The Effects of Trading Methods on Volatility and Liquidity: Evidence from the Taiwan Stock Exchange

This study contrasts the call and continuous auction methods using Taiwan Stock Exchange data. Volatility under the call market method is approximately one-half of that under the continuous auction method. The call market method is more effective in reducing the volatility of high-volume stocks than low-volume stocks. This contradicts conventional wisdom which suggests that the call market method is superior for thinly traded stocks, while the continuous auction method is preferred for heavily traded stocks. The call market method does not impair liquidity and price discovery. The call market appears more efficient than in the continuous auction market.     

How does the call market method affect price efficiency? Evidence from the Singapore Stock Market

On August 21, 2000, the Singapore Exchange (SGX) adopted the call market method to open and close the market while the remainder of the day’s trading continued to rely on the continuous auction method. The call method significantly improved the price discovery process and market quality. A positive spillover effect is observed from the opening and closing calls. Day-end price manipulation also declined after the introduction of the call market method. However, the beneficial impact from the call market method is asymmetric, benefiting liquid stocks more than illiquid stocks.     

Latency,liquidity and price discovery

The speed of trading is an important factor in modern security markets, although relatively little is known about the effect of speed on liquidity and price discovery, two important aspects of market quality. On April 23, 2007, Deutsche Boerse made an important upgrade to their trading system. With the 8.0 release of Xetra, system latency was reduced from 50 ms to 10 ms. Subsequently, both quoted and effective spreads decreased, which are mainly concentrated in small- and medium-sized stocks. This increase in liquidity is due to dramatically lower adverse selection costs that were only partially translated into higher liquidity. We interpret this as a decrease in the competition between liquidity suppliers who are able to increase their revenues by more than 90 million euros. The contribution of quotes to price discovery doubles to 90% post upgrade, indicating that prices are more efficient.     

Market structure, informational efficiency and liquidity: An experimental comparison of auction and dealer markets

We report the results of 18 market experiments that were conducted in order to compare the call market, the continuous auction and the dealer market. Transaction prices in the call and continuous auction markets are much more efficient than prices in the dealer markets. The call market shows a tendency towards underreaction to new information. Execution costs are lowest in the call market and highest in the dealer market. The trading volume and Roll's (Journal of Finance (1984) 1127–1139) serial covariance estimator are inappropriate measures of execution costs in the present context. The relation between private signals, trading decisions and trading profits is analyzed.     

Not all call auctions are created equal: evidence from Hong Kong

On 25 March 2002, the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Ltd (HKEx) introduced an opening call auction. This trading mechanism is designed to facilitate price discovery in the presence of asymmetric information at the market open, increasing opening price efficiency. The design of the HKEx differs significantly from opening auctions in other markets. Contrary to previous research, the results indicate a decrease in market quality following the introduction of the opening call auction. This decline is largest in the less actively traded stocks.

Opening and closing behavior following the introduction of call auctions in Singapore

The Singapore Exchange introduced opening and closing call auctions in August 2000. We find that the frequency of call trades is lower than on other markets. However, when auctions are used, the percentage of daily volume traded in the auction is high. Many days without call trades have quotes during the pre-call periods so that there is an opportunity for learning about equilibrium prices even when there are no call trades. Consistent with prior research, the introduction of call auctions enhances market quality at the open and the close. The call auctions also helped to address the issues that motivated their introduction in Singapore. That is, they increased the volume traded at the opening in initial public offerings and reduced the incidence of closing price manipulation.     

Price-Formation Process of an Emerging Futures Market: Call Auction Versus Continuous Auction

This study assesses the market qualities of alternative price-formation processes for an emerging futures market—the Taiwan futures market. In 2002, the price formation process in the market changed during the period of trade between call auction and continuous auction. The performances of call auction and continuous auction are compared using intraday data. Empirical results show that the market is more liquid, and volatility is slightly lower, under continuous auction than under call auction. Also, there is robust evidence that continuous auction improves informative efficiency. The study suggests that for an emerging futures market like that of Taiwan, continuous auction offers a better trading environment for futures trading. In addition to demonstrating the virtue of continuous auction, this study also finds that the asymmetry in volatility is related to the price formation process. The asymmetry effect exists under continuous auction, but not under call auction.     

A simulation analysis of the microstructure of an order driven financial market with multiple securities and portfolio choices

In this paper we propose an artificial market where multiple risky assets are exchanged. Agents are constrained by the availability of resources and trade to adjust their portfolio according to an exogenously given target portfolio. We model the trading mechanism as a continuous auction order-driven market. Agents are heterogeneous in terms of desired target portfolio allocations, but they are homogeneous in terms of trading strategies. We investigate the role played by the trading mechanism in affecting the dynamics of prices, trading volume and volatility. We show that the institutional setting of a double auction market is sufficient to generate a non-normal distribution of price changes and temporal patterns that resemble those observed in real markets. Moreover, we highlight the role played by the interaction between individual wealth constraints and the market frictions associated with a double auction system to determine the negative asymmetry of the stock returns distribution.     

