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1.
We study the effects of an economic policy in an endogenous growth general equilibrium framework where production of consumption
goods requires two resource inputs: a polluting non-renewable resource and a non-polluting labour resource. The use of the
former contributes to the accumulation of pollution in the atmosphere, which affects welfare. There is a specific research
sector associated with each of those resources. We provide a full welfare analysis, and we describe the equilibrium paths
in a decentralized economy. We go on to study the effects of three associated economic policy tools: a tax on the polluting
resource, and two research subsidies. We show that the optimal environmental policy has two main effects; it delays the extraction
of the resource and with it the level of polluting emissions and it reallocates research efforts, decreasing the amount put
into “grey” research to the benefit of “green” research. We also show that the environmental policy is grey-biased in the
short-term, and green-biased in the long-term. Finally, we compute the optimal values for these tools.
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2.
The most fundamental proposition about growth and competition is that there is a tradeoff between static welfare and long-term
growth. This paper reconsiders this basic proposition in an expanding variety endogenous growth model with competitive markets
for “old” innovative products and for a traditional good. We shed light on some implications of monopolistic distortions which
tend to be ignored by standard models. First, no growth may be better than some growth, since modest positive growth potentially
requires sizeable static welfare losses. Second, the economy may converge to a steady state with zero growth, even though
a locally saddle-point stable steady state with positive growth exists if the initial share of “cheap” competitive markets
is sufficiently high, as this implies a relatively low demand for “expensive” innovative goods. Third, such a “no-growth trap”
may happen in a world economy made up of several countries engaged in free trade with each other. The policy implications
are that growth-enhancing policies may be misguided and that quick deregulation as well as quick trade liberalization can
lead to stagnation in the long term.
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3.
The Water Framework Directive (WFD) has mobilized economic theory in order to encourage E.U. Member States to reach desirable
environmental water pollution levels by conciliating economic and ecological interests. For this purpose, a stringent standard
(“good status”) has been set. Nevertheless, it will be possible to relax this standard if it appears that total abatement
costs required for reaching this “good status” exceed expected environmental benefits. This ambitious policy updates the issue
of the abatement costs and environmental benefits assessment. Concerning the costs, a full discrimination of the abatement
effort minimizes the total cost when the impact of polluters changes spatially, while a uniform effort can reach a pollution
target in flexible ways. In this case, the increase of the degree of discrimination of the abatement effort is required only
if it generates significant positive economies. Our theoretical and empirical results have shown that the discrimination advantage
becomes insignificant for either very demanding or very little demanding ecological standards and varies according to the
polluters’ profile. In the case of “intermediate” standards, efficiency gains become negligible with a restricted number of
effort “levels”. 相似文献
4.
J. Peter Neary 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2006,33(1):95-118
I review and extend three approaches to trade and environmental policies: competitive general equilibrium, oligopoly and monopolistic
competition. The first two have surprisingly similar implications: deviations from first-best rules are justified only by
constraints on policy choice (which motivates what I call a “single dividend” approach to environmental policy), and taxes
and emissions standards differ in ways which reflect the Le Chatelier principle. I also show how environmental taxes may lead
to a catastrophic relocation of industry in the presence of agglomeration effects, although not necessarily if there is a
continuum of industries which differ in pollution intensity.
*An earlier version was presented as an invited plenary lecture to the European Association for Environmental and Resource
Economics Conference, Oslo, 1999. 相似文献
5.
Tetsuo Ono 《Economic Theory》2003,22(1):141-168
Summary. The purpose of this paper is to consider environmental taxation which would control emissions of firms in a model of growth
cycles. In the model presented below, the economy may experience two phases of growth and environmental quality: “the no-innovation
growth regime” and “the innovation-led growth regime”. Aggregate capital and environmental quality remain constant in the
no-innovation growth regime, while they perpetually increase in the innovation-led growth regime. The paper shows that the
tax plays a key role in determining whether the economy stably converges to one of the two regimes or fluctuates permanently
between them. It also shows that there is a critical level of the tax and that the economy obtains higher growth rates of
capital and environmental quality by raising (or reducing) the tax if the initial tax is below (or above) the critical level.
