Determinants of the premium in forward contracts

Whilst the benefits of forward contracting for goods and services have been extensively researched in terms of mitigating market power effects in spot markets, we analyse how the risk in spot price formation induces a counteracting premium in the contract prices. We consider and test a wide-ranging set of propositions, involving fundamental, behavioural, dynamic, market conduct and shock components, on a long data set from the most liquid of European electricity forward markets, the EEX. We show that part of what is conventionally regarded as the market price of risk in electricity is actually that of its underlying fuel commodity, gas; that market power has a double effect on prices, insofar as it increases spot prices and induces a forward premium; that oil price sentiment spills over and that the premium reacts to scarcity and the higher moments of spot price uncertainty. We observe that considerations of the scale and determinants of the forward premium are at least as important as the market power effects in spot market price formation when evaluating the efficiency of wholesale power trading.     

Search cost,trading strategies and optimal market structure

The theory of Walrasian equilibrium yields a set of prices at which the aggregate competitive demand for each commodity equals its aggregate competitive supply. However, even at equilibrium prices the theory of competitive equilibrium does not explicitly offer explanation regarding the manner in which trades are actually executed. This paper considers a model where trade takes place in a decentralized fashion and examines in a dynamic game-theoretic framework, the role of social institution of money and markets in facilitating exchange. The steady state Nash equilibrium derived in the paper demonstrates how, depending on the level of transaction costs associated with a market setup (synonymously, trading posts to exchange possible pairs of goods) appropriate monetary trade emerges, which like a hub and spoke network (Starr and Stinchcombe, 1999) makes some markets non-functioning and in equilibrium only the markets having trade through the medium of exchange continue to exist. However, despite the obvious advantages of a market setup in reducing search costs, pure random search for a complementary trading partner (as considered by Ostroy and Starr, 1974; Kiyotaki and Wright , 1989; and others) prevails in many economies, especially, in many developing economies. This paper models this feature of developing economies by introducing differences in transaction costs across agents and shows why sustainable equilibria might exist exhibiting random search for certain commodities even in the presence of established markets.     

COMPETITIVE MARKET BEHAVIOR: CONVERGENCE AND ASYMMETRY IN THE EXPERIMENTAL DOUBLE AUCTION

We conducted a large number of controlled continuous double auction experiments to reproduce and stress-test the phenomenon of convergence to competitive equilibrium under private information with decentralized trading feedback. Our main finding is that across a total of 104 markets (involving over 1,700 subjects), convergence occurs after a handful of trading periods. Initially, however, there is an inherent asymmetry that favors buyers, typically resulting in prices below equilibrium levels. Analysis of over 80,000 observations of individual bids and asks helps identify empirical ingredients contributing to the observed phenomena including higher levels of aggressiveness initially among buyers than sellers.     

SEARCH,ADVERSE SELECTION,AND MARKET CLEARING

We examine a dynamic decentralized trading model with infinitesimal sellers and buyers to investigate whether or not the market fails to clear in the limit of search friction vanishing. A seller, who has private information about product quality, and a buyer are matched to bargain over price. They form a long‐term relationship if they reach agreement. They return to the matching pool if they fail to agree or the existing relationship is dissolved. The market fails to clear if and only if the ratio of agents' patience over the dissolution rate exceeds a threshold.     

The Impact of the EU ETS on Prices,Profits and Emissions in the Power Sector: Simulation Results with the COMPETES EU20 Model

This paper analyses the impact of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) on electricity prices, in particular on wholesale power markets across the EU. To study this impact, this paper discusses the major results of a bottom-up modelling analysis of the implications of emissions trading for the performance of the wholesale power market in 20 European countries. The analyses show that a significant part of the costs of (freely allocated) CO₂ emission allowances is passed through to power prices, resulting in higher electricity prices for consumers and additional (‘windfall’) profits for power producers, even in cases of full auctioning. In addition, they show that the ETS-induced increases in power prices depend not only on the level of CO₂ prices but also on the structure of the power market, i.e., the incidence of market power, and the price responsiveness of power demand. Finally, the analyses show that the internalization and pass-through of carbon costs are crucial elements in a policy regime to reduce CO₂ emissions by both changing the mix of power generation technologies and lowering total electricity demand.     

Ripple effect in house prices and trading volume in the UK housing market: New viewpoint and evidence

This study adopts the data of house prices and trading volume in the overall UK housing market and in the housing markets in the 10 major regions in the UK to estimate the ripple effect in the trading activities in the housing markets. First, this study details why the ripple effect occurs in the housing market price and volume using static and cobweb dynamic models. The results of the panel-based unit root tests indicate that the relative price and volume ratios show constancy, signifying that long-run equilibrium relationships exist between the regional and national housing markets in the UK. The frequency of the transaction volume convergence behavior is higher than that of the overall house prices.     

How to explain carbon price using market micro-behaviour?

