Agency,Firm Growth,and Managerial Turnover

We study managerial incentive provision under moral hazard when growth opportunities arrive stochastically and pursuing them requires a change in management. A trade‐off arises between the benefit of always having the “right” manager and the cost of incentive provision. The prospect of growth‐induced turnover limits the firm's ability to rely on deferred pay, resulting in more front‐loaded compensation. The optimal contract may insulate managers from the risk of growth‐induced dismissal after periods of good performance. The evidence for the United States broadly supports the model's predictions: Firms with better growth prospects experience higher CEO turnover and use more front‐loaded compensation.     

RAROC AT BANK OF AMERICA: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE

In 1993, Bank of America's Risk and Capital Analysis Group was charged with the task of developing and instituting a single corporate-wide system to allocate capital to all the bank's activities. Since 1994, that system has been providing quarterly reports of risk-adjusted returns on capital (RAROC) for each of the bank's 37 major business units. By 1995, B of A had also developed the capability to calculate RAROC down to the level of individual products, transactions, and customer relationships. RAROC systems allocate capital for two basic reasons: (1) risk management and (2) performance evaluation. For risk management purposes, the overriding goal of allocating capital to individual business units is to determine the bank's optimal capital structure–the proportion of equity to assets that minimizes the bank's overall cost of funding. This process involves estimating how much the risk (or volatility) of each business unit contributes to the total risk of the bank, and hence to the bank's overall capital requirements. For performance evaluation purposes, RAROC systems assign capital to business units as part of a process of determining the risk-adjusted rate of return and, ultimately, the “economic profit” of each business unit. The objective in this case is to measure a business unit's contribution to shareholder value, and thus to provide a basis for effective planning, capital budgeting, and incentive compensation at the business unit level. Concerns about capital adequacy, along with the Basel risk-based capital requirements, have played some role in the growth of RAROC among commercial banks. But the most powerful impetus to bankers' use of more systematic risk measures is coming from increasingly activist institutional investors. Besides giving senior management an economic basis for evaluating the bank as a portfolio of businesses and for making resource allocation decisions that improve the bank's risk/reward profile, RAROC systems are also expected to produce better performance by holding managers accountable for the amount of investor capital they are putting at risk.     

Reforming Banks Without Destroying Their Productivity and Value

Government‐protected banking systems tend to blow up, imposing huge losses on taxpayers. In a recent much‐publicized book, The Bankers' New Clothes, Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig propose to fix this problem by forcing banks to maintain 25% of their assets in the form of equity rather than debt. But this author argues, the book overstates the benefits and understates the costs of the proposed reform, while also failing to identify additional necessary reforms. Because bank equity is not true equity, and equity must be evaluated only in relation to risk, increasing required book equity ratios will not necessarily reduce the risk of bank failure significantly. Raising equity requirements is also socially costly because it reduces banks' willingness to lend. When banks need to raise their equity‐to‐asset ratios, they often choose to do so by cutting back on new loans, rather than paying the high costs of raising new equity. The reduction in loan supply that comes from raising equity ratios can be substantial, and is not just a one‐time cost. Balancing the costs and benefits of higher equity implies a much lower required equity ratio than the 25% posited in The Bankers' New Clothes. Finally, because equity ratios relative to risk should be the focus of prudential regulation, additional regulatory policy reforms that strengthen incentives for more effective risk management are needed in addition to higher capital ratios.     

中国式P2P网络借贷的形式与实质

P2P网络借贷的性质认定直接决定了监管体制和具体的监管措施。虽然在美国等国 家,P2P网络借贷被定义为证券发行等金融业务,但在中国,P2P网络借贷却被定义为个人对个 人的直接借贷,属于民间借贷范畴,不被认可为正规的金融业务。然而,经过创新改造之后的 中国大多数P2P网络借贷业务,仅仅在形式上与直接借贷和民间借贷相类似,但在实质上与传 统的民间借贷已经存在非常大的区别。将P2P网络借贷归类为民间借贷,使得监管体制和监管 逻辑存在很多悖论和相互矛盾的地方,值得反思。     

Another victory of retail investors: Social media's monitoring role on firms' earnings management

Stock forums are expected to complement individual investors' sophistication via collective wisdom, thus triggering extreme market reactions through uniform scattered opinions. This paper investigates whether stock forums improve corporate governance and decrease earnings management among firms. We found that increased posts, views and comments in a stock forum raise firms' potential costs for obfuscating corporate performance and constrain their upward earnings management. Stock forum discussion tends to increase the likelihood of and the penalties for earnings management detection. By decomposing the cost of earnings management into tangible and regulatory costs, we find that the stock forum governance effect is more pronounced in firms with higher managerial ownership and higher regulatory risk. Social media is a complement and intensifier of traditional mass media. Firms with broader media coverage are more sensitive to the stock forum governance effect. Our results are robust after considering the likelihood that executives will account for stock forum discussion in their reporting decisions.     

