The national segmentation of euro area bank balance sheets during the financial crisis

This paper analyses bank balance sheet data in conjunction with macroeconomic and other financial variables. Our aim is to understand the nature of the instability in financial intermediation in the euro area during the recent financial crises. We define “large changes” as significant departures in the actual evolution of balance sheet variables during the crisis from their historical association with the business and financial cycles. In the course of the global 2008–2009 financial crisis, such “large changes” were features of the behaviour of cross-border inter-bank flows, both within the euro area and between the euro area and the rest of the world. By contrast, retail assets and liabilities, as well as inter-bank flows among banks of the same country, did not significantly deviate from historical regularities. Since the euro area sovereign crisis of 2011–2012, “large changes” have been more pervasive. In particular, a significant home bias in the sovereign bond market has emerged.     

Determinants of government bond spreads in the euro area: in good times as in bad

Government bond spreads increased rapidly during the financial turmoil in the euro area. In general, government bond spreads in the euro area are attributed to solvency and liquidity risks and determinants thereof. This paper proposes the use of latent processes to model the time variation present in the evaluation of these determinants. In contrast to approaches using global measures like the US corporate bond spreads or short-term interest rates to approximate time variation, our model is also flexible enough to deal with the unfolding of the financial crisis. The findings suggest that the expected debt-to-GDP ratio explains a major part of the differences in bond yields in the euro area between 2003 and the unfolding of the financial crises. Coefficients for many determinants increased rapidly during the financial crises. Especially market capitalization gained relative importance in winter 2008/2009.     

危机时刻的社会保障支出

文章研究了社会保障支出与金融危机之间的关系,回答了两个问题:第一个问题是:在金融危机发生后,社会保障支出的发展趋势如何?第二个问题是:哪些原因可以解释这些变化?文章认为,社会保障制度往往诞生于危机之际。此外,一般地讲,社会保障支出在危机期间会增加;但是各国情况不同,发达国家显示出反周期支出的特点。文章支持这样一个观点,即危机可以被当作改善和加强社会保障的机会,而在这样的过程中,各国不仅可以缓解危机最不利的影响,而且能制定比较好的社会政策,改进长期危机的防范应对。     

Germany,the problem of leadership,and institution-building in EMU reform

ABSTRACT

This article examines the extent to which Germany has provided leadership in creating institutions to overcome the euro area crisis. Under which conditions does Germany act as a driver of institutional change, and what are the implications for the Economic and Monetary Union? Germany’s leadership record is mixed: while it took the lead in enhancing austerity, it refrained from fostering burden-sharing. As a result, EMU faces a persistent imbalance between enhanced institutions of supervision and insufficient institutions of financial assistance. Moreover, the article points out that current conditions for the emergence of German leadership in the euro area are unfavourable.     

“两次金融危机”产生的原因与影响及对中国经济发展的启迪

分析1997年"亚洲金融危机"和2007年"世界金融危机"产生的原因及其异同点与"两次金融危机"对世界及其中国经济发展的影响.在此基础上,探讨"两次金融危机"对中国经济发展的启迪,为中国在今后经济发展中防范和应对金融危机提供科学依据.     

Measuring the end of the European financial crisis

In 2013 it was declared that ‘the eurozone crisis is over’. However, in fact, the series of financial crises since 2008 may have interrupted the process of EMU enlargement, which in turn triggered a continuing crisis of confidence in the euro. In this paper we extend the sigma‐convergence test to provide a more precise understanding of real interest rate parity (RIP) convergence. On the basis of this, we predict the timing for eliminating the cost of economic asymmetric shocks. Our estimation indicates the RIP among EMU members and accessions were still valid after the disruptions of the 2008 financial crisis. However, the situation has been even worse since the 2010 European sovereign debt crisis, and ceteris paribus, symmetry cannot be achieved without further policy actions. This implies that the EMU authority must do its best to strengthen symmetry and thereby solidify the EMU, at which point it will be better able to re‐start the process of enlargement.     

Banking,currency, stock market and debt crises in Spain, 1850–1995

What type of crisis is generated when debt increases? We extend the literature by framework by introducing currency and stock market crises in the analysis. We apply our proposal to the case of Spain, since this is a country that has experienced a very important amount of financial crises from the nineteenth century onwards. We find the same results as the previous literature for the determinants of banking and debt crises but substituting external and public debt with perpetual debt and where perpetual debt has a less important role than crises in the private sector. Moreover, we find evidence in favour of the hypothesis that currency crises depend strongly and positively on financial centre crises and negatively and mildly on perpetual debt. We justify the negative relalionship due to an inflation tax. We also find evidence in favour of the hypothesis that stock market crises depend only positively and strongly on financial centre crises.     

