The innovation value chain

The challenges of coming up with fresh ideas and realizing profits from them are different for every company. One firm may excel at finding good ideas but may have weak systems for bringing them to market. Another organization may have a terrific process for funding and rolling out new products and services but a shortage of concepts to develop. In this article, Hansen and Birkinshaw caution executives against using the latest and greatest innovation approaches and tools without understanding the unique deficiencies in their companies' innovation systems. They offer a framework for evaluating innovation performance: the innovation value chain. It comprises the three main phases of innovation (idea generation, conversion, and diffusion) as well as the critical activities performed during those phases (looking for ideas inside your unit; looking for them in other units; looking for them externally; selecting ideas; funding them; and promoting and spreading ideas companywide). Using this framework, managers get an end-to-end view of their innovation efforts. They can pinpoint their weakest links and tailor innovation best practices appropriately to strengthen those links. Companies typically succumb to one of three broad "weakest-link" scenarios. They are idea poor, conversion poor, or diffusion poor. The article looks at the ways smart companies - including Intuit, P&G, Sara Lee, Shell, and Siemens- modify the best innovation practices and apply them to address those organizations' individual needs and flaws. The authors warn that adopting the chain-based view of innovation requires new measures of what can be delivered by each link in the chain. The approach also entails new roles for employees "external scouts" and "internal evangelists," for example. Indeed, in their search for new hires, companies should seek out those candidates who can help address particular weaknesses in the innovation value chain.     

Discovering new points of differentiation

Most profitable strategies are built on differentiation: offering customers something they value that competitors don't have. But most companies concentrate only on their products or services. In fact, a company can differentiate itself every point where it comes in contact with its customers--from the moment customers realize they need a product or service to the time when they dispose of it. The authors believe that if companies open up their thinking to their customer's entire experience with a product or service--the consumption chain--they can uncover opportunities to position their offerings in ways that neither they nor their competitors though possible. The authors show how even a mundane product such as candles can be successfully differentiated. By analyzing its customers' experiences and exploring various options, Blyth Industries, for example, has grown from a $2 million U.S. candle manufacturer into a global candle and accessory business with nearly $500 million in sales and a market value of $1.2 billion. Finding ways to differentiate one's company is a skill that can be nurtured, the authors contend. In this Manager's Tool Kit, they have designed a two-part approach that can help companies continually identify new points of differentiation and develop the ability to generate successful differentiation strategies. "Mapping the Consumption Chain" captures the customer's total experience with a product or service. "Analyzing Your Customer's Experience" shows managers how directed brainstorming about each step in the consumption chain can elicit numerous ways to differentiate any offering.     

The research vendor selection process: A quantitative decision matrix for increasing value for both buyers and sellers

This paper provides a real life example of the importance of the research vendor selection process within an organisation that is transforming its focus towards a customer-centric approach through an increased understanding of customers and consumers and the use of research for segmentation. The authors have developed a ‘Vendor Selection Matrix’ which quantitatively weighs and measures potential vendors against key criteria for successful research and segmentation. This matrix was used on a consulting project with a Canadian-based financial services organisation. Valuable insights and ideas for marketing executives, managers and professionals, the market research community and marketers of financial services products are provided. The paper finishes with the key lessons learnt throughout the market research vendor selection process, industry applicability and implications for further research.     

The relative value of growth

Most executives would say that adding a point of growth and gaining a point of operating-profit margin contribute about equally to shareholder value. Margin improvements hit the bottom line immediately, while growth compounds value over time. But the reality is that the two are rarely equivalent. Growth often is far more valuable than managers think. For some companies, convincing the market that they can grow by just one additional percentage point can be worth six, seven, or even ten points of margin improvement. This article presents a new strategic metric, called the relative value of growth (RVG), which gives managers a clear picture of how growth projects and margin improvement initiatives affect shareholder value. Using basic balance sheet and income sheet data, managers can determine their companies' RVGs, as well as those of their competitors. Calculating RVGs gives managers insights into which corporate strategies are working to deliver value and whether their companies are pulling the most powerful value-creation levers. The author examines a number of well-known companies and explains what their RVG numbers say about their strategies. He reviews the unspoken assumption that growth and profits are incompatible over the long term and shows that a fair number of companies are effective at delivering both. Finally, he explains how managers can use the RVG framework to help them define strategies that balance growth and profitability at both the corporate and business unit levels.     

