Do managers use earnings guidance to influence street earnings exclusions?

Despite the apparent importance of “street earnings” to investors, we know relatively little about the process through which this earnings metric is determined. The limited evidence in the extant literature provides analyst-centric explanations, suggesting that analysts’ abilities and incentives influence which line items forecast-tracking services exclude from GAAP earnings to arrive at street earnings. We propose an alternative explanation: managers actively influence analysts’ forecast exclusion decisions via earnings guidance. We test this explanation by examining how earnings guidance influences two aspects of analysts’ exclusions: (1) special item exclusions (i.e., nonrecurring items) and (2) incremental exclusions (i.e., recurring items). We find that for firms with no special items in the previous year, when managers guide, analysts exclude almost all current-year special items, whereas when managers do not guide, the proportion that analysts exclude is significantly lower. More importantly, we that analysts’ incremental exclusions are significantly higher when managers guide than when they do not guide. Overall, our evidence suggests that managers play an active role in influencing the composition of street earnings via earnings guidance.     

Does earnings acceleration convey information?

Valuation theory, investment managers, financial analysts, and textbooks advocating horizontal financial statement analysis suggest that the change in earnings growth (earnings acceleration) conveys value relevant information. We test this assertion using a large sample of U.S. firms. Results from cross-sectional short-window (around earnings announcements) and long-window (annual) returns-earnings regressions reveal a strong association between contemporaneous returns and earnings acceleration after controlling for earnings levels and changes. Moreover, earnings acceleration is useful in predicting future earnings, and financial analysts appear to use the information in earnings acceleration in addition to earnings levels and changes in revising their forecasts. Furthermore, earnings acceleration conveys information incremental to that provided by changes in analysts’ forecasts of long-term earnings growth. This study extends the empirical returns-earnings model that includes only earnings levels and changes and shows that more useful information can be extracted from reported earnings numbers than has been previously documented.     

How far can we trust earnings numbers? What research tells us about earnings management

The article reviews the recent academic research literature on earnings management (EM) with a view to identifying research themes and results of interest to users and preparers of financial statements, accounting standard setters, and others with responsibility for ensuring that companies provide financial information to shareholders that can be relied upon. Hopefully students of accounting with an interest in exploring the EM literature will find that the article provides a useful framework. The literature on this topic is vast, and it is not possible to cover every article in detail. I provide an impressionistic survey that highlights examples of specific research themes and methods that regularly appear in the literature. Most of the examples are chosen from the literature published since 2000, although I do also highlight a few methodological contributions that appeared earlier. It is inevitable that the selection of articles reflects to some extent my personal interests and biases (intentional or otherwise). Thus, I wish to acknowledge that I owe a very substantial intellectual debt to the insights and contributions of the many uncited authors of a literature that spans over 40 years in over 20 accounting and finance journals.     

Where do firms manage earnings?

Despite decades of research on how, why, and when companies manage earnings, there is a paucity of evidence about the geographic location of earnings management within multinational firms. In this study, we examine where companies manage earnings using a sample of 2,067 U.S. multinational firms from 1994 to 2009. We predict and find that firms with extensive foreign operations in weak rule of law countries have more foreign earnings management than companies with subsidiaries in locations where the rule of law is strong. We also find some evidence that profitable firms with extensive tax haven subsidiaries manage earnings more than other firms and that the earnings management is concentrated in foreign income. Apart from these results, we find that most earnings management takes place in domestic income, not foreign income.     

Predictability and the earnings–returns relation

This paper studies the effects of predictability on the earnings–returns relation for individual firms and for the aggregate. We demonstrate that prices better anticipate earnings growth at the aggregate level than at the firm level, which implies that random-walk models are inappropriate for gauging aggregate earnings expectations. Moreover, we show that the contemporaneous correlation of earnings growth and stock returns decreases with the ability to predict future earnings. Our results may therefore help explain the apparently conflicting recent evidence that the earnings–returns relation is negative at the aggregate level but positive at the firm level.     

Are earnings announced early of higher quality?

This study examines whether the timing of annual earnings announcements is related to how promptly earnings incorporate value‐relevant information (timeliness in recognition), the extent to which earnings are managed (income smoothing) and the extent to which earnings are realized into operating cash flow (accruals quality). Based on Trueman ( 1990 ), we hypothesize that early announcers will have higher quality earnings. Our results, however, do not support these hypotheses. We find, instead, that late announcers have higher quality earnings and that earnings of late announcers recognize bad news on a more timelier basis than do earnings of early announcers.     

