Asset redeployability and trade credit

We examine the relationship between asset redeployability and firms' use of trade credit. Using a large sample of US public firms, we document that firms with more redeployable assets use significantly less trade credit. Our cross-sectional analyses show that the negative relation between asset redeployability and trade credit is more salient for firms with more financing constraints, high levels of information asymmetry, and less corporate liquidity. These findings remain robust to alternative measures of asset redeployability, trade credit, and alternative regression specifications, and they are not driven by an endogeneity problem. Finally, we find that firms with fewer redeployable assets adjust trade credit to the target level relatively quickly when compared with firms having more redeployable assets. Overall, findings from this study provide robust evidence that asset redeployability has an important bearing on firms' short-term financing.     

Endogenizing exogenous default barrier models: The MM algorithm

In this paper, we propose a Maximization–Maximization (MM) algorithm for the assessment of hidden parameters in structural credit risk models. Step M1 updates the value, volatility, and expected return on the firm’s assets by maximizing the log-likelihood function for the time series of equity prices; Step M2 updates the default barrier by maximizing the equity holders’ participation in the firm’s asset value. The main contribution of the method lies in the M2 step, which allows for ‘endogenizing’ the default barrier in light of actual data on equity prices. Using a large international sample of companies, we demonstrate that theoretical credit spreads based on the MM algorithm offer the lowest CDS pricing errors when compared to other, traditional default barrier specifications: smooth-pasting condition value, maximum likelihood estimate, KMV’s default point, and nominal debt.     

Trade credit,collateral liquidation,and borrowing constraints

Assuming that firms’ suppliers are better able to extract value from the liquidation of assets in default and have an information advantage over other creditors, the paper derives six predictions on the use of trade credit. (1) Financially unconstrained firms (with unused bank credit lines) take trade credit to exploit the supplier's liquidation advantage. (2) If inputs purchased on account are sufficiently liquid, the reliance on trade credit does not depend on credit rationing. (3) Firms buying goods make more purchases on account than those buying services, while suppliers of services offer more trade credit than those of standardized goods. (4) Suppliers lend inputs to their customers but not cash. (5) Greater reliance on trade credit is associated with more intensive use of tangible inputs. (6) Better creditor protection decreases both the use of trade credit and input tangibility.     

Product market competition and the cost of bank loans: Evidence from state antitakeover laws

The extant literature documents a positive relationship between a firm’s takeover vulnerability and its agency cost of debt. Using state antitakeover laws as an exogenous measure of variation in takeover vulnerability, I investigate whether product market competition has a disciplinary effect that can lower a firm’s cost of bank loans. After taking into account the industry composition of borrowers, I find that banks charge higher spreads to borrowers that are vulnerable to takeovers, but only in concentrated industries. In the absence of disciplinary competitive pressure, the effect of takeover vulnerability on the cost of bank loans is mitigated for larger firms, firms followed by analysts, firms with existing credit ratings, non-family firms, and for borrowers with shorter maturity loans or loans with covenants and collateral in place. Taken together, the results suggest that the effect of governance on the cost of financing is not homogenous across all industries, and that concentrated industry firms may need to use supplementary governance mechanisms to mitigate debt holder agency problems.     

The Determinants of Corporate Trade Credit Policies in a Bank‐dominated Financial Environment: the Case of Finnish Small Firms

This paper examines trade credit policies of small firms operating in a bank‐dominated environment (Finland). We find that creditworthiness and access to capital markets are important determinants of trade credit extended by sellers. The level of purchases is positively correlated with the level of accounts payable. Larger and older firms and firms with strong internal financing are less likely to use trade credit, whereas firms with a high ratio of current assets to total assets, and firms subject to loan restructurings use it more. Negative loan decisions by financial intermediaries increase and a close bank‐borrower relationship decreases the probability that a firm does not take advantage of trade credit discounts.     

Credit channel,trade credit channel,and inventory investment: Evidence from a panel of UK firms

In this paper, we use a panel of 609 UK firms over the period 1980–2000 to test for the existence of a trade credit channel of transmission of monetary policy, and for whether this channel plays an offsetting effect on the traditional credit channel. We estimate error-correction inventory investment equations augmented with the coverage ratio and the trade credit to assets ratio, differentiating the effects of the latter variables across firms more or less likely to face financing constraints, and firms making a high or low use of trade credit. Our results suggest that both the credit and the trade credit channels operate in the UK, and that the latter channel tends to weaken the former.     