How accounting and auditing systems can counteract risk-shifting of safety-nets in banking: Some international evidence

This paper suggests that accounting and auditing systems can be effective devices to counteract tendencies for firm risk-taking associated with bank safety nets. Results are obtained from an international sample of publicly traded banks after controlling for other regulatory control devices for bank risk such as restrictions on banking activities, minimum regulatory capital requirements and official discipline. The efficacy of accounting and auditing systems in controlling bank risk diminishes with bank charter value and increases with moral hazard stemming from a country's deposit insurance. The results also indicate that accounting and auditing systems are complements for minimum capital requirements, but substitutes for restrictions on bank activities and official discipline.     

Capital requirements and claims recovery: A new perspective on solvency regulation

Protection of creditors is a key objective of financial regulation. Where the protection needs are high, that is, in banking and insurance, regulatory solvency requirements are an instrument to prevent that creditors incur losses on their claims. The current regulatory requirements based on value at risk (V@R) and average value at risk (AV@R) limit the probability of default of financial institutions, but they fail to control the size of recovery on creditors' claims in the case of default. We resolve this failure by developing a novel risk measure, recovery V@R. Our conceptual approach is flexible and allows the construction of general recovery risk measures for various risk management purposes. We provide detailed case studies and applications. We show that recovery risk measures can be used for performance-based management of business divisions of firms and discuss how to calibrate recovery risk measures to historical regulatory standards. Finally, we analyze how recovery risk measures react to the joint distributions of assets and liabilities on firms' balance sheets and compare the corresponding capital requirements with the current regulatory benchmarks based on V@R and AV@R.     

The structuration of legitimate performance measures and management: day-to-day contests of accountability in a U.K. restaurant chain

This paper reports on a longitudinal field study of accounting systems and their relationship to accountability in a U.K. restaurant chain. It is based on interviews and observations involving restaurant managers, the operations management hierarchy, and head office managers. In contrast to earlier studies of accounting and accountability this paper presents evidence to suggest that local managers’ uses of central performance reports may serve to disseminate head office’s strategic vision to operating units. It also suggests that the contests of accountability around performance measurement systems that have previously been reported in connection with major organizational transformations are a feature of everyday organizational management. With reference to structuration theory three modalities of such contests of accountability (signification, legitimation, domination) are distinguished and some of their interrelationships explained. Within an overall frame of strict hierarchical relationships, restaurant chain management exhibited considerable diversity with respect to the uses of performance measures, reflecting diverse local and central factors.     

How to Evaluate Risk Management Units in Financial Institutions?

Based on the existing Enterprise Risk Management framework and current government regulations, “banks are required to establish risk management units (RMUs) to review and evaluate their risks, monitor them, and to advise top management.” Currently an integral part of the risk governance and management process, RMUs in financial institutions have become increasingly important since the 2007–2008 financial crisis. This article details the authors' creation of an index to evaluate the performance of risk management units in financial institutions, and then examines some of their findings. The index transforms twelve parameters into a simple and convenient index that isolates the RMU's activities from the rest of the organizational risk management process, its risk preferences and the activities of the rest of the units. The index's parameters are divided into three dimensions of the RMU's performance: professionalism, organizational status and relationship with top management and the board. The authors found a positive relationship between their RMUI and some important risk governance characteristics: CROs who are among the five highest paid executives at the bank, banks with at least one independent director serving on the board's risk committee having banking and finance experience and boards with greater efficacy.     