Market implied future earnings and analysts’ forecasts

This study provides evidence on market implied future earnings based on the residual income valuation (RIV) framework and compares these earnings with analyst earnings forecasts for accuracy (absolute forecast error) and bias (signed forecast error). Prior research shows that current stock price reflects future earnings and that analyst forecasts are biased. Thus, how price-based imputed forecasts compare with analyst forecasts is interesting. Using different cost of capital estimates, we use the price-earnings relation and impute firms’ future annual earnings from three residual income (RI) models for up to 5 years. Relative to I/B/E/S analyst forecasts, imputed forecasts from the RI models are less or no more biased when cost of capital is low (equal to a risk-free rate or slightly higher). Analysts slightly outperform these RI models in terms of accuracy for immediate future (1 or 2) years in the forecast horizon but the opposite is true for more distant future years when cost of capital is low. A regression analysis shows that, in explaining future earnings changes, analyst forecasts relative to imputed forecasts do not impound a significant amount of earnings information embedded in current price. In additional tests, we impute future long-term earnings growth rates and find that they are more accurate and less biased than I/B/E/S analyst long-term earnings growth forecasts. Together, the results suggest that the RIV framework can be used to impute a firm’s future earnings that are high in accuracy and low in bias, especially for distant future years.     

Use of benchmarks in predicting earnings management?

This study conducts multiple approaches to identify whether earnings benchmarks are an indicator for earnings management within the Australian market. We investigate firms reporting small positive earnings and small positive earnings changes, referred to as benchmark beaters. Accrual quality models, earnings distributions and earnings persistence measures are applied to identify whether benchmark beating firms are manipulating earnings. Our findings suggest that the small positive earnings benchmark attracts earnings managers. However, we do not identify any evidence to indicate that the positive earnings change benchmark is a signal for earnings management.     

When and why do IPO firms manage earnings?

There is significant disagreement about whether, when, and why IPO firms manage earnings. We precisely identify the timing and motives behind earnings management by IPO firms. The period around an IPO is characterized by two events: the IPO itself and the lockup expiration. Both the raising of capital at the IPO and the exit by pre-IPO shareholders at lockup expiration create incentives for firms to manage earnings. To disentangle the effect of these events, we examine quarterly, rather than annual, abnormal accruals. We find no evidence of income-increasing earnings management before the IPO. However, IPO firms exhibit positive abnormal accruals in the quarter before and the quarter of the lockup expiration. Positive abnormal accruals are concentrated in less scrutinized firms and firms with high selling by pre-IPO shareholders. Moreover, we find that these accruals subsequently reverse and that such reversals contribute to long-run IPO underperformance.     

Do more able managers provide better non-GAAP earnings?

This paper investigates whether managerial ability is associated with non-GAAP earnings quality. I find that the quality of non-GAAP earnings is greater for high-ability managers than low-ability managers. I also find that investors consider non-GAAP earnings released by high-ability management to be informative. Additional tests show that the positive association between managerial ability and the quality of non-GAAP earnings is stronger when return volatility or managerial stock ownership is greater. The results are robust to alternative measures of managerial ability and non-GAAP earnings quality and to controlling for endogeneity bias. Overall, this paper provides evidence that managers of high ability use non-GAAP reporting as a signalling tool to reduce information asymmetry.     

Detailed management earnings forecasts: do analysts listen?

We provide archival evidence on how a particular type of supplementary information affects the credibility of management earnings forecasts. Managers often provide detailed forecasts of specific income statement line items to shed light on how they plan to achieve their bottom-line earnings targets. We assess the effect of this forecast disaggregation on the credibility of management earnings forecasts. Based on a relatively large hand-collected sample of 900 management earnings forecasts, we find that disaggregation increases analysts’ sensitivity to the news in managers’ earnings guidance, suggesting that analysts find the guidance more credible. More importantly, we identify several factors that influence this relation. First, disaggregation plays a more important role when earnings are otherwise more difficult to forecast. Second, disaggregation is more important after Regulation Fair Disclosure prohibited selective disclosure, especially for firms that were more affected because they had previously provided more private guidance. Finally, in contrast to common assertions in the prior literature, we find that, in more recent years, disaggregation matters more for guidance that conveys bad news. Managers as well as researchers should be interested in evidence suggesting that financial analysts find disaggregation especially helpful in contexts where managers’ credibility is particularly important.     

What do dividends tell us about earnings quality?

Over the past 30 years, there have been significant changes in the distribution of earnings—cross-sectional variation has increased, with increasing left skewness—as well as in corporate payout policy, with many fewer firms paying dividends and the emergence of stock repurchases. We investigate whether the informativeness of payout policy with respect to earnings quality changes over this period. We find that the reported earnings of dividend-paying firms are more persistent than those of other firms and that this relation is remarkably stable over time. We also find that dividend payers are less likely to report losses and those losses that they do report tend to be transitory losses driven by special items. These results do not hold as strongly for stock repurchases, consistent with them representing less of a commitment than dividends.     

