Managerial Risk-Taking Incentives and Executive Stock Option Repricing: A Study of US Casino Executives

I examine the relation between managerial incentives from holdings of company stock and options and stock option repricing. Because options provide incentives to increase both risk and stock price, firms must realize that as options go underwater, executives might face incentives to invest in risky, negative NPV projects. Repricing may alleviate such incentives. I examine repricing activity by firms in the US gaming industry and find that risk-taking incentives from options are positively related to the incidence of executive option repricing. The results support the hypothesis that repricing assists firms in alleviating excessive risk-taking incentives of senior management.     

Repricing and Executive Turnover

We examine whether the threat of executive turnover faced by a firm affects its decision to reprice stock options held by its executives. We estimate a model of voluntary turnover among top executives and show that the predicted turnover from this model is positively related to the probability of repricing. The relationship is robust to the inclusion of several known determinants of repricing. Our results are consistent with a model in which a tight labor market makes executives hard to replace, forcing firms to reprice stock options when they go underwater.     

Management compensation contracts and distribution policies in the US technology sector

This paper examines the impact of executive compensation practices on (a) the decision to distribute and (b) the distribution channel employed by companies from the US technology sector. We report that firms that compensate their managers using executive stock options (ESOs) tend to distribute less and firms that use stock awards make more distributions. When we simultaneously examine the distribution and the channel used, we find firms using ESOs restrict their dividend payments but their propensity for stock repurchases is unaffected. Firms using stock awards to compensate managers make greater distributions across all channels. We also provide strong evidence in favour of the agency and leverage explanations for distributions.     

The Timing of Option Repricing

We investigate whether executive stock option repricings are systematically timed to coincide with favorable movements in the company's stock price. For a sample of 236 repricing events, we observe sharp increases in stock price in the 20‐day period following the repricing date. In addition, repricing dates tend to either precede the release of good news or follow the release of bad news in the quarterly earnings announcements. Since information about stock option repricing is not generally released to the public around the repricing date, these findings suggest that CEOs opportunistically manage the timing of the option repricing date.     

Asymmetric stock price and liquidity responses to changes in the FTSE SmallCap index

We examine market reactions to changes in the FTSE SmallCap index membership, which are determined quarterly based on market capitalization and are free of information effects. Our main results are asymmetric price and liquidity responses between the firms that are shifted between FTSE indexes and the firms that are new to FTSE indexes. Firms promoted from a smaller-cap to a larger-cap FTSE index experience a permanent increase in stock price accompanied by improvements in liquidity. Similarly, firms demoted from a larger-cap to a smaller-cap FTSE index experience a permanent decrease in stock price accompanied by declines in liquidity. In contrast, firms added to the FTSE SmallCap index that were not previously in FTSE indexes show a transitory price gain and declines in liquidity. The results support the liquidity and price pressure hypotheses.     

THE INFLUENCE OF ORGANIZED OPTIONS TRADING ON STOCK PRICE BEHAVIOR FOLLOWING LARGE ONE-DAY STOCK PRICE DECLINES

In this study I examine the effect of organized options trading on stock price behavior immediately following stock price declines of 10 percent or more. A matched-pair sample of National Market System option and nonoption firms are analyzed from June 1985 through December 1992. After controlling for the bid-ask bounce, firm size, share price, return standard deviation, and beta, I find that three-day cumulative abnormal returns for option firms are approximately 1.57 percent less than those for nonoption firms. Thus, options trading enhances stock market efficiency and/or liquidity. However, no profitable trading strategies are indicated.     

CEO turnover in China: the role of market-based and accounting performance measures

We investigate the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) turnover and firm performance in China's publicly traded firms. We provide evidence on the use of accounting and market-based performance measures in CEO turnover decision. We also investigate the moderating roles of noise in performance measures, firm growth opportunities, state-owned enterprises, and corporate governance reform on the weights attached to these performance measures. We observe that Chinese listed firms rely more on accounting performance than on stock market performance when determining CEO turnover. Firms with noisier performance measures and larger growth opportunities rely less on both accounting performance and stock market performance in CEO replacement decision. State-controlled firms are more likely to use accounting performance to determine CEO turnover. Finally, we observe that the weight attached to the accounting performance measure is significantly reduced and the weight attached to the stock market performance measure is significantly increased after the governance reform. We also observe that the reform has different impact on state-owned firms and private firms in terms of the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance.     

Do executive stock options induce excessive risk taking?

