Confident expectations, rational expectations and the optimal conduct of monetary policy

Under what conditions central banks can afford to deviate from announced targets without losing their reputation is analyzed. For this, the public must have something like ‘confident expectations' vis-a-vis monetary policy and central banks have to behave accordingly. The paper shows that it can be rational for the public and welfare-increasing for the society to retain ‘confident expectations' instead of switching to rational expectations, when central banks have gained long-run reputation. At the end of the paper, alternative optimal money supply rules are compared in a dynamic optimization framework. © 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.     

Variance-minimizing monetary policies with lagged price adjustment and rational expectations

This paper considers a macroeconomic model with rational expectations in which prices are incompletely flexible. Markets therefore fall to clear. In such a model monetary policy is not neutral. The variance of real and nominal quantities and interest rates is sensitive to the parameters of the feedback rule that determines the money supply. The monetary policy that achieves the goal of minimizing the steady-state variance of real output is characterized. We also examine monetary policies that are restricted in their generality and derive ‘second-best’ variance-minimizing feedback rules.     

The lucas supply function and the feasibility of monetary stabilization policy with rational expectations

Zusammenfassung Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht die Effektivität systematischer (d. h. regelgebundener) Geldpolitik in einem makroökonomischen Modell mit einer Lucas-Angebotsfunktion, rationalen Erwartungen und asymmetrischer Information. InMcCallum (1980) wurde dieses Modell anhand der Methode der unbestimmten Koeffizienten gelöst und gezeigt, daß die Notenbank die Varianz des Outputs durch die Wahl des Politikparameters in einer einfachen Geldmengenregel (autoregressiver Prozeß erster Ordnung) beeinflussen kann. Die Auswirkungen von monetären Schocks können dabei zwar gedämpft, aber nicht vollständig eliminiert werden.In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird das Modell anhand der Methode der forward looking solutions gelöst und gezeigt, daß esunendlich viele Geldmengenregeln gibt, welche den Output von Geldangebots- und Güternachfrageschocksperfekt abschirmen. Produktivitätsschocks können hingegen nur kurzfristig neutralisiert werden.

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I am indebted to H. Frisch, Ch. Peutl, and unknown referees for their valuable comments and suggestions.     

Competitive equilibrium hyperinflation under rational expectations

This paper shows that a competitive equilibrium model, where a representative agent maximizes welfare, expectations are rational and markets are in equilibrium can account for several hyperinflation stylized facts. The theory is built by combining two hypotheses, namely, a fiscal crisis that requires printing money to finance an increasing public deficit and a predicted change in an unsustainable fiscal regime.We thank an anonymous referee for very helpful comments. A. B. Cunha acknowledges financial support from the Brazilian Council of Science and Technology (CNPq).     

Decision making on pension schemes under rational expectations

In this paper the formation of expectations during decision making processes on pension schemes is the main focus. An overlapping generations model is used where politicians control the tax-transfer system and the young determine savings. No generation of decision makers is committed to previous decisions. It appears that the outcome in the stationary state depends on the efficiency of the tax-transfer system compared with savings and on the preferences of politicians relative to young individuals with respect to the division of endowments between young-age and old-age consumption. One of the main conclusions is that if the parameters of the system are constant the stationary state enters within a finite time interval. So, if the system is initially outside the stationary state, the decision makers can calculate the path of taxes and savings towards the stationary state. This feature is also used to determine the effects of a demographic change.Comments from Dieter Bös, Fons Groot, Lex Meijdam, Willem Thorbecke, and David Wildasin are gratefully acknowledged. All remaining errors are, of course, ours.     

Dynamic factor demands for US cigarette manufacturing under rational expectations

Portugal was the first country with a national health system to incorporate diagnosis related group (DRG) case-mix adjustment in formulating hospital budgets on a nation-wide basis. Most of the case-mix payment-outcomes literature comes from the USA where the quality of data is superior to that of many other countries. The purpose of this article is to assess the initial impact of case-mix financing on the quality of inpatient care in Portuguese hospitals using a methodology that may be appropriate for health care systems whose information is not as complete as that of the USA. Estimating a count data model at the hospital level with inpatient mortality as a quality indicator, the authors find no evidence that case-mix based payment has had adverse consequences on inpatient mortality for the most frequent non-obstetric DRG during the three year time period under study.     

Interest-rate policy and rational expectations

The choice of monetary instrument under rational expectations is discussed in a general equilibrium model for the financial sector. It is shown that a supply rule leads to indeterminate asset prices, whereas the prices are determinate under an appropriately formulated interest-rate policy.     

Understanding Markov-switching rational expectations models

We develop a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibria to be determinate in a class of forward-looking Markov-switching rational expectations models and we develop an algorithm to check these conditions in practice. We use three examples, based on the new-Keynesian model of monetary policy, to illustrate our technique. Our work connects applied econometric models of Markov-switching with forward looking rational expectations models and allows an applied researcher to construct the likelihood function for models in this class over a parameter space that includes a determinate region and an indeterminate region.     