Take command of your growth

Ask senior managers to pare costs by 10%, and they know just what to do. Ask them to boost growth by 10%, and they're stymied, assuming that growth is not really something they can influence. But managers can control their company's growth if they have better information about where their revenues are coming from. Rather than sort sales by geographic market, business unit, or product line, they should break them out in a way that reveals which part of their strategy is responsible for what part of their revenue. This article presents a tool--the sources of revenue statement (SRS)--that does just that. Through straightforward calculations using data taken from a company's balance sheet, along with estimations of customer-churn and industry growth rates, the SRS enables managers to classify their revenue according to five sources of growth: continuing sales to established customers (base retention); sales won from the competition (share gain); sales that fell into their laps because the market was expanding (market position); sales from moves into adjacent markets; and sales from entirely new lines of business. Once sorted in this way, revenue can be viewed as the outgrowth of manageable circumstances. At one company, seemingly healthy 10% total revenue growth masked substantial customer defections counter-balanced only by sales in a fast-expanding market--a market that actually grew faster than the company did. Rather than doing well, the company was ceding customers and market share to competitors. Comparing the sources of revenue across divisions can uncover similarly profound insights, which can suggest smart ways to change strategy or set stretch goals. Hundreds of companies are perched atop enormous potential that they can't see and so don't exploit. The SRS can endow them with sight and, more important, with understanding.     

Reputation and its risks

Regulators, industry groups, consultants, and individual companies have developed elaborate guidelines over the years for assessing and managing risks in a wide range of areas, from commodity prices to natural disasters. Yet they have all but ignored reputational risk, mostly because they aren't sure how to define or measure it. That's a big problem, say the authors. Because so much market value comes from hard-to-assess intangible assets like brand equity and intellectual capital, organizations are especially vulnerable to anything that damages their reputations. Moreover, companies with strong positive reputations attract better talent and are perceived as providing more value in their products and services, which often allows them to charge a premium. Their customers are more loyal and buy broader ranges of products and services. Since the market believes that such companies will deliver sustained earnings and future growth, they have higher price-earnings multiples and market values and lower costs of capital. Most companies, however, do an inadequate job of managing their reputations in general and the risks to their reputations in particular. They tend to focus their energies on handling the threats to their reputations that have already surfaced. That is not risk management; it is crisis management--a reactive approach aimed at limiting the damage.The authors provide a framework for actively managing reputational risk. They introduce three factors (the reputation-reality gap, changing beliefs and expectations, and weak internal coordination) that affect the level of such risks and then explore several ways to sufficiently quantify and control those factors. The process outlined in this article will help managers do a better job of assessing existing and potential threats to their companies' reputations and deciding whether to accept a particular risk or take actions to avoid or mitigate it.     

Value innovation: the strategic logic of high growth

Why are some companies able to sustain high growth in revenues and profits--and others are not? To answer that question, the authors, both of INSEAD, spent five years studying more than 30 companies around the world. They found that the difference between the high-growth companies and their less successful competitors was in each group's assumptions about strategy. Managers of the less successful companies followed conventional strategic logic. Managers of the high-growth companies followed what the authors call the logic of value innovation. Conventional strategic logic and value innovation differ along the basic dimensions of strategy. Many companies take their industry's conditions as given; value innovators don't. Many companies let competitors set the parameters of their strategic thinking; value innovators do not use rivals as benchmarks. Rather than focus on the differences among customers, value innovators look for what customers value in common. Rather than view opportunities through the lens of existing assets and capabilities, value innovators ask, What if we start anew? The authors tell the story of the French hotelier Accor, which discarded the notion of what a hotel is supposed to look like in order to offer what most customers want: a good night's sleep at a low price. And Virgin Atlantic challenged industry conventions by eliminating first-class service and channeling savings into innovations for business-class passengers. Those companies didn't set out to build advantages over the competition, but they ended up achieving the greatest competitive advantages.     