Received: April 2, 2001; revised version: March 21, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" This research reported here was conducted within the research project “Project on Intergenerational Equity” at Institute
of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. I am deeply grateful to an anonymous referee for his or her insightful comments,
which greatly improved the paper. I also thank Hiroshi Honda, Yasuo Maeda, Yuji Nakayama, and participants in workshops at
Hitotsubashi University, Kyoto University, Nagoya University, Osaka University, University of Tsukuba, Yokohama National University,
and University of Tokyo for their valuable comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are mine. 相似文献
6.
Roberto Rodríguez-Ibeas 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2007,36(2):237-254
In this paper, we have considered a duopolistic model of environmental product differentiation with two types of consumers
(green and brown) to analyze how environmental awareness affects the environment. “Green” consumers value the physical and
environmental attributes of the good they purchase while “brown” consumers only value the physical attributes. We find that
more environmental awareness may not be good news for the environment as the firm that produces the good without environmental
attributes may increase its sales. The result depends on the degree of product differentiation and the cost to achieve it.
Social welfare can also be inversely related to environmental awareness if the negative environmental effect dominates the
positive market effect.
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7.
Using public policy instruments to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has become standard in most countries, irrespective
of their level of development, geographical location or industrial structure. Against this background the paper analyses the
suitability of various public policies to attract inward FDI based on a sample of 11 countries and 10 industries from the
manufacturing sector over 10 years. For this aim we derive an empirical baseline model of the determinants of inward FDI-stock.
From this baseline model FDI-gaps—measured as the difference between the “estimated actual” inward FDI-stock and the “potential”
FDI-stock, which could be realized if a certain “best practice policy” were carried out—are derived. Thereby the analysis
focuses on business taxation, public research and development expenditures, the information and communication infrastructure
endowment, labor costs as well as institutional and skill-related policies. The analysis inter alia reveals the share of each
of these location factors in the total industry- and country-level FDI-gap. Moreover, the analysis explores how policy advice
depends on the definition of the “best practice policy”. 相似文献
8.
Global environment and dynamic games of environmental policy in an international duopoly 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Akihiko Yanase 《Journal of Economics》2009,97(2):121-140
This paper examines a differential game model of international pollution control in which polluting oligopolists compete in
a third country market. Two alternative policy instruments (emission taxes and command-and-control regulations) are considered.
A tougher emission policy in the home country enhances the foreign firm’s competitiveness because of the static “rent-shifting”
effect. The foreign country also enjoys a future improvement of the global environmental quality by “free riding” on the home
country’s emission reduction effort. Because of these strategic effects, the levels of environmental policy determined in
the noncooperative policy game are distorted away from the socially optimal level. Moreover, the emission tax game produces
a more distortionary outcome than that in the command-and-control game; it generates more pollution and lower welfare.
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9.
Infinite horizon dynamic optimization problems with non-exponential time preferences may not only exhibit time inconsistency
but may also have multiple solutions with distinct payoffs. We here show that such multiplicity is generic in the sense that
it occurs in an open set of such decision problems, even with small state- and action-spaces. Non-exponential discounting
allows for an “addictive” equilibrium alongside a “virtuous” equilibrium. We also provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness
in infinitely repeated decision problems with general action spaces.
Authors thank Philippe Jehiel, Maria Saez-Marti and Bill Sandholm for comments to an earlier version, and the Knut and Alice
Wallenberg Research Foundation for financial support. 相似文献
10.
Holger Strulik 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2021,23(3):462-486
In this paper I propose a time-consistent method of discounting hyperbolically and apply it to three canonical environmental problems: (i) optimal renewable resource use, (ii) the tragedy of the commons, and (iii) economic growth and pollution. I show that, irrespective of potentially high initial discount rates, time-consistent hyperbolic discounting leads always to a steady state of maximum yield, or, if the environment enters the utility function, a steady state where the Green Golden Rule applies. While (asymptotic) extinction is a real threat under exponential discounting it is impossible under time-consistent hyperbolic discounting. This result is also confirmed for open-access resources. In a model of economic growth and pollution, hyperbolic discounting establishes the Golden Rule of capital accumulation and the modified Green Golden Rule. 相似文献
11.