Corporate fraud and bank loans: Evidence from china

Receiving punishment from regulators for corporate fraud can affect financing contracts between a firm and its bank, as both the firm’s credit risk and information risk increase after punishment. By focusing on Chinese firms’ borrowing behavior after events of corporate fraud, we find that firms’ bank loans after punishment are not only significantly lower, but are also less than those for non-fraudulent firms. In addition, loan interest rates after punishment are not only higher than before, but also higher than those for their non-fraudulent counterparts. In addition, we find that corporate fraud indirectly destabilizes the “performance-bank loan” relationship. Our results suggest that corporate fraud negatively affects a firm’s ability to source debt financing, which provides new evidence about the economic consequences of fraud.     

The signaling role of trade credit: Evidence from a counterfactual analysis

We quantify the signaling effect of trade credit on bank credit in a sample of US firms. Our identification strategy relies on the signaling model by Biais and Gollier (1997) and accounts for the endogeneity due to the possibility of self-selection and the simultaneity between banks’ and firms’ credit decisions. We find that: (i) firms’ self-select into trade credit; (ii) firms’ decision to use trade credit results in a higher chance of obtaining bank credit and a lower cost than the counterfactual ones they would have faced if not using trade credit.     

Management quality and the cost of debt: Does management matter to lenders?

This paper investigates the effect of organizational capital, typified by various management practices within a firm, on the cost of external debt financing. Using a sample of medium-sized manufacturing firms in the US, we find that better management practices enhance a firm’s external financing capacity by lowering the firm’s cost of bank loans. We do not find any evidence that the lower loan cost of a high-quality-management firm is associated with more restrictive non-price contract terms such as greater collateral requirements and stricter covenants. These results suggest that banks explicitly take into account the risk arising from poor management practices when pricing and designing debt contracts.     

Employee treatment and firm leverage: A test of the stakeholder theory of capital structure

We investigate the stakeholder theory of capital structure from the perspective of a firm’s relations with its employees. We find that firms that treat their employees fairly (as measured by high employee‐friendly ratings) maintain low debt ratios. This result is robust to a variety of model specifications and endogeneity issues. The negative relation between leverage and a firm’s ability to treat employees fairly is also evident when we measure its ability by whether it is included in the Fortune magazine list, “100 Best Companies to Work For.” These results suggest that a firm’s incentive or ability to offer fair employee treatment is an important determinant of its financing policy.     

The value of excess cash and corporate governance: Evidence from US cross-listings

We examine whether and how a US cross-listing mitigates the risk that insiders will turn their firm’s cash holdings into private benefits. We find strong evidence that the value investors attach to excess cash reserves is substantially larger for foreign firms listed on US exchanges and over-the-counter than for their domestic peers. Further, we show that this excess-cash premium stems not only from the strength of US legal rules and disclosure requirements, but also from the greater informal monitoring pressure that accompanies a US listing. Overall, because investors’ valuation of excess cash mirrors how they expect the cash to be used, our analysis shows that a US listing constrains insiders’ inefficient allocation of corporate cash reserves significantly.     

Information content of repurchase signals: Tangible or intangible information?

The outperformance of repurchasing firms with a high book-to-market (B/M) ratio is usually explained by investors’ undervaluation of the firm’s past performance. However, several studies suggest that the underestimation of future intangible value may explain the high return associated with the share repurchase. To better understand the actual information content of repurchases, I decompose the B/M ratio into past tangible information and future intangible information and find that repurchase signals an undervaluation of the intangible return. In addition, I investigate several potential proxies for intangible information—R&D expenses, intangible assets, and future operating performance. My results show that intangible information signals the undervaluation of future operating performance.     

Estimating the cost of capital with basis assets

Instead of using industry groups or asset pricing models to estimate the cost of capital we propose using risk equivalent classes known as basis assets. A basis asset is constructed by grouping firms together whose returns indicate they share a common risk exposure, which in theory permits a precise and accurate expected return estimate. Thus, knowing to which basis asset a firm belongs, the firm’s cost of capital can be obtained. Empirically, we show that basis assets lead to superior cost of capital estimates when compared with widely used industry groupings. This means we are no longer reliant on asset pricing models or industry groups to estimate the cost of capital of a firm.     

The decision to first enter the public bond market: The role of firm reputation,funding choices,and bank relationships

This paper uses survival analysis to investigate the timing of a firm’s decision to issue for the first time in the public bond market. We find that firms that are more creditworthy and have higher demand for external funds issue their first public bond earlier. We also find that issuing private bonds or taking out syndicated loans is associated with a faster entry to the public bond market. According to our results, the relationships that firms develop with investment banks in connection with their private bond issues and syndicated loans further speed up their entry to the public bond market. Finally, we find that a firm’s reputation has a “U-shaped” effect on the timing of a firm’s bond IPO. Consistent with Diamond’s reputational theory, firms that establish a track record of high creditworthiness as well as those that establish a track record of low creditworthiness enter the public bond market earlier than firms with intermediate reputation.     

Does multinationality matter? Implications of operational hedging for the exchange risk exposure

An important issue in global corporate risk management is whether the multinationality of a firm matters in terms of its effect on exchange risk exposure. In this paper, we examine the exchange risk exposure of US firms during 1983–2006, comparing multinational and non-multinational firms and focusing on the role of operational hedging. Since MNCs and non-multinationals differ in size and other characteristics, we construct matched samples of MNCs and non-multinationals based on the propensity score method. We find that the multinationality in fact matters for a firm’s exchange exposure but not in the way usually presumed – the exchange risk exposures are actually smaller and less significant for MNCs than non-multinationals. The results are robust with respect to different samples and model specifications. There is evidence that operational hedging decreases a firm’s exchange risk exposure and increases its stock returns. The effective deployment of operational risk management strategies provides one reason why MNCs may have insignificant exchange risk exposure estimates.     

Boards,ownership structure,and involuntary delisting from the New York Stock Exchange

This study examines whether the likelihood of becoming involuntarily delisted from NYSE is associated with a firm’s board of directors and ownership characteristics. To this end we compare 161 firms that were delisted from NYSE between 1998 and 2004 to a set of industry and size-matched control firms. Consistent with our expectations, we find that the likelihood of delisting is related to a firm’s governance characteristics. Our results on the importance of the board of directors are new to this setting and add to a large body of evidence linking corporate boards and ownership characteristics to corporate performance.     

Business credit information sharing and default risk of private firms

We investigate whether and how business credit information sharing helps to better assess the default risk of private firms. Private firms represent an ideal testing ground because they are smaller, more informationally opaque, riskier, and more dependent on trade credit and bank loans than public firms. Based on a representative panel dataset that comprises private firms from all major industries, we find that business credit information sharing substantially improves the quality of default predictions. The improvement is stronger for older firms and those with limited liability, and depends on the sharing of firms’ payment history and the number of firms covered by the local credit bureau office. The value of soft business credit information is higher the smaller the firms and the lower their distance from the local credit bureau office. Furthermore, in spatial and industry analyses we show that the higher the value of business credit information the lower the realized default rates. Our study highlights the channel through which business credit information sharing adds value and the factors that influence its strength.     

How important are small banks to small business lending?: New evidence from a survey of small firms

Typically, small banks lend a larger proportion of their assets to small businesses than do large banks. The recent wave of bank mergers has thinned the ranks of small banks, raising the concern that small firms may find it difficult to access bank credit. However, bank consolidation will reduce small business credit only if small banks enjoy an advantage in lending to small businesses. We test the existence of a small bank cost advantage in small business lending by conducting the following simple test: If such advantages exist, then we should observe small businesses in areas with few small banks to have less bank credit. Using data on small business borrowers from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finance, we find that the probability of a small firm having a line of credit from a bank does not decrease in the long run when there are fewer small banks in the area, although short-run disruptions may occur. Nor do we find that firms in areas with few small banks are any more likely to repay trade credit late, suggesting that such firms are no more credit constrained than firms in areas with many small banks.     

Trade Credit Terms: Asymmetric Information and Price Discrimination Evidence From Three Continents

Abstract:   Trade credit terms offer firms contractual solutions to informational asymmetries between buyers and sellers. The credit period permits buyers to reduce uncertainty concerning product quality prior to payment, while the seller can reduce uncertainty concerning buyer payment intentions by prescribing payment before/on delivery or through two‐part payment terms and other mechanisms. Variation in trade credit terms also offers firms price discriminating opportunities. This study, drawing on the responses of 700 large firms in the US, UK and Australia, explores trade credit terms through the twin objectives of reducing information asymmetries and discriminatory pricing. Support is found for both theories.     

Investor relations,reputational bonding,and corporate governance: The case of Royal Ahold

Royal Ahold (Koninklijke Ahold NV) was one of the major success stories in the 1990s and is one of the major failures, suffering a complete meltdown, in 2003. We investigate the strategy, investor relations, accounting transparency and corporate governance of Ahold; these elements jointly drive the firm’s performance over the past decade. Investor relations and its implications are an important but under researched aspect of the market’s belief formation process. For Ahold, investor relations is an important component of reputational bonding [Siegel, J., 2005. Can foreign firms bond themselves effectively by renting US securities laws? Journal of Financial Economics 75, 319–359]. Our clinical study documents investor relations’ influence on investor expectations. We then provide an in-depth analysis of the strategy, accounting transparency and corporate governance that lead to Ahold’s downfall. We provide insights and implications into these relationships that present theory and empirical studies have not fully addressed.