Designing management control in hybrid organizations: The role of path creation and morphogenesis

Path-creating change in organizational form is proposed as an important element in achieving management control in hybrid organizations. Using case examples from large-scale projects in the architectural, engineering, and construction industry, as well as from joint ventures in the oil and gas industry, we highlight the role of mindfully synthesizing new organizational forms in the design of management control systems. A series of paradoxes is disclosed, in which attempts to achieve control through mimetic adoption of established management control techniques lead to reduced control. On the other hand, path-creating deviations from institutionalized practices, resulted in improved project and venture performance. It has been argued that the design of inter-organizational management control systems seeks to enable organizations to compete for resources and efficiency, and also to obtain institutional legitimacy. Institutional theory proposes that isomorphism permits organizations to obtain that legitimacy and explains their design. In this paper, we propose that path creation and morphogenesis, which deviates from isomorphism, is an additional consideration in explaining management control system design.     

DECENTRALIZATION, ACCOUNTING CONTROLS AND PERFORMANCE OF GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS: A NEW ZEALAND EMPIRICAL STUDY

This paper reports the results of a study which was conducted in five departments of the New Zealand Government and investigated the relationships between (a) decentralization and the use of accounting control systems, (b) the use of accounting control systems and district office performance, and (c) the decentralization and district ofice performance. The performance was assessed using the managers' perception of their district office (unit's) performance. Data for the study were collected from 59 district office managers using a structured questionnaire. The results indicate that an increased decentralization is associated with a greater managerial use of accounting control systems which, in turn, is associated with improved district office performance.     

Aligning Incentives at Systemically Important Financial Institutions: A Proposal by the Squam Lake Group

To address the moral hazard problem that can motivate bank executives to take excessive risks and to fail to raise capital when needed, a group of 13 distinguished financial economists recommends that systemically important financial institutions be required to issue contingent convertible debt (CoCos) and to hold back a substantial share—as much as 20%—of the compensation of employees who can have a meaningful impact on the survival of the firm. This holdback should be forfeited if the firm's capital ratio falls below a specified threshold. The deferral period should be long enough—the authors suggest five years—to allow much of the uncertainty about managers' activities to be resolved before the bonds mature. Except for forfeiture, the payoff on the bonds should not depend on the firm's performance, nor should managers be permitted to hedge the risk of forfeiture. The threshold for forfeiture should be crossed well before a firm violates its regulatory capital requirements and well before its contingent convertible securities convert into equity. The Swiss Bank UBS has paid bonuses to its top 6,500 executives that have been structured in exactly this way. Management forfeits its deferred compensation if the bank's regulatory capital ratio falls below 7.5%, and its contingent convertible debt is set up to convert into equity if the bank's capital ratio falls below 5%.     

城市商业银行异地分行经营管理模式探讨

跨区域经营是全国主要城市商业银行近年发展的基本路径和战略取向。随着经营管理半径和链条的延伸．业务、管理流程改造、总行与分行机构的对接、业务发展与管理职能的侧重、地区薪酬差异、授权与风险控制不平衡、人才缺乏等问题也一一显现，本文从实务的角度探讨城市商业银行在跨区域经营过程中，如何实现总一分一支三级架构。     

The Dempster‐Shafer Theory: An Introduction and Fraud Risk Assessment Illustration

This article introduces the Dempster‐Shafer theory (DS theory) of belief functions for managing uncertainties, specifically in the auditing and information systems domains. The use of DS theory is illustrated by deriving a fraud risk assessment formula for a simplified version of a model developed by Srivastava et al. (2007). In this formulation, fraud risk is the normalised product of four risks: risk that management has incentives to commit fraud; risk that management has opportunities to commit fraud; risk that management has an attitude to rationalise committing fraud; and risk that an auditor's special procedures will fail to detect fraud. The article demonstrates how to use such a model to plan for a financial audit where management fraud risk is assessed to be high. In addition, it discusses whether audit planning is better served by an integrated audit/fraud risk assessment as now suggested in SAS 107 (AICPA 2006a, see also ASA 200 in AUASB 2007) or by the approach illustrated here where a parallel, but separate, assessment is made of audit risk and fraud risk.     

Moody’s investors service response to the consultative paper issued by the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision “A new capital adequacy framework”

Moody's endorses the Basel Committee's proposal to use banks' internal risk assessments to refine the Basel Accord's risk weights on bank assets and commitments. External risk assessments, such as Moody's credit ratings, will likely play a supporting role as direct inputs into banks' internal rating systems and as tools for benchmarking and validating those systems. However, the widespread use of ratings in regulation threatens to undermine the quality of credit over time by increasing rating shopping, decreasing rating agency independence, and reducing incentives to innovate and improve the quality of ratings. This paper discusses how bank regulators can use external ratings in ways that mitigate the adverse incentives created by the resulting regulatory demand for rating agency services.     

