Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from Syndicated Loans

I empirically explore the syndicated loan market, with an emphasis on how information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers influences syndicate structure and on which lenders become syndicate members. Consistent with moral hazard in monitoring, the lead bank retains a larger share of the loan and forms a more concentrated syndicate when the borrower requires more intense monitoring and due diligence. When information asymmetry between the borrower and lenders is potentially severe, participant lenders are closer to the borrower, both geographically and in terms of previous lending relationships. Lead bank and borrower reputation mitigates, but does not eliminate information asymmetry problems.     

Asymmetric information effects on loan spreads

This paper estimates the cost arising from information asymmetry between the lead bank and members of the lending syndicate. In a lending syndicate, the lead bank retains only a fraction of the loan but acts as the intermediary between the borrower and the syndicate participants. Theory predicts that asymmetric information will cause participants to demand a higher interest rate and that a large loan ownership by the lead bank should reduce this effect. In equilibrium, however, the asymmetric information premium demanded by participants is offset by the diversification premium demanded by the lead. Using shifts in the idiosyncratic credit risk of the lead bank's loan portfolio as an instrument, I measure the asymmetric information effect of the lead's share on the loan spread and find that it accounts for approximately 4% of the total cost of credit.     

Relationship Banking and Loan Syndicate Structure: The Role of Private Equity Sponsors

Using a sample of syndicated loans to private equity (PE)‐backed initial public offering companies, we examine how a third‐party bank relationship influences the syndicate structure of a loan. We find that a stronger relationship between the lead bank and the borrower's PE firm enables the lead bank to retain a smaller share of the loan and form a larger and less concentrated syndicate, especially when the borrower is less transparent. A stronger PE‐bank relationship also attracts greater foreign bank participation. Our findings suggest that the lead bank's relationship with a large equity holder of the borrower facilitates information production in lending.     

The Informational Role of the Media in Private Lending

We investigate whether a borrower's media coverage influences the syndicated loan origination and participation decisions of informationally disadvantaged lenders, loan syndicate structures, and interest spreads. In syndicated loan deals, information asymmetries can exist between lenders that have a relationship with a borrower and less informed, nonrelationship lenders competing to serve as lead arranger on a syndicated loan, and also between lead arrangers and less informed syndicate participants. Theory suggests that the aggressiveness with which less informed lenders compete for a loan deal increases in the sentiment of public information signals about a borrower. We extend this theory to syndicated loans and hypothesize that the likelihood of less informed lenders serving as the lead arranger or joining a loan syndicate is increasing in the sentiment of media‐initiated, borrower‐specific articles published prior to loan origination. We find that as media sentiment increases (1) outside, nonrelationship lenders have a higher probability of originating loans; (2) syndicate participants are less likely to have a previous relationship with the borrower or lead bank; (3) lead banks retain a lower percentage of loans; and (4) loan spreads decrease.     

Within-syndicate conflicts,loan covenants,and syndicate formation

We study how conflicts within a lending syndicate affect loan contract and syndicate formation. We argue that loan provisions serve an important dual function: In addition to moderating borrower–lender conflicts, they reduce within-syndicate conflicts. We show that greater potential for within-syndicate conflicts is associated with more and stricter covenants. Loans are less restrictive when the interests of participants and the lead arrangers are better aligned, for example, when participant–banks have stronger relationships with the lead arranger or hold borrower's equity (indirectly). Overall, our results show that covenant choice, syndicate formation, and lead arranger's loan allocation all play an important role in reducing within-syndicate conflicts.     

Relationship lending,hierarchical distance and credit tightening: Evidence from the financial crisis

This paper examines the firms’ credit availability during the 2007–2009 financial crisis using a dataset of 5331 bank–firm relationships provided by borrowers’ credit folders of three Italian banks. It aims to test whether a strong lender–borrower relationship can produce less credit rationing for borrowing firms even during a credit crunch period. The results show that exclusivity of the relationship can mitigate the firm credit rationing. We also verify the influence of lending organizational structure during crisis. A new measure of distance in lending technologies has been introduced: the hierarchical distance calculated as the distance between the branch that originates the loan and the location of the hierarchical level responsible for financing decision. Our findings document a negative impact of distance on credit availability, consistent with the idea that proximity facilitates the transmission of soft information.     

The Debt-Contracting Value of Accounting Information and Loan Syndicate Structure

We investigate how both the ownership structure and explicit contractual structure of syndicated loan deals are shaped by the debt‐contracting value (DCV) of borrowers' accounting information. DCV captures the inherent ability of firms' accounting numbers to capture credit quality deterioration in a timely fashion. We hypothesize and document that when a borrower's accounting information possesses higher DCV, information asymmetry between the lead arranger and other syndicate participants is lower, allowing lead arrangers to hold a smaller proportion of new loan deals. Further, we document that the influence of DCV on the proportion of the loan retained is conditional on the lead arranger's reputation, the existence of a credit rating, and the lead arranger's previous relationships with the same borrower. Finally, we find that when loans include performance pricing provisions, the likelihood that the single performance measure used is an accounting ratio, rather than a credit rating, is increasing in DCV.     