Continuous Trading or Call Auctions: Revealed Preferences of Investors at the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange

We use the move of Israeli stocks from call auction trading to continuous trading to show that investors have a preference for stocks that trade continuously. When large stocks move from call auction to continuous trading, the small stocks that still trade by call auction experience a significant loss in volume relative to the overall market volume. As small stocks move to continuous trading, they experience an increase in volume and positive abnormal returns because of the associated increase in liquidity. Overall, though, a move to continuous trading increases the volume of large stocks relative to small stocks.     

Myopic loss aversion and margin of safety: the risk of value investing

Abstract

Most modern financial markets use a continuous double auction mechanism to store and match orders and facilitate trading. In this paper we develop a microscopic dynamical statistical model for the continuous double auction under the assumption of IID random order flow, and analyse it using simulation, dimensional analysis, and theoretical tools based on mean field approximations. The model makes testable predictions for basic properties of markets, such as price volatility, the depth of stored supply and demand versus price, the bid–ask spread, the price impact function, and the time and probability of filling orders. These predictions are based on properties of order flow and the limit order book, such as share volume of market and limit orders, cancellations, typical order size, and tick size. Because these quantities can all be measured directly there are no free parameters. We show that the order size, which can be cast as a non-dimensional granularity parameter, is in most cases a more significant determinant of market behaviour than tick size. We also provide an explanation for the observed highly concave nature of the price impact function. On a broader level, this work suggests how stochastic models based on zero intelligence agents may be useful to probe the structure of market institutions. Like the model of perfect rationality, a stochastic zero intelligence model can be used to make strong predictions based on a compact set of assumptions, even if these assumptions are not fully believable.     

Price Discovery in the Treasury‐Bill When‐Issued Market

When‐issued (i.e., forward) trading in T‐bills yet to be auctioned provides a unique environment for examining price discovery. Because T‐bills are auctioned in a sealed‐bid process, when‐issued traders cannot observe the spot market price. Yet the forward price must ultimately converge on the auction outcome price. Our results indicate that traders in the when‐issued market “discover” the ultimate auction price. Little evidence is found that standard order flow variables contribute to price discovery. Instead, the ability to observe a few trades with relatively small volume in the when‐issued market is sufficient to discover the auction price resulting from the sealed‐bid process.     

Do Unexpected Land Auction Outcomes Bring New Information to the Real Estate Market?

Land and real estate are intrinsically related but generally traded in two different markets. Vacant land, being a major “raw material” for development of real estate, is traded by developers who actively manage development risk for profit. Real estate, being a long lived final product, is traded by end-users or investors for use or investment in the secondary market. This study examines price discovery between the two markets. The key question is whether land transactions, in the form of public auctions, convey any new information to the secondary real estate market. Our results suggest unexpected land auction outcomes have both market-wide and local effects on real estate prices. However, the impacts are asymmetric. We found that lower than expected land auction prices have a significant negative market-wide and local impact on real estate prices while higher than expect land auction prices have little or no impact.     

Closing call auctions and liquidity

The present paper examines the impact of closing call auctions on liquidity. It exploits the natural experiment offered by the introduction of a closing call auction on the Australian Stock Exchange on 10 February 1997. The introduction of the closing call auction is associated with a reduction in trading volume at the close of continuous trading. However, bid‐ask spreads during continuous trading are largely unaffected by the introduction of the closing call auction. Therefore, closing call auctions consolidate liquidity at a single point in time without having any adverse effect on the cost of trading.     

Frequency of observation and the estimation of integrated volatility in deep and liquid financial markets

Using two newly available ultrahigh-frequency datasets, we investigate empirically how frequently one can sample certain foreign exchange and U.S. Treasury security returns without contaminating estimates of their integrated volatility with market microstructure noise. Using the standard realized volatility estimator, we find that one can sample dollar/euro returns as frequently as once every 15 to 20 s without contaminating estimates of integrated volatility; 10-year Treasury note returns may be sampled as frequently as once every 2 to 3 min on days without U.S. macroeconomic announcements, and as frequently as once every 40 s on announcement days. Using a simple realized kernel estimator, this sampling frequency can be increased to once every 2 to 5 s for dollar/euro returns and to about once every 30 to 40 s for T-note returns. These sampling frequencies, especially in the case of dollar/euro returns, are much higher than those that are generally recommended in the empirical literature on realized volatility in equity markets. The higher sampling frequencies for dollar/euro and T-note returns likely reflect the superior depth and liquidity of these markets.     