On non-revealing rational expectations equilibrium

It is shown that a non-revealing rational expectations equilibrium may not be coalitionally Bayesian incentive compatible, may not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and may not belong to the weak fine core and thus may not be fully Pareto optimal. These negative results lead us to conclude the non-revealing rational expectations equilibrium is not a sensible solution concept. We wish to thank Dr A. Hadjiprocopis for his invaluable help with the implementation of Latex in a Unix environment. We also thank a referee for several, constructive suggestions.     

The government behavioural constraint in rational expectations models

Models with rational expectations typically include state variables whose values are controlled by the government. Hence, the need to specify behavioural rules for the authorities. Our purpose is to show, in the context of a well-known Cagan type model of the demand for money, that the assumption of rational expectations imposes the hitherto neglected requirement of rationality of the postulated behaviour of government. In particular the occurance of non-unique solutions highlights the need for a rational choice between these on grounds other than mathematical convenience or ad hoc economic assumptions of minimum variance, terminal conditions etc.     

Learning rational expectations: The finite state case

This paper is devoted to the question of whether traders can learn rational expectations from repeated observations of market data in a stationary environment with finitely many exogenous states of the world. The learning problem is placed in the context of an iterative adjustment process which achieves equilibrium if traders have rational expectations. The main result is that even if traders begin with no knowledge of their environment, there exists an estimation procedure which converges to rational expectations when the environment satisfies a certain regularity condition. The regularity condition is shown to be generic.     

Public utility pricing and capacity choice under risk: A rational expectations approach

Over the last two decades there has developed an extensive literature on the theory of public enterprise pricing and capacity choice under uncertainty. A major concern has been the analysis of the rationing of consumers in states in which demand exceeds available system capacity. An issue that has been largely ignored however is the effect that consumers' probability of being rationed (system reliability) has on their demand for the service. In this paper we develop a model that reflects the intuitive notion that a more reliable service is a higher quality service, so that an increase in system reliability shifts consumers' demand curves outward. We then incorporate this effect into our analysis of the utility's optimal pricing and investment rules. Finally, we demonstrate how the value of reliability can, in principle, be estimated from generally available demand data.     

Learning rational expectations in an asset market

Will traders in a risky asset market learn Muthian expectations when they initially lack the necessary information? If some traders learn from their observations, will market dynamics depend only on “fundamentals,” as implied by the Efficient Market Hypothesis? This paper shows that at any finite point in time the answer to these questions is “no”. The context is a constant absolute risk aversion model with two kinds of traders and asymmetric information. The market converges asymptotically to a rational expectations equilibrium where prices depend only on fundamentals and the market is efficient.     

Speculative bubbles,crashes and rational expectations

Self ending speculative bubbles, i.e., speculative bubbles followed by market crashes, are consistent with the assumption of rational expectations. More generally, speculative bubbles may take all kinds of shapes. Detecting their presence or rejecting their existence is likely to prove very hard.     

Devaluation,long-term contracts and rational expectations

This paper considers the effects of devaluation and expected devaluation on output, prices and foreign exchange reserves in a small open economy with overlapping two period wage contracts and rational expectations. A devaluation has an expansionary effect on output provided it is unanticipated by at least some contracts when it occurs. Expected devaluations, however, have no effect on prices until they take place. If a devaluation is expected, but fails to take place, output is reduced. Reserves increase in response to all devaluations; but the expectation of a devaluation causes a loss of reserves prior to its expected date.     

Functional rational expectations equilibria in market games

The rational expectations equilibrium (REE) has been criticized as an equilibrium concept in market game environments. Such an equilibrium may not exist generically, or it may introduce unrealistic assumptions about an economic agent’s knowledge or computational ability. We define an REE as a probability measure over uncertain states of nature which exploits all available information in a market game, and which exists for almost all economies. Furthermore, if retrading is allowed, it is possible for agents to compute such a ‘functional rational expectations equilibrium’ using straightforward numerical fixed point algorithms. The approach is demonstrated in a detailed numerical example.     

Inflationary expectations and monetary policy: evidence from Bangladesh

This article first estimates inflationary expectations using a Blanchard–Quah VAR model by decomposing the nominal interest rate into expected inflation and the ex ante real interest rate. Then I utilize this expected inflation along with other macroeconomic variables as inputs to the monetary policy function in a recursive VAR model to identify exogenous policy shocks. To calculate inflationary expectations, I assume that ex ante real interest rate shocks do not have a long-run effect on the nominal interest rate. This article finds that the public expects lower inflation for the future during periods of high inflation. Estimated results from the recursive VAR suggest that a contractionary policy shock increases the real interest rate, appreciates domestic currency, and lowers inflationary expectations and industrial output. However, I find a lagged policy response from Bangladesh Bank to higher inflationary expectations.