以制造业为例的上市企业信用评级分析

随着产能过剩和企业效益下滑等问题逐渐向金融领域传导,为了降低不良贷款率,防范信贷风险,商业银行对上市企业信用评级的方法仍需不断完善.通过建立指标体系,综合运用因子分析和聚类分析的统计方法,对我国116家制造业上市企业划分了信用风险等级,进而建立了上市企业信用评级标准.     

企业信用评级衍生风险及其防范

在金融制度比较成熟的西方商业银行,企业信用评级作为风险管理的一个有效工具,其结果被广泛应用于银行经营管理的各个方面,包括信贷准入、授信审批、贷款定价、经济资本管理与绩效考核等等。因此,企业评级质量的高低直接影响商业银行的信贷结构及信贷质量,进而影响到商业银行的经营绩效。本文针对目前国内商业银行对企业开展信用评级过程中所暴露出的一些问题予以关注,并就信用评级过程中所存在的操作风险、交易风险以及道德风险等作重点论述,同时根据巴塞尔新资本协议对风险控制的要求,讨论如何降低和防范信用评级过程中所衍生的风险,以提高商业银行的整体风险管理水平。     

企业信用评级衍生风险及其防范

在金融制度比较成熟的西方商业银行,企业信用评级作为风险管理的一个有效工具,其结果被广泛应用于银行经营管理的各个方面,包括信贷准入、授信审批、贷款定价、经济资本管理与绩效考核等等。因此,企业评级质量的高低直接影响商业银行的信贷结构及信贷质量,进而影响到商业银行的经营绩效。本文针对目前国内商业银行对企业开展信用评级过程中所暴露出的一些问题予以关注,并就信用评级过程中所存在的操作风险、交易风险以及道德风险等作重点论述,同时根据巴塞尔新资本协议对风险控制的要求,讨论如何降低和防范信用评级过程中所衍生的风险,以提高商业银行的整体风险管理水平。     

基于ANP的银行信贷企业信用等级评价

科学、合理、准确地评价借款企业偿还能力是银行有效判断、规避信用风险的重要手段。信贷企业信用等级评价是银行确定风险程度的依据和信贷资产风险管理的重要基础。针对银行信贷企业的信用特点,提出了一个银行信贷企业信用等级综合评价指标体系,构建了一个基于ANP理论的银行信贷企业信用评价模型,为有效评价银行信贷企业信用等级提供了新的思路。     

商业银行绿色信贷助推能源央企低碳转型研究

能源央企是落实“双碳”目标的关键角色，绿色信贷在绿色低碳发展中有着重要的经济激励作用，商业银行绿色信贷助推能源央企低碳转型的研究受到更多关注。本文从理论基础和政策背景出发，分析当前能源央企绿色低碳转型的实践路径以及商业银行绿色信贷助推能源央企绿色低碳转型中的实践探索，针对存在的薄弱环节提出对策建议。     

商业银行推行低碳信贷的实践、困境与对策

在倡导经济与生态环境和谐可持续发展的今天,银行低碳信贷伴随低碳经济而提出,提倡商业银行可以通过将碳排放水平作为评判企业信用风险的重要指标来提供不同的金融产品和服务。实现低排放、低污染,用金融手段保护环境、推动低碳经济发展。本文通过分析商业银行推行低碳信贷的实践情况,解析在推行低碳信贷中面临的困境,进而提出了有效开展低碳信贷,解除困境的一些对策。     

碳金融业务分层模型及发展思路

碳金融的内涵从狭义到广义可划分为三个层次,分别基于碳交易、碳减排和气候变化的应对行动.广义的碳金融业务据此分为三个市场:低碳产业投融资市场、碳交易市场和气候风险资本市场,这三个市场共有绿色信贷、低碳产业直接融资、碳指标及衍生品交易、碳交易中介服务、碳金融理财产品、天气衍生品和巨灾债券七种业务模式.本文以制度、市场和组织...     

绿色金融政策推动商业银行资产配置绿色低碳化转型探析

近年来,我国逐步完善绿色金融政策,通过建立健全绿色信贷及债券标准,丰富绿色金融产品体系,形成绿色金融长效发展机制,推动商业银行资产配置绿色低碳化转型.绿色政策发挥降低资产风险、降低参与成本、拓宽配置空间的作用,持续为商业银行资产配置转型提供动力.此外,在绿色信贷的环境效益体现与业务认定标准、绿色债券发行机制与收益体现、碳金融工具定价及创新等方面,政策仍有较大的优化空间.商业银行应利用政策机遇,优化资产转型风控及资源配置机制,实现信贷由高碳向零碳的动态迭代,加强绿色债券的发行、投资及承销力度,加快绿色金融产品创新,助力实现"双碳"目标.     

