Trade liberalization,forward‐looking firms,and welfare

We set up an oligopolistic model with two exporting firms selling to a third market to investigate the welfare implications of trade liberalization when the exporting firms are forward‐looking. The results show that with cost asymmetry trade liberalization encourages the exporting firms to engage in tacit collusion, which may not only be detrimental to the domestic welfare, but also to the consumer surplus of the importing country. Moreover, we find that tacit collusion is less sustainable if the government of the importing country imposes a lower (higher) tariff on the more (less) efficient exporting firm. If a nonforward‐looking or a forward‐looking cost‐efficient domestic firm exists in the importing country, then trade liberalization also encourages tacit collusion.     

On the International Linkages between Trade and Merger Policies*

In a three‐country model, this paper investigates linkages between merger incentives of exporting firms and the trade policy of an importing country. When exporting firms come from only one country, the tariff response of the importing country reverses the welfare effects of a merger in the exporting country. If there exist two exporting countries, a merger creates two types of conflicting international externalities. First, a merger in one exporting country increases profits of all firms. Secondly, non‐merged firms lose if the importing country is free to raise its tariff in response to a merger of foreign exporters.     

TARIFF POLICY AND WELFARE IN AN INTERNATIONAL DUOPOLY WITH CONSUMER‐FRIENDLY INITIATIVE

The purpose of this paper is to explore how strategic tariff policy and welfare are affected by the consumer‐friendly initiative of foreign exporting firms. We define a firm that is consumer‐friendly or non‐profit‐based if it considers both its own profit and consumer surplus. This paper extends Brander and Spencer by taking the consideration of consumer‐friendly firms into an international duopoly, and within such context examining the tariff policy and welfare. The consumer‐friendly initiative that leads to trade liberalization is a ‘Win‐Win‐Win’ solution in the sense that it is not only beneficial for foreign exporting firms, but also for the government and consumers of the importing country.     

Planting Disinformation through Voluntary Export Restraints

Voluntary export restraints typically are determined in bilateral negotiations between an importing country and a major exporting country, and have the appearance of forcibly limiting exports from the latter while leaving minor exporters unrestrained. However, during the negotiation process the major exporter can acquire insight into the nature of the importing country government. This private information may actually motivate the major exporter to restrain exports voluntarily.     

ORDERLY MARKETING ARRANGEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GATT REGIME*

When a country faces a sudden surge of import, GATT allows it to impose an import quota to protect its domestic import-competing firms. Nevertheless, various types of OMAs (orderly marketing arrangements) are often utilized instead of import quotas. This paper shows that the threat of the exporting country's retaliation approved by GATT makes it advantageous for both the exporting and importing countries to establish an OMA. By designing an OMA under which its deadweight loss is appropriately distributed to them, they avoid the retaliation approved by GATT which causes an additional deadweight loss.     

Importing exporters and exporting importers: A study of the decision of Chinese firms to engage in international trade

This paper examines the complex and interdependent relationship between importing and exporting for a panel of Chinese manufacturing firms. We estimate the decision to import and export simultaneously within a dynamic random‐effects bivariate probit framework addressing the endogenous initial conditions problem. Results show that decisions to export and import are simultaneously determined and that sunk‐entry costs play a significant role in a firm's decision to enter international markets. Costs are larger for exporting. We also find a substitution effect between the two decisions. The substitutability between exporting and importing is greater for financially constrained private firms.     

Strategic Regulation Policy in the Internet

Some countries are importers while others are exporters of global backbone connectivity. At the same time, input components such as local access are non-traded. This paper analyzes a non-cooperative regulatory game between importing and exporting countries, assuming that the prices of both traded and non-traded inputs can be regulated. We show that exporting countries choose a more restrictive regulation of non-traded goods than importing countries do. We further show that a requirement of international non-discrimination may hurt importing countries, and give firms producing traded inputs incentives to invest in quality degradation.     

