金融契约理论:基于控制权视角的最新研究

如何构建有效的金融契约是经济转型过程中提升我国企业公司治理效率、保护投资者利益的关键.最近兴起的金融契约理论突破传统的现金流思路.从控制权视角考察企业内部控制权配置机制及时各利益主体行动策略的影响.论文从控制权视角出发,系统回顾了金融契约理论的相关成果,并指出了目前该领域研究存在的主要局限.本文研究将对我国企业融资决策、内部公司治理和外部资本市场金融创新等具有一定的实践启示.     

不完全契约及其治理：一个文献综述

不完全契约理论强调了现实中契约的不完全性,注重信息可观察但不可证实和行动事前不可缔约的重要性.在此基础上,提出了各种挽救不完全合同效率的办法.以交易互利性为出发点,从控制权配置、逐步投资、声誉投资和连续时间缔约四个方面回顾了不完全契约理论的发展,并讨论了不完全契约理论未来的发展方向.     

家族企业控制权安排问题研究:一个文献综述

突破家族企业的成长与发展困境,需要引进外部职业经理人,建立两权分离的现代企业制度。权力的分离将带来如何界定权力、权力如何影响企业经营、如何实现权力最优安排等问题,这些问题又再次成为学者们的关注焦点。对有关家族企业控制安排问题的研究进行综述,内容包括控制权、剩余控制权、特定控制权、实际控制权的基本内涵、各类控制权的权力来源,控制权对经理人行为影响、基于委托—代理理论、交易费用理论的控制权分配。在此基础上,提出进一步的研究方向,应是家族企业尤其是中小家族企业不完备契约下的控制权特别是剩余控制权的安排问题。     

创业者的最优融资契约安排研究

本文认为“控制权”变量的引入是融资契约理论的重大进步,但是由于现有的模型将控制权视为“零一”性质的变量且未能对之作内生化解释,所以这些模型仅仅能够揭示了现实融资契约安排的某个侧面。作为一种改进,我们强调现实中的融资契约不仅是多维度的,且它们通常是可连续变化的变量;更重要的是,它们必然是当事人之间通过谈判而理性选择的结果。基于这样的判断,我们站在创业者/企业家(entrepreneur)的角度构建了一个最优融资契约安排的一般均衡模型,以便更全面地理解融资契约安排的现实规律。     

公司治理结构中的控制权配置：基于不完全契约理论的视角

企业的控制权配置是公司治理结构的核心问题。本文通过不完全契约理论对公司控制权的分析,论证了控制权机制影响着公司治理的效果和作用,合理的控制权配置对于完善公司治理具有积极作用。公司控制权机制问题成为我国后股权分置时代上市公司治理的主要问题之一。完善的控制权机制是提高我国公司治理效率的有效途径。     

不完全契约理论下的公司控制权配置

契约的不完全性导致了控制权问题的产生.GHM基本模型认为,公司控制权应授予物质资本的所有者,GHM第二代模型提出了"控制权相机配置"命题,由此遭到了利益相关者理论的批评.利益相关者理论缺乏分享企业控制权的依据,实践中也难以实行.不完全契约理论下公司控制权配置的解释,仍然具有较强的理论和现实意义.     

风险投资中控制权分配及其影响因素的研究

在风险投资中,创业者和风险投资家由于目标不同而存在着利益冲突,这时对风险企业的控制权进行适当分配成为关键.由于风险投资中有关控制权问题的复杂性,国内外对这方面的研究目前还较少,尚处于起步阶段.文章以不完全合同作为理论基础通过建立两期模型分析了影响风险企业中控制权配置的重要因素,从而在统一的不完全合同理论的框架下对风险企业的控制权、现金流量权、声誉机制等各种影响因素展开系统的研究.     