Are current syndicated loan alliances related to past alliances?

The odds of a current syndicate relationship between two lenders depend upon their previous alliances. The odds are significantly higher [lower] and strongest for a current lead–participant relationship with a continuation [reversal] of their previous roles. To illustrate, the odds are nearly four times higher when two lenders have allied in the previous 5 years. The strength of lead–participant syndicate relationships between two lenders with same-ordered roles is most sensitive to the lead bank’s reputation and informationally opaque participants tend to have stronger relationships with lead banks. Lenders exhibit home bias in their syndicate alliances since ongoing relationships are stronger with domestic counterparts.     

Does Poor Performance Damage the Reputation of Financial Intermediaries? Evidence from the Loan Syndication Market

We investigate the effect of poor performance on financial intermediary reputation by estimating the effect of large‐scale bankruptcies among a lead arranger's borrowers on its subsequent syndication activity. Consistent with reputation damage, such lead arrangers retain larger fractions of the loans they syndicate, are less likely to syndicate loans, and are less likely to attract participant lenders. The consequences are more severe when borrower bankruptcies suggest inadequate screening or monitoring by the lead arranger. However, the effect of borrower bankruptcies on syndication activity is not present among dominant lead arrangers, and is weak in years in which many lead arrangers experience borrower bankruptcies.     

Institutional Differences and International Private Debt Markets: A Test Using Mandatory IFRS Adoption

Institutional differences between countries result in additional information risks between borrowers and lenders in cross‐border private loans. This study examines the effect of these information risks on the structure of optimal debt contracts in international (cross‐border) versus domestic private debt markets. Using mandatory IFRS adoption as an indicator for institutional changes that reduced differences between countries, I compare attributes of international versus domestic loans before and after IFRS adoption. I find that, in the pre‐IFRS period, international loans are associated with a higher credit spread, a weaker relationship between the bank and the borrower, a more diffuse loan syndicate, and less reliance on accounting‐based covenants than domestic loans. These results are consistent with incremental information risks in international debt markets that make it more costly for lenders to screen and monitor borrower credit quality, resulting in a more arm's‐length relationship between borrowers and lenders. Many of these associations attenuate after IFRS adoption, suggesting that the pre‐IFRS differences in contract terms are driven by incremental information risks related to institutional differences between countries. My findings imply that incremental information risks result in a different optimal contract in international debt contracts compared to domestic debt contracts.     

Did Regulation Fair Disclosure affect credit markets?

This study assesses whether the implementation of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) has affected the quantity and quality of information in credit markets. We find that, after Reg FD, borrowing from new lenders was associated with a higher loan spread. We also document that, after Reg FD, (1) borrowers became more dependent on relationship lending; (2) lead lenders retained a higher loan share; and (3) a typical loan syndicate involved a smaller number of participating lenders. We interpret these results as evidence of an increased level of information asymmetry in credit markets after Reg FD.     

Does Bank Monitoring Influence Loan Contract Terms?

We examine the impact of bank monitoring on loan contract terms using a new proxy for monitoring ability based on the labor input into monitoring. We show in out-of-sample tests that the proxy is a statistically and economically significant determinant of future loan quality. Accounting for clustering of observations by lead bank, and controlling for borrower characteristics, contract features and bank risk, we find a statistically significant direct relationship between monitoring ability and loan maturity and a statistically and economically significant direct relationship between monitoring ability and the loan yield spread. The relationships are particularly strong for working capital loans. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority.     

Stock market illiquidity,bargaining power and the cost of borrowing

We show that firms with illiquid stock have higher syndicated loan spreads. This result is invariant to measurement of stock illiquidity, and is robust to a wide set of cross-sectional loan and firm features, firm and time fixed effects. It also holds using a matched difference-in-differences estimator, at an exogenous reduction in the minimum tick size of major United States exchanges, and using a two-stage least squares estimator. Stock illiquidity is shown to increase spreads more when a lead lender has a high market share or a borrower has a low credit rating. It increases spreads less when a borrower has public rated debt and it diminishes the benefit to the loan recipient of a lending relationship. Measurements of stock price informativeness and firm-level governance do not affect the stock illiquidity and loan spread relation. A rationale for these findings is that stock illiquidity impairs the bargaining power of corporate borrowers, in negotiating a loan rate, as it raises the cost of alternatively raising funds by issuing equity.     