Do management EPS forecasts allow returns to reflect future earnings? Implications for the continuation of management’s quarterly earnings guidance

Using 18,253 firm-year observations from 1998 through 2003, we build on literature suggesting that more informative disclosures allow returns to better reflect future earnings and test whether management earnings per share forecasts and their characteristics influence the future earnings response coefficient (FERC). We find that FERCs are greater for forecasting firms and when forecasts are more frequent or precise. We suggest that more frequent and more precise forecasts assist investors in better predicting future earnings. Importantly, we find that quarterly and short-term forecasts incrementally increase the association between returns and future earnings beyond annual and long-term forecasts; thus, even short-term, quarterly forecasts allow investors to form better expectations about future earnings. This suggests a benefit of quarterly earnings forecasts possibly overlooked in recommendations from the United States Chamber of Commerce, CFA Institute, Business Roundtable Institute for Corporate Ethics, and The Conference Board to eliminate quarterly earnings guidance.     

Do UK firms manage earnings to meet dividend thresholds?

This paper examines earnings management by dividend-paying firms in cases where pre-managed earnings would fall below the expected dividend, and by non-dividend paying firms aiming to avoid reporting losses. We find that within the UK market the likelihood of upward earnings management is significantly greater in the former case than the latter, though both are drivers for earnings management. Large firms are less likely to upwardly manage earnings to reach dividend thresholds, consistent with prior UK evidence on the ability of the largest firms to avoid restrictive debt covenants. We also find that earnings management is more clearly observable through examining working capital discretionary accruals than through examining total discretionary accruals.     

Does auditor tenure influence the reporting of conservative earnings?

In this study, we examine the relation between auditor tenure and the reporting of conservative earnings. Using several measures of conservatism, we document a positive association between the conservatism in reported earnings and the length of the auditor–client relationship. We further document an increase in conservatism between short and medium tenure that does not deteriorate over long tenure. Collectively, the results imply lower conservatism for short auditor tenure, which suggests that mandating auditor rotation may have an adverse affect on the conservatism in reported earnings.     

Within-industry timing of earnings warnings: do managers herd?

An earnings surprise can be caused by a combination of firm-specific factors and market or industry factors. We hypothesize that managers have an incentive to time their warnings to occur soon after their industry peers’ warnings to minimize their apparent responsibility for earnings shortfalls. Using duration analysis, we find that firms accelerate their warnings in response to peer firms’ warnings. We conduct several tests to control for alternative explanations for warning clustering (for example, common shocks and information transfer) and conclude that the observed clustering is primarily due to herding. Our study is one of the first to empirically examine managers’ herding behavior and the first to document clustering of bad news. Moreover, we provide a multi-firm perspective on managers’ disclosure decisions that alerts researchers to consider or control for herding when they examine other determinants of managers’ disclosure decisions.     

Are CEOs compensated for value destroying growth in earnings?

Prior research shows that firms generating earnings growth by improving profitability create shareholder value, while firms generating earnings growth through investment destroy value. This paper examines whether compensation committees consider this while determining CEO compensation. We first confirm prior results that growth from increased profitability is perceived by markets to add value while growth from investment does not. While growth from increased profitability is positively associated with compensation, so is growth from investment. The presence of institutional ownership increases the weight on growth from increased profitability, but does not reduce the weight on growth from investment. Further, value-oriented institutional ownership increases the sensitivity of compensation growth to growth from increased profitability and reduces the sensitivity to growth from investment. Contrarily, growth-oriented institutional ownership increases the sensitivity of compensation growth to growth from investment. Our results highlight the importance of understanding the nature of earnings growth in determining executive compensation.     

Comment on ‘earnings management around UK open offers’

This note discusses the result of Iqbal, A., S. Espenlaub, and N. Strong. 2008 Iqbal, A., Espenlaub, S. and Strong, N. 2008. Earnings management around UK open offers. European Journal of Finance, this issue [Google Scholar]. Earnings management around UK open offers. European Journal of Finance, this issue, regarding long-run abnormal returns following open offers and announcement abnormal returns, compared with differing results in two previous studies based on similar samples. A survivorship bias explains some of the differences in the reported long-run abnormal returns. The difference in the announcement abnormal returns could be due to use of different data sources.     

Discretionary accruals: signalling or earnings management in Australia?

We investigate the signalling effect of discretionary accruals (DAC). Although we find that discretionary accruals are insignificantly related to contemporaneous stock returns, we uncover that income‐increasing discretionary accruals of GAAP‐complying growth firms are significantly and positively related to contemporaneous stock returns. Furthermore, we find that this positive effect is stronger among firms with better corporate governance mechanisms, such as Board of Directors Independence, Audit Committee Independence and Large Shareholders’ Ownership. In addition to contemporaneous stock returns, we also find similar results with the future increase in dividends. Our findings are consistent with the argument that corporate governance can enhance the signalling effect of reported earnings of GAAP‐complying growth firms.     

Do analysts overreact to extreme good news in earnings?

We provide an alternative explanation for the previous finding of analysts’ overreaction to extreme good news in earnings. We show that such finding could be a result of analysts’ rational behavior in the face of high earnings uncertainty rather than their cognitive bias. Extreme earnings performance tends to be associated with higher earnings uncertainty that generally leads to more forecast optimism. Once this effect is accounted for, the univariate result of analysts’ overreaction to extreme good news in earnings is subsumed, leaving only their underreaction in general.