US–Japan Trade Frictions: The Past,the Present,and Implications for the US–China Trade War

The United States and Japan have been involved in trade frictions over a number of products including textiles, steel, automobiles, semi‐conductors, and agricultural products over the last 50 years. US–Japan trade frictions have taken basically two forms: (i) the United States attempting to restrict Japan's exports to the United States; and (ii) the United States attempting to increase its exports to Japan by “opening” the Japanese market. By putting pressure on Japan to adopt necessary measures, the United States sought to achieve two main objectives: (i) to reduce its trade deficit vis‐à‐vis Japan; and (ii) to protect and/or promote US industries. The United States failed to achieve the first objective, while some success was achieved for the second objective. The United States triggered a trade war against China with the objectives of: (i) reducing the bilateral trade deficit; and (ii) stopping unfair trade practices by Chinese firms such as violations of intellectual property rights and forced technology transfer. Based on the experiences from the US–Japan trade frictions, the United States may achieve some success for the second objective, but not for the first. The chances of achieving the second objective would increase if the United States cooperates with countries such as Japan and the European Union, which are faced with similar problems.     

The economic and trade effects of the UK–Korea free trade agreement on the United Kingdom,Korea, Japan,China, and the European Union

We explored a comparative static computable general equilibrium model with six regions and 12 sectors to estimate the impacts of the recent UK–Korea free trade agreement (FTA) along with the European Union (EU)–Korea FTA. The empirical results provide quantitative evidence of the impact on national GDP, national exports and imports by sector, and the changes in exports or imports among the United Kingdom, Korea, Japan, China, and the EU. The UK–Korea FTA, along with the EU–Korea FTA, increases GDP and welfare for the United Kingdom and Korea; moreover, there is a large increase in automobiles, transport equipment, and machinery exports between Korea and the United Kingdom. The GDP and welfare level of non-member countries such as Japan and China will slightly decline. Exports from the United Kingdom and Korea to non-member countries are also expected to decrease in most manufacturing sectors. The UK–Korea FTA will lead to increases in imports between the United Kingdom and Korea due to mutual trade creation effects and trade diversion effects. However, non-member countries such as Japan's exports are expected to experience a large decline in automobiles to the United Kingdom and in most manufacturing products to Korea due to the negative impact of the UK–Korea FTA.     

Unlikely Pivotal States in Competitive Free Trade Agreement Diffusion: The Effect of Japan's Trans-Pacific Partnership Participation on Asia-Pacific Regional Integration

How can a state with dysfunctional trade politics spur the negotiation of major free trade agreements (FTAs)? Using the case of Japan's participation in the trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), we develop an analytical framework on FTA diffusion that takes into account multidimensional (economic, legal and political) competitive pressures, and the ability of states to act as pivots in triggering FTA cascades. We disaggregate the makeup of a pivotal state into two main components – capability and credibility – and underscore Japan's significant latent capabilities, but also its serious credibility shortcomings. The TPP's boost to Japan's credibility raised the possibility of significant economic, legal and political externalities for specific countries which responded by accelerating FTA initiatives that had long stalled: the trilateral China–Japan–Korea FTA, a 16-state East Asian FTA and the Japan–European Union trade negotiations. This study extends the theoretical frontier in policy diffusion studies by clarifying the combination of factors that allows some states, but not others, to activate the externalities behind the dissemination of defensive FTAs.     

Poisoned grapes,mad cows and protectionism

This paper studies two episodes where a ban on imports was imposed to safeguard people's health. The first case is the poisoned grapes crisis involving Chile and the United States in 1989. The second is the “mad cows” dispute, which broke out in 1996, between the United Kingdom and the European Union. These case studies motivate a new definition of “protectionist measure” which is applied to argue that the European Union's ban on British beef exports was not protectionist, while the US ban on Chilean fruit possibly classifies as such a measure.     