In this article, we analyse the micro-behaviours of the emitting companies and financial intermediaries in the European Union emissions trading scheme (EU-ETS) and their influence on carbon prices. Based on the full-sample community independent transaction log (CITL), the micro-behaviours can be observed in a closed system. The micro-behaviours of the emitting companies are divided into ‘compliance trading’ and ‘non-compliance trading’ based on the emitting companies’ trading motivations. The micro-behaviours of the financial intermediaries are measured by their influence on the total supply and demand in the market. Then, an AR-GARCH model is established to examine the dynamic relationships between carbon prices and the micro-behaviours of the emitting companies and financial intermediaries. The estimation results suggest that the prices–behaviours relationship is significant. Other important findings are as follows: (1) the mean value of carbon prices positively depends on the compliance trading of the emitting companies and the micro-behaviours of the financial intermediaries; (2) non-compliance buying increases the volatility of carbon prices, while the non-compliance selling stabilizes it and (3) the micro-behaviours of the emitting companies in the lower 50% in terms of emission levels have no significant influence on the mean carbon price, but their non-compliance buying stabilizes the carbon price.     

碳中和目标下基于GA-BP神经网络的碳交易定价模型及其模拟研究

系统剖析了欧盟碳排放交易体系,在厘清GA-BP神经网络原理的基础上构建了基于GA-BP神经网络的碳交易定价模型,用以刻画碳交易价格的影响因素,并结合情景设置、数值模拟不同情景下不同因素对碳交易价格的作用机理。研究结果表明GA-BP神经网络对于碳交易价格模拟具有可靠性,在不同经济发展水平和能源结构情景下碳交易价格变化较大,构建区域碳排放交易体系不仅能促进温室气体减排,还能优化能源结构,其关键在于形成与碳排放交易体系相适应、相配套的体制机制,营造契合碳中和目标的政策环境。论文旨在为我国碳交易市场运行机制优化提供理论参考,为我国碳中和与高质量发展目标的实现提供有益增补。     

Front-running dynamics

We integrate a monopolist dual trader into a dynamic model of speculation. In static settings, [J.-C. Rochet, J.-L. Vila, Insider trading without normality, Rev. Econ. Stud. 61 (1994), 131-152] establish an irrelevance result—expected equilibrium outcomes are the same whether the monopolist speculator sees liquidity trade or not; and Roell [Dual-capacity trading and market quality, J. Finan. Intermediation (1990), 105-124] shows that with multiple speculators, dual trading benefits liquidity traders. In dynamic settings, these results are reversed: a front-running speculator exploits knowledge of future liquidity trade, extracting greater profits by smoothing profit extraction intertemporally. Front running introduces positive serial correlation to order flow. Accordingly, market makers discount past order flow in prices, but prices retain the martingale property.     

Market microstructure and security pricing in the warsaw market

The speed with which information is impounded in security prices is evaluated with respect to several market microstructure variables in the context of a dynamic, rapidly-changing market, the Warsaw Stock Exchange. The dynamic nature of this market allows for predictions concerning pricing efficiency in more mature markets as they merge or expand their number of offerings. The results indicate that the performance of the Warsaw Exchange compares favorably with that of the average security traded on the NASDAQ. To the extent that recent mergers of several exchanges have had the effect of engaging more market participants and enhancing trading opportunities through expanded hours, trading efficiency has been positively affected. There is also weaker support for the view that consolidating securities on fewer exchanges will improve informational efficiency as well.     

Evolution of Walrasian equilibrium in an exchange economy

We study the stochastic stability of a dynamic trading process in an exchange economy. We use a simplified version of a trading model à la Shapley and Shubik (J Polit Econ 85:937–968, 1977). Two types of agents equipped with Leontief preferences trade goods in markets by offering endowments, and actual trades occur at market clearing prices. Better behavior tends to spread through the same type of agents by imitation, and agents also make mistakes occasionally. We provide a sufficient condition for the perturbed dynamic process to have a unique stochastically stable state that is a Walrasian equilibrium allocation. In this sense, we give a rationale for Walrasian behavior.     

Emissions Trading, Wealth Transfers and the Wounded Bull Scenario in Power Generation

Electricity generators accept that emissions trading is fundamental to meeting CO₂ reduction targets. But unless a percentage of permits are allocated, existing generators will face non-trivial wealth transfers. Seldom contemplated in academic works are the adverse economic consequences of an all-auction approach to emissions trading. Using Victoria to illustrate, we find that once CO₂ prices exceed $17.50/t, the marginal coal generator facing large wealth transfers will withhold generating capacity to raise prices and recoup stranded investments, thus becoming a 'wounded bull' in the market place. This has material welfare implications with modelling results indicate an intermediate-run 300 per cent increase in wholesale power prices.     

Information aggregation in financial markets with career concerns

What are the equilibrium features of a dynamic financial market in which traders care about their reputation for ability? We modify a standard sequential trading model to include traders with career concerns. We show that this market cannot be informationally efficient: there is no equilibrium in which prices converge to the true value, even after an infinite sequence of trades. We characterize the most revealing equilibrium of this game and show that an increase in the strength of the traders' reputational concerns has a negative effect on the extent of information that can be revealed in equilibrium but a positive effect on market liquidity.     