Profit pools: a fresh look at strategy

In charting strategy, many managers focus on revenue growth, assuming that profits will follow. But that approach is dangerous: today's deep revenue pool may become tomorrow's dry hole. To create strategies that result in profitable growth, managers need to look beyond revenues to see the shape of their industry's profit pool. The authors define an industry's profit pool as the total profits earned at all points along the industry's value chain. Although the concept is simple, the structure of a profit pool is usually quite complex. The pool will be deeper in some segments of the value chain than in others, and depths will vary within an individual segment as well. Segment profitability may, for example, vary widely by customer group, product category, geographic market, and distribution channel. Moreover, the pattern of profit concentration in an industry will often be very different from the pattern of revenue concentration. The authors describe how successful companies have gained competitive advantage by developing sophisticated profit-pool strategies. They explain how U-Haul identified new sources of profit in the consumer-truck-rental industry; how Merck reached beyond its traditional value-chain role to protect its profits in the pharmaceuticals industry; how Dell rebounded from a misguided channel decision by refocusing on its traditional source of profit; and how Anheuser-Busch made a series of astute product, pricing, and operating decisions to dominate the beer industry's profit pool. The companies with the best understanding of their industry's profit pool, the authors argue, will be in the best position to thrive over the long term.     

Introducing T-shaped managers. Knowledge management's next generation

Most companies do a poor job of capitalizing on the wealth of expertise scattered across their organizations. That's because they tend to rely on centralized knowledge-management systems and technologies. But such systems are really only good at distributing explicit knowledge, the kind that can be captured and codified for general use. They're not very good at transferring implicit knowledge, the kind needed to generate new insights and creative ways of tackling business problems or opportunities. The authors suggest another approach, something they call T-shaped management, which requires executives to share knowledge freely across their organization (the horizontal part of the "T"), while remaining fiercely committed to their individual business unit's performance (the vertical part). A few companies are starting to use this approach, and one--BP Amoco--has been especially successful. From BP's experience, the authors have gleaned five ways that T-shaped managers help companies capitalize on their inherent knowledge. They increase efficiency by transferring best practices. They improve the quality of decision making companywide. They grow revenues through shared expertise. They develop new business opportunities through the cross-pollination of ideas. And they make bold strategic moves possible by delivering well-coordinated implementation. All that takes time, and BP's managers have had to learn how to balance that time against the attention they must pay to their own units. The authors suggest, however, that it's worth the effort to find such a balance to more fully realize the immense value of the knowledge lying idle within so many companies.     

Charting your company's future

Few companies have a clear strategic vision. The problem, say the authors, stems from the strategic-planning process itself, which usually involves preparing a large document, culled from a mishmash of data provided by people with conflicting agendas. That kind of process almost guarantees an unfocused strategy. Instead, companies should design the strategic-planning process by drawing a picture: a strategy canvas. A strategy canvas shows the strategic profile of your industry by depicting the various factors that affect competition. And it shows the strategic profiles of your current and potential competitors as well as your own company's strategic profile--how it invests in the factors of competition and how it might in the future. The basic component of a strategy canvas--the value curve--is a tool the authors created in their consulting work and have written about in previous HBR articles. This article introduces a four-step process for actually drawing and discussing a strategy canvas. Readers will learn how one European financial services company used this process to create a distinct and easily communicable strategy. The process begins with a visual awakening. Managers compare their business's value curve with competitors' to discover where their strategy needs to change. In the next step--visual exploration--managers do field research on customers and alternative products. At the visual strategy fair, the third step, managers draw new strategic profiles based on field observations and get feedback from customers and peers about these new proposals. Once the best strategy is created from that feedback, it's time for the last step--visual communication. Executives distribute "before" and "after" strategic profiles to the whole company, and only projects that will help move the company closer to the "after" profile are supported.     