Not all international monetary shocks are alike for the Japanese economy

This paper examines the influence of monetary aggregates shocks in the U.S., China and the Euro area on Japan. China's monetary expansion has significant effects on Japan's economy that are quite different from those of the U.S. and Euro area. In line with the implications of the Mundell–Fleming model when there are capital controls in place, Chinese monetary expansion is found to primarily affect Japan through trade. The income absorption effect of China's monetary expansion is substantial for Japan. China's monetary expansion results in significant increases in Japan's industrial production, exports and inflation, and decreases in the trade-weighted yen. After 24 months, monetary shocks in China forecast 20% of the variation in Japan's real trade balance. In contrast, U.S. monetary expansion results in contraction in Japan's industrial production, exports and trade balance (expenditure-switching). Monetary expansion in the Euro area does not significantly affect Japan. Structural vector error correction models and a factor-augmented model are estimated to establish robustness of results.     

Used automobile protection and trade: Gravity and ordered probit analysis

There is a great deal of protection against used automobile imports in many countries of the world that has gone largely unnoticed in the trade policy literature. Indeed, there has been no recent attempt to systematically analyze the determinants of used automobile trade and the role of protection in this trade. This paper makes a preliminary attempt, introducing an ordered measure of protection levels in 132 countries. A gravity model of used automobile exports from the United States shows that protection measures against used automobile import have a statistically-significant, suppressive effect on trade flows. An ordered probit analysis of the protection measures themselves points to new automobile production interests as a key factor behind used automobile protection. Other relevant explanatory factors of protection are income levels, democratic regime, transitional status, WTO membership, and income distribution.First version received: December 2002/Final version received: August 2003The authors would like to thank Ken Button, Michael Ferrantino, Kingsley Haynes, the late Don Lavois, Keith Maskus, Arvind Panagariya, Baldev Raj, Thomas Strattman, Roger Stough, Wendy Takacs, Michael Walsh, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and discussions.     

标准化对中国出口贸易的影响效应——基于局部均衡的分析

由于技术差距的存在,中国出口贸易产品的技术标准普遍低于美、日、欧等发达国家,因此,标准化对中国出口贸易的影响显著。从局部均衡的角度分析短期和长期的不同影响效应发现：在短期内,标准化对中国的出口贸易效应主要是负面的,表现为贸易限制效应、贸易转移效应和贸易条件效应;而在长期情况下,如果企业能够积极改进,不断创新,那么标准化对中国的贸易会产生积极的促进效应,贸易量会增加,同时贸易条件也会得到改善。     

Trade,Determinants, and Causality: A Case of Hong Kong's Exports to The United States

This paper examines recent development in Hong Kong's exports to the United States. It explains the trade flows by estimating five demand-equations for exports. Besides, vector autoregressions are fitted to test the causal relationship among exports, exchange rates and income. Our study suggests that a sustained high growth rate of Hong Kong's exports of principal commodities to the United States contribute to the chronical bilateral trade surplus for Hong Kong. Variations in income and exchange rates, the major determinants of Hong Kong's exports, “cause” exports to change as indicated in the causality test. [420]     

The United States and United Kingdom activities of Japanese banks, 1980–1988

This paper analyzes the United States and United Kingdom activities of Japanese banks by integrating their activities in these two markets with the regulatory environment for banks in Japan and Japan's overall external financial position, as well as with business opportunities in the two host countries. The paper concludes that the regulatory environment in Japan, including restraints on interest rates and possible quantitative restraints, has had an impact on activities of Japanese banks in these two foreign markets.Japanese banks appear to have adjusted to their domestic regulatory environment by using their London branches as a flexible funding source and their U.S. offices in extending commercial and industrial loans to Japan-based companies as well as a substitute location for interbank trading. In both markets Japanese banking offices are large net barrowers from unrelated banks because of constraints on raising funds in their homer market.     

FOREIGN TAKEOVERS AND NEW INVESTMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

This study is unique in several respects. First, it reviews the characteristics of the top 10 industries targeted for foreign direct investment (FDI) activity in the United States between 1979 and 1987. It analyzes both overall FDI activity and new plant and expansion FDI activity. The study summarizes and tests alternative hypotheses regarding the determinants of FDI in the United States by all countries, by the United Kingdom, by the European Community, by Japan, and by Canada.
Large and growing product markets in an expanding economy have attracted FDI in the United States. Exchange rate movements have prompted opportunistic decisions to invest in U.S. production facilities. Investors' superior management skills appear to have prompted takeovers, while efforts to realize technological advantages of new physical capital and of relatively large operating plants have fostered plant and expansion investments.
Evidence exists that a desire to circumvent current—but not potential—trade restrictions has motivated foreign direct investment. FDI activities are not associated with concentrated or heavily unionized industries. Highly protected industries have attracted heavier equity FDI by Japan and heavier new plant FDI by all sources and Canada. No evidence exists that FDI in the United States by Japan or anyone else is targeted to undercut union-dominated firms or to arrest the spread of protectionist trade policies.     