Dimitrios Xefteris 《Constitutional Political Economy》2011,22(3):221-237
Constitutions are multidimensional objects with non-trivial implications on the structure of the political environment and,
therefore, on the policy outcomes. This paper models constitutions as sets of “restraints” on the authority’s choice freedom
(absolute and democracy restraints). We argue that even if both kinds of restraints seem to be serving the same purpose (increase
social welfare), “democracy restraints” prolong the “life” of a constitution while “absolute restraints” not. We moreover
use the proposed way of modelling constitutions in order to explain the dominance of intermediate (in terms of tightness of
“democracy restraints”) constitutions in the real world. 相似文献
12.
Increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) flows accompanied with globalization have raised the concern of a “race to the
bottom” phenomenon in environmental protection. This is because footloose investors of “dirty” industries tend to relocate
to “pollution havens” of the developing world. However when pollutant is transboundary (as in the case of greenhouse gases),
the source country’s incentive to relocate and the recipient country’s willingness to host such industries are not straightforward.
This article studies the relationship between FDI and environmental regulation using a North–South market share game model
in a two-country setting, when pollution is transboundary. Contrary to the pollution haven hypothesis, our model shows that
if market sizes of the two countries are small, FDI will raise the emission standard of the host country, resulting in a “race-to-the-top”
phenomenon; but if market sizes are large enough, FDI will not change the emission standard of the South (from its laxest
form), a finding that is consistent with the “regulatory chill” argument. Equilibrium FDI is contingent on the fixed cost
of FDI, as the traditional proximity–concentration tradeoff theory predicts. 相似文献
13.
Armin Schmutzler 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2011,48(3):511-535
The paper introduces a simple framework for analyzing the environmental effects of local transportation policies, and it reviews
some evidence. In several cases, subsidies for local public transportation have led to substantial reductions in road transportation and have thereby reduced externalities.
Some but not all estimates suggest positive overall welfare effects of such policies. In the rare cases where road pricing has been applied, it has helped to reduce automobile transportation, and it has led to environmental improvements. The experience
with specific driving restrictions like “days without cars” and “low emission zones” has been mixed. Local transportation policy can have a useful role to play
as a complement to national policy instruments, but neither efficiency nor effectiveness can be taken for granted. 相似文献
14.
Esteban Castellano Pablo Martínez de Anguita José I Elorrieta Marcelino Pellitero Concepción Rey 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2008,39(3):331-356
This article develops a method for establishing water prices and their effects in order to provide policy makers an environmentally
and socially optimal range of regional prices for irrigation water. Two prices are determined. The “environmentally optimal
price” of water is defined as the one that internalizes the environmental costs generated by agricultural consumption. The
“social optimally price” of water is defined as the one that maximizes levies on water for agriculture without affecting the
regional economy. The environmentally optimal price is calculated with an economic model built over a Geographical Information
System (GIS) that allows the economic quantification and valuation of the environmental cost of water in different basins.
The optimal price is calculated with a demand curve for irrigation water introduced into a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM)
to observe if the regional economy can accept higher prices without affecting the regional GDP. Potential water prices are
established, ranging from prices that minimize the negative impact in the regional economy to those that totally internalize
the environmental cost of water. 相似文献
15.
Ulrich Witt 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2003,13(2):77-94
Economic policy making is discussed from three different angles: the political economy of actual policy making (“what policy
does do”), the analysis of policy instruments for given ends (“what policy could do”), and the debate on policy goals and
their legitimization (“what policy ought to do”). Center stage in the evolutionary perspective is new, positive and normative
knowledge which is unfolding during the policy making process and in its aftermath. It is argued that this implies regularities
and constraints which extend and modify the comparative-static interpretations of public choice theory, economic policy making
theory, and social philosophy.