Trust,acceptance and knowledge of technological and environmental hazards in Chile

Studies over the past decade have found empirical links between trust in risk management institutions and the risk perceptions and acceptability of various individual hazards. Mostly addressing food technologies, no study to date has explored wider possible relationships among all four core variables (risk, benefit, trust and acceptability) covering a heterogeneous group of hazards. Our prime objective was to ascertain effects among social trust in regulatory entities, and the public's perceived risk, perceived benefit and the degree of acceptability towards both technological and environmental hazards. We also assess whether trust in regulatory authorities is the cause (causal model) or a consequence (associationist model) of a hazard's acceptability for a wide and heterogeneous range of hazards on all four core variables. Using a web‐based survey, 539 undergraduates in Chile rated the five variables across 30 hazards. Implications for technology and environmental risk management organizations are discussed. Independent of the magnitude of the perceived risk or benefit surrounding a given hazard, or how knowledgeable the public claim to be of it, the trust sustained in regulatory institutions will either generate or be the consequence of public attitudes towards the hazard.     

Assessing qualitative similarities between financial reporting frameworks using visualization and rules: COREP vs. pillar 3

Financial institutions are struggling with larger volume, more specific and greater frequency of regulatory reporting after the global financial crisis in 2008, especially those that need to report to multiple jurisdictions. To help to improve reporting efficiency, this paper aims to assess the existence of similarities between templates related to credit and counter party credit risk of COREP and Pillar 3 regulatory reporting frameworks by applying Correspondence Analysis and Association Rules Mining. Our results suggest a high degree of overlap between these reporting frameworks, more prominently the three business functions as Front office, Finance and Risk. These patterns can be used as guidance for financial institutions to reshape their reporting architecture.     

国家审计与政府绩效管理

审计机关作为政府的职能部门,有义务也有责任对推进政府绩效管理作出贡献。本文在导入政府绩效管理的相关表述,强调国家审计介入政府绩效管理的意义后,从国家审计是加强和改进政府绩效管理的重要力量以及政府绩效管理为国家审计提供了深入发展的平台两个方面分析了国家审计与政府绩效管理的关系,并结合现有经验,特别是江苏推进绩效审计的实践,阐述了国家审计推进政府绩效管理的主要途径,并提出国家审计进一步推进政府绩效管理需解决的主要问题。     

The effect of earnings management on firm performance: The moderating role of corporate governance quality

This paper investigates the relationship between earnings management and financial performance of firms in Anglophone sub-Saharan African Countries in a dynamic framework. The study shows how this relationship is moderated by aggregate disclosure and best-practice corporate governance quality metrics. The findings indicate that earnings management's performance effects persist even after controlling for dynamic endogeneity, simultaneity, and unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity inherent in the earnings management and performance relationship. Again, the results support the prediction of agency theory regarding the efficient monitoring effect of adherence to best-practice internal governance systems in constraining firms' earnings management practices and subsequently enhancing firms' performance. Moreover, the study's findings regarding the positive effect of earnings management on performance, which suggests efficiency motives behind earnings management practices in Africa, demonstrate that the African context is uniquely different from other emerging markets that report opportunistic motives. Concerning the moderating role, our study reveals that the positive effect of earnings management on the financial performance of firms tends to be stronger in the presence of corporate governance quality.     

Strategic Governance and Management Accounting: Evidence From a Case Study

This paper seeks to establish if top management (the board) of a firm should extend its overview of the governance process to the execution of strategy (i.e., strategic governance) and, if so, does the management accounting information system (MAIS) have a role in facilitating this strategy execution process. This study investigated the role of the board and MAIS in strategic governance by examining a company with a public record of both successful governance and integrated strategic management accounting processes in a high‐risk industry. The analysis demonstrates that boards should go beyond the minimum conformance (compliance) requirements of the governance‐regulatory legislation and assume ultimate responsibility for strategy execution and enterprise performance. However, while management accounting techniques, processes and reports were found to be used extensively in strategic governance to integrate the policy‐management interface in numerous conformance–performance domains, the traditional role of the management accountant was found to be limited in terms of their role in such governance. The study demonstrates that a more strategic governance role offers the management accountant a way back into senior management by using the routines of management accounting to socialize the board and curb any opportunism that may arise.