Creating new growth platforms

Sooner or later, most companies can't attain the growth rates expected by their boards and CEOs and demanded by investors. To some extent, such businesses are victims of their own successes. Many were able to sustain high growth rates for a long time because they were in high-growth industries. But once those industries slowed down, the businesses could no longer deliver the performance that investors had come to take for granted. Often, companies have resorted to acquisition, though this strategy has a discouraging track record. Over time, 65% of acquisitions destroy more value than they create. So where does real growth come from? For the past 12 years, the authors have been researching and advising companies on this issue. With the support of researchers at Harvard Business School and Insead, they instituted a project titled "The CEO Agenda and Growth". They identified and approached 24 companies that had achieved significant organic growth and interviewed their CEOs, chief strategists, heads of R&D, CFOs, and top-line managers. They asked, "Where does your growth come from?" and found a consistent pattern in the answers. All the businesses grew by creating new growth platforms (NGPs) on which they could build families of products and services and extend their capabilities into multiple new domains. Identifying NGP opportunities calls for executives to challenge conventional wisdom. In all the companies studied, top management believed that NGP innovation differed significantly from traditional product or service innovation. They had independent, senior-level units with a standing responsibility to create NGPs, and their CEOs spent as much as 50% of their time working with these units. The payoff has been spectacular and lasting. For example, from 1985 to 2004, the medical devices company Medtronic grew revenues at 18% per year, earnings at 20%, and market capitalization at 30%.     

Breaking out of the innovation box

In most companies, investments in innovation follow a boom-bust cycle. For a time, the cash flows. Then, as the economy sours or companies rethink their priorities, the taps go dry. But when research budgets are slashed, the strong projects are often abandoned along with the weak ones. Promising initiatives are cut off just when they are about to bear fruit. Expensive labs are closed; partnership agreements costing millions in legal fees are thrown away. When disruptive changes in the competitive landscape come, companies are caught flat-footed. Sustainable innovation requires a new approach: Instead of being largely isolated projects, innovation initiatives need to gain access to the insights and capabilities of other companies. To be protected from the ax of short-term cost reductions and the faddishness born of easy money, the initiatives must become part of the ongoing commerce that takes place among companies. But how can businesses traffic in such sensitive information without giving their competitors an advantage? The answer, the author contends, lies in a practice that's been common since the Middle Ages: the use of independent intermediaries to facilitate the exchange of sensitive information among companies without revealing the principals' identities or motives and without otherwise compromising their interests. Executive search firms, for example, allow job seekers to remain anonymous during the early stages of a search, and they protect businesses from disclosing their hiring plans to rivals. A network of innovation intermediaries would be in a unique position to visualize new opportunities synthesized from insights and technologies provided by several companies--ideas that might never occur to businesses working on their own.     

The discipline of innovation

Some innovations spring from a flash of genius. But as Peter Drucker points out in this HBR Classic, most result from a conscious, purposeful search for opportunities. For managers seeking innovation, engaging in disciplined work is more important than having an entrepreneurial personality. Writing originally in the May-June 1985 issue, Drucker describes the major sources of opportunities for innovation. Within a company or industry, opportunities can be found in unexpected occurrences, incongruities of various kinds, process needs, or changes in an industry or market. Outside a company, opportunities arise from demographic changes, changes in perception, or new knowledge. These seven sources overlap, and the potential for innovation may well lie in more than one area at a time. Innovations based on new knowledge, of course, tend to have the greatest effect on the marketplace. But it often takes decades before the ideas are translated into actual products, processes, or services. The other sources of innovation are easier and simpler to handle, yet they still require managers to look beyond established practices. Drucker emphasizes that in seeking opportunities, innovators need to look for simple, focused solutions to real problems. The greatest praise an innovation can receive is for people to say, "This is obvious!" Grandiose ideas designed to revolutionize an industry rarely work. Innovation, like any other endeavor, takes talent, ingenuity, and knowledge. But Drucker cautions that if diligence, persistence, and commitment are lacking, companies are unlikely to succeed at the business of innovation.     