Product standards, trade disputes, and protectionism

Abstract.  Disputes over national product standards are a major source of tension in international trade negotiations. The usual pattern is that exporters challenge new product standards as a 'disguised barrier to trade.' The paper develops a two‐country political agency model of standard setting. It is shown that there exists a political equilibrium in which the importing country on average applies a more stringent standard than the exporting country. This difference can be due either to a too lax standard in the exporting country or a too stringent standard in the importing country. JEL classification: F18, F13, D72     

出口战略、代工行为与本土企业创新—来自江苏地区制造业企业的经验证据

对来自江苏省微观企业大样本调查问卷的实证分析表明:以代工方式切入全球价值链生产体系是我国制造业本土企业参与全球市场的主要手段之一;我国制造业企业对国外市场依赖程度的不同会对其创新活动产生倒U型非线性影响效应;完全依赖于国外市场的代工企业创新活动显著受到代工"俘获效应"和"锁定效应"的负面作用影响。进一步分析还发现,我国代工企业的关键设备引进等行为,可能是阻碍其自主创新能力形成的重要因素之一。     

The Impact of Exporting and Export Destination on Manufacturing Wages: Evidence for Sub-Saharan Africa

This paper investigates wage effects of trade status of African firms. Using data for manufacturing firms, we find a positive overall association between individual earnings and export status. Moreover, the skill wage premium in exporting firms is significantly higher. These results are consistent with either trade inducing higher wages in the exporting country, or with more productive (higher wage) firms self‐selecting into exporting. The results are not robust, however, to disaggregation by export destination. Exporting to outside Africa generates a negative wage premium whereas exporting to African markets yields a positive premium in export firms of the exporting country. This suggests that there is a disciplining effect on the wages of exporting firms only when exporting is to more competitive markets.     

Uniform Versus Discriminatory Tariffs

We analyze the non‐cooperative interaction between two exporting countries producing differentiated products and one importing country when governments use optimal policies to maximize welfare. The analysis includes product differentiation, asymmetric costs, and Bertrand competition. For identical exporting countries we demonstrate that the importing country always prefers a uniform tariff regime while both exporting countries prefer a discriminatory tariff regime for any degree of product differentiation. If countries are asymmetric in terms of production cost then the higher‐cost exporter always prefers the discriminatory regime but the lower‐cost exporter prefers the uniform regime if there is a significant cost differential. With cost asymmetry the announcement of a uniform tariff regime by the importer is not a credible strategy since there is an incentive to deviate to discrimination. This implies an international body can play a role in ensuring that tariff agreements are respected.     

Optimal tariffs with inframarginal exporters

This paper shows that an importing country can have an incentive to impose a tariff to extract rents earned by foreign exporters even in a perfectly competitive setting. To demonstrate this, I develop a new model of international trade that incorporates fixed costs of exporting and firm heterogeneity within a perfectly competitive framework. In this setting, despite the fact that there are no preexisting distortions, the optimal tariff is positive even for a small country with no world market power. In the limit, as either firm heterogeneity or the fixed costs of exporting vanish, the optimal tariff approaches zero.     

An analysis of the MFN clause under asymmetries of cost and market structure

Abstract.  We conduct a welfare comparison of MFN and tariff discrimination in an oligopoly model of trade between two exporting countries and one importing country. While MFN dominates tariff discrimination from a world welfare perspective when exporting countries are asymmetric with respect to either cost or market structure, such need not be the case when both types of asymmetries co‐exist. In particular, when high‐cost exporters are merged and the cost disadvantage of the merged unit relative to competing firms is of intermediate magnitude, tariff discrimination can be welfare preferred to MFN (even when the average tariff is actually lower under MFN). JEL classification: F13, F12     

Export cartel and consumer welfare

The purpose of this paper is to show that export cartels are not necessarily harmful for consumers in the importing countries. Using a strategic trade policy model, we show that, contrary to the harmful effect, product‐market cooperation benefits consumers by affecting the trade policies. We further show that consumers in the importing countries are affected adversely if cooperation is among the governments of the exporting countries, instead of the exporting firms.     