The role of uncertainty in the euro crisis – an application of liquidity preference theory

The world financial crisis triggered a rediscovery of the active role fiscal policy can play as a remedy in such situations. During the euro crisis, escalating funding costs in a number of southern eurozone member states and Ireland have called this strategy into question. One interpretation of the euro crisis concentrated on the public debt trends in those countries. Opposing this view, the main point of this contribution is to elaborate the link between rising interest rates on sovereign bonds in the euro crisis and a major feature of the financial crisis – a subdued degree of investor confidence after the Lehman collapse. Theoretically, this link is developed with reference to Keynes’ liquidity preference theory. The high explanatory power of measures for the degree of confidence in financial markets as well as detrimental effects of fiscal austerity on the evolution of sovereign yield spreads are demonstrated empirically by means of panel regressions and supplementary correlation analyses.     

What is really common in the run-up to banking crises?

Arguing that crises are similar if they are predictable from historical experience, we employ panel logit models to examine similarities in the run-ups to the current global financial crisis and historical banking crises. Asset bubbles are the most common precursors.     

Effects of asset purchases and financial stability measures on term premia in the euro area

We study the effects of the announcements of ECB asset purchases and of financial stability measures in the euro area in the wake of the global financial crisis and the euro area sovereign debt crisis on 10-year government bond term premia in 11 euro area countries. We find that the term premia of euro area countries with higher sovereign risk, as measured by sovereign CDS spreads, decreased more in response to the announcements of asset purchases and financial stability measures. Term premia of countries with lowest sovereign risk either increased as in Germany, or were not significantly affected or fell slightly, as in the Netherlands and Finland.     

Firm credit in the euro area: a tale of three crises

Using survey data from 2009 to 2011, we analyse the effects of the recent euro area economic, financial and private debt crisis on the supply of and demand for bank finance for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). At the country level, we identify three distinct aspects of the recent crisis in the euro area affecting firm credit through different channels. Controlling for country fixed effects, the impact of a weak real economy on firm credit operates both by reducing firms’ demand for bank financing and by lenders increasing loan rejections and tightening terms and conditions on credit allocated. On the other hand, financial conditions have no significant effect on demand, but they do affect credit supply as we find that financial tensions worsen the chances of obtaining credit and its terms and conditions. We interpret this as evidence of a bank balance sheet channel negatively impacting credit provision. We find that private sector indebtedness has important effects on SMEs’ credit access and its terms and conditions.     

Time-varying dependence in European equity markets: A contagion and investor sentiment driven analysis

In the light of the global financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis, this paper investigates the dependence patterns in 24 European equity markets from January 5, 2004 to July 1, 2016. We further examine whether these stressful events trigger contagion. Given that investors tend to behave irrationally in turmoil periods, we add to the literature by studying the effect of investor sentiment on markets correlations. Our results reveal heterogeneity in the time-varying dependence and across markets. Contagion is confirmed in turbulent times, a spillover effect from periphery euro area being detected. We find that similar sentiments increase correlations, especially in crises, suggesting that investors’ perceptions are an important channel of moving markets in the same direction. Furthermore, negative sentiments, such as fear or pessimism, amplify the linkages between markets. Our results offer useful insights to policy makers for reacting timely to financial shocks and for designing a more integrated market.     

Asset Prices and the Financial Crisis of 2007–09: An Overview of Theories and Policies

The financial crisis of 2007–09 has led to a rethinking of the role of monetary and financial regulatory policy. It has also called into question the benefits of financial innovation and monetary policy that focuses solely on inflation and the output gap. This paper discusses financial instabilities in general, the recent financial crisis as well as the appropriate role of monetary and financial regulatory policy in dealing with asset bubbles. The paper concludes by evaluating appropriate policies to reduce the economic impact of future financial crises.     

Asset Prices and the Financial Crisis of 2007–09: An Overview of Theories and Policies

The financial crisis of 2007–09 has led to a rethinking of the role of monetary and financial regulatory policy. It has also called into question the benefits of financial innovation and monetary policy that focuses solely on inflation and the output gap. This paper discusses financial instabilities in general, the recent financial crisis as well as the appropriate role of monetary and financial regulatory policy in dealing with asset bubbles. The paper concludes by evaluating appropriate policies to reduce the economic impact of future financial crises.     