基于债务契约的控制权配置及风险控制方式对公司内部治理影响的实证研究

以某电力集团为研究背景,基于不完全契约理论,针对我国电力行业自身固有的低风险及其国有企业的竞争优势,分析了资产负债率与企业内外部风险的关系,以及股东控制权对企业内部风险的影响,讨论了国有企业特有的债务契约软约束条件下公司治理不健全的深层原因。     

不完全契约与控制权的由来

企业是当事人的一个签约集合,由于个人的有限理性,外在世界的复杂性、不确定性,信息的不对称和不完全性,契约必然是不完全的。产权配置的重要性来自契约的不完全性,由于契约的不完全性,使得在各有其主的企业间签订契约的成本可能很高,控制权配置是降低签约成本的有效方式。当合同中未预料到的情况出现时,谁说了算？谁有权对契约中未规定的情况做出决策,这就是所谓的＂剩余控制权＂或所有权问题。     

公司治理中控制权配置问题的理论分析

本文通过契约理论对公司控制权的分析 ,论证在公司控制权中 ,公司剩余控制权居于重要地位。对控制权配置的研究对正处于向市场经济转轨中的我国经济的持续发展将有很大帮助。     

When is it coevolution?

This paper evaluates the differences between Norgaard's and Winder et al.'s approach to socio-environmental coevolution. Winder et al. emphasize the evolutionary dynamics of coevolutionary change. These were omnipresent in Norgaard's work but they have not been adequately explored by other ecological economists. I argue that Winder et al.'s definition of coevolution is in essence the same as Norgaard's and that their real differences are, how they see coevolution applied and how far they are willing to draw a priori a line between evolutionary and non-evolutionary socio-environmental dynamics. My thesis is that at this stage a more open approach to evolutionary dynamics and coevolution a la Norgaard is a wiser strategy than Winder et al.'s narrower approach.     

大股东终极控制与掠夺行为研究

本文从公司控制链微观结构的视角研究了大股东的终极控制与掠夺行为.金字塔式控股结构和交叉持股是大股东实现控制权与现金流权分离的两种重要方式,并造成了大股东对小股东掠夺的强烈动机.通过建立一个模型分析了大股东掠夺行为产生的机理,大股东能够用较少的现金流权来实现对公司的实质控制是掠夺行为产生的本质原因,从而攫取更多的控制权私人收益.     

Credible delegation

We show that the vertical delegation of decision-making authority to agent firms can act as a credible strategic commitment even when contracts are unobservable (or renegotiable) if and only if multilateral delegation is combined with decentralized ownership of the agent firms. In this case, the possibility of renegotiation of other agents’ contracts constrains the set of contracts acceptable to each agent. Delegation may induce more or less aggressive behavior, depending on the nature of within-structure competition among the agent firms. Thus, delegation may be a valuable, credible strategic commitment mechanism when strategies are either substitutes or complements.     

正式契约的第三方实施与权力最优化--对农民工工资纠纷的契约论解释

本文运用契约理论解释农民工工资纠纷的成因 ,提出以下主要观点 :首先 ,农民工工资被拖欠的主要原因并非农民工与直接“关系”雇主之间的非正式口头契约无法有效实施 ,而恰是国家明文规定的、应该由国家作为第三方强制实施的正式契约无法有效实施 ;其次 ,国家作为强制实施的第三方 ,无法有效保护农民的合法权益 ,原因在于一方面国家拥有的部分绝对权力在追求租金最大化的动机下被滥用 ;另一方面 ,作为国家强制实施的直接工具的司法体系的相对权力又被强势利益群体所削弱 ,无法有效进行强制 ;再次 ,国家作为第三方在保护农民工合法权益方面的失效 ,导致农民工选择契约的其他执行方法 ,使得契约的实施由“公共强制”倒退回“私人秩序” ,进而可能导致私人暴力的无序使用 ,危及社会稳定 ,反过来又迫使政府只能选择更大力度地实际使用权力 ;最后 ,国家要重新建立国家作为强制实施第三方在保护农民工权益中的权威 ,就必须考虑“第三方权力的最优化”问题     

Volatility, Stabilization and Union Wage-setting: The Effects of Monetary Policy on the 'Natural' Unemployment Rate

In a unionized economy with nominal-wage contracts, the 'natural' (rational-expectations equilibrium) employment level is not invariant with respect to the stabilization rule followed by the monetary authority. This is because alternative monetary policies change the variance of the inflation rate (price level) relatively to the variance of some measure of economic activity (employment level), thereby influencing the trade-off desired by union members between the real wage and the probability of employment. Indeed, a more volatile employment level induces the (risk-neutral) union members to prefer a higher expected real wage.
(J.E.L: E5, J5).     