商业银行碳资产质押融资业务发展策略分析

碳资产质押融资业务可以有效盘活碳资产，为企业加快绿色低碳转型提供资金支持，帮助企业提高碳减排效率。本文总结了商业银行碳资产质押融资业务的发展现状及面临的挑战，并提出了完善配套机制、加强客户营销以及强化流程管理等业务发展策略。     

碳减排、转型风险与监管应对——基于DSGE的政策模拟研究北大核心CSSCI

本文应用动态随机一般均衡模型,通过开展多情景政策模拟及数值分析,考察了碳减排约束(以碳税为例)对转型风险的影响以及监管应对策略。考察结果显示:放慢征税节奏、政策沟通先行,可增强碳税政策的稳定性,缓解转型风险;金融与实体经济间“循环反馈”式传导路径,可放大碳税转型风险。碳税与监管工具搭配的结果表明:通过对银行棕色、绿色资产实施差别监管,可优化银行资产结构,显著提高银行和整个金融体系的韧性,有效遏制转型风险放大作用;综合运用银行棕色资产惩罚和绿色资产支持工具,以及明确监管工具的政策目标,均可提升监管成效,防范转型风险。本文的政策启示是:在有序推进碳达峰碳中和基础上,应警惕金融体系风险放大器的作用,注重惩罚类和支持类监管工具的综合运用,提升金融体系韧性;同时,确保监管工具聚焦于防范低碳转型风险,避免政策目标泛化。     

A sparsity algorithm for finding optimal counterfactual explanations: Application to corporate credit rating

Machine learning methods used in finance for corporate credit rating lack transparency as to which accounting features are important for the respective rating. A counterfactual explanation is a methodology that attempts to find the smallest modification of the input values which changes the prediction of a learned algorithm to a new output, other than the original one. We propose a “sparsity algorithm” which finds a counterfactual explanation to find the most important features for obtaining a higher credit score. We validate the novel algorithm with synthetically generated data and we apply it to quarterly financial statements from companies in the US market. We provide evidence that the counterfactual explanation can capture the majority of features that change between two quarters when corporate ratings improve. The results obtained show that the higher the rating of a company, the greater the “effort” required to further improve credit rating.     

Ratings Quality and Borrowing Choice

Past studies document that incentive conflicts may lead issuer‐paid credit rating agencies to provide optimistically biased ratings. In this paper, we present evidence that investors question the quality of issuer‐paid ratings and raise corporate bond yields where the issuer‐paid rating is more positive than benchmark investor‐paid ratings. We also find that some firms with favorable issuer‐paid ratings substitute public bonds with borrowings from informed intermediaries to mitigate the “lemons discount” associated with poor quality ratings. Overall, our results suggest that the quality of issuer‐paid ratings has significant effects on borrowing costs and the choice of debt.     

An analysis and critique of the BIS proposal on capital adequacy and ratings

This paper examines two specific aspects of stage 1 of the Bank for International Settlement’s (BIS’s) proposed reforms to the 8% risk-based capital ratio. We argue that relying on “traditional” agency ratings could produce cyclically lagging rather leading capital requirements, resulting in an enhanced rather than reduced degree of instability in the banking and financial system. Despite this possible shortcoming, we believe that sensible risk based weighting of capital requirements is a step in the right direction. The current risk based bucketing proposal, which is tied to external agency ratings, or possibly to internal bank ratings, however, lacks a sufficient degree of granularity. In particular, lumping A and BBB (investment grade corporate borrowers) together with BB and B (below investment grade borrowers) severely misprices risk within that bucket and calls, at a minimum, for that bucket to be split into two. We examine the default loss experience on corporate bonds for the period 1981–1999 and propose a revised weighting system which more closely resembles the actual loss experience on credit assets.     