RID="*"
ID="*" The author should like to thank three anonymous referees of this journal and the editor for helpful comments on an
earlier version of the paper. 相似文献
16.
Günther Rehme 《Journal of Economics》2007,91(1):1-40
Many models show that redistribution is bad for growth. This paper argues that in a non-cooperative world optimizing, redistributing
(“left-wing”) governments mimic non-redistributing (“right-wing”) policies for fear of capital loss if capital markets become
highly integrated and the countries are technologically similar. “Left-right” competition leads to more redistribution and
lower GDP growth than “left-left” competition. Efficiency differences allow for higher GDP growth and more redistribution than one's opponent. Irrespective of efficiency differences, however, “left-wing” governments have higher
GDP growth when competing with other “left-wing” governments. The results may explain why one observes a positive correlation
between redistribution and growth across countries, and why capital inflows and current account deficits may be good for relatively
high growth. 相似文献
17.
It is widely recognized that industrialized countries’ commitments under the Kyoto Protocol to reduce their greenhouse-gas
emissions will be far less costly to achieve if they can be met at least in part through investment in cheap abatement options
available in developing countries, as is permitted under the Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism. Developing-country NGOs
and others involved in the policy debate on the CDM have frequently raised concerns, however, about the so-called “low-hanging
fruit” problem. The standard characterization of this problem is that if developing countries allow their cheap abatement
options to be used now, they may find themselves worse off in future when they take on emissions-reduction commitments of
their own, because only expensive abatement options will remain. We show that under plausible CDM-market imperfections a low-hanging
fruit problem may indeed arise, but that the standard characterization of the problem is incorrect. We also present a potential
solution, based on mandating a “virtual” option clause in CDM-investment contracts. 相似文献
18.
A resource-based view of Schumpeterian economic dynamics 总被引:6,自引:0,他引:6
John A. Mathews 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2002,12(1-2):29-54
This paper seeks to offer a theoretical platform where the modern “resource-based view” of the firm might meet with evolutionary
economics and the study of entrepreneurship, and with the economics of industrial organization. It does so by proposing the
concept of the “resource economy” within which productive resources are produced and exchanged between firms. This is presented
as the dual of the mainstream goods and services economy – where the “resource economy” captures the dynamic capital structure
of the economy. The paper is concerned to bring out the distinctive principles governing resource dynamics in the resource
economy, capturing competitive dynamics in such categories as resource creation, replication, propagation, exchange and leverage;
evolutionary dynamics in terms of resource variation, selection and retention; entrepreneurial dynamics in terms of resource
recombination and resource imitation, transfer and substitution; and industrial organizational dynamics in terms of resource
configuration, resource complementarities and resource trajectories. 相似文献
19.
We study the optimal timing of adoption of a cleaner technology and its effects on the rate of growth of an economy in the
context of an AK endogenous growth model. We show that the results depend upon the behavior of the marginal utility of environmental
quality with respect to consumption. When it is increasing, we derive the capital level at the optimal timing of adoption.
We show that this capital threshold is independent of the initial conditions on the stock of capital, implying that capital-poor
countries tend to take longer to adopt. Also, country-specific characteristics, as the existence of high barriers to adoption,
may lead to different capital thresholds for different countries. If the marginal utility of environmental quality decreases
with consumption, a country should never delay adoption; the optimal policy is either to adopt immediately or, if adoption
costs are “too high”, to never adopt. The policy implications of these results are discussed in the context of the international
debate surrounding the environmental political agenda.
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20.
Encouraging firms to develop voluntarily more comprehensive environmental management systems (EMSs) is touted as a policy
tool to augment mandatory environmental regulations. Using a unique dataset of environmental management practices of Japanese
manufacturers and controlling for self-selection bias in survey responses, we find that proxies for regulatory pressures and
consumer pressures are the most important factors that motivate firms toward more comprehensive EMSs. Despite the oft-claimed
“voluntary” nature of EMS development, our results show that the government may have a role to play in both directly and indirectly
affecting EMS development by firms.
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