We examine whether executive stock options can induce excessive risk taking by managers in firms’ security issue decisions. We find that CEOs whose wealth is more sensitive to stock return volatility due to their option holdings are more likely to choose debt over equity as a capital-raising vehicle. More importantly, the pattern holds not only in firms that are underlevered relative to their optimal capital structure but also in overlevered firms. This evidence is inconsistent with executive stock options aligning the interests of managers and shareholders; rather, it supports the hypothesis that stock options sometimes make managers take on too much risk and in the process pursue suboptimal capital structure policies.     

Option grant backdating investigations and capital market discipline

Using a large sample of option granting firms, some of which were investigated for option grant backdating, we develop a predictive model for such investigations and examine how the capital market responded as the backdating scandal unfolded. Firms that were investigated experienced significant stock price declines from the beginning of the Wall Street Journal's Perfect Payday series through the end of 2006. Firms predicted to have backdating problems, but not the subject of publicly revealed investigations, experienced stock price performance during the same period that was remarkably similar to that of firms with publicly revealed investigations. In contrast, firms not predicted to have backdating problems experienced normal stock price performance. Our results suggest that capital markets disciplined companies with suspicious option grant histories, often prior to, and irrespective of, any public revelation of an investigation into the matter.     

Underwater Options and the Dynamics of Executive Pay-to-Performance Sensitivities

We empirically analyze the dynamics of executives' pay‐to‐performance sensitivities. Option pay‐to‐performance sensitivities become weaker as options fall underwater, often leading to pressures to reprice options or restore pay‐to‐performance sensitivity in other ways. Building a detailed data set on executives' portfolios of stock and options, we find that the responsiveness of pay‐to‐performance sensitivities (created by all executive holdings of stock and options) to changes in stock price is large. The elasticity of pay‐to‐performance sensitivities with respect to stock price decreases is about 0.7 and is larger for high‐option executives and for executives with high percentages of options already underwater. The dominant mechanism through which companies offset declines in option pay‐to‐performance sensitivities is larger option grants following stock price declines; on average, these larger grants restore approximately 40% of the stock‐price‐induced pay‐to‐performance sensitivity declines. Option repricings are inconsequential in this regard, despite the attention they have attracted. In looking at positive returns, we find the reverse: higher returns both directly increase pay‐to‐performance sensitivities and lead to larger option grants, which raise pay‐to‐performance sensitivities further. Thus, option grants to executives tend to be largest following large stock price increases or large stock price decreases.     

Options,option repricing in managerial compensation: Their effects on corporate investment risk

While stock options are commonly used in managerial compensation to provide desirable incentives, they can create adverse incentives to distort the choice of investment risk. Relative to the risk level that maximizes firm value, call options in a compensation contract can induce too much or too little corporate risk-taking, depending on managerial risk aversion and the underlying investment technology. We show that inclusion of lookback call options in compensation packages has desirable countervailing effects on managerial choice of corporate risk policies and can induce risk policies that increase shareholder wealth. We argue that lookback call options are analogous to the observed practice of option repricing.     

Corporate Performance,Corporate Governance and Top Executive Turnover in Finland

This paper empirically investigates how corporate governance forces and firm performance affect top executive turnover in Finnish listed companies. I document an increase in CEO, top management, and board turnover in response to poor stock price performance and operating losses. The sensitivity of the relation between stock price performance and CEO turnover is significantly higher in firms with a two‐tier board structure (when the CEO is not the chairman), but significantly lower when the CEO or a board member is the controlling shareholder. These results suggest that both the ownership structure and the board design have implications for the disciplining of managers.     

Capital expenditures,financial constraints,and the use of options

This paper analyzes why gold mining firms use options instead of linear strategies to hedge their gold price risk. Consistent with financial constraints based theories, the largest and least financially constrained firms are the most likely to hedge with insurance strategies (put options), while more constrained firms finance the purchase of puts by selling calls (collars). The most financially constrained firms use strategies that involve selling calls. Firms with large investment programs are also more likely to use insurance rather than linear strategies. Firms’ hedging instrument choices are also correlated with current market conditions, suggesting that managers’ market views partially drive hedging instrument choices.     

Repricing of executive stock options

The main purpose of this paper is to extend the model of Acharya et al. (J Financ Econ 57:65–101, 2000) to examine the ex-ante optimality of repricing of executive stock options while considering dilution effects and the tax effects of new accounting rules associated with repricing. Although there has been a body of empirical literature on repricing, the optimality of repricing after considering the economic impact of changing accounting rules has not been addressed in an ex-ante contracting setting. We find that traditional repricing loses its ex-ante dominance over the do-nothing strategy after we incorporate the tax effects of new accounting rules. The theoretical predictions of our paper shed light on this controversial practice and lay a foundation for evaluating repricing alternatives.     