“一带一路”下防范主权信用评级风险的法律对策研究

“一带一路”战略的实施,凸显主权信用评级的重要价值。然而,主权评级屡次发生风险并演化为系统性风险和危机,造成重大损失。此风险一方面是由主权评级自身在金融稳定时期潜在的风险要素引起的,另一方面也是美欧当下缺乏有效的风险防范措施所导致的。因此,为推进“一带一路”建设,以尽早防范主权评级风险,我国应采取设定“本土+全球”的双评级规范、强化控制和监管国际评级机构以及减弱对主权评级的依赖等法律对策。     

债券评级机构变更——基于评级选购与评级迎合视角

本文以2008年至2017年的公司债券为样本,研究了发行人变更评级机构的影响,以此来解释评级市场上发行人频繁变更评级机构的现象。本文发现发行人变更评级机构后,其信用等级得到显著提升。发行人变更评级机构的行为对信用等级的影响在以下两种情形中更显著:一是当发行人所处行业或评级机构所在的评级市场竞争激烈时;二是当发行人主体评级位于AA信用等级的临界点时。进一步研究发现,考虑到评级机构变更与信用等级之间的交互影响,变更评级机构的发行人整体上可实现发债成本的降低。但该类发行人未来的违约风险增加、经营业绩下降。最后,本文发现债券发行规模较大以及非国有发行人更倾向于变更评级机构来提高信用等级。本文通过分析发行人更换信用评级机构的动机和后果,为监管部门构建以评级质量为导向的良性竞争环境提供借鉴参考。     

The reputational effects of analysts' stock recommendations and credit ratings: Evidence from operational risk announcements in the financial industry

This paper investigates whether more favorable stock recommendations and higher credit ratings serve as a reputational asset or reputational liability around reputation-damaging events. Analyzing the reputational effects of operational risk announcements incurred by financial institutions, we find that firms with a “Buy” stock recommendation or “Speculative Grade” credit rating are more likely to incur an equity-based reputational damage. In addition, firms with lower credit ratings incur a much more severe debt-based reputational damage. Moreover, credit ratings are more instrumental in mitigating the debt-based reputational damage caused by fraud incidents or incurred in non-banking activities. Furthermore, the misconduct of senior management could demolish the reputation of firms with less heterogeneous stock recommendations. Finally, credit ratings serve as an equity-based reputational asset in the short term but turn into an equity-based reputational liability in the long term. Overall, our analysis reveals that stock recommendations represent a reputational burden and credit ratings act as a reputational shield; however, the persistence and magnitude of such reputational effects are moderated by time and event characteristics.     

Sovereign ceilings “lite”? The impact of sovereign ratings on corporate ratings

Although credit rating agencies have gradually moved away from a policy of never rating a corporation above the sovereign (the ‘sovereign ceiling’), it appears that sovereign credit ratings remain a significant determinant of corporate credit ratings. We examine this link using data for advanced and emerging economies over the period of 1995–2009. Our main result is that a sovereign ceiling continues to affect the rating of corporations. The results also suggest that the influence of a sovereign ceiling on corporate ratings remains particularly significant in countries where capital account restrictions are still in place and with high political risk.     

The effect of corporate governance on firm’s credit ratings: further evidence using governance score in the United States

We investigate whether corporate governance affects firms’ credit ratings and whether improvement in corporate governance standards is associated with improvement in investment grade rating. We use the Gov‐score of Brown and Caylor (2006) , the Gomper’s G index and an entrenchment score of Bebchuk et al. (2009) to proxy for corporate governance. Using a sample of US firms, we find that firms characterized by stronger corporate governance have a significantly higher credit rating, and that this association is accentuated for smaller firms relative to larger firms. We find that an improvement in corporate governance is associated with improvement in bond rating.     

An Empirical Study of International Spillover of Sovereign Risk to Bank Credit Risk

The severity and complexity of the recent financial crisis has motivated the need for understanding the relationships between sovereign ratings and bank credit ratings. This is the first study to examine the impact of the “international” spillover of sovereign risk to bank credit risk through both a ratings channel and an asset holdings channel. In the first case, the downgrade of sovereign ratings in GIIPS (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) countries leads to rating downgrades of banks in the peripheral countries. The second channel indicates that larger asset holdings of GIIPS debt increases the credit risk of cross‐border banks, and hence, the probabilities of downgrade.     

Financial Distress in the Great Depression

We use firm‐level data to study corporate performance during the Great Depression era for all industrial firms on the NYSE. Our goal is to identify the factors that contribute to business insolvency and valuation changes during the period 1928‐1938. We find that firms with more debt and lower bond ratings in 1928 became financially distressed more frequently during the Depression, consistent with the trade‐off theory of leverage and the information production role of credit rating agencies. We also document for the first time that firms responded to tax incentives to use debt during the Depression era but that the extra debt used in response to this tax‐driven “debt bias” did not contribute significantly to the occurrence of distress. Finally, we conduct an out‐of‐sample test during the recent 2008‐2009 Recession and find that higher leverage and lower bond ratings also increased the occurrence of financial distress during this period.