FOREIGN TAKEOVERS AND NEW INVESTMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

This study is unique in several respects. First, it reviews the characteristics of the top 10 industries targeted for foreign direct investment (FDI) activity in the United States between 1979 and 1987. It analyzes both overall FDI activity and new plant and expansion FDI activity. The study summarizes and tests alternative hypotheses regarding the determinants of FDI in the United States by all countries, by the United Kingdom, by the European Community, by Japan, and by Canada.
Large and growing product markets in an expanding economy have attracted FDI in the United States. Exchange rate movements have prompted opportunistic decisions to invest in U.S. production facilities. Investors' superior management skills appear to have prompted takeovers, while efforts to realize technological advantages of new physical capital and of relatively large operating plants have fostered plant and expansion investments.
Evidence exists that a desire to circumvent current—but not potential—trade restrictions has motivated foreign direct investment. FDI activities are not associated with concentrated or heavily unionized industries. Highly protected industries have attracted heavier equity FDI by Japan and heavier new plant FDI by all sources and Canada. No evidence exists that FDI in the United States by Japan or anyone else is targeted to undercut union-dominated firms or to arrest the spread of protectionist trade policies.     

Effects of trade diversion and trade creation of MERCOSUR on US and world apple markets

Apples are the third most valuable fruit in the United States and account for 18% of US fruit exports. Chile is a major competitor to the United States in the MERCOSUR market, since it is one of the leading apple producing countries and enjoys the tariff reductions as a member of MERCOSUR. Consequently, Chilean exports displace US exports in MERCOSUR. In addition, other MERCOSUR members import more from lower-cost Chile, leading to a reduction in production and an increase in consumption in these countries. This study develops a theoretical and an empirical model of world apple market to quantify the trade diversion and trade creation effects of the MERCOSUR free trade agreement and to estimate the welfare impacts.     

Kosovo – EU trade relations: a dynamic panel poisson approach

To inform policymaking following trade liberalization between Kosovo and the EU within the framework of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), we specify a gravity model to investigate Kosovo’s trade in goods with 28 EU countries over the period 2005–2013. We reconcile competing methodological requirements by using a dynamic Poisson approach to estimation. Together, persistent trade patterns and an unfavourable combination of demand and supply elasticities suggest that trade liberalization in isolation is not sufficient to promote exports but may need to be incorporated within a wider policy and institutional framework. In addition, our findings suggest that trade costs should be a particular focus for policy: distance has a big negative influence on Kosovo’s exports to EU countries; while diaspora communities promote Kosovo’s exports to EU markets, most likely because they offset trade costs.     

The Real Cost of Financial Capital in the United States,Japan and Korea: Comparison and Convergence Tests

This paper presents alternative measures of the real cost of financial capital in the United States, Japan, and Korea over the 1975-90 period. Japan's cost of financial capital was the lowest among the three countries studied. The U.S. real cost of financial capital was higher than the Korean real cost. Our statistical analyses provide some evidence for shrinking the gap in the real financial costs of Japan and Korea vis a vis the United States. This is the reflection of increasing goods market integration and financial liberalization occurring in Japan and Korea. [F36, G15]     

The trade impact of European Union agricultural preferences

We assess the impact on agricultural trade of European Union (EU) trade policies, using a gravity model based on disaggregated trade flows from 161 developing countries (DCs) to 15 EU member countries. We use a sample selection framework to account for potential selection bias of positive trade flows and provide an explicit measure for relative preference margins. From a policy perspective, our results debunk some of the most widespread criticisms of preferential policies: EU preferences matter and have a positive impact on DCs agricultural exports at both the extensive and intensive margins, although with significant differences across sectors.     