Quote disclosure and price discovery in multiple-dealer financial markets

We examine the effects of price disclosure on market performancein a continuous experimental multiple-dealer market in whichseven professional market makers trade a single security. Thedealers trade with one another and with computerized informedand liquidity traders. Our key comparison is between fully publicprice queues (pretrade transparent market) and bilateral quoting(pretrade opaque). We find that opening spreads are wider andtrading volume is lower in the opaque markets due to highersearch costs there. More importantly, however, higher searchcosts also induce more aggressive pricing strategies, so thatprice discovery is much faster in the opaque markets.     

A call auction's impact on price formation and order routing: Evidence from the NASDAQ stock market

Electronic call auctions are used globally to open and close equity market trading; as such, they are a critically important facility that needs to be better understood. The paper focuses on the impact NASDAQ's calls (introduced in 2004) have had on bid-ask spreads, price volatility, and order routing in the continuous market that follows daily openings and which precedes daily closings. NASDAQ's closing call has significantly reduced both spreads and volatility for all market capitalization groups. Its opening call similarly reduced spreads, while a generally similar, though somewhat weaker, pattern of volatility reduction was realized. Although the pattern of trading volume has, for the most part, not been significantly affected, our findings, comprehensively viewed, suggest that the calls have had a positive spillover effect on the dynamic behavior of price formation in NASDAQ's continuous market.     

A Parimutuel Market Microstructure for Contingent Claims

Parimutuel principles are widely used as an alternative to fixed odds gambling in which a bookmaker acts as a dealer by quoting fixed rates of return on specified wagers. A parimutuel game is conducted as a call auction in which odds are allowed to fluctuate during the betting period until the betting period is closed or the auction ‘called’. The prices or odds of wagers are set based upon the relative amounts wagered on each risky outcome. In financial microstructure terms, trading under parimutuel principles is characterised by (1) call auction, non‐continuous trading; (2) riskless funding of claim payouts using the amounts paid for all of the claims during the auction; (3) special equilibrium pricing conditions requiring the relative prices of contingent claims equal the relative aggregate amounts wagered on such claims; (4) endogenous determination of unique state prices; and (5) higher efficiency. Recently, a number of large investment banks have adopted a parimutuel mechanism for offering contingent claims on various economic indices, such as the US Nonfarm payroll report and Eurozone Harmonised inflation. Our paper shows how the market microstructure incorporating parimutuel principles for contingent claims which allows for notional transactions, limit orders, and bundling of claims across states is constructed. We prove the existence of a unique price equilibrium for such a market and suggest an algorithm for computing the equilibrium. We also suggest that for a broad class of contingent claims, that the parimutuel microstructure recently deployed offers many advantages over the dominant dealer and exchange continuous time mechanisms.     

Intraday stock price effects of ad hoc disclosures: the German case

This paper examines intraday stock price and trading volume effects caused by ad hoc disclosures in Germany. The evidence suggests that the stock prices react within 30 min after the ad hoc disclosures. The adjustment of the trading volume needs even more time. We find no evidence for abnormal high price nor trading volume reactions in the five transactions before ad hoc disclosures. The bigger the company, which announces an ad hoc disclosure, the less severe the abnormal price effect, following the announcement, is. The higher the trading volume at the last trading day before the announcement, the higher the price and trading volume effects, after the ad hoc disclosures, are.     

The effectiveness of competing regulatory regimes and the switching effects: Evidence from an emerging market

I investigate the effectiveness of two competing regulatory regimes and the effect of switching from strict price limits to circuit breakers on volatility spillover, and also on trading interference hypotheses. I find that switching to the circuit breakers' regime increases volatility and disrupts the price discovery mechanism. Stock prices are prevented from reaching their equilibrium levels and traders are unable to obtain their desired positions on limits hit day. Moreover, I find that volatility is spread out over the following 2 days post-limit hits within the strict price limits regime. Finally, the results show that price limits interfere with trading activity and affect investors' beliefs and liquidity positions.     

Price discovery on the S&P 500 index markets: An analysis of spot index,index futures,and SPDRs

This paper investigates the price discovery function in three S&P 500 index markets: the spot index, index futures, and S&P Depositary Receipts markets. Four hypotheses regarding market structure and security design are proposed to differentiate the price discovery function performed by the three index instruments. Using matched synchronous intraday trading data, Johansen's maximum likelihood estimator is employed to disclose the cointegration relationships among the three markets. Results indicate that the three price series are a cointegrated system with one long-run stochastic trend. Estimated coefficients of the vector error correction model suggest that price adjustment takes place in the spot index market and for SPDRs, but not in the futures market. When the common stochastic trend is decomposed, it is found that the futures market serves the dominant price discovery function. The leverage hypothesis and the uptick rule hypothesis explain its superior price discovery function.