to estimate sustainable debt has also been at the center of the debate over the Asian 1997–1998 financial crisis. If the external value of the currency depends on the external debt of a country, it is necessary to estimate the creditworthiness of the country. This paper studies credit risk and sustainable debt in the context of a dynamic model. For a dynamic growth model with an additional equation for the evolution of debt, we demonstrate of how to compute sustainable debt and creditworthiness. The model is estimated by employing time series data for the core countries of the Euro-area. The computations show that the Euro-area has large external assets. Using time series methods, the sustainability of external debt (assets) is estimated for those core countries of the Euro-area. Those estimations show that the Euro will be a stable currency in the long-run.     

中国主权资产负债表及其风险评估(下)

2000——2010年,中国的国民资产负债表呈快速扩张之势。对外资产、基础设施以及房地产资产迅速积累,构成资产扩张的主导因素。这记载了出口导向发展战略之下中国工业化与城镇化加速发展的历史进程。在负债方,各级政府以及国有企业的负债以高于私人部门的增长率扩张。这凸显了政府主导经济活动的体制特征。对主权资产负债表的风险评估表明:(1)总体上,中国主权净值为正,因而,在相当一段时间内,发生主权债务危机的概率极低;(2)近期的风险点主要体现在房地产信贷与地方债务上,而中国的长期风险则更多集中在对外资产负债表、企业债务与社保欠账上。这些风险大都是或有负债风险,且与过去的发展方式密切相关;(3)主权债务动态的模拟进一步揭示出维持经济增长率与利率之差对于化解债务风险的重要性。因此,转变经济发展方式,保持经济可持续增长,是应对主权债务风险的根本途径。     

Fiscal limits and monetary policy: default vs. inflation

This paper studies the monetary policy trade-off between low inflation and low sovereign risk in the environment where fiscal authorities fail to fully ensure the sustainability of government debt. Building on the Fiscal Theory of Price Level (FTPL) and the Fiscal Theory of Sovereign Risk (FTSR), this paper differs in its baseline assumption about the monetary policy objective, which is neither to rule out defaults regardless of inflation costs (as in FTPL), nor to follow inflation targeting regardless of associated sovereign risk (as in FTSR). Instead, we study the case in which the central bank controls the risky interest rate to minimize the probability of default while ruling out large inflation hikes. We show that this policy regime can mitigate default risks only when the central bank is expected to allow sufficient increases in inflation. When agents believe that the central bank's tolerance toward inflation hikes has increased, equilibrium risk premium goes down, suggesting that information concerning changes in the central bank's preferences over inflation directly impacts default risks.     

Determinants of nonresident government debt ownership

We examine the determinants of nonresident government debt ownership, accounting for domestic and external factors and financial variables during the period 2000Q2–2014Q4, focussing on a small euro area open economy: Portugal. Our results show that better fiscal positions, higher systematic stress in Europe and higher shares of monetary and financial institutions (MFI) cross-border holdings of public debt, increase the share of nonresident held debt, and rising sovereign yields decrease that ratio.     

Debt Crises and Risk‐Sharing: The Role of Markets versus Sovereigns

Using a variance decomposition of shocks to gross domestic product (GDP), we quantify the role of international factor income, international transfers, and saving in achieving risk‐sharing during the recent European crisis. We focus on the subperiods 1990–2007, 2008–2009, and 2010 and consider separately the European countries hit by the sovereign debt crisis in 2010. We decompose risk‐sharing from saving into contributions from government and private saving, and show that fiscal austerity programs played an important role in hindering risk‐sharing during the sovereign debt crisis.     

Effects of Eurobonds: A stochastic sovereign debt sustainability analysis for Portugal,Ireland and Greece

This paper assesses the impact of Eurobonds on sovereign debt dynamics for selected European member states (Greece, Ireland and Portugal). For each member state, we produce sovereign debt fan charts of (i) a baseline scenario (no Eurobonds) and (ii) a Full-Fledged Eurobond introduction. The key building blocks of our methodology are (i) a debt framework (which embeds the traditional recursive debt equation), (ii) a vector autoregressive model to take into account and parametrise macroeconomic uncertainty and (iii) a fiscal reaction function. Conditional on the absence of moral hazard, we find Eurobonds to be a good instrument to absorb macroeconomic shocks and to diminish uncertainty over future debt forecasts; for Ireland and Portugal, we find debt to be 20 percentage points lower than under our baseline scenario, by 2020.     

Does local and Euro area sentiment matter for sovereign debt markets? Evidence from a bailout country

Does sentiment impact the sovereign debt markets? This article investigates whether lagged domestic and Euro area irrational sentiment (optimism or pessimism unwarranted by fundamentals) predicts future sovereign bond spreads, in Portugal, between January 2000 and December 2013. We find that domestic and Euro area sentiment negatively forecasts total return spreads and that this effect is stronger during the bailout period. Also, we find that the business sentiment is even most noticed. Therefore, Portuguese sovereign debt market is prone to the influence of investors’ sentiment.     

One crisis,two crises…the subprime crisis and the European sovereign debt problems

This article explores the link between the subprime crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. Using a panel data approach, we estimate the impact of the different government interventions aimed at rescuing financial institutions on the significant increase of the costs of public debts as measured by the interest rate spreads with respect to Germany. We show evidence on the existence of a statistically significant link between the two crises embodied by capital injections and government guarantees. More specifically, the two types of government interventions have a negative impact on the cost of the sovereign debts under study. This empirical result can explain why the sovereign debt crisis immediately followed the subprime crisis.     

Sovereign default and the sustainability risk premium effect

We analyze the joint determination of interest rate risk and debt sustainability for governments with fiscal imbalances. Because higher interest rates imply increased debt services, they worsen the government's financial situation and increase the probability of sovereign default. Thus, higher interest rates eventually lead to a decrease in the real demand for government bonds, which imposes an additional constraint on government debt sustainability.