Strategic loan defaults and coordination: An experimental analysis

This paper experimentally studies the impact of bank and borrower fundamentals on loan repayment. We find that solvent borrowers are more likely to default strategically when the bank’s expected strength is low, although loan repayment is a Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium. Borrowers are also less likely to repay when other borrowers’ expected repayment capacity is low, regardless of banks’ fundamentals. We show that changes in expectations about bank and borrower fundamentals change the risk dominance properties of the borrowers’ coordination problem, and that these changes subsequently explain strategic defaults. For the individual borrower, loss aversion and negative past experiences reduce repayment, suggesting that bank failure can be contagious in times of distress.     

Comparing Present Value Cost Differentials between Fixed- and Adjustable-Rate Loans: A Mortgage Simulation

When a borrower chooses between a fixed-rate and an adjustable-rate loan, he is doing so based on expectations of future interest rates and the expected life of the loan. This paper demonstrates how Monte Carlo simulation can be employed to assist in decision making when the borrower is confronted with the choice of fixed or adjustable-rate mortgages. Present value costs of future mortgage payments are modeled using actual lending parameters offered over a 50-month period, at varying borrower discount rates, and with different mortgage holding periods. The selection of a fixed-rate or a variable-rate mortgage is shown to be sensitive to mortgagee holding period and discount rates as well as to market conditions.     

CEO Risk‐taking Incentives and Bank Loan Syndicate Structure

This paper investigates the effects of a borrowing firm's CEO risk‐taking incentives on the structure of the firm's syndicated loans. When CEO risk‐taking incentives are high, syndicates are structured to facilitate better due diligence and monitoring efforts. These syndicates have a smaller number of total lenders and are more concentrated, and lead arrangers will retain a greater portion of the loan. Moreover, CEO risk‐taking incentives have a lesser effect on the syndicate structure when lead arrangers have a good reputation and a prior lending relationship with a borrowing firm, while they have a greater effect on the syndicate structure when borrowing firms have low information transparency, are financially distressed or have low growth prospects.     

Corporate ownership structure and bank loan syndicate structure

Using a novel data set on corporate ownership and control, we show that the divergence between the control rights and cash-flow rights of a borrowing firm's largest ultimate owner has a significant impact on the concentration and composition of the firm's loan syndicate. When the control-ownership divergence is large, lead arrangers form syndicates with structures that facilitate enhanced due diligence and monitoring efforts. These syndicates tend to be relatively concentrated and composed of domestic banks that are geographically close to the borrowing firms and that have lending expertise related to the industries of the borrowers. We also examine factors that influence the relation between ownership structure and syndicate structure, including lead arranger reputation, prior lending relationship, borrowing firm informational opacity, presence of multiple large owners, laws and institutions, and financial crises.     

Constraints on Loan Sales and the Price of Liquidity

In the syndicated loan market, borrowers and syndicate arrangers sometimes employ contractual restrictions that influence a loan’s liquidity. We analyze two types of constraints on loan resales: (1) prior consent constraints implemented by the borrower or the syndicate’s lead arranger and (2) a minimum denomination requirement for loan sales. We hypothesize that constraints could be mechanisms for fostering relationships and/or facilitating the resolution of financial distress and find some support for each notion. We find that resale constraints are more likely when borrowers are small and have relatively poor credit ratings. We also find that loans with any type of constraint have higher all-in-spreads and are more likely to be secured than unconstrained loans and that the marginal cost of constraining liquidity is relatively high.

Auditor choice and information asymmetry: evidence from international syndicated loans

Analyzing a large sample of non-US public firms from 31 countries that obtain private loans, we find that loan syndicates that lend to borrowers that employ Big N auditors are larger and less concentrated and that the lead arrangers and largest investors of these syndicates are able to hold a lower proportion of the loan after issuance. Further analysis demonstrates that this effect exists only in countries with strong creditor rights and in those countries with high levels of societal trust, suggesting that both sound formal and informal institutional factors are prerequisites for lenders and borrowers to benefit from differential audit quality on loan syndicate structure efficiency. Furthermore, we find that the loan syndicate structure benefits for borrowers that employ Big N auditors are higher for borrowers with greater information asymmetry problems, but we do not find that Big N audits are able to address the information asymmetry and moral hazard issues between the lenders themselves.     

The determinants of bank loan recovery rates

Using Moody’s Ultimate Recovery Database, we estimate a model for bank loan recoveries using variables reflecting loan and borrower characteristics, industry and macroeconomic conditions, and several recovery process variables. We find that loan characteristics are more significant determinants of recovery rates than are borrower characteristics prior to default. Industry and macroeconomic conditions are relevant, as are prepackaged bankruptcy arrangements. We examine whether a commonly used proxy for recovery rates, the 30-day post-default trading price of the loan, represents an efficient estimate of actual recoveries and find that such a proxy is biased and inefficient.