An Analysis of a Rules-based Approach to Disciplining Export Credits in Agriculture

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the comparative static effects of rules-based disciplines for government supported export credit arrangements. The arrangements provide traders in the country offering the guarantees more favourable borrowing conditions. This may provide an advantage relative to rival exporters since the supported trader may offer better financial terms to importers. Rules that discipline implicit interest rate subsidies are appropriate when an importing country does not face liquidity constraints when borrowing. However, these rules may not be appropriate with liquidity constraints because of the potential for additionality and benefits for all exporting countries. Rules on benchmarks for insurance premiums are always appropriate because insurance subsidies unambiguously have the potential to distort markets.     

Impact of nontariff measures on firms in Tunisia

This paper analyzes the effect of nontariff measures (NTMs) on firms in Tunisia. It draws a precise picture of NTMs’ effects on firms’ imports. We use firm‐level data to take into account firm heterogeneity. We explore the impact of NTMs on small vs. medium and large firms. We also consider the differentiated impact of NTMs. Some measures have informational content and help reduce information asymmetries. When the endogeneity issue of NTMs is controlled for, results show an overall positive impact of NTMs on imports. They provide evidence that NTMs are more beneficial to the imports of medium and large firms. Moreover, NTMs with informational content have an import enhancing effect. An extended analysis separating importing and exporting firms from those solely importing suggests that both types of firms benefit from the positive effects of NTMs. This result highlights the need to assist small firms facing NTMs. Furthermore, some NTMs with informational content should be addressed carefully and not considered only as barriers to trade to be eliminated. Instead, harmonization efforts between countries can be a better policy.     

Optimal Pollution Standard in an Open Economy: Characterizing Environmental Diversity

The paper examines the optimal pollution standard for a large open economy. Using a two-country partial-equilibrium framework, the optimal standards are charaterized for autarky, free trade, and free trade together with cooperation among countries in setting standards. If pollution is local, at the free-trade equilibrium, the exporting country imposes a stricter standard than does the importing country. The ranking may be reversed if pollution is transnational. A surpriising implication is that if pollution is local, cooperation may imply a less stringent standard for both the exporting country and the importing country.     

Importing,Exporting, and Innovation in Developing Countries

This study shows the persistent differences in evolution of firms when they are grouped according to their trade orientation as: two‐way traders (both importing and exporting), “exporters‐only”, “importers‐only”, and nontraders. Extending the existing models of firm evolution into an open economy setup by incorporating the importing decision, a simple model is presented and it is empirically shown that: (i) globally engaged firms are larger, more productive, and grow faster than nontraders; (ii) two‐way traders are the fastest growing and most innovative group who are followed by exporter‐only firms; and (iii) estimating the export premium without controlling for import status is likely to overestimate the actual value by capturing the import premium. Robustness of the results is shown by providing evidence from the panel data constructed from the original dataset and controlling for variables that are likely to affect firm evolution.     

Strategic Distortion of the Objectives of Trade Policy

Abstract

By employing a simple three-country model in which there are two exporting countries and one consuming country, this paper analyses the consequences of one-country strategic distortion of the objectives of trade policy. It finds that although an exporting country can benefit from strategic distortion, it would be preferred that the importing country distorts its policy. Furthermore, it is found that preferential trading agreements can emerge endogenously.     

The trade distorting effect of state trading enterprises in importing countries

This paper focuses on the potential trade distorting effect of state trading enterprises, an issue that is likely to receive greater attention than hitherto in the context of the current agricultural negotiations in the WTO. Although state trading enterprises can arise in both exporting and importing countries, the emphasis here is on the importing country case. Our results show that state trading enterprises do distort trade, though the nature of the distortion (i.e., whether it is equivalent to an import tariff or import subsidy) depends on the nature of exclusive rights bestowed by government on the state enterprise. We also consider state trading enterprises in both developed and developing economies, the main difference being the nature of the government's pay-off function. The theoretical framework allows us to derive the tariff equivalent effects for various types of STEs, the results suggesting that the trade distorting effect is likely to vary considerably dependent on the type of STE that arises in particular circumstances.