Managing the right tension

Of all the competing objectives every company faces, three pairs stand out: profitability versus growth, the short term versus the long term, and the whole organization versus the units. In each case, progress on one front usually comes at the expense of progress on the other. The authors researched the performance of more than 1000 companies worldwide over the past two decades and found that most struggle to succeed across the three tensions. From 1983 to 2003, for example, only 32% of these companies more often than not achieved positive profitability and revenue growth at the same time. The problem, the authors discovered, is not so much that managers don't recognize the tensions--those are all too familiar to anyone who has ever run a business. Rather, it is that managers frequently don't focus on the tension that matters most to their company. Even when they do identify the right tension, they usually make the mistake of prioritizing a "lead" objective within it-for example, profitability over growth. As a result, companies often end up moving first in this direction, then in that, and then back again, never quite resolving the tension. The companies that performed best adopted a very different approach. Instead of setting a lead objective, they looked at how best to strengthen what the two sides of each tension have in common: For profitability and growth,the common bond is customer benefit; for the short term and the long, it is sustainable earnings; and for the whole and its parts, it is particular organizational resources and capabilities. The authors describe how companies can select the right tension, what traps they may fall into when they focus on one side over the other, and how to escape these traps by managing to the bonds between objectives.     

Lean consumption

During the past 20 years, the real price of most consumer goods has fallen worldwide, the variety of goods and the range of sales channels offering them have continued to grow, and product quality has steadily improved. So why is consumption often so frustrating? It doesn't have to be--and shouldn't be--the authors say. They argue that it's time to apply lean thinking to the processes of consumption--to give consumers the full value they want from goods and services with the greatest efficiency and the least pain. Companies may think they save time and money by off-loading work to the consumer but, in fact, the opposite is true. By streamlining their systems for providing goods and services, and by making it easier for customers to buy and use those products and services, a growing number of companies are actually lowering costs while saving everyone time. In the process, these businesses are learning more about their customers, strengthening consumer loyalty, and attracting new customers who are defecting from less user-friendly competitors. The challenge lies with the retailers, service providers, manufacturers, and suppliers that are not used to looking at total cost from the standpoint of the consumer and even less accustomed to working with customers to optimize the consumption process. Lean consumption requires a fundamental shift in the way companies think about the relationship between provision and consumption, and the role their customers play in these processes. It also requires consumers to change the nature of their relationships with the companies they patronize. Lean production has clearly triumphed over similar obstacles in recent years to become the dominant global manufacturing model. Lean consumption, its logical companion, can't be far behind.     

The discipline of innovation. 1985

How much of innovation is inspiration, and how much is hard work? The answer lies somewhere in the middle, says management thinker Peter Drucker. In this HBR classic from 1985, he argues that innovation is real work that can and should be managed like any other corporate function. Success is more likely to result from the systematic pursuit of opportunities than from a flash of genius. Indeed, most innovative business ideas arise through the methodical analysis of seven areas of opportunity. Within a company or industry, opportunities can be found in unexpected occurrences, incongruities of various kinds, process needs, or changes in an industry or market. Outside a company, opportunities arise from demographic changes, changes in perception, or new knowledge. There is some overlap among the sources, and the potential for innovation may well lie in more than one area at a time. Innovations based on new knowledge tend to have the greatest effect on the marketplace, but it often takes decades before the ideas are translated into actual products, processes, or services. The other sources of innovation are easier and simpler to handle, yet they still require managers to look beyond established practices, Drucker explains. The author emphasizes that innovators need to look for simple, focused solutions to real problems. The greatest praise an innovation can receive is for people to say, "That's so obvious!" Grandiose ideas designed to revolutionize an industry rarely work. Innovation, like any other endeavor, takes talent, ingenuity, and knowledge. But Drucker cautions that if diligence, persistence, and commitment are lacking, companies are unlikely to succeed at the business of innovation.     