Courts,contracts, and interference

This paper shows that the possibility of interference in court proceedings, or more generally jamming other agents’ messages, has significant consequences for the form of optimal contracts and the flexibility of decisions that can be made inside firms. Our approach offers a new view of authority, basing it on the ability of parties to have their say in court. Interference gives authority a role in worlds where it is traditionally absent in contract theory, like simple employment relationships without specific investments.     

Environmental Tax Reform and Growth: Income Tax Cuts or Profits Tax Reduction

This study investigates how recycling revenues, which are generated by environmental taxes, affect growth through different types of tax cuts. A growth model with creative destruction (Aghion and Howitt Econometrica 60(2):323–351,1992, Aghion and Howitt The economics of growth, 2009) is modified to include the production of final output as a source of pollution. This paper demonstrates that introducing an environmental tax, accompanied by either an income tax cut or a profits tax reduction, increases the output growth rate. The analysis also shows that, if technological change is resulted from deliberate activities of economic agents, the reduction of the profits tax rate for an intermediate monopolist is more growth-enhancing than an income tax cut since a profits tax reduction directly promotes R&D activities.     

Regulatory and environmental effects on public transit efficiency: a mixed DEA-SFA approach

This paper assesses the impact of regulatory and environmental factors and statistical noise on the efficiency of public transit systems within a DEA-based framework. Using a panel of Italian companies, we implement a DEA-SFA mixed approach based on [H.O. Fried et al. (2002) Journal of Productivity Analysis, 17(1–2), 157–174] to decompose DEA inefficiency measures into three components: exogenous effects, managerial inefficiency and stochastic events. Besides providing evidence on the determinants of input-specific efficiency differentials across companies, the results point out that managerial skills play a minor role, and emphasize the relevance of regulatory policies aimed at replacing cost-plus subsidization with high-powered incentive contracts as well as improving environmental conditions of public transit networks.      

何去何从:贸易保护还是开放竞争?——来自微观企业创新的证据

文章基于熊彼特效应和逃离竞争效应假说,结合中国转轨时期的经济制度背景,利用2001?2008年制造业关税数据和沪深A股上市公司专利数据,研究了中国加入WTO后,关税削减所导致的进口竞争对企业创新的影响.研究发现,关税削减后,企业的发明专利申请数量显著增加,而专利申请总数和非发明专利申请数量却没有受到显著影响,表明进口竞争激励企业进行了高质量的发明创新.进口竞争的激励效应对于易受竞争影响和全要素生产率高的企业更加显著.文章认为,应以开放的心态迎接贸易自由化和进口竞争,引导企业将进口竞争转化为创新动力,推动企业创新向高质量迈进,形成国际竞争新优势.     

Large economies with differential information and without free disposal

We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy et al. (Econ Theory 18, 321–332, 2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis et al. in Econ Theory 21, 495–526, 2002). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (Econ Theory 18, 321–332, 2001) are still valid without free-disposal. Then, motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution, we adapt the incentive compatibility property introduced in Krasa and Yannelis (Econometrica 62, 881–900, 1994) and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of competitive or core allocations are enforceable. We would like to thank two anonymous reviewers and the Associate Editor for their valuable suggestions and remarks. This work was partially done while V.F. Martins-da-Rocha was visiting the Dipartimento di Matematica e Informatica of the Università degli Studi di Perugia. We thank the audience of the First General Equilibrium Workshop at Rio. Section 6 dealing with contract enforcement and coalitional incentive compatibility has benefited from discussions with J. Correia-da-Silva, W. Daher, F. Forges, C. Hervès-Beloso, E. Moreno-García, K. Podczeck, Y. Vailakis and N.C. Yannelis.