Should Independent Directors Have Term Limits? The Role of Experience in Corporate Governance

We examine the role of independent directors with extended tenure in board‐level governance, monitoring decisions, and advising outcomes. These directors exhibit a higher level of commitment as they attend more board meetings and take more committee memberships. Firms with a higher proportion of these directors have lower chief executive officer (CEO) pay, higher CEO turnover‐performance sensitivity, and a smaller likelihood of intentionally misreporting earnings. These firms also restrict the expansion of resources under the CEO's control as they are less likely to make acquisitions, while the acquisitions they do make are of higher quality. Efforts to impose term limits on directors may, therefore, be misguided.     

Short-horizon incentives and stock price inflation

Do managerial incentive horizons have capital market consequences? We find that they do when short-sale constraints are more binding. Firms experience significant stock price inflation when their CEOs have short horizon incentives. The short-horizon CEOs sell more shares at inflated prices and generate greater abnormal trading profits. The stock price inflation is partly explained by greater earnings surprises and more positive investor reaction to the surprises. To inflate stock prices, short-horizon firms are more likely to employ income-increasing discretionary accruals. Consistent with theoretical predictions, all these effects are attenuated or statistically insignificant when short-sale constraints are less binding.     

Risk-taking incentives of executive stock options and the asset substitution problem

Various theoretical models show that managerial compensation schemes can reduce the distortionary effects of financial leverage. There is mixed evidence as to whether highly levered firms offer less stock‐based compensation, a common prediction of such models. Both the theoretical and empirical research, however, have overlooked the leverage provided by executive stock options. In principle, adjusting the exercise prices of executive stock options can mitigate the risk incentive effects of financial leverage. We show that the near‐universal practice of setting option exercise prices near the prevailing stock price at the date of grant effectively undoes most of the effects of financial leverage. In a large cross‐sectional sample of Canadian option‐granting firms, we find evidence that executives' incentives to take equity risk are negatively rather than positively related to the leverage of their employers.     

Financial crisis and bank executive incentive compensation

We study the executive compensation structure in 14 of the largest U.S. financial institutions during 2000–2008. We focus on the CEO's purchases and sales of their bank's stock, their salary and bonus, and the capital losses these CEOs incur due to the dramatic share price declines in 2008. We consider three measures of risk-taking by these banks. Our results are mostly consistent with and supportive of the findings of Bebchuk, Cohen and Spamann (2010), that is, managerial incentives matter — incentives generated by executive compensation programs are correlated with excessive risk-taking by banks. Also, our results are generally not supportive of the conclusions of Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) that the poor performance of banks during the crisis was the result of unforeseen risk. We recommend that bank executive incentive compensation should only consist of restricted stock and restricted stock options — restricted in the sense that the executive cannot sell the shares or exercise the options for two to four years after their last day in office. The above incentive compensation proposal logically leads to a complementary proposal regarding a bank's capital structure, namely, banks should be financed with considerably more equity than they are being financed currently.     

Does a national industrial policy promote financial market stability? A study based on stock price crash risk

Whether the implementation of a national industrial policy can maintain stability in the financial market is a question of theoretical and practical significance. Using data from China’s non-financial listed firms from 2007 to 2020, we find that a national industrial policy lowers stock price crash risk. We find that the effect of an industrial policy on lowering stock price crash risk is more pronounced in regions with low levels of regional marketization and if firms have high external uncertainty, low total asset turnover, greater earnings management and receive small increments of long-term loans and fewer government subsidies, suggesting that industrial policies lower stock price crash risk by improving firm fundamentals and reducing external uncertainty, agency costs and information asymmetry.     

Raids, Rewards, and Reputations in the Market for Managerial Talent

We find that executives who jump to chief executive officer(CEO) positions at new employers come from firms that exhibitaboveaverage stock price performance. This relationship is morepronounced for more senior executives. No such relationshipexists for jumps to non-CEO positions. Stock options and restrictedstock do not appear to significantly affect the likelihood ofjumping ship, but the existence of an "heir apparent" on themanagement team increases the likelihood that executives willleave for non-CEO positions elsewhere. Hiring grants used toattract managers are correlated with the equity position forfeitedat the prior employer and with the prior employer's performance.