Trade liberalization in the presence of domestic regulations: public policies applied to EU and U.S. wine markets

Wine is the highest valued product in the agricultural, food, and beverage sector traded between the United States and the European Union (EU) and wine faces a range of tariffs that are differentiated by country and product category. In addition, the production of wine grapes is heavily regulated within the EU and there are complicated state-level policies in the United States designed to limit the retail availability of wine. There continues to be economic and political pressure for reform to the tariffs between the United States and the EU, and to the domestic regulations in each region. We carefully develop parameters to characterize the effects of tariffs and domestic regulations that affect production and consumption of wine in the two regions. Simulation results show that reductions in tariffs would have relatively small effects in EU and U.S. wine markets, whereas reductions in EU domestic policies that affect wine grape production would have much larger trade and welfare implications.     

Little Divergence: Evidence from Cotton Textiles in Japan and China 1868–1930

This paper looks at the role of textile exports in Japan and China's economic development in the period of 1868–1930 as a major explanation for the “Little Divergence” between the two countries in the context of the “Great Divergence” between Europe and Asia. Because of textiles' large weighting in proto‐industrialization gross domestic product (GDP), we postulate that China's initial 20‐year lag in textiles vis‐à‐vis Japan turns out to be fatal for its industry and that it eventually ordains totally different development patterns for the textile industry in the two countries, which ultimately led to different growth patterns for the overall economy. Although both countries saw rapid growth of textile exports, the nature of those exports and the entailed position of each country in the industry value chain of trade were quite different. We then use Granger causality tests to show that in one case (Japan) it is in support of the export‐led‐growth hypothesis (ELG) while in another (China) it is not. Our study then also explains why Japan's industrial revolution took place much earlier than China's.     

Domestic Political Institutions,Diplomatic Style and Trade Agreements: A Comparative Study of China and Japan

Through an analysis of the formation of free trade agreements (FTAs), this article seeks to examine the factors that caused the gap in Japan and China's relationship with Southeast Asia to emerge and expand in the new millennium. In order to address this question, the article focuses on China and Japan's diplomatic styles and domestic political institutions and examines how these two elements influenced negotiations on the formation of FTAs, as well as the evolving perceptions that the Southeast Asian nations have of these two states. The article argues that Japan and China possess different kinds of weaknesses in implementing feasible external policies – a lack of policy decisiveness for Japan and weak policy credibility for China – which have resulted from the operation of domestic political institutions. Given these differences, while China implemented pragmatic diplomacy that helped improve its policy credibility, Japan's bargaining diplomatic style did not serve to rectify its weak policy decisiveness. Such differences in their diplomatic approach have led to the differing influence of these two states on Southeast Asia.     

Unravelling the Puzzle of Social Standards’ Design in EU and US Trade Agreements

The European Union (EU) and the United States (US) are signing preferential trade agreements (PTAs) increasingly used as vehicles for exporting social regulation, such as labour and environmental standards. Despite the similarity in terms of the inclusion of such provisions, their design varies greatly between US and EU agreements. The US exports its domestic standards, relying on coercive enforcement, while the EU emphasises international rules and soft measures. Why do US PTAs have stricter social standards than those signed by the EU? Using the principal–agent approach to explain the domestic politics of social provisions in EU and US PTAs, I argue that greater insulation of trade executives from interest groups and legislators results in their ability to set the agreement agenda independently, in accordance with their normative preferences. The argument is supported by case studies and original interview data.     

The Welfare Cost of Autarky: Evidence from the Jeffersonian Trade Embargo, 1807–09

The United States came close to complete autarky in 1808 as a result of a self‐imposed embargo on international shipping from December 1807 to March 1809. Monthly prices of exported and imported goods reveal the embargo's striking effect on commodity markets and allow a calculation of its welfare effects. A simple general‐equilibrium calculation suggests that the embargo cost about 5 percent of America's 1807 GNP, at a time when the trade share was about 13 percent (domestic exports and shipping earnings). The welfare cost was lower than the trade share because the embargo did not completely eliminate trade and because domestic producers successfully shifted production toward previously imported manufactured goods.