The Impact of 2007/08 Financial Crisis on the Stability and Enlargement of the EMU

Before 2007/08, the European Monetary Union (EMU) was expected to be enlarged on schedule, but the European sovereign debt problem, triggered by the exogenous US sub‐prime crisis, not only has revealed the EMU's fiscal coordination failure, but also has weakened regional financial integration. The stagnation of financial integration will therefore increase the cost of sustaining a monetary union, which in turn slows EMU enlargement and ruins the reputation of the euro. This paper aims to measure the damage to financial integration and to provide a more precise answer on real interest rate parity (RIP) convergence. Our estimation indicates that RIP between the EMU and some accession candidates is still valid after the interruptions of the financial crises. However, convergence of real interest rates cannot be achieved until 2030. This implies the EMU authority must strengthen regional financial integration to solidify the EMU and then be able to re‐start enlargement.     

International yield curve comovements: impact of the recent financial crisis

Empirical evidence on international yield comovement is sparse and lacks consensus. Employing a dynamic correlation approach, we show that during the recent global financial crisis, euro area yields have ceased to comove with the yields of the other international markets – Canada, UK and US. Some implications of our results are discussed.     

Owner-managers and firm performance during the asian and global financial crises: evidence from Korea

We examine the performance of the Korean owner-managers during the 1997?1998 Asian financial crisis and the 2008?2009 global financial crisis to establish whether they overcome the unexpected exterior shocks better than employed managers. We find that the owner-managers record a significantly greater performance during the crises, and especially during the latter period. Moreover, our results suggest that such a tendency comes from the owner-managers’ superior investment decisions. Our paper thus highlights the role of owner-managers by studying their performance during the Korean economic crisis periods. (JEL G01, G32, G34)     

Liberalization,Regulatory Delays and Vulnerability to Systemic Banking Crisis

This work aims at contributing to the improvement of the early warning systems of banking crises using a new approach accounting for model uncertainty. We show that a multinomial logit model based on Bayesian model averaging (BMA) is a good strategy to predict banking crisis. To do this, we argue that differences in vulnerability to banking crisis can be largely explained by an asymmetry between financial market evolution and regulation update on a sample of 49 developed and developing countries between 1980 and 2010. When markets are liberalized, competition pushes bankers to take more risks and take advantage of regulatory delays thus increasing crises probabilities. Our empirical evidence supports that crisis probability is higher in country liberalizing their banking system when regulation is not updated. We developed an early warning system for systemic banking crises based on the multinomial logit model. Its main difference to existing prediction models and its contribution to the literature is that it is intended to identify and resolve what is called by Bussiere and Fratzscher [(2006). Towards a new early warning system of financial crises. Journal of International Money and Finance, 25(6), 953–973] as post-crisis bias in binomial models and to develop a new methodology of leading indicators selection based on BMA. Overall, our model predicts all banking crises during our sample period.     

On the time-varying relationship between EMU sovereign spreads and their determinants

We use a dynamic multipath general-to-specific algorithm to capture structural instability in the link between euro area sovereign bond yield spreads against Germany and their underlying determinants over the period January 1999–August 2011. We offer new evidence suggesting a significant heterogeneity across countries, both in terms of the risk factors determining spreads over time as well as in terms of the magnitude of their impact on spreads. Our findings suggest that the relationship between euro area sovereign risk and the underlying fundamentals is strongly time-varying, turning from inactive to active since the onset of the global financial crisis and further intensifying during the sovereign debt crisis. As a general rule, the set of financial and macro spreads' determinants in the euro area is rather unstable but generally becomes richer and stronger in significance as the crisis evolves.     

Balance Sheet Effects, Growth, and Crises

This paper addresses two questions: are currency crises predicted by increases in a central bank’s external and contingent liabilities relative to assets, and do these “balance sheet effects” generate persistent output losses following a crisis? I find empirical evidence that the answer to both questions is yes. I use data on stocks of gross external assets and liabilities for 167 countries over 1973–2003, in an unbalanced panel probit regression to obtain robust estimates of the probability and determinants of a post‐crisis recession. Several single and simultaneous equation specifications support the idea that the output cost of a currency crisis depends on its transmission mechanism. Specifically, a recession is likely to be severe if it is preceded by a crisis that works its way through the financial sector. In addition, the results show that measures of contingent liabilities, capital flight, and lack of financial depth are significant predictors of costly crises.