Top Management Incentives and Corporate Performance

There is little agreement about either the effect of executive compensation on corporate performance or the best way to measure the strength of executive incentives. With little guidance from academic research, managers and directors continue to rely heavily on the percentage of pay "at risk" as a proxy for incentive strength.
Starting with the premise that managers, like investors, are motivated by prospective changes in their wealth, this article presents a measure of incentive strength called "wealth leverage" that reflects the sensitivity of an executive's company-related wealth—total stock and option holdings plus the present value of expected future compensation, including future salary, bonus and stock compensation—to changes in shareholder wealth. After estimating top management's wealth leverage at 702 companies, the authors conclude that: 1) the median company has significant wealth leverage; 2) almost all corporate wealth leverage comes from their accumulated stock and option holdings, not from current compensation; and 3) companies with higher wealth leverage significantly outperform their industry competitors.     

Predators and prey: a new ecology of competition

Much has been written about networks, strategic alliances, and virtual organizations. Yet these currently popular frameworks provide little systematic assistance when it comes to out-innovating the competition. That's because most managers still view the problem in the old way: companies go head-to-head in an industry, battling for market share. James Moore sets up a new metaphor for competition drawn from the study of biology and social systems. He suggests that a company be viewed not as a member of a single industry but as a part of a business ecosystem that crosses a variety of industries. In a business ecosystem, companies "co-evolve" around a new innovation, working cooperatively and competitively to support new products and satisfy customer needs. Apple Computer, for example, leads an ecosystem that covers personal computers, consumer electronics, information, and communications. In any larger business environment, several ecosystems may vie for survival and dominance, such as the IBM and Apple ecosystems in personal computers or Wal-Mart and K mart in discount retailing. In fact, it's largely competition among business ecosystems, not individual companies, that's fueling today's industrial transformation. Managers can't afford to ignore the birth of new ecosystems or the competition among those that already exist. Whether that means investing in the right new technology, signing on suppliers to expand a growing business, developing crucial elements of value to maintain leadership, or incorporating new innovations to fend off obsolescence, executives must understand the evolutionary stages all business ecosystems go through and, more important, how to direct those changes.     

EVA AND THE "NEW ECONOMY"

Some have observed that the new economy means the end of the EVA performance measurement and incentive compensation system. They claim that although the EVA system is useful for oldline companies with heavy investments in fixed assets, the efficient management of investor capital is no longer an imperative for newage firms that operate largely without buildings and machinery–and, in some cases, with negative working capital. This article argues that EVA is not only suitable for the emerging companies that lead the new economy, but even more important for such firms than for their “rust belt” predecessors. While there may be a new economy in terms of trade in new products and services, there is no new economics– the principles of economic valuation remain the same. As in the past, companies will create value in the future only insofar as they promise to produce returns on investor capital that exceed the cost of capital. It has made for sensational journalism to speak of companies with high valuations and no earnings, but this is in large part the result of an accounting framework that is systematically flawed. New economy companies spend much of their capital on R&D, marketing, and advertising. By treating these outlays as expenses against current profits, GAAP accounting presents a grossly distorted picture of both current and future profitability. By contrast, an EVA system capitalizes such investments and amortizes them over their expected useful life. For new economy companies, the effect of such adjustments on profitability can be significant. For example, in applying EVA accounting to Real Networks, Inc., the author shows that although the company reported increasing losses in recent years, its EVA has been steadily rising–a pattern of profitability that corresponds much more directly to the change in the company's market value over the same period. Thus, for stock analysts that follow new economy companies, the use of EVA will get you closer to current market values than GAAP accounting. And for companies intent on ensuring the right level of investment in intangibles– neither too much nor too little– EVA is likely to send the right message to managers and employees. The recent decline in the Nasdaq suggests that stock market investors are starting to look for the kind of capital efficiency encouraged by an EVA system.