How Low Can It Go? Analysing the Political Economy of Carbon Market Design and Low Carbon Prices

Despite the ascendency of carbon pricing as a key regulatory strategy for governing anthropogenic climate change, insufficient attention has been paid to the issue of price discovery in emission trading schemes, now the dominant form of carbon pricing globally. By analysing the political economy of carbon market design, this paper highlights a number of design features that are instrumental in depressing carbon prices across the world’s emission trading schemes, keeping them well below those considered necessary to spur deep emission reductions in order to avoid catastrophic global warming. In doing so, it advances critiques of carbon trading by illuminating the extent to which carbon markets manifest as expressions of specific power relations rooted in the political economy of advanced capitalism, with low prices ensuring minimal disruption to business as usual.     

Seller competition by mechanism design

This paper analyzes a market game in which sellers offer trading mechanisms to buyers and buyers decide which seller to go to depending on the trading mechanisms offered. In a (subgame perfect) equilibrium of this market, sellers hold auctions with an efficient reserve price but charge an entry fee. The entry fee depends on the number of buyers and sellers, the distribution of buyer valuations, and the buyer cost of entering the market. As the size of the market increases, the entry fee decreases and converges to zero in the limit. We study how the surplus of buyers and sellers depends on the number of agents on each side of the market in this decentralized trading environment.     

Return spillovers around the globe: A network approach

We study the connectedness of a sample of 40 stock markets across five continents using daily closing prices and return spillovers based on Granger causality. All possible 1560 return spillovers between 40 markets create a complex network of relationships between equity markets around the world. Apart from analyzing the topological and time-varying properties of the created networks, we also identify the determinants of the connectedness of equity markets over time. Adjusting for non-synchronous trading, our modelling approach leads to evidence that the probability of return spillover from a given stock market to other markets increases with market volatility and market size and decreases with higher foreign exchange volatility. We empirically show that the temporal proximity between closing hours is important for information propagation; therefore, choosing markets that trade during similar hours bears an additional risk to investors because the probability of return spillovers increases.     

Manipulation and the Allocational Role of Prices

It is commonly believed that prices in secondary financial markets play an important allocational role because they contain information that facilitates the efficient allocation of resources. This paper identifies a limitation inherent in this role of prices. It shows that the presence of a feedback effect from the financial market to the real value of a firm creates an incentive for an uninformed trader to sell the firm's stock. When this happens the informativeness of the stock price decreases, and the beneficial allocational role of the financial market weakens. The trader profits from this trading strategy, partly because his trading distorts the firm's investment. We therefore refer to this strategy as manipulation . We show that trading without information is profitable only with sell orders, driving a wedge between the allocational implications of buyer and seller initiated speculation, and providing justification for restrictions on short sales.     

Internet auctions with many traders

We study a multi-unit auction environment similar to eBay. Sellers, each with a single unit of a homogeneous good, set reserve prices at their own second-price auctions. Each buyer has private value for the good and wishes to acquire a single unit. Buyers can bid as often as they like and move between auctions. We characterize a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this decentralized dynamic mechanism in which, conditional on reserve prices, an efficient set of trades occurs at a uniform price. In a large but finite market, the sellers set reserve prices equal to their true costs under a very mild distributional assumption, so ex post efficiency is achieved. Buyers’ strategies in this equilibrium are simple and do not depend on their beliefs about other buyers’ valuations, or the number of buyers and sellers.     

Securities Market Macrostructure: Property Rights and the Efficiency of Securities Trading

This article derives securities market macrostructure from microstructuralfoundations under a variety of assumptions regarding propertyrights. Because liquidity effectively makes securities tradinga network industry, intermediaries can exercise market powerby restricting access to the trading mechanism. Fragmentation,cream skimming, and free riding reduce the inefficiency thatresults from this market power, but welfare would be improvedfurther by requiring open access to all trading venues. Implementingopen access in practice must confront a trade-off between reducingmarket power and potentially impairing the incentives of theoperators of trading systems to reduce cost and improve quality.Other network industries, notably telecoms and electricity transmission,have faced similar dilemmas, and the path to the creation ofa more efficient property rights structure in financial marketscould benefit from the experiences of other network markets.     

Approximate tâtonnement processes

Summary We introduce a probabilistic model for price adjustment in an exchange economy which approximates the classical Walras tâtonnement process while avoiding many of its unrealistic features. The model is decentralized in that the trades permitted to an agent and the resulting price changes depend only on the commodity vector currently held by that agent, and not on the commodity vectors held by the other agents in the economy. Our results will show that the Walras tâtonnement process can be decentralized without changing its behavior on the macroeconomic scale. Our model has a finite set of commodities, a market maker who adjusts prices, and a large finite set of agents who trade only with the market maker. Each agent has a demand function depending on his commodity vector and the price vector. At each discrete time, one agent is chosen at random and exchanges his current commodity vector for his demand vector. Then the market maker adjusts the price vector by an amount which depends on the selected agent's commodity vector and the current price. Prices are adjusted rapidly enough to avoid prolonged trading at the wrong price, but slowly enough so that a substantial price change will depend on a significant simple of agents. The main result shows that with probability arbitrarily close to one the price will rapidly approach and then remain close to an equilibrium value, following a path which is close to the price path of the